Document Type
Article
Publication Date
5-2008
Published In
Philosophy And Phenomenological Research
Abstract
Epistemological contextualism - the claim that the truth-value of knowledge-attributions can vary with the context of the attributor - has recently faced a whole series of objections. The most serious one, however, has not been discussed much so far: the factivity objection. In this paper, I explain what the objection is and present three different versions of the objection. I then show that there is a good way out for the contextualist. However, in order to solve the problem the contextualist has to accept a relationalist version of contextualism.
Recommended Citation
Peter Baumann.
(2008).
"Contextualism And The Factivity Problem".
Philosophy And Phenomenological Research.
Volume 76,
Issue 3.
580-602.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00158.x
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/11
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Comments
This work is a preprint and is freely available courtesy of Wiley and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research with the Philosophy Documentation Center and the International Phenomenological Society.
The final publication version can be freely accessed courtesy of Wiley's Content Sharing service.