Document Type
Response or Comment
Publication Date
7-2-2025
Published In
Social Epistemology Review And Reply Collective
Abstract
Benjamin W. McCraw’s article “A Reidian Transcendental Argument Against Skepticism” (2025) constitutes an original and thought-provoking contribution both to Reid scholarship and to the discussion of epistemic skepticism.[1] In the following I will make a few remarks about it, focusing on the discussion of skepticism. I start with a brief historical remark on Reid and Kant (§ 1) before I explain the anti-skeptical argument in some detail (§ 2). A discussion of the premises of the argument follows (§ 3). I add some remarks about the social aspect of McCraw’s anti-skeptical stance (§ 4). I finish with another set of historical remarks (§ 5), this time about Reid and Wittgenstein, and a brief conclusion (§ 6).
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Recommended Citation
Peter Baumann.
(2025).
"Transcendental Arguments In Reid? A Reply To McCraw".
Social Epistemology Review And Reply Collective.
Volume 14,
Issue 7.
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/634
Comments
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