Document Type
Article
Publication Date
9-1-2008
Published In
Erkenntnis
Abstract
One of the most recent trends in epistemology is contrastivism. It can be characterized as the thesis that knowledge is a ternary relation between a subject, a proposition known and a contrast proposition. According to contrastivism, knowledge attributions have the form “S knows that p, rather than q”. In this paper I raise several problems for contrastivism: it lacks plausibility for many cases of knowledge, is too narrow concerning the third relatum, and overlooks a further relativity of the knowledge relation.
Recommended Citation
Peter Baumann.
(2008).
"Contrastivism Rather Than Something Else? On The Limits Of Epistemic Contrastivism".
Erkenntnis.
Volume 69,
Issue 2.
189-200.
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-008-9111-4
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/17
Comments
Reprinted in: (2012). Conceptions of Knowledge. 395-411.
This work is a preprint and is freely available courtesy of the author.