Shame And Contempt In Kant's Moral Theory
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
7-1-2013
Published In
Kantian Review
Abstract
Attitudes like shame and contempt seem to be at odds with basic tenets of Kantian moral theory. I argue on the contrary that both attitudes play a central role in Kantian morality. Shame and contempt are attitudes that protect our love of honour, or the esteem we have for ourselves as moral persons. The question arises: how are these attitudes compatible with Kant's claim that all persons deserve respect? I argue that the proper object of shame and contempt is not the humanity within a person, but rather her self-conceit, or the false esteem that competes with love of honour.
Recommended Citation
Krista Karbowski Thomason.
(2013).
"Shame And Contempt In Kant's Moral Theory".
Kantian Review.
Volume 18,
Issue 2.
221-240.
DOI: 10.1017/S136941541300006X
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/226
