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Philosophy And Phenomenological Research


Epistemological contextualism - the claim that the truth-value of knowledge-attributions can vary with the context of the attributor - has recently faced a whole series of objections. The most serious one, however, has not been discussed much so far: the factivity objection. In this paper, I explain what the objection is and present three different versions of the objection. I then show that there is a good way out for the contextualist. However, in order to solve the problem the contextualist has to accept a relationalist version of contextualism.


This work is a preprint and is freely available courtesy of Wiley and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research with the Philosophy Documentation Center and the International Phenomenological Society.

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