Political Economy Of Budgeting Under Autocratization

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

6-26-2025

Published In

British Journal Of Middle Eastern Studies

Abstract

This article examines the impact of autocratization on central government spending, arguing that increasing authoritarian rule centralizes budgetary authority in the executive branch, thereby allocating larger resources to institutions directly controlled by the incumbent. We test this argument using data from Turkey’s Ministry of Treasury and Finance, focusing on Turkey under Erdoğan’s rule. Our findings illustrate that executive aggrandizement creates an autocratization effect in central government spending, thus rendering budgeting more centralized, with spending patterns shifting towards the executive office. Consequently, the parliament’s role diminished, while the presidential office and its associated directorates gained a larger share and greater discretion over budgetary affairs. Additionally, we observe that spending on judicial and military institutions exhibits a volatile trend, influenced by the executive’s political control. This analysis highlights an under-investigated aspect of democratic backsliding and contributes to the literature on the political economy of budgeting from the perspective of regime dynamics.

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