Document Type

Article

Publication Date

9-1-2017

Published In

Kantian Review

Abstract

One way of understanding Kant’s views about moral emotions is the cultivation view. On this view, emotions play a role in Kantian morality provided they are properly cultivated. I evince a sceptical position about the cultivation view. First, I show that the textual evidence in support of cultivation is ambiguous. I then provide an account of emotions in Kant’s theory that explains both his positive and negative views about them. Emotions capture our attention such that they both disrupt the mind’s composure and serve as a surrogate for reason. As such, Kant cannot recommend that we cultivate our emotions.

Keywords

Kantian moral philosophy, emotions, cultivation, virtue

Comments

This work is a preprint that is freely available courtesy of Cambridge University Press.

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