Review Of "Chicago Sociology, 1920-1932" By R. E.L. Faris

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Review
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without an overall knowledge of the space program, as it was the Soviet practice to keep the Germans working on isolated projects. Correctly, Daniloff sees the contribution of German scientists as "mostly complementary."

Although the Germans possessed superior technology, Russian theory was equally advanced. By 1947 Stalin and his advisors were convinced that the development of an ICBM was possible and could deliver an atomic warhead, contrary to Vannevar Bush's statement on the impracticality of ICBM development. Daniloff does not see the Russian decision as anything more than a response to U.S. capability and a preoccupation with defense. Space exploration, satellites, and their attendant propaganda value were not seriously discussed.

During the final months of the Stalin era (1952-1953) the Soviet government began to finalize its rocket development plans. Preparations for the International Geophysical Year led to a decision in 1955 to launch a satellite, which was forewarned in Soviet magazines but generally overlooked by Western observers. Pravda spoke of the "American lag" in January 1957. Khrushchev was not fully aware of the propaganda impact of Sputnik until several weeks after the launch, but his increasing boastfulness seemed like a challenge to the U.S. The space race to the moon, if it ever existed, was never officially declared by the Kremlin. "Both Kennedy and Khrushchev," Daniloff concluded, "tried to harness the superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union for the purpose of stimulating their own domestic programs-in the American case, space exploration; in the Soviet, economic development. Neither thought it worthwhile directly to respond to the other's challenge."

Daniloff holds that Krushchev, although cautious about sending a man to the moon, favored a manned expedition, probably by earth orbital rendezvous technique, and pressed space scientists toward this goal. There were skeptics among the scientists and within high policy councils; Daniloff, although unable to identify them by name, presents evidence for their existence. Up to Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 the Soviets were seriously studying how to achieve a manned landing. After the Premier's removal, manned flight receded into the background and automated spacecraft was publicized in flights to Mars and Venus and the landing of an eight-wheeled moon rover, Lunakhod-1, in 1970. Aware of U.S. progress, in 1968 the Russians ceased their propaganda statements about reaching the moon first.

Daniloff views cooperation as essentially confined to talks between Kennedy and Khrushchev and their respective representatives because of outstanding political and military disarmament problems. Exchange of information from agreements on weather satellites, magnetic field data, and space medicine has lagged badly. After the U.S. lunar landing, cooperation on the Skylab project opens possibilities for joint efforts in the late 1970s in orbital laboratories.

In concluding, Daniloff asserts that the Soviets did participate in the space race, especially when Khrushchev was in power, in spite of the fact that the Kremlin never officially made the challenge. The evidence here is simply that the Russians laid claim to many "firsts" in the early years of the space age.

The Kremlin and the Cosmos supplies a great deal of data to enable the reader to assess the Soviet space program; but as the author freely admits, much information remains secret, and conclusions drawn are open to revision in the light of new evidence.

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A brief, clearly organized overview, this study traces the development of sociology at the University of Chicago during its first three decades. Although gaining prominence with the arrival of Robert Park in 1915, the Chicago School owed much to a fortuitous combination of circumstance and zeal in its early days: the newness of the university; a tailor-made social laboratory in Chicago; the organizing genius of Albion Small, chairman of the department from 1892 to 1923; and the methodological work of W. I. Thomas. The resulting harvest was abundant:
in urban ecology, in social psychology (Chicago practiced "symbolic interactionism," Robert E. L. Faris writes, before the label was known), and in widely ranging studies of the family, race, immigration, and social change. Together these investigations overturned a "do-gooder" tradition that, in Faris' view, blighted earlier effort. Freeing sociology from moorings in physiology and biology, they also fostered more enlightened social policy.

In preparing this informal history, Faris draws on his own memories as an undergraduate and graduate at Chicago (1924–1931), on the reminiscences of former associates, and on past conversations with his father, the late Ellsworth Faris, who headed the department from Small's retirement until 1939. In supplement, he provides portraits and brief sketches of leading members of the department and complete lists of doctoral and masters theses from 1893 to 1935. Intending a straightforward, "objective" account, he attempts no refutation of recent criticism of the Chicago School (e.g., in Milton Gordon's Social Class in American Sociology or Maurice Stein's The Eclipse of Community). Nor does he dwell on the clash of personalities or on departmental politics, persuaded that such have little place in a history of social science. Although specialists may regret these decisions, and the absence of more raw material for a sociology of Chicago sociology, this fairminded comprehensive account, with its lucid summaries of the chief works of the Chicago sociologists, provides a balanced general introduction to an important chapter in the history of social science.

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Robert F. Murphy's Robert H. Lowie is the second book to be published in Columbia University Press' Leaders of Modern Anthropology Series. Together with the first volume on Ralph Linton, co-authored by Adelin Linton and the general editor of the series, Charles Wagley, it indicates a format for the series as a whole: a text of just under two hundred pages, roughly divided into an eighty-page essay on the subject and his work, followed by selections from the subject's publications, and concluding with a more or less complete bibliography depending on whether a complete bibliography is readily available elsewhere. Both published books self-consciously aim at a general audience of presumably undergraduate-level competence in anthropology, and all of the authors including those announced for projected volumes are either personal acquaintances of their subjects (usually former associates) or they are slightly younger scholars whose expertise was the subject's major area of interest. All have established some professional identity as anthropologists.

These general observations point to the peculiar constraints on the value of Murphy's book. In the case of the Linton study there had previously existed no biographical or autobiographical studies, no collection of Linton's papers, and no complete bibliography. The remarks of Linton's widow, however uneven, are therefore invaluable. But in the case of Lowie, there already existed a published autobiography, Cora Du Bois' selection of Lowie's papers (although Murphy duplicated only one of her selections), and Alan Dundes' complete bibliography. Murphy is himself an anthropologist, not a biographer or historian, and he admits to having drawn most of his information from Lowie's own account, even though a wealth of information is to be found in the Lowie papers in the Bancroft Library.

The account, however, is sympathetic, contrasting markedly with the hypercritical chapter on Lowie in Marvin Harris' The Rise of Anthropological Theory (1968). Murphy's book is not a biography as much as a short and much-needed protest against a distorted public record. The intended audience is by implication quite definitely anthropological, indicated in the subdivision of the biographical "reminiscence" into two sections: "Lowie the Ethnographer" and "Lowie the Social Theorist." Emphasis is placed on the general anthropological climate within which Lowie was trained and began his fieldwork among the American Indians. In context Murphy usefully relates Lowie's