Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2015

Published In

Philosophical Papers

Abstract

Several philosophers who argue that forgiveness is an important virtue also wish to maintain the moral value of retributive emotions that forgiveness is meant to overcome. As such, these accounts explicate forgiveness as an Aristotelian mean between too much resentment and too little resentment. I argue that such an account ends up making forgiveness superfluous: it turns out that the forgiving person is not praised for a greater willingness to let go of her resentment, but rather for her fairness or good judgment. I conclude by arguing that the virtue of fair-mindedness is more compatible with maintaining the value of the retributive emotions than the virtue of forgiveness.

Comments

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Papers on June 15, 2015, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/05568641.2015.1056962.

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