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AGGREGATE DATA AND THE STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT*

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IN THE LAST DECADE, the rapid emergence of new less developed states has precipitated interest among political scientists in problems of "political development." Going beyond mere historical accounts of the emergence of new governing institutions, various scholars have attempted to spell out the basic processes involved in political change and the creation of government.¹ Largely ignoring traditional indicators such as constitutions, scholars have recently suggested variables such as capacity for responsiveness, division of political tasks, participation in decision-making and provision of welfare as key indicators of political growth and the formation of healthy and viable polities. A few researchers, influenced by these new formulations, have collected cross-national data on traits which seem related to political development. Their efforts have been aimed at refining, specifying, or testing relationships among suggested indicators and causal variables. Although an important focus of all types of studies has been on new dimensions of political development, it is not clear to what extent their ideas about political development are valid, useful, or in agreement.

My purpose in this paper is to compare the results of some recent theorizing about political development with efforts to collect data on the subject. A basic problem in advancing our understand-

*I wish to thank Hayward R. Alker, Jr., who provided helpful counsel; Ronald D. Brunner, Robert O. Keohane, J. Roland Pennock and Bruce M. Russett, who read and commented on drafts of this article; and the Yale Political Data Program with its grant from the National Science Foundation for its financial support.

ing of politics is the gap between theory and empirical evidence. I hope to contribute to the closing of this gap by suggesting some inadequacies in both recent theory and data collections relevant to political development. My discussion of neither subject is exhaustive, but by analyzing comparatively both theory and data, I hope some of the problems in the current literature will be highlighted.

I began my analysis by selecting four major data studies: *The Cross-Polity Survey* by Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor; *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* by the Yale Political Data Program (Bruce M. Russett, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Harold D. Lasswell); the *Dimensionality of Nations Project* by Rudolph J. Rummel, and studies of political development by Phillips Cutright. Variables with explicitly political denotations were selected from these studies for analysis. These data were then subjected to a series of statistical refinements and a factor analysis was performed on the resulting data. Schemata from three sources were then selected for examination: Gabriel Almond, the Comparative Politics Committee of the SSRC, and Samuel Huntington.


Before discussing the results of the factor analysis, I shall briefly review the analytical views on political development proposed by these authors. This review will then form a basis upon which to compare and contrast these theoretical dimensions of development with the results of the factor analysis.

I

Gabriel Almond asserts that all political systems may be compared at three levels of functional analysis. These are: capabilities, conversion functions, and system maintenance and adaptive functions. Each of these levels can subsequently be broken into several distinct categories or aspects. He suggests, for example, that capabilities analysis can be broken into five functional types: regulative, extractive, distributive, symbolic, and responsive. This complex framework, however, only serves to embrace, and perhaps confuse but not to describe the basic dimensions of development. In his book with Powell, Almond concludes that political functions at all levels can be measured according to three criteria of development; these are autonomy, differentiation, and secularization. Autonomy is linked to pluralism which is linked to democracy in Almond’s schema. The notion put forth is that “subsystem autonomy” is a characteristic of development, and hence in societies where political, economic or religious subsystems are capable of dominating

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Similarly, conversion functions fall into six categories: 1) interest articulation, 2) interest aggregation, 3) rule making, 4) rule application, 5) rule adjudication, and 6) communication. System maintenance and adaptive functions involve two functional processes: socialization and recruitment.

In their words, “classification of political systems is a developmental one in which the variables of structural differentiation, autonomy and secularization are related to other aspects of the functioning of particular classes of political systems—their conversion characteristics, capabilities, and system maintenance patterns,” Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 300.
all social life, as for example occurs in totalitarian societies, development is retarded. Differentiation, Almond’s second dimension of development, refers to the specialization of role functions. In more developed political systems, different roles, such as sheriff, judge, and tax collector, replace the single role, such as headman or chief, in performing such basic functions as apprehending criminals, meting out justice, and raising revenues. The third criterion of development, secularization, is an index based on the instrumentalism or rationality of the political culture. Secular goals and ends-means calculations increasingly predominate in the reflections of policy makers. The development of bureaucracies with an accompanying increase in record keeping, codification of laws, and formal procedures for evaluation of policies are indicators of the spread of rational choice, calculation, and control. Almond’s functionalist approach, therefore, has identified three dimensions of political development: autonomy (pluralism), differentiation (role specialization), and secularization (bureaucratization), which are distinct if not uncorrelated measures.6

A second list of dimensions of development has been drawn up by the Social Science Research Council’s Comparative Politics Committee and is summarized by Lucian Pye.7 The dimensions they suggest are: first, equality, which includes widespread participation and suffrage, equality and universality of law, and political role recruitment based on achievement; second, capacity, which includes wider scope of political performance, effectiveness in executing public policy, rational administration and secular policy orientation; and third, differentiation, which occurs when political offices and agencies have distinct and limited functions, roles are assigned to specific functions, and complex structures and parts of the political system are integrated. There are obvious similarities with Almond’s typology. To begin with, differentiation is suggested by both as a dimension of development. Capacity (SSRC), a broader rubric than secularization, subsumes Almond’s secularization criteria along with the notion of scope or magnitude

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6Almond and Powell apparently believe that differentiation and secularization are highly correlated, as indicated by their combination of them into a single scale for categorization of some country examples. Op. cit., p. 308. The parenthetical descriptions of each of the dimensions above are suggested as possible synonyms for Almond’s terms.

of political performance. Finally, the SSRC dimension of equality generally parallels Almond's autonomy, but measures individual rather than system differences. While both these remaining dimensions seem to have liberal democracy as their touchstone, the SSRC committee emphasizes the sharing of power through broader participation, widespread suffrage, and the elimination of privilege, while Almond stresses the independence of societal subsystems (the traditionally "liberal" value).

Samuel Huntington begins his discussion of political development with the argument that a distinction should be made between modernization and political development. The latter, he suggests, is often falsely equated with the introduction of modern technology and social processes, for example, mass communications and urbanization. Huntington classifies under four categories—rationalization, national integration, democratization, and mobilization—those characteristics often erroneously associated with development. Huntington argues that political development should be conceived of as a process independent of modernization, and defines it as "institutionalization of political organization and procedures." While admitting that the strength of political organizations and procedures depends upon both a) their "scope of support" and b) their "level of institutionalization," Huntington discusses only the level of institutionalization as the core of political development. He thus ignores the development characteristics suggested by "scope of support," an omission which I will mention again later. He views institutionalization as movement along four continua: 1) adaptability-rigidity, 2) complexity-simplicity, 3) autonomy-subordination, and 4) coherence-disunity.

There are two obvious similarities and one contrast in this list of four criteria compared with the two earlier lists. Both the continua of complexity-simplicity and autonomy-subordination are related to differentiation. Complexity, for example, requires "differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits" and autonomy relates to "the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings." Moreover, Huntington notes the interrelation of these two continua or dimensions: "the complexity of a political system contributes to its autonomy

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*Huntington, op. cit., p. 393.
by providing a variety of organizations and positions in which individuals are prepared for the highest offices."10 Huntington's coherence dimension is related to the SSRC's aspect of differentiation consisting of the integration of complex structures. In contrast to these similarities, Almond and Huntington use "autonomy" with nearly opposite emphases. Almond sees greater development in societies which are not dominated by a political system, but have subsystems independent and autonomous of political control, thus capable of articulating their independent interests. Huntington, on the other hand, is concerned that the political subsystem should have greater strength, and thus be autonomous or free from the influence and control of military, economic, or international interests. Both argue for equal rather than dominant influence for the "political" sphere of a society, but they reach this agreement from opposite concerns.

Huntington, as I noted, passes over quickly, apparently excluding as a development criterion, the scope of political support, which he describes as the extent to which a "a large segment of the population is politically organized."11 Almond, likewise, does not suggest scope, magnitude, or degree of participation as a criterion for development. However, his notion of state-building, discussed elsewhere, is related to these concepts.12 In contrast, the SSRC Committee includes this quality under two of their three dimensions, first as participation under the equality dimension, and second, as scope of political performance under capacity.

The differences among the authors largely reflect their varying concerns. Huntington, for instance, is clearly anxious about stability. The result is that he analyzes characteristics which he believes are associated with political institutions (such as parties, bureaucracies, legislatures, and courts) that are free from coups, internal violence, and other conflicts associated with disorder, disintegration, and decay. Almond and the SSRC Committee, despite some differences we have noted, have similar teleologies. The Weber-Parsons vision of modernization (pattern variables) and various ingredients of the democratic model inform both their lists of

10Ibid., p. 402.
11Huntington, op. cit., p. 394.
12Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
development dimensions. Criteria stressing achievement, specialization, secularization, rationality and universality of the law, clearly the influence of Weber and Parsons, are encapsulated by their dimensions of differentiation, secularization, and capacity. Almond's inclusion of autonomy or pluralism and the SSRC's elaboration of equality are clear evidence, I believe, of efforts to include at least some facet of democratic processes in lists of development criteria. Thus the goals of stability, and alternatively, of democracy and rationality, are the valued outcomes of development which shape the alternative measures of development proposed by these authors.

Certainly the exhaustiveness and, perhaps also, the consistency and mutual exclusiveness of the categories in each of these three typologies might be questioned. Moreover the concepts employed may embrace more than one empirically distinct phenomenon or it may be that two dimensions from one list are so highly correlated in the real world as to make their operational distinction misleading. In the face of such an increasing number of new and different terms, concepts and typologies, social scientists are wise to weigh carefully the usefulness of each new product of theory construction. The purpose of this summary, however, has not been to dissect or criticize these three lists of development criteria exhaustively. My purpose is rather to see how well or conveniently political variables commonly associated with development cluster or group themselves in some fashion or pattern resembling dimensions proposed by these prominent theorists.

The procedure in the construction of development criteria employed by the theorists is to try intuitively to isolate and aggregate salient differences from a comparative analysis of political systems

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14Other lists might have been selected for review; for example, a similar list suggested by Joseph LaPalombara, op. cit., pp. 39ff. which includes 1) structural differentiation, 2) magnitude, 3) achievement orientation, and 4) degree of secularization might have been discussed. Or, a very different list, urging the measurement of outputs of a political system could have been included. See, for example, J. Roland Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems and Political Goods," World Politics (April, 1966) pp. 415-434, who suggests indices of 1) security, 2) welfare, 3) justice and 4) liberty.
in order to construct a typology. This enables the plotting of political systems along the typology's traits or dimensions of development. Such an analytical-deductive approach is basic to social science research and those engaged in gathering data have a bootstrap task without this theoretical direction.\footnote{Banks and Textor, \textit{op. cit.}, for instance, draw heavily upon the functional categories proposed by Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, \textit{op. cit.} Russett, \textit{et al., op. cit.}, likewise are influenced by the theoretical considerations of such men as Deutsch, Lerner and Pye. Conflict data, which is of interest to Huntington, see \textit{op. cit.}, p. 402 and 416, is included as a major domain of Rummel's data catalogue.}

After theorists have conceived approaches, dimensions, and causes of development in this fashion, data oriented researchers informed by these theories have organized a number of relevant measures. But there is still an incomplete step in the circulation of ideas about development. The final step is to generate feedback, to see how well data collectors have been measuring traits similar to those suggested by the most recent theories, and to suggest what changes or new directions in data collection or in theoretical perspectives may be required. The next section of this paper will attempt to promote such a dialogue, employing, in contrast to the theorists, an inductive, data based approach to the construction of political development measures.

II

Factor analysis allows one to identify a set of dimensions underlying those political data which are available for the study of comparative development. The results are useful for evaluating various theories to the extent to which the variables used in the factor analysis are valid and are relevant to political development. The real merit of this technique is as an approach to simplifying, clarifying, and criticizing the present array of data being used by students of political development. Table 1 presents the results of such a factor analysis.\footnote{The calculations were done at the Yale Computer Center using the YCC factor analysis program and the IBM 7094. The principal component technique was selected and orthogonal (varimax) rotation was performed. Since the rotated factor structure was quite similar to the set of unrotated factors, and yet provided clearer indications of the constituent variables of a particular factor, it was selected for presentation. For a discussion of factor analysis see R. J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," \textit{Journal of Conflict Resolution} (December, 1967) pp. 444-480 and Harry Harman, \textit{Modern Factor Analysis} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).} It contains the orthogonally
rotated factor loadings on 43 development variables. These numbers, called “loadings,” indicate the correlation of each variable with each underlying dimension or factor which is extracted in the analysis.17 In order to interpret and label the factors, those variables which had “high” loadings, generally .50 or above, as indicated in Table 1, have been examined.

The 43 variables—measured across 85 countries—were selected for several reasons. The initial criterion was that each variable be distinctively political. Thus data on communication flows, economic growth, trade (as in YPDP and DON), and historical and areal variables (in B & T) were excluded. DON variables were selected from the domains of internal politics and domestic conflict and YPDP variables from the section on “government and politics.” Criteria for eliminating missing data and non-normal distributions were used to complete the selection of the variables.18 The eight factors presented in Table 1 account for 73.1 percent of the variance among the variables.19 The communality \( h^2 \) of all variables is above .50 with the exception of four

17The eight factors in Table 1 are presented in the descending order of variance explained (which is somewhat different than the order of the factors before rotation.)

18The second criterion for screening variables was missing data. Beginning with 133 countries and territories, the same as in the YPDP Handbook, the number of observations was reduced to a final 85, after dropping countries with 20 or more missing variables. Similarly, variables with less than 60 observations were dropped. The third criterion was distribution. DON variables (73 and 75), legitimacy and defense expenditure, were dropped from the analysis because their non-normal distributions could not be normalized. The 85 countries included in the analysis are U.S., U.K., Canada, Ireland, West Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, U.S.S.R., Poland, E. Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Israel, Ethiopia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia, Iran, Indonesia, Malaya, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China (mainland), Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ghana, Madagascar, Afghanistan, South Vietnam, Nepal, Cambodia, Laos, Liberia, Mongolia, Luxembourg.

19Factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 were rotated. In all, ten factors, accounting for 81.1 percent of the variance, met this test; but only eight of these ten rotated factors seemed worth discussing. The two factors not presented accounted for 4.1 percent and 3.9 percent of the variance and each had one high loading variable. These were number of assassinations and the ratio of government revenue to expenses, respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>TRANSFORMATION</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
<th>VIII</th>
<th>COMMUNALITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Percent population voting</td>
<td>YPDP(24)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Freedom of the press</td>
<td>B&amp;T (13)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Constitutional regime</td>
<td>B&amp;T (26)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Government stability</td>
<td>B&amp;T (27)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Representativeness of regime</td>
<td>B&amp;T (28)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Party competition</td>
<td>B&amp;T (29)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.96</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Freedom of group opposition</td>
<td>B&amp;T (30)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Political enculturation</td>
<td>B&amp;T (31)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Sectionalism</td>
<td>B&amp;T (32)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Articulation by assoc. groups</td>
<td>B&amp;T (33)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Artic. by institutional groups</td>
<td>B&amp;T (34)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-2.24</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Articulation by anomic groups</td>
<td>B&amp;T (36)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-3.22</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Aggregation by executive</td>
<td>B&amp;T (39)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Aggregation by legislature</td>
<td>B&amp;T (40)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.84</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Party system—number</td>
<td>B&amp;T (41)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Stability of party system</td>
<td>B&amp;T (43)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Elitism</td>
<td>B&amp;T (45)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. Character of the bureaucracy</td>
<td>B&amp;T (53)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-2.20</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>.62</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Military in politics</td>
<td>B&amp;T (54)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. No press censorship</td>
<td>DON (71)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Tenure of last 2 executives</td>
<td>DON (74)</td>
<td>Log</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Freedom of opposition</td>
<td>DON (65)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Voting system</td>
<td>DON (66)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Total Variance Explained</td>
<td>% “Common” Variance Explained</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Cutright political dev. index</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25. Legality of government change</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Federalist vs. unitary govt.</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27. Number of purges</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>28. Number of riots</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>29. Number of revolutions</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>30. Demonstrations</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>31. No. killed in domestic violence</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>32. Military personnel/population</td>
<td>Σ = 73.1%</td>
<td>Σ = 100.0%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>33. Defense expenditures/GNP</td>
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<tr>
<td>34. Deaths from domestic violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>35. Years in office of executive</td>
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<td>36. Number of political parties</td>
<td></td>
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<td>37. Number of assassinations</td>
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<td>38. Number of general strikes</td>
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<td>39. Guerilla warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>40. No. of government crises</td>
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<tr>
<td>41. Government revenue/Expenses</td>
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<tr>
<td>42. Tax revenue/total revenue</td>
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<tr>
<td>43. Political representativeness</td>
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DON measures: legality of government change, number of political parties, number of assassinations, and ratio of government revenue to expenses. Otherwise, the eight factor solution accounts for a majority of the variation found in the selected variables.

The first factor, which accounts for nearly 30 percent of the variance among the variables, correlates highly with variables from all the data sources except the YPDP. Among the high loading variables are Press Freedom, Party Competition, Existence of Opposition Groups, Interest Articulation by Associational rather than Non-associational Groups, Elitism (negative loading), Multi-party systems, and Cutright’s measures of democratic Political Development. The Banks and Textor variables, owing to the coding procedure, indicate the reverse condition of their variable names.22 This dimension I label “Power Sharing.” It relates to the concern for the establishment of democratic institutions and suggests that a pluralistic society which shares decision-making among various groups is of major interest among the data collectors. It may be that this factor’s predominance is largely a product of preferences for Western democratic procedures shared by both some data collectors and theory-

20 Following each variable name is a notation as to its source and its original identification number (in parentheses). Specifically see Russett, et al., op. cit., pp. 56-101; Rummel, et al., op. cit., and Rummel, “Dimensionality of Nations Project: Variable Definitions, Data Sources and Year,” (manuscript, July, 1964); Banks and Textor, op. cit., pp. 67-114; and Cutright op. cit. The Cutright variable 24 is from his 1963 study and was taken from the DON data. #79a. Variable 43 was obtained from a set of raw code sheets supplied by Cutright for his 1965 study and is based on figures for 1961.

21 The percent of variance “explained” by a factor is $100 \times \sum a_j^2 / N$, where $a_j$ is the loading of the jth variable on the factor and N is the number of variables (43 in this case). “Common” variance would generally refer to all 10 rotated factors. See Harry Harman, op. cit., p. 198.

22 Banks and Textor data are specified by alphabetical categories, A, B, etc., where A is the characteristic mentioned in the variable name. For example, variable 13, Freedom of the Press, was coded by Banks and Textor so that A=complete freedom, B=less freedom, and so on. In my coding, A’s were recorded as O, B’s as 1, etc., so that the signs on Banks and Textor variables indicate the reverse of the quality indicated. This explains why opposite signs are found on similar variables, for instance, in factor 1, variable 2, Freedom of the Press (B & T) loads -.94 and variable 20, No Press Censorship, (DON), has a loading of .76. These qualities are in fact positively, not negatively, related.

23 This represents a view of development similar to one proposed by Harold D. Lasswell in “The Policy Sciences of Development,” World Politics (January, 1965), pp. 293ff.
builders. By recognizing this possible value bias, we indicate that the factor is not necessarily the most important criterion for measuring development based on empirical inter-national differences. Moreover, not all indicators of democracy contributed fully to this dimension. Some of the high loading variables on this factor (Cutright's variables in particular) have unique secondary characteristics as will be illustrated by factor seven. It is clear, however, that this polyarchic or power sharing quality is a major dimension by which data collectors have measured politics across nations.

The second dimension is labeled "Executive Stability." Although it accounts for far less of the variance (8.2%) than the first factor, it is important because each of the three major data collectors (YPDP, B & T, DON) represented in this study expressed interest in similar though operationally distinct measures of executive tenure, and each of these is highly correlated with this single factor. These two facts enhance the validity of the "Executive Stability" factor. Huntington's criteria of development are directly relevant to factor II. A lengthy and peaceful tenure among political executives serves to indicate both autonomy and co-

24 A number of the variables included in this dimension are from Banks and Textor and of these several were influenced by Almond's analysis of political functions in Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 1-64. In another factor analysis, using only Banks and Textor data, Philip M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of A Cross-Polity Survey," The American Political Science Review (September, 1965), pp. 602-614, the first factor which emerged, labeled "Access," closely parallels the first factor reported here. There are several important differences in the way the variables from the Banks and Textor survey were employed in the Gregg and Banks factor analysis as compared with this one. The full ranges of the variables reported by Banks and Textor were employed in our factor analysis, while Gregg and Banks collapsed their variables so that each was dichotomous or trichotomous. The second largest factor emerging in the Gregg and Banks analysis (labeled "Differentiation of Political Institutions within Former Colonial Dependencies") was based largely on nominal dichotomous variables excluded from our analysis. These excluded variables include "Date of Independence," "Ex-French Dependency," "Ex-Spanish Dependency," "African Areal Grouping," "Post-colonial Bureaucracy," and "Underdeveloped Tutelary Political Modernization." In excluding these variables our view was that many cross-national variables are simply not related to the development syndrome per se, although they might conceivably be relevant to the comparison of polities for other purposes.

25 See Donald T. Campbell and Donald W. Fiske, "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix," Psychological Bulletin, 56(1959), pp. 81-105 for a discussion of validation of a single trait using several measures or authors.
herence."26 But, although longevity is also a positive indicator of "adaptability," this is with reference to groups and not individual office-holders. In fact, according to Huntington, turnover of leaders, especially inter-generational changes, indicates greater adaptability. Hence, this factor may reflect mixed qualities of institutionalization (development) such as negative adaptability and positive autonomy and coherence. If one accepts Huntington's view of development, then, certainly more discriminating and refined measures of stability and change in leadership than underlie this factor are needed. It is difficult to see any direct relation between this factor and the development criteria of the Almond or SSRC schemata. Stability, however, may be relevant to some of their subcategories. For instance, the capacity of a political system and its ability to make effective policy changes (an SSRC dimension) might be associated with stability of executive tenure as the French Fourth Republic illustrates. The second factor then, like the first, is both composed of data from several sources and relevant to at least one theoretical construct.

Factor III (variance explained, 7.5 percent) I have called "Domestic Violence." The high loading variables which suggest this title are from YPDP and DON. Revolutions, domestic killed, death by violence, and acts of guerrilla war combine to yield a measure of the stability and regulatory capacity of a government. Although this dimension does not specifically correspond to any of the qualities mentioned by Huntington, clearly the variables underlying this factor are indicators of development in Huntington's view. He states while discussing autonomy of political organizations, "a highly developed political system has procedures to minimize if not eliminate the role of violence in the system."27 He later adds that "coup\'s d\'etat and military interventions in politics are one index of low levels of institutionalization: they occur where political institutions lack autonomy and coherence."28 The other authors also discuss this quality in relation to development. Almond and Powell, for example, discuss state building which involves the capacity to penetrate, regulate behavior,

26See Huntington, op. cit., pp. 405, 407. It is interesting to note, however, that legality of government change, variable 25, is not at all correlated with this factor.
27Huntington, op. cit., pp. 401-402.
28Ibid., p. 407.
and overcome revolutionary threats as a "challenge" of political development.\(^9\) Similarly, the SSRC authors describe crises such as penetration and participation which relate to the control of domestic violence, and include in their criteria for the capacity dimension qualities which could certainly be measured by, among other things, the amount of internal political violence in a system.\(^10\) Thus while not explicitly suggested as one of the broad criteria of development (in the schemata we have examined), domestic violence generally could be related to the qualities mentioned in the development syndromes of all the theory-builders, as an operational if not analytical index.\(^11\) Since this factor is composed of variables closely linked to violent unrest, it is an indicator of the security provided by a political system, and in contrast to factor five, discussed later, provides a more distinct barometer of a polity's decay. Factors three and five are similar to the first two factors found in several other factor analyses of cross-national data on conflict.\(^12\)

The fourth factor in the analysis (variance explained 7.1 percent) is called "Participant Political Socialisation." The high loading variables which lead to this label are Percent of Population Voting (YPDP), Political Enculturation (B & T), and Stability of the Party System (B & T). These variables give us an indication of the degree to which members of the political system have learned to participate and to demand stable and familiar political practices. As such, they reflect both the range and coherence of political socialization. Theoretically derived dimensions to which this factor may be related are Huntington's coherence continuum and the SSRC equality criteria (which includes participation). In addition, other studies have also stressed participation as an index of development.\(^13\) If other variables relevant to socialization were included in a future factor analysis it would be possible to con-

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\(^{9}\) Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 35.
\(^{10}\) See Pye, Aspects, pp. 64–65.
\(^{11}\) In addition, Pennock, op. cit., p. 427, specifically includes security (assessed by domestic violence) among his criteria of development.
firm whether socialization and participation represent an empirically unique dimension for assessing development.

Riots, anti-government demonstrations, and general strikes load highly on the fifth factor. This dimension, consequently, is labeled "Internal Turmoil." All three identifying variables are from the DON project. Although Huntington is concerned with destabilizing and disintegrative effects such as unrest and turmoil which are measured by the variables significantly contributing to this factor, his criteria of institutionalization do not specifically include indices of this order. Moreover, Huntington is primarily interested in phenomena like coups, revolutions and military interventions as indicators of the failure of institutionalization. As aside from its lack of theoretical significance, another possible criticism is the fact that only data from DON contributes to this factor. This suggests that it may be an idiosyncratic index of development.

It must be noted, however, that this quality has been replicated in a factor analysis by Raymond Tanter using similar data over a different time period. If conflict data compiled by Tanter, Eckstein or the Feierabends were included in this study the criticism of this factor as a single author product would certainly be vitiated.

The sixth factor, like the fifth, is a dimension reflecting data from only one study. It is labeled "Government Military Activity" since the two high loaders from YPDP are indicative of central government military expenditure and resources. It is possible to relate this dimension to what Huntington discusses as complexity, or the other authors mean by differentiation, since high government expenses and a large army are often associated with a complex governmental organization having a variety of agencies and offices.

uses this factor as an index of participation for the analysis. See also Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 19-40, 501-505. Almond and Verba develop the ideal type of a participant political culture which is associated with modern and democratic politics.

Ibid., pp. 402, 407.

It is unlikely, however, that any of the theory builders would be satisfied with the two variables loading high on this factor as empirical indicators for these dimensions of development. More relevant and immediate operational indices of differentiation and complexity are conceivable. It remains for data collections to broaden their variable lists to include complete measures, for example, on the size and specialization of government personnel.36

Factor seven, although having moderate loadings (between .40 and .54) on variables 18, 34, and 42, is largely, in our view, a Cutright Factor (based on variables 24 and 43).37 There are no signal loadings. Cutright, in creating his index of development, relied largely on measuring political representativeness.38 Cutright's view of political representativeness shares some characteristics among nations with the amount of revenue coming from taxation (variable 42). This relationship may be due to the fact that in communist and less developed states, revenue from taxation tends to be low, while in the "developed" Western states, tax revenues, especially from incomes, tend to be much higher. Theoretically, the first factor, based on democratic characteristics, should have accounted for a greater share of the variance in Cutright's measures which specifically emphasize "democratic" political development. Perhaps the reason these variables load on a separate factor is due to some unique quality in Cutright's construction of indices, the coding of his data, or the choice of time periods for this study.39

The last interesting factor in the analysis I have labeled "Territorial Integration." The two highest loaders were Sectionalism (B & T) and Federal vs. Unitary Structure (DON). This factor seems to emphasize territorial integration, that is, "the progressive

36Some data collectors have gathered data of this order. In Russett, et al., op. cit., p. 71, the percent of population employed by the government is included as a variable, but measures for only 21 countries were collated.
37In an earlier factor analysis based on 45 variables, Cutright's Political Representativeness Index (variable 43) emerged as the single high loading on a factor.
38In his article "Political Structure," op. cit., Cutright renames his earlier index—after alterations—an index of political representativeness.
39Deane Neubauer has also criticized the sensitivity of Cutright's measure, noting that among the 23 nations which he discriminated among in terms of "polyarchy," "many" were tied for the highest score possible on Cutright's scale. See Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," American Political Science Review, LXI, No. 4 (December, 1967), p. 1007.
reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities" as opposed to political integration which refers to "developing integrated process in a participant political community.3340 While the authors of all three of the outlined schemata recognize integration as a problem or crisis in states undergoing political development, only the SSRC specifically mention integration (as a sub-category of differentiation) and their use relates more to political than to territorial integration. It is plausible, however, to consider Huntington's coherence trait, which is based on consensus of norms, as a measure of integration. And had Huntington discussed "scope" as a criterion of development, this quality might also be linked to the reduction of territorial discontinuities. The SSRC committee's criterion of capacity (which includes the scope of "political and governmental performance") also can be related to territorial integration. Territorial integration, nevertheless, is only peripherally tied to these theoretical schemata. Moreover, it may be associated with negative development if it results in overburdening a central government, thereby reducing system effectiveness.4 Only two variables load highly on this factor and its contribution to explaining variance among the variables is unsurprisingly low (4.0 percent).

These eight factors represent what should be, as a consequence of the factor analytic model, independent traits of political development. The fact that several of these dimensions (factors 5, 6, and 7) have high loading variables drawn from a single data source suggest these dimensions may be more or less the product of individual perspectives. In other words, these dimensions may be methods factors rather than underlying or basic traits.42 If we leave out these three factors from our analysis, we have a list of five dimensions of political development, Power Sharing, Executive Stability, Domestic Violence, Political Socialization and Territorial Integration.

44For an elaboration of these concepts see James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., editors, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 9.


46See Campbell and Fiske, op. cit. Of course, if more authors' measures on these variables had been included in the analysis, these factors might not be subject to this criticism.
## Table 2
**Comparison of Political Development Dimensions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor Analysis Results</th>
<th>Almond</th>
<th>Comparative Pol. Comm. (SSRC)</th>
<th>Huntington</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POWER SHARING</td>
<td>AUTONOMY</td>
<td>EQUALITY</td>
<td>ADAPTABILITY</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Equality of law</td>
<td>AUTONOMY</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>COHERENCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE STABILITY</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DOMESTIC VIOLENCE</td>
<td></td>
<td>(CAPACITY ?)</td>
<td>AUTONOMY</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Effective execution of policy)</td>
<td>COHERENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTICIPANT POLITICAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>EQUALITY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIALIZATION</td>
<td></td>
<td>Participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY</td>
<td></td>
<td>DIFFERENTIATION</td>
<td>COHERENCE</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Integration of complex structures</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CAPACITY</td>
<td>Consensus among member units</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wide scope of political performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIFFERENTIATION</td>
<td>DIFFERENTIATION</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SECULARIZATION</td>
<td>CAPACITY</td>
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<td>Rational and secular policy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EQUALITY</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Recruitment by achievement</td>
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</table>
Table 2 summarizes the relationships among political development dimensions. Blanks indicate complete lack of equivalence among the lists. Where only one aspect of a theoretical dimension is relatable, this aspect is specifically mentioned. Among the relationships which the Table does suggest, many are partial or tenuous, as I have indicated in the earlier discussion. Moreover, the factor analysis dimensions are rather specific compared to the broad rubrics employed in the theorists’ schemata. This perhaps reflects their closeness to actual data. While these factor analysis results are certainly not free of subjective influences, they nevertheless represent structurally independent dimensions underlying some of the data collated by empirically oriented researchers and relatable in some fashion to dimensions of development suggested in theoretical literature.

III

This examination by factor analysis of selected political indicators underlines problems of finding commonly acceptable measures or scales of development. Our study indicates that there is a common though not universal interest in a measure of development related to democratic practices. The first and dominant factor found in the data reflects this. Another characteristic suggested by the factor analysis is a tendency for data studies to be idiosyncratic, utilizing measures which are not convincingly related to measures from other studies but which were supposed by the analysis to be related (e.g. democracy). This fact, therefore, calls into question the generalizability of research results based on these idiosyncratic measures.

Comparing the factor analysis results with the theoretical dimensions outlined in Table 2 reveals that the data generally do not cluster along dimensions identifiable as similar or common with those suggested by theory builders. Not even the individual variables submitted to the factor analysis coincide with suggested measures of the theory builders such as secularization or differentiation. This tenuous relationship between the theoretically derived lists

and the multiple data sources factors may be partially explained by
the fact that the theoretical lists largely contain broad rubrics em-
bracing, often with difficulty, empirically distinct phenomena. An-
other reason for the absence of some of the dimensions proposed by
theory-builders from the factor analytic solution may be due
to the deletion from our study of some variables, such as per-
centage employed by the central government (YPDP), because of
missing data. Finally the discontinuities between theory and data
based development criteria may be attributed to the concern of
most data collectors for a more general comparison of nations
rather than an explicit measurement of "development."

These circumstances, nevertheless, do not obviate the clear need
for thorough measures which do capture variations along dimensions
of structural differentiation, role specificity, and secular value proc-
tesses, none of which was obtained in this factor analysis of
current data. Better data for variables already measured are like-
wise required. In addition to improved measures on these vari-
ables, we are going to need historical time series and trend data.
Measures of this genre are required for calculating rates of change
and making projections about probability, timing and direction of
future political changes.

Also we must begin to distinguish between system level and
lower level measures, such as group or individual characteristics.
For example, although equality and autonomy may both be related
to democracy, inequality among individuals may or may not be
reflected in low autonomy at the system level (which is where
Almond and Powell cast their analysis). By recognizing differences
in the unit being measured some of the ambiguity we have
found in comparing theoretical dimensions may be alleviated.

In establishing a scale for a particular development dimension
or for any explanatory variable which might be associated with
development, two strategies may prove serviceable. First, combining
several similar indicators may increase the overall validity of the
final variable. For example, combining measures of radio audience,
newspaper reading and telephones, either by factor analysis or some
other scaling technique, may yield a more comprehensive variable

"The original DON conflict variables for 1955-57, for example, contain
up to one third tied scores for zero instances of conflictual events. More dis-
criminating and sensitive techniques of measurement seem to be required."
for communication levels among nations.\textsuperscript{46} For other purposes, of course, such variables may be more usefully employed separately, for example, in order to examine the additive and interesting political effects which exposure to radio, reading a newspaper, or attending a cinema may have on a traditional peasant. The second strategy would be to develop intermethod and inter-author indices. For example, factors one, two and four represent dimensions of development which are based on the procedures and results of several data collections and combine more than one operational technique. As data collections improve the validity, breadth, and span of their deposits, methodological advances such as these can be expected.\textsuperscript{46}

Data collectors will be aided in these efforts if theory builders explicitly specify operational indicators of the critical dimensions and variables of development which they sketch.\textsuperscript{47} This task may lead theoreticians to consider more carefully the phenomena which comprise both their values and the mechanisms which mediate valued outcomes. Complicated theoretical machinery may be less elegant but more useful for empirical work and policy making if operational terms in plain language are attached to it. Authors of theoretically constructed development dimensions may also wish to reconsider the meaningfulness of terms such as differentiation, secularization or rationalization which failed to find an empirical counterpart among the factors. Secularization, in particular, may either be highly correlated (perhaps forming a single empirical pattern) with other development qualities such as power-sharing (equality, autonomy) or it may be composed of empirically heterogeneous traits which are difficult to assess with

\textsuperscript{46}See Alker, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 20-23. Two other communication variables, television sets and movie exhibitions, were discarded in creating this combined measure because of missing data and their failure to cluster with the other variables.

\textsuperscript{47}The second edition of the Yale Political Data Program's \textit{World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators} (forthcoming), for example, moves in these directions. Some of these suggestions for improving the gathering and use of aggregate data are considered in more detail in Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Research Possibilities Using Aggregate Political and Social Data," in Stein Rokkan, editor, \textit{Comparative Research Across Cultures and Nations} (Paris: Mouton, 1967).

\textsuperscript{48}Huntington, \textit{op. cit.}, and Pennock, \textit{op. cit.}, have made attempts to do just this. Almond, whose theoretical dimensions least correspond to the ones derived by factor analysis, is a clear example of a theorist who has so far failed in this task.
any precision. In either case some revision or further explication may be indicated by the absence of data relatable to these rather amorphous theoretical dimensions.48

Perhaps the most ambiguous quality of development revealed in this study is stability. From the discussion of factors 2, 3, and 5 it is clear that there are no clean, unambiguous relationships between measures of stability and theoretical dimensions related to this quality. Both data collectors and theory builders may be blamed for the fuzziness in this quality. Huntington is the prime theorist interested in stability, but he attempts to measure development in terms of traits such as coherence, which explain rather than describe stability. Ambiguity occurs because a few of the operational indices for his four continua, such as coups or civil disorders are commonly accepted as signs of instability. This makes it difficult to operationalize distinctly his particular development continua from more generalized notions of stability. Equally open to criticism are data collectors who tend to count events as equal which are quite different, for example, peaceful and violent changes of executives (as in factor 2) or who classify together as instances of conflict both demonstrations and revolutions. Several analyses have revealed the different qualities in these conflict events,49 although one might have suspected that countries which suppress strikes and demonstrations (and thus have none) are more likely to experience serious conflict such as revolution. In seeking to reconcile the varying concepts and data related to instability it may be useful to conceptualize this quality in terms of manifest and latent characteristics. Kinetic instability could refer to observed disruptive activity, while potential instability could be a measure of the likelihood and intensity of future kinetic instability. Whether this suggestion proves useful or not, it is certain that theory builders and data collectors need to combine their efforts to develop more subtle and satisfactory measures, not only for stability, but for most all the development dimensions.

48Of course, although two concepts are empirically highly correlated (or load on the same factor), it may still be profitable to maintain their theoretical distinction, provided they are operationally distinct. Moreover, if oblique factor rotation were employed, it might be possible to detect different, but correlated, factors.

The eight factor solution to the list of political development variables brought together by this study represents neither a finished nor a satisfactory typology for empirical exploration of political development. The different interests that influenced the various data collectors to assemble the particular variables which they chose are compounded by this study's own criteria for selecting variables. These are just two biases which operate to affect the outcome of the factor analysis approach. In addition, weaknesses in the data itself may also have had a biasing effect, for example, due to missing data, ill-informed judgments by observers, or injudicious selection of cutting points. Relativity and subjectiveness, therefore, weaken this inductive-empirical approach to establishing dimensions of political development. The results, nevertheless, are important as provisional standards for comparing and assessing theoretical dimensions. They provide insight about lacuna in both data collections and theoretical writings, and underscore clear weaknesses in present theories.

The differences between and among theory-oriented writers and data collectors which I have pointed out are partially produced by their varying concepts about the basic characteristics of development. Such differing visions and values hinder useful dialogue and cloud untested and unrefined propositions. Thus Lasswell's reminder that the study of political development demands explicit statements of preference as to what constitutes developed characteristics is particularly incisive. Increased candidness about value preferences will be helpful in improving standards of clarity in the study of political development. This may facilitate broader agreement on the dimensions underlying political development and on the data which are relevant to its measurement. To this end greater dialogue and idea comparisons among theorists and data collectors are needed.

50 For example, the assumption that the diffusion of "world culture" is an inevitable process which will account for a great deal of political change may be correct in the long run, say 25 or 50 years, but is of little or no value in attempts to explain or predict short run changes.