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GRAND ALLUSIONS: VERGIL IN PHAEDRUS

JEREMY B. LEFKOWITZ

Abstract. This article focuses on two allusions to Vergil in the opening of the third book of Phaedrus’ Aesopic fables (3. Prol.) and suggests that Vergilian poetry plays a surprisingly central role in Phaedrus’ reflections on the nature and purpose of his poetic project. By linking his own avowedly humble poetry to the Aeneid and Eclogues, Phaedrus draws attention to some unexpected points of contact with Vergil; but he also quite clearly presents himself as a relatively unimportant poet who has had a particularly difficult time finding acceptance in Rome. The engagements with Vergil thus provide contexts for Phaedrus to highlight a crucial dimension of his poetic identity: the Roman fabulist expressed grand ambition but insisted that his inventiveness and sophistication would ultimately do nothing to improve his position on the margins of Roman literary culture.

In the opening poem to the third and central book of his collection of Aesopic fables (3. Prol.), Phaedrus reflects on the origins of fable-telling and announces a dramatic expansion of the size and scope of his project. As Henderson (1999, 318) has noted, in this central poem, Phaedrus incorporates a number of elements of what Conte (1992) has called the “proem in the middle,” a convention according to which Latin poets used the midpoints of books to assert their identities, advertise their aesthetic commitments, and carve out a place for their work in literary history. In 3. Prol. the fabulist names himself for the first time (Phaedri, 1); uses the first person pronoun ego three times (17, 38, 54); associates himself with a famous site of poetic initiation (Pierio . . . iugo, 17); offers an account of the invention of his genre (fabularum . . . sit inventum genus, 33); uses terms and images drawn from Alexandrian and neoteric poetics (e.g., libellos, 1; pro semita feci viam, 38); and boasts of his literary pedigree (ego litteratae qui sum proprior Graeciae, 54; Linoque Apollo sit parens, Musa Orphee, 57; cf. 16–23). Although he signals an interest in several predecessors, Phaedrus quite explicitly evokes Vergil twice, and he does so in ways that suggest he was keen to have readers think of certain dimensions of Vergilian poetry as especially relevant to
his project. But why does the humble fabulist turn to the great Vergil in this central poem? What does Vergil have to do with the writing of Aesop’s fables?

In what follows I will approach Phaedrus’ allusions to Vergil as specimens of what Hinds (1998) has called “allusive self-fashioning,” referring to the ways in which poets use literary allusion to negotiate their position within an ever-shifting and tendentious literary tradition. The two passages with which I will be primarily concerned are as striking for their specificity as for their central position. In the first, Phaedrus quotes Aeneid 2.77–78 (cuncta equidem tibi, rex, fuerit quodcumque, fatebor / vera), carefully ascribing the phrase quodcumque fuerit to Vergil’s Sinon (sed iam, quodcumque fuerit, ut dixit Sinon, 3.Prol.27) and describing the specific moment at which the Greek spy spoke the words (ad regem cum Dardaniae perductus foret, 28). In the second allusion, which Phaedrus makes as he attempts to establish himself as a legitimate Roman poet with roots in Greece (cf. 51–52), the fabulist names the divine poet-figures Linus and Orpheus as his Thracian predecessors (Linoque Apollo sit parens, Musa Orpheo, 57) in a line that recalls Vergil’s Eclogue 4.57 (Orphei Calliopea, Lino formosus Apollo) with remarkable precision: both Phaedrus’ allusion and Vergil’s original passage appear in the fifty-seventh line of sixty-three-line poems. While commentators have noted these echoes, the consequences of Phaedrus’ pronounced engagements with Vergil have not been much explored. By looking closely at the contexts and broader implications of the Vergilian allusions in 3.Prol., I will suggest that Vergil plays a surprisingly central role in Phaedrus’ reflections on the nature and purpose of his own poetic project. Phaedrus may present his work as minor and insignificant, but alluding to Vergil in this programmatic middle poem signals a greater ambition. At the same time, as we shall see, Phaedrus’ use of Vergil suggests as many differences between the two poets as similarities; indeed, a central dimension of Phaedrus’ allusive program is his own expressed uncertainty about whether his work will ever earn a place alongside the great works of Latin literature that preceded him.

1Vergil’s “proems in the middle,” which include Georg. 3 (esp. 3.3–22), Ecl. 6, and Aen. 7 (esp. 7.44–45), are central to Conte’s study; cf. Thomas 1983, 92.
2Thiele 1906, 574–75, noted the link between Phaedrus 3.Prol. and Ecl. 4 (cf. Oberg 2000, 119), but it was Champlin 2005, 104, who first noted the positioning of the lines.
4As, e.g., when he refers to his poems as “trifles” (neniae) at 3.Prol.10; cf. 1.Prol.7; and 4.2.1.
1. ALLUSION IN PHAEDRUS

Phaedrus is not generally considered to be a highly allusive poet. As the author of our earliest surviving collection of Aesopic fables, Phaedrus does on occasion explicitly raise the issue of the influence of earlier literature on his own work. But such passages, concentrated in the series of prologues and epilogues that frame the five books, are concerned primarily with his dependence upon and gradual independence from Aesop. In general, beyond occasional reference to putatively original versions by the legendary Aesop, the fable genre is not usually thought of as allowing much scope for allusion.

In addition, long-held assumptions about Phaedrus’ life and social status have influenced scholarly perception of his allusive practice. The traditional biography had it that Phaedrus was a “freedman of Augustus” and was prosecuted by Sejanus for unknown reasons. Despite the absence of external evidence, the idea that Phaedrus occupied a precarious position in Roman society has been conflated with his work’s place on the margins of Latin literary history in striking ways, e.g., by Conte 1999, 433 (trans. Solodow; my italics):

Phaedrus . . . represents a completely isolated voice. In many respects, he is a marginal author. As a person, he has a quite modest social position, and as a poet, he cannot be called a virtuoso; and he practices a minor literary genre, which is itself marginal to the great literary currents of the early Empire.

Conte goes on to contrast Phaedrus’ fables with more celebrated authors who occasionally included fables in their own works, including Callimachus, Ennius, Horace, and Petronius. According to Conte, those authors

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7 Our one scrap of external evidence comes from the title in our best MSS, which reads PHAEDRI AUGUSTI LIBERI FABULARUM AESOPIARUM (“Aesopic Fables of Phaedrus, freedman of Augustus”). But we do not know who first attributed this particular title to the work, and although slavery surfaces as a theme in a number of Phaedrian fables (e.g., 2.5; 2.8; 3.7; 3. Prol.; 3.19; App.17; App.27), nowhere does Phaedrus claim that he himself had been a slave. Scholars have reconstructed Phaedrus’ biography drawing only on the fables themselves (e.g., Pisi 1977). Champlin 2005 has effectively drawn attention to the lack of evidence for Phaedrus’ life and emphasized the constructed nature of Phaedrus’ identity; cf. Grimal 1980, Jennings 2009, Libby 2010, and Polt 2014.
achieved a level of “refinement and taste” that Phaedrus was unable to match, since the fabulist possessed a “mentality that was for the most part excluded from high literary expression” (435). Currie 1984, who described Phaedrus as a poet of “small talent” (504), describes the fabulist’s connection to the literary establishment in similar terms (my italics):

The experience of Phaedrus was a proletarian one; he was an outsider and felt his exclusion keenly. His achievement had been to elevate fable into an independent genre, and this evidently excited criticism which he seeks to rebut again and again. Socially and artistically he was isolated.

By linking Phaedrus’ putatively marginalized social position to the question of the fables’ connections to major works of Latin literature, Currie and Conte implicitly provide a rationale for the historical lack of attention to literary allusion in Phaedrus. If one accepts that Phaedrus was an isolated freedman whose minor work was excluded from mainstream literary culture and, in any event, is practically a transcription of popular culture, then traces of major literary works in the fables will tend to be treated as either incidental or unsophisticated.

But scholarly attitudes toward the fable tradition have shifted in recent years, with several studies drawing attention to the ancient fable’s connectedness to major works of Greek and Latin literature. This has included studies that recognize echoes of earlier literature in Phaedrus, some obvious and explicit (e.g., Phaedrus mentions Simonides by name at 4.23.2), others less so. Horace includes a number of fables and references to fables in his work and his significance to Phaedrus is most readily apparent. For example, Phaedrus describes his verse fables as a blending of humor (*risum movet*, *Prol*.3) and ethical advising (*prudenti vitam consilio monet*, 4) in terms borrowed from Horace (cf. *Satires* 1.1.24; *AP* 333), and he presents himself as a kind of Horatian satirist of human 

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8 Cf. West 1974, who compares the fable of the country and city mouse in Phaedrus and Horace, noting the “greater wealth and wit of the Horatian version” (78–79). Jennings 2009, n. 139, has compiled a list of similarly disparaging evaluations of Phaedrus’ artistry.

9 See esp. Dijk 1997 and Kurke 2010. See also the recent study of Babrius in Hawkins 2014, 87–141.


behaviors who disavows the naming of individuals (*neque enim notare singulos mens est mihi / verum ipsum vitam et mores hominum ostendere, 3.Prol.49–50; cf. Satires 1.4.5).*

Current Phaedrian scholarship has moved things well beyond Horatian influence, as reflected in studies by Henderson (1999, 2001), Gärtnér (2000, 2007), Holzberg (2002), Champlin (2005), Glauthier (2009), Jennings (2009), Libby (2010), Sciarrino (2010), and Polt (2014), which have shed light on the richness and complexity of Phaedrus’ engagements with a wide range of earlier literature. This surge of interest in Phaedrus has also involved the realization that Phaedrus’ *persona* is every bit as fictionalized as any other poetic “I” in ancient literature, and, not surprisingly, that allusion plays a key role in Phaedrus’ construction of a poetic identity. Of particular interest are the elements of irony that scholars have detected in Phaedrus’ allusive practice, including the suggestion that what may appear to be botched or seemingly clumsy invocations of earlier literature may indeed be part of a strategy of self-deprecation. My aim in what follows is to contribute to these developments in Phaedrian studies by suggesting that Phaedrus’ allusions to Vergil simultaneously secure and undermine the fabulist’s position on the margins of the literary world, reflecting his preoccupation with tracking both differences and similarities between great works of Latin literature and his own humble but undeniably innovative literary project.

2. UT DIXIT SINON

In our first passage, Phaedrus quotes Vergil’s Sinon while lamenting his poor reception and attempting to persuade his addressee to continue reading his books. This imagined reader, an unknown figure called Eutychus, is presented as a prototypically busy Roman with no time for poetry, as Phaedrus implores him to follow his example and change his lifestyle (*mutandum tibi propositum est et vitae genus, 3.Prol.15; cf. 17–23*). Despite the fabulist’s elimination of all desire for gain from his life (*curamque habendi penitus corde eraserim, 21*) and dedication of himself to the Muses (17–23), he complains that he is only grudgingly accepted as a

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13 Champlin 2005.
legitimate poet (*fastidiose tamen in coetum recipior*, 23). At this point Phaedrus announces his intention to continue writing regardless of his reader’s indifference (27–32; trans. Perry):

`sed iam, quodcumque fuerit, ut dixit Sinon
ad regem cum Dardaniae perductus foret,
librum exarabo tertium Aesopi stilo,
honori et meritis dedicans illum tuis.
quem si leges, laetabor; sin autem minus,
habebunt certe quo se oblectent posteri.

But now, “whatever may come of it” (as Sinon said when he was led before the king of Dardania), I will trace out a third book with Aesop’s pen, dedicating it to you in recognition of your honour and worth. If you read it I shall be glad; but if not, at any rate, those who come after us will have something with which to amuse themselves.

Having made vague reference to past difficulties establishing his literary bona fides, Phaedrus now looks squarely toward the future (e.g., *fuerit, exarabo, laetabor, habebunt, oblectent, posteri*) and as a model for perseverance in the face of hostility he looks to Sinon, the Greek interloper who tricked the Trojans into accepting the Trojan horse.

What is at first most striking about Phaedrus’ turn to Vergil is the obvious difference between the situations in which the Roman fabulist and the Greek spy utter the same words. Sinon stands before the leader of the enemy camp, with his life on the line, seeking to gain the confidence of the Trojans in order to get the wooden horse inside Troy (Verg. *Aen*. 2.77–78). For Sinon, the indefinite *fuerit quodcumque* emphasizes his utter vulnerability (2.77–80):

> ‘cuncta equidem tibi, rex, *fuerit quodcumque*, fatebor vera,’ inquit; ‘neque me Argolica de gente negabo. hoc primum; nec, si miserum Fortuna Sinonem finxit, vanum etiam mendacemque improba finget.


For the text and translation of Phaedrus, I follow Perry 1965 throughout, but I have also consulted Guaglianone 1969.

All translations of Vergil’s *Aeneid and Eclogues* are my own; for the texts, I follow Mynors 1969.
“Certainly, king,” he says, “whatever may come of it, I will tell you the whole truth, and I will not deny I am Greek. This first I own; even if shameless Fortune has made Sinon wretched, she will not also make him false and deceitful.”

When Sinon claims he will tell the Trojans the whole truth (cuncta . . . vera, 2.77–78), regardless of the consequences, the phrase fuerit quodcumque acknowledges that some of the things he says might reasonably get him killed.18

By sharp contrast, Phaedrus’ ostensible goal in 3.Prol. is merely to keep his reader interested. Just as he urges Eutychus in the opening lines to make more time for literature in general, Phaedrus closes the poem by asking again if he has been persuaded (Induxi te ad legendum? 3.Prol.62; cf. quem si leges, 31). In presenting himself as a poet with a reluctant reader, and one who has had trouble gaining acceptance within Roman literary culture (cf. 23), Phaedrus asks to be welcomed into his reader’s world as a kind of suppliant. Invoking the Aeneid in this context links his humble literary project to the pinnacle of Latin literary achievement, but the way in which Phaedrus quotes Sinon would undoubtedly make his already skeptical reader even more wary.19 After all, Phaedrus makes his reader think of the circumstances, words, and character of the deceitful Sinon in the same breath with which he announces his intention to write his third book (librum exarabo tertium Aesopi stilo, 29). What, then, does Phaedrus gain from comparing himself to Sinon at Troy?

As it happens, several important aspects of Phaedrus’ authorial persona find meaningful parallels in the figure of Sinon. In the lines immediately following the Sinon quotation, Phaedrus recasts the writing of his fable collection as a more risky and threatening undertaking (33–50). In his account of the origin of his genre at 33–37, Phaedrus claims that the fable was invented because slaves needed a way to communicate their “true feelings” (affectus proprios, 36) without being accused of calumnia (37; cf. calumniari, 1.Prol.5).20 But because fables conceal their true meaning under a veil of joking fiction (fictis . . . iocis, 3.Prol.37), and because they require that a message be drawn from the tale, they are always susceptible to misinterpretation (44–50).21 This is precisely what

18 Cf. Aen. 2.61–62.
19 On the Sinon episode as a site for writers to oppose Roman virtue to Greek cunning and criminality, see Austin 1959, Lynch 1980, and Abbot 2000.
20 Cf. 2.Epil.8–9.
21 On the double-edged nature of fable-telling, see esp. Nagy 1979, 235–41, on the Archaic Greek ainos (fable).
Phaedrus claims happened to him in two well-known passages at 41–44 and 45–50, in which it is suggested that none other than Sejanus himself tried to interpret Phaedrus’ fables and was apparently misled by his own suspicions (cf. *suscipione . . . errabit sua*, 45).\(^{22}\)

The Greek interloper and the fabulist employ similar strategies. In pleading his case to Priam, Sinon immediately admits that he is Greek (*neque me Argolica de gente negabo*, *Aen*. 2.78), but he quickly adds that he himself has been a victim of prototypical Greek dishonesty: slipping in his name and calling himself wretched for the second time (*miserum . . . Sinonem*, 79). Sinon first claims to be related to Palamedes, who was killed “under false evidence” (*falsa sub prodizione*, 83) and by “wicked witnessing” (*infando indicio*, 84) by “the malice of subtle Odysseus” (*invidia . . . pellacis Ulixi*, 90). Then, because he wanted to avenge Palamedes, Sinon claims to have been personally targeted by Odysseus, who would always terrify him with new accusations (*hinc semper Ulixes / criminibus terrere novis*, 97–98) and spread dark rumors about him (*hinc spargere voces / in vulgum ambiguas*, 98–99). Sinon’s vulnerability, along with his claim to have been falsely accused by Odysseus, win the Trojans over and allow him to move forward with his own bold and deceitful plot.

Sinon seeks to get “inside the walls” (*intra muros*, *Aen*. 2.33) and to be accepted (*accipere*, 70), and he is ultimately brought into Troy both physically and in the broader sense of practically becoming Trojan (cf. *noster eris*, 149).\(^{23}\) He disarms the Trojan repugnance at his Greek-ness (102–4), going so far as to suggest that the Trojans will be granting the Greeks and Odysseus in particular a kind of victory if they reject him straightaway simply because he is Greek. Phaedrus makes similar comments elsewhere in the collection in his effort to find acceptance as a Greek-born poet in Rome. In addition to claiming that he has been unjustly accused by Sejanus and that he has not been well received (*recipior*) in the community (*in coetum*) of Latin poets, Phaedrus connects his fate to the future of Latin letters (4.*Ep*.5–6) and offers himself as ready to stand with Roman authors against those of Greece: “If Latium shall look with favor upon my work, she will have more [authors] to set against those of Greece” (*quodsi labori faverit Latium meo, / plures*...
Like Sinon, Phaedrus is a Greek seeking access to closed-off space who wants to be perceived as innocent, unjustly accused, and potentially helpful to the Roman cause.

But in both cases it is made clear that the words and intentions of the Greek suppliants are not to be taken at face value: for Sinon, by the narrator, Aeneas; and for Phaedrus, by the poet’s own words. By the time Sinon appears and begins to speak (Aen. 2.68), Aeneas has already described the deception (3–39). Again, at 65–66, Aeneas makes it clear that Sinon is not to be trusted, and he is to be taken as an exemplum of Greek dishonesty: accipe nunc Danaum insidias et crimine ab uno / disce omnis (cf. 161: si vera feram, si magna rependum). This contrast between Sinon’s claims and the narrator’s account is most clearly made at the end of Sinon’s speech: Sinon concludes by telling the Trojans that, if they accept the horse inside the gates, “Asia would even advance in mighty war to the walls of Pelops” (192–94). Immediately afterward, Aeneas comments: “through such snares (insidiis) and craft (arte) of forsworn (periuri) Sinon the story won belief, and we were ensnared by wiles (dolis) and forced tears” (195–96).

Similarly, Phaedrus himself ascribes an essential duplicity to his project in the opening lines of the collection, where he claims that his fables offer a benevolent type of “double dowry” (duplex libelli dos est, 1.Prol.3). He emphasizes the polysemy of fable and the potential dangers involved in fable-telling and fable-interpreting, suggesting that there are critics out there who may accuse him of calumnia (calumniari si quis autem voluerit, 5) and insisting that his fables are jokes about things that never happened (fictis iocari nos meminerit fabulis, 7). Indeed, the tension between the supposed light-heartedness of fables and their potentially serious, accusatory messages surfaces repeatedly in Phaedrus. Despite his disavowals, Phaedrus persistently courts the suspicion that his fables may indeed be targeting specific individuals. The idea that among Phaedrus’ readers there are those who would know the intended targets of specific
fables, whether as themselves or others, is pursued in *epimythia* at 3.1.7 (*hoc quo pertineat dicet qui me novet*); 3.12.8 (*hoc illis narro qui me non intellegunt*); 3.13.16–17 (*hanc praeterissem fabulam silentio / si pactam fuci non recusassent*); and 5.10.10 (*hoc cur, Philete, scripserim pulchre vides*). Beyond such expressions of the fable’s functional duplicity, the themes of deception, disguise, and misrepresentation are often the focus of the fables themselves. For example, at 4.2.5–7, the moral advises that things are not always what they seem to be (*non semper ea sunt quae videntur*); that appearance (*frons*) can deceive; and that things have been deliberately hidden in corners (*rara mens intelligit / quod interiore condidit cura angulo*).26

The surprising links with Vergil’s Sinon can be understood as part of a larger strategy by which Phaedrus deliberately presents himself as an outcast who has been misunderstood by contemporaries and falsely accused by corrupt authorities. Like Sinon, who insists he is neither *mendax* nor *improbus* (*Aen. 2.80*) as he tells his famous lie, Phaedrus advertises his duplicity at the very moment when he asserts his identity and expresses his grand ambition to eclipse Aesop (*3. Prol. 38–39*). Indeed, deceit and the potential for wickedness are central to the Aesopic *persona* Phaedrus constructs throughout the five books.27 Phaedrus encourages us to make the following observation: the Trojan horse itself is a lot like an animal fable. Sinon, after all, is telling a seemingly innocent “tale” about an obviously fictional animal (the giant wooden horse) that in fact conceals within it a dangerous “message” for his addressees.28 Sinon’s lie is not just any old lie—it is one that involves the claim that the image of an animal is a gift that will benefit the receiver, while, in fact, what appears to be an animal on the surface will turn out to be concealing something ominous. Fables, too, seem to be innocent, benevolent tales about animals, but they contain hidden messages that have the potential to get both the teller and the addressee(s) into trouble. Thus, Phaedrus presents the fable

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26 Indeed, fables frequently draw attention to differences between appearances and reality as a theme (see esp. 4.2.12–13 and *App. 7.17–18*).

27 This scandalous and threatening stance links Phaedrus to other satirical and “iambic” poetic *personae* in ancient literature (cf. Cavazare 2001). Of course, a significant point of comparison is also the legendary Aesop, a Phrygian “outsider” and trickster-figure who was believed to have been falsely accused of treachery and executed in Delphi; on Aesopic fable-telling as an “iambic” mode, see esp. Rosen 2007.

28 At 4.2.1–7, Phaedrus claims that hidden messages can be found beneath the fable’s façade of humor and fiction. Ancient notices of the interplay of fiction and truth in fable-telling include Quintilian *Inst. 5.11.19–21*; Plutarch *Mor. 14E*; Gell. 2.29.1; Theon, *Progymnasmata 72*. 
collection itself as a kind of Trojan horse, craftily importing potentially dangerous and distinctly Greek material into Rome for consumption by the descendants of Troy. This affinity with Sinon is further reflected in the way both Phaedrus and Vergil’s Sinon claim divine support in the figure of Pallas Athena, a symbol of both benevolent and destructive intelligence: compare Phaedrus’ *nec Pallade hanc invita in vitam incubuerim* (3.Prol.22) and Sinon’s *instar montis equum divina Palladis arte* (Aen. 2.15).29 And this underlines an important dimension of the appeal of Sinon’s character to Phaedrus: as unattractive a figure as he may be, he had the gods on his side, and he was ultimately successful in carrying out his mission.30

3. LINOQUE APOLLO SIT PARENS, MUSA ORPHEO

In our second passage (3.Prol.57), some thirty lines later, Phaedrus alludes to Vergil (Ecl. 4.57) again with a striking degree of specificity, here in the context of a palpably defensive hypothetical question (3.Prol.51–59):

> rem me professum dicet fors aliquis gravem.  
> si Phryx Aesopus potuit, si Anacharsis Scythes  
> aeternam famam condere ingenio suo,  
> ego litteratae qui sum proprior Graeciae,  
> cur somno inerti deseram patriae decus,  
> Threissa cum gens numeret auctores deos,  
> Linoque Apollo sit parens, Musa Orpheo,  
> qui saxa cantu movit et domuit feras  
> Hebrique tenuit impetus dulci mora?

Perhaps someone will say that I have undertaken a weighty task. If Aesop the Phrygian, if Anacharsis the Scythian, could, by the exercise of their inborn talents, establish an everlasting fame, why should I, who am nearer by birth to the literary land of Greece, through sleepy indolence fail to uphold my country’s fame? *Why indeed, considering that the Thracian race counts gods among its authors, that Apollo was the parent of Linus, and that a Muse was the mother of Orpheus*—Orpheus who moved stones by the power of his song, who tamed wild beasts, and held in check the onrushing currents of the Hebrus, so pleased were they to linger and listen?

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29 The horse is presented as atonement for the defiled Palladium; cf. Aen. 2.163, 166, 183.

30 An analogue for Phaedrus’ hyperbolic appropriation of Sinon’s actions and character can be found in the boastful speech by the clever slave Chrysalus at Plaut. *Bacch.* 925–77; cf. Scafoglio 2008, 11.
Phaedrus returns to Vergil again in the course of responding to a skeptical reader and (again) insists he will produce great poetry despite the obstacles in his way. Moreover, as in the Sinon passage, Phaedrus’ Greek identity is central: after “someone” (aliquis, 3.Prol.51) suggests that surpassing Aesop may be too “weighty” a task (rem . . . gravem, 51), Phaedrus wonders why he should not achieve the kind of glory (decus, 55) and fame (aeternam famam, 53) other Thracians have won (cf. 17).

While the identical positioning of the lines in which Linus and Orpheus are named in Phaedrus 3.Prol.57 and Vergil Ecl. 4.57 might suggest a particularly close relationship between the two poems, there are some striking differences in the positions from which the lines are spoken. At the end of 3.Prol., Phaedrus tries to defend his foreignness before warding off Envy (ergo hinc abesto, Livor, 60) and turning back rather meekly to his addressee: “Have I persuaded you to read?” (Induxi te ad legendum? 62); while in the original passage from the Eclogues, the poet is full of confidence (cf. Ecl. 4.58–59) and advice (cf. 60–63) as he names Orpheus and Linus, praying for long life and boasting that not even the divine poets of legend could compose greater poetry (53–59):

{o mihi tum longae maneat pars ultima vitae,}
{spiritus et quantum sat erit tua dicere facta!}
{non me carminibus vincet nec Thracius Orpheus}
{nec Linus, huic mater quamvis atque huic pater adsit,}
{Orpei Calliopea, Lino formosus Apollo.}
{Pan etiam, Arcadia mecum si iudice certet,}
{Pan etiam Arcadia dicat se iudice victum.}

Let the twilight of a long life remain to me, and enough inspiration to tell how great your deeds will be! Then neither Thracian Orpheus nor Linus will vanquish me in song, though his mother help one and his father the other, Calliope Orpheus, and fair Apollo Linus. Even if Pan were to compete with me, with Arcady as judge, then even Pan, with Arcady as judge, would admit he was defeated.

The prayer at 53–59 develops the tension between epic ambition and pastoral form with which the poem famously opens (cf. paulo maiora canamus, Ecl. 4.1). The poet wants to sing of great deeds (implying epic, 53–54), but he imagines doing this in a rustic song contest with Pan

31 For discussion of the poet’s prayer for long life, see esp. Kraus 1980 and Courtney 2010.
(implying pastoral, 58–59). Thus, Vergil will compose “humble” pastoral poetry (humilesque myricae, Ecl. 4.2), but he will do so in a way that accommodates his dramatic extension of the traditional boundaries of the genre by somehow transforming his sylvan setting into “woods worthy of a consul” (silvae sint consule dignae, 4.3). The invocation of Linus and Orpheus here (cf. 66–67, 73) touches directly on Vergil’s complex disavowal of epic, that is, of poetry on a grand scale, while also hinting at his ambitious agenda to remake pastoral into something radically new.

While the passages differ markedly in tone and attitude, the central concerns are surprisingly analogous. Phaedrus emphasizes his own transformation from a poet wholly dependent upon a Greek original to a poet who breaks new ground, introduces new material, and permanently changes the tenor of his genre. Like Vergil in the Eclogues, Phaedrus seeks to reconcile his ambition to outstrip his model (Aesop) with his commitment to his genre’s reputation for simplicity and brevity. Throughout the five books, Phaedrus keeps his readers focused on his debt to Aesop and repeatedly makes a virtue of his own commitment to brevitas. But Phaedrus also wants to be considered an important and innovative Latin poet, which involves expressing a desire to outdo Aesop and to achieve lasting fame (e.g., 3.Prol.53), as well as more indirect demonstration (through allusion, among other strategies) of his place among the great Latin poets who came before him. At the collection’s midpoint, the project that began at 1.Prol.1 with the words Aesopus auctor has evolved into

32 Courtley 2010, 31–37. For the Callimachean background, see esp. Thomas 1983; of course, the pairing of Linus and Orpheus has its own rich history, on which see the recent discussions by Hunter 2006, 16–28; Nagy 2009, 257–300.

33 Although it is Ecl. 4 that is evoked with such specificity in 3.Prol., the ideas behind the allusion and 3.Prol.’s own status as a “proem in the middle” signal an engagement with both Ecl. 4 and 6, putting Phaedrus’ poetic program in dialogue with Vergil’s. Indeed, it is revealing that, in his discussion of these lines, Henderson 2001, 62, notes only the echoes of Ecl. 6, of which there are many in 3.Prol.: for Linoque Apollo (3.Prol.57), cf. Ecl. 6. 66–67; 73; for artium . . . chorum (3.Prol.19), cf. Phoebi chorus, Ecl. 6. 66; for qui saxa cantu movit et domuit feras / Hebrique tenuit impetus dulci mora? (of Orpheus, 3.Prol.58–59; cf., of Hesiod, quibus ille solebat / cantando rigidas deducere montibus ornos, Ecl. 6.70–71). Note also a parallel with Phaedrus at App. 2.1–2: Hoc quaecumque est Musa quod ludit mea nequitia pariter laudat et frugalitas; cf. Vergil, Ecl. 6.1–2: ludere . . . Thalia.

34 The complexities of Vergil’s poetic program come to light when Ecl. 4 and 6 are read together; see the influential discussions in Leach 1968; Segal 1969; Putnam 1970, 195–221, 342–94; Conte 1986, 100–129; Farrell 1991, 58–59, 289–314; Ross 2008.

an independent work authored by Phaedrus himself (*Phaedri*, 3. Prol. 1), who now represents himself as widening the boundaries of the genre and “thinking up more than Aesop left behind” (*et cogitavi plura quam reliquerat*, 3. Prol. 39).

For his expansion and enlargement of the traditional boundaries of the fable, Phaedrus finds in Vergil a model to describe his intentions to do something “big” in a conventionally “small” field. In a passage at 4.2.1–4 particularly relevant to our discussion, Phaedrus explicitly disavows doing anything “big” (*maius*, 2) in a double Vergilian allusion, again to the *Eclogues*:

Ioculare tibi videmur: et sane levī,
dum nil habemus māius, calamo ludimus.
Sed diligenter intuere has nenias;
quantum in pusillis utilitatem reperies!

I seem to you to be fooling, and *I do indeed wield the pen light-heartedly*, so long as I have *no very important theme*. But take a careful look into these trifles; what a lot of practical instruction you will find in tiny affairs.

The “slender reed” with which Phaedrus plays recalls Vergil’s *Ecl*. 1.10 (*ludere . . . calamo*; cf. 1.1–2; 5.2; 6.6), but Phaedrus also repeats his own disavowal of “big” (*maius*) subjects, and thus returns to a distinctly Vergilian gesture of advertising a commitment to minor, humble forms at the very moment that he transgresses traditional generic boundaries and signals far grander ambitions (cf. *Ecl*. 4 and 6). Phaedrus’ description of his fables here as “trifles” (*nenias*; cf. *viles nenias*, 3. Prol. 10) that contain far more than meets the eye (*quantum in pusillis utilitatem reperies*) also reflects his interest in presenting the fables as a kind of light-hearted play-thing in the spirit of Vergil’s self-presentation in the *Eclogues*. Indeed, the central preoccupation of Phaedrus’ poetic program is the problem of how he can expand the scope and ambition of his traditionally humble

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36 Henderson 1999 provides a concise overview of the problems associated with the contents and order of Phaedrus’ books. Discussion of Phaedrus’ independence and authority as they emerge over the course of the collection can be found in Adrados 2000, Henderson 2001, Champlin 2005, Libby 2010, and Polt 2014.

37 At 38–40, Phaedrus boasts in a similar spirit: “where (Aesop) has made a footpath (*semita*), I have built a highway (*via*).” The Callimachean (*Aitia* fr. 1.27–28 Pf.) background to Phaedrus’ road imagery has been discussed by Henderson 2001, 81–84; Gärtner 2007, 442–43; Glaubhier 2009, 263.

38 Heller 1943 discusses links between *nenia* and *ludere*. 
The problem is central to his allusive program, too, as reflected in his appropriation of Catullan poetics (e.g., *polivia* and *libellus* in 1. Prol.) and in his possibly deliberate misunderstanding of Callimachean poetics, especially in the contrast between *semita* and *via* at 3. Prol. 38, on which see Glaubier 2009.

While there may indeed be some tantalizing similarities between the genres of fable and pastoral, it seems that Phaedrus’ interest in the *Eclogues* in particular is ultimately less a matter of positing overlaps in the content or outlook of the fable and pastoral than it is a matter of the complex ways in which the two poets choreograph the surpassing of their respective Greek models and, in so doing, transform their rustic (Greek) source material into sophisticated (Latin) poetry. Both poets challenge their Greek models (Theocritus and Aesop, respectively) and, in their attempts to surpass the Greek founders of their respective traditions, both participate in a familiar pattern of Latin poets remaking Greek literary material. In each case, the process of renovation broadens the range of themes of the genre; stages contact between the timeless, rustic world of both the fable and pastoral with the real, historical and political worlds in which each poet lives; and raises the literary stakes through the apparent anti-Callimacheanism of quasi-epic ambition.

If Phaedrus’ engagement with the *Eclogues* supports the expression of some of his loftier ambitions, it also raises a number of questions. On the one hand, Phaedrus evokes Vergil in the context of comparing himself to Aesop and Anacharsis, both of whom achieved fame despite coming from the margins of the Greek-speaking world. But as much as Aesop and Anacharsis were undeniably held in high regard as sages, both were also figures whose foreignness remained absolutely central to their identity. Neither figure ever really succeeded in becoming a truly Greek author. If Phaedrus’ hope is to be accepted as a genuine “Latin” poet on the basis of the analogy, then he has chosen some particularly poor models. On the other hand, the collocation of Linus and Orpheus puts Phaedrian fable into dialogue with Vergil’s grand revision of pastoral poetics, suggesting a model for the transformation of the humble and lowly into the sophisticated and elite. Unlike Vergil’s Sinon, however, whose “animal story” infiltrated and conquered Troy, Linus and Orpheus

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40 On the complex ways in which Vergil’s two “proems in the middle” negotiate a broadening of the poet’s literary ambition, see Putnam 1970, 162.

41 To compound the confusion, Phaedrus then distances himself from Aesop and Anacharsis by claiming to be more Greek than they were, because he is from Thrace, a privileged birthplace for a poet (*ego litteratae qui sum proprior Graeciae*, 54).
famously encounter audiences whom they cannot overcome with the power of poetry. Indeed, Linus and Orpheus often appear together as two singers who suffered violent deaths, and in many traditions, deaths caused by envy (cf. *ergo hinc abesto, Livor, 3.Prol.60*). In closing his “proem in the middle,” Phaedrus reminds us that his relationship to the Thracian legends is perhaps not quite as (seemingly) simple as Vergil’s.

**4. NEC FABELLAE TE IUVANT NEC FABULAE**

Phaedrus’ poetic *persona* needs defense on various fronts: defense against critics who say that he (and his chosen genre) is not sophisticated enough and does not deserve a place among Latin poets (e.g., 4.7); defense against those who think he is devious and critical of specific individuals, including those in positions of power (e.g., 3.*Prol.*33–50); and defense against those envious of his work who would seek to challenge him as a fabulist (e.g., 2.*Epil.*). While the Vergilian allusions and, by extension, the larger framework of 3.*Prol.* as a “proem in the middle,” may defend him against such attacks by linking the fables to texts firmly established at the very core of the Latin literary tradition, Phaedrus’ distinctive manner of engaging with Vergil calls into question whether his allusive practices will in the end earn him a place alongside the works of the great poets who came before him. As we have seen, what is perhaps most striking about Phaedrus’ engagements with Vergil is the way in which they advertise his precise knowledge of Latin poetry at the very moment that they draw attention to his status as someone outside the tradition and highlight the difficulties and, indeed, dangers he faces in transforming Greek fables into a new form of Latin literature.

Before concluding, let us turn to two passages in which Phaedrus alludes to Ennius (3.*Epil.*34 and 4.7.6–16), as they involve similar dynamics to those in the Vergilian allusions we have been considering. In both passages, Phaedrus appears to go out of his way to draw attention to his readers’ indifference and skepticism toward his practices of literary allusion, which in turn complicates any attempt to evaluate his goals and motivations. First, in the closing poem of the third book (3.*Epil.*), Phaedrus again presents himself as unfairly attacked (22–23), and again seems to blur the lines between the negative critical reception of his work and the

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42 See Henriksén 2012 on Martial 9 (on 9.86.4).
possibility that he may face actual, legal prosecution. Phaedrus suggests that he has been “accused” (*reus*, 22) of some kind of punishable crime, but he does not elaborate on the matter. Then he claims he is “innocent” (*innocenti*, 23), but he does not explain whether he is referring to literary abuses or real crimes. At the end of the poem, he turns to his (unnamed) addressee, and quotes Ennius’ *Telephus* in the penultimate line of the poem (26–35):

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decerce quod religio, quod patitur fides,
    ut gratuler me stare iudicio tuo,
excedit animus quem proposui terminum,
sed difficulter continetur spiritus,
integritatis qui sincerec conscius
    a noxiorum premitur insolentiis.
qui sint, requiris? apparebunt tempore.
ego, quondam legi quam puer sententiam
    “Palam muttire plebeio piaculum est,”
dum sanitas constabit, pulchre meminero.
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Settle the matter as duty and honour permit, that I may rejoice to be supported by your decision. My feelings have carried me beyond the limit that I intended; but it is hard for a man to contain himself when he is aware of his own untainted integrity and is weighed down at the same time by the insults of those who seek to injure him. “Who are they?” you ask. They will be seen in time. As for me, as long as my wits remain unshaken, I shall keep in mind a maxim that I once read as a boy: “It is sacrilege for a man of low birth to murmur in public.”

Phaedrus depicts his addressee as incredulous and skeptical (32). The fabulist’s response to his addressee’s question (just who is critical of you?) is that he cannot say exactly who attacks him because he (Phaedrus) is *plebeius*, and it is not right (it is *piaculum*) for him to speak openly (*palam*, 34).

There are at least two significant points of contact with the passages we considered earlier. First, in an echo of 3.*Prol.*34–37, Phaedrus claims that he must be cagey and indirect because it is not safe or appropriate for him to express himself openly; as a *plebeius*, he is in a similar position to the slave (*servitus*, 34) who must conceal his true feelings (*affectus proprios*, 36) under the veil of fictionalized fables. Here, Phaedrus claims that his feelings (*animus*, 3.*Epil.*28) threaten to exceed the limits he had set himself and that he is having difficulty containing them (*difficulter continetur spiritus*, 29). Second, Phaedrus again couples the claim that he is marginalized with another precise allusion displaying his learning
and sophistication. That is, it is not simply because he is plebeius that he cannot express himself openly, it is also because he is plebeius in the same way that the hero of Ennius’ Telephus is plebeius. Moreover, Phaedrus’ offhand reference to boyhood reading habits and the demonstration of familiarity with Ennian drama undercuts his claim to be insufficiently Roman. Indeed, unlike the imagined, enslaved fable-teller at 3.Prol.33f., Phaedrus’ expression is not confined to fables (in fabellas, 36) but includes long autobiographical reflections (e.g., 3.Prol., 3.Epil.) and sophisticated literary allusion. Through such gestures Phaedrus again dips into the history of Latin poetry to associate himself with a Greek figure who is most famous for disguising his true identity and for infiltrating enemy territory with devious intent.44 If Phaedrus must prove his value by his ability to quote or otherwise demonstrate knowledge of Latin literature, he has done so in ways that ensure his readers will remain skeptical.

In a closely related poem (4.7), Phaedrus imagines a reader who “turns up (his) nose” at his writings (tu qui nasute scripta destringis mea, 4.7.1).45 This reader “disdains to read” his work (legere fastidis, 2; cf. fastidiose...recipior, 3.Prol.23), which Phaedrus (again) presents as a “genre of light jests” (iocorum...genus, 4.7.2) in the form of an “elegant little book” (libellum, 4.7.3), terms that (again) recall neoteric and Augustan poetics. In 4.7.4–5, Phaedrus suggests that his reader’s severitas (4.7.4) might be appeased (placo, 4.7.4) by putting the fable into dialogue with a more serious form of Latin literature. Specifically, Phaedrus presents an eleven-line imitation of the opening of Ennius’ Medea (4.7.6–16),46 and in so doing the fabulist hopes to win over his reader by “bringing Aesop on the stage for the first time in tragic buskins” (et in coturnis prodit Aesopus novis, 5), openly naming a practice with which he has been engaged at various points in the five books by presenting Aesopica “dressed-up” as high-brow literature. Phaedrus here explicitly addresses a concern that has surfaced in more oblique ways elsewhere in the collection: perhaps his humble fables will find acceptance if only they can be shown to accommodate precise engagements with serious and venerable literary genres.

Phaedrus’ motivations in turning to Ennian tragedy may also include reminding his readers that great Roman poets have always had complex ethnic identities (Ennius’ tria corda),47 and that the adaptation of Greek material has always involved importing to Rome stories that

46 Ennius, Medea (fr. 103 Jocelyn 1967).
47 Gell. 17.17.1. Ennius was also a fable-teller, cf. Satires fr. 21–58 and fr. 65 Vahlen.
celebrate sneaky “outsiders” who can turn dangerous once inside: Medea is described as “subtly cloaking her savage will in many ways” (*saevum ingenium variis involvens modis*, 4.7.14), in a line that recalls the schemes of Phaedrus’ metapoetic weasel at 4.2.12–13 (*involvit se farina et obscuro loco / abiecit neclegenter*; cf. App. 7.17–18). But none of this matters to Phaedrus’ imagined reader, for whom Phaedrus’ engagement with Ennian tragedy fails to achieve the desired effect. The imitation of the opening of Ennian’ *Medea* is called “tasteless” (*insulsum*) and “false” (*falso dictum*, 17–18), but the only reason given for the reader’s rejection of Phaedrus is that the opening of the *Medea* contains a falsehood. After all, Minos had sailed on the Aegean sea long before the Argo (4.7.19–20). By focusing fussily on this pseudo-historical point in Phaedrus’ tragic lines, the constructed critic comes off as simply impossible to please. No matter how completely Phaedrus alters his “Aesopus”—here simply abandoning fable altogether and imitating Ennus (cf. *Aesopus in coturnis*)—he will still be judged as *insulsum*, and he will always be rejected.

Phaedrus shoots back at his skeptical reader with a retort that seems to cut to the heart of his vexed allusive program (4.7.21–24):

> quid ergo possum facere tibi, lector Cato, if nec fabellae te iuvant nec fabulae?
> noli molestus esse omnino litteris,
> maiorem exhibeant ne tibi molestiam.

What, then, can I possibly do for you, reader Cato, if neither fables nor tragedies suit your taste? Don’t meddle with literature at all, lest it confront you with greater annoyance than you bring upon it.

By framing his elaborate and elegant imitation of the opening of Ennian’ *Medea* in 4.7 with the skeptical and ultimately disparaging response of his imagined reader, Phaedrus highlights a tension that percolates beneath the surface of the collection and, indeed, periodically in the reception of his work. Phaedrian allusions develop the idea that the Greek fable transformed into Latin verse is destined to be both a part of literary history and somehow permanently outside of it. Despite numerous demonstrable links between fable-telling and major Latin literary genres, Phaedrus ensures that his place in Latin literary history is never quite safely established.

As much as he may express a desire to be happily preserved alongside Vergil and Ennius (and Catullus and Horace, among others), Phaedrus is just as insistent that his readers view him as a threatening outsider. It is worth recalling a claim made by Travis (1940, 582) that there is “nothing more striking in the vocabulary of Phaedrus than the constant recurrence of the adjective improbus” (it occurs fourteen times). Phaedrus never refers to himself as improbus (“roguish”), but the label stuck to him nonetheless; as it happens, improbus is the only descriptor in the one notice of Phaedrus before the fifth century: improbi iocos Phaedri (Martial 3.20.5). Like the disguised Telephus and the cloaked Medea, the victimized Orpheus and Linus, and the bad-but-triumphant Sinon, Phaedrus sets out to slip past the guardians of Roman literary culture and to triumph over his adversaries, armed only with his animal tales, but he does not want the roguish nature of his constructed identity to be forgotten. As we have seen, the subtlety and depth of Phaedrus’ allusions both undercut the claim that he is a complete outsider and further court suspicion by associating the fabulist with threatening forms of Greek cleverness. It seems to be entirely in keeping with this agenda that his work quietly positioned itself in the canon with barely a notice, and that the single descriptor applied to him in antiquity was improbus.

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49 See also Postgate 1919; cf. Jennings 2009, 245.