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Review Of "Education And Middle-Class Society In Imperial Austria, 1848-1918" By G.B. Cohen

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Gary B. Cohen, *Education and Middle-Class Society in Imperial Austria, 1848–1918*

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Review by: Pieter M. Judson

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Eighteen essays by nineteen scholars, 662 pages of text, 110 pages of notes: no wonder these two volumes provide less a history of young people, as they promise, than a variety of perspectives and insights about their doings here and there. Most chapters are informative, a few are leaden, their scholarship more evident than style. Volume 1 takes us from ancient Greece to seventeenth-century Italy, volume 2 continues to the mid-twentieth century. Both offer ample, sometimes illuminating, references to art history and suggestive illustrations; both, unsurprisingly in a work first published in Italy (1994) and France (1996), dwell heavily on those two countries; and both privilege social over biological definitions of their subject(s). Therefore the young people they describe range from striplings to young men. Girls receive some attention, but not much; their dowries are more interesting than their doings. Women attract notice when providing social and financial support, as when Guinevere gives Lancelot “abundance of gold and silver and the sumptuous presents” that permit him to behave generously, as befits a knight (1:157).

On the whole, though, “youth” here indicates males. That may be just as well since, as Sabina Loriga opens her essay on the military experience, “War wears the face of youth” (2:11). That’s poetry, of course; and Loriga demonstrates that this was not really so in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century armies, where thirty- and forty-year-olds sometimes outnumbered teens. This began to change with nineteenth-century conscription, which also cleared out young boys, women, and other civilian camp-followers. Military service turned into a rite of passage, and the “class” of draft-age young gained a new identity. Not war per se, but belligerence, marked youth: blustery, irascible, and turbulent. If one common theme emerges from the disparate contributions, it is of the young as agents of disruption. Courage, arrogance, ferocity were characteristic of the juvenes that Cicero talked about (1:70); and ferox adolescents, while spirited, were as reckless and undisciplined as Roland later proved.

Norbert Schindler’s essay, “Guardians of Disorder,” argues that “only the class-stratified society of the industrial era” dramatized youth as menace (1:242). Most of the collection tells a different story. Christiane Marchello-Nizia’s chapter on courtly chivalry characterizes chansons de geste as a “poetics of joyful genocide” and describes their young heroes as full of “destructive, murderous joy” (1:144). Writing about the young in medieval imagery, Michel Pastoureau describes them as noisy, turbulent, violent, and dangerous. Green is the color of youth, and impetuous green knights “unfailingly provoke disorder” (1:237).

Elizabeth Crouzet-Pavan’s reflections on young men in medieval Italy, “A Flower of
Evil,” bristles with contemporary condemnations: dissipation, license, excess, lots of sodomy (perhaps, as in ancient Greece, pederastic couples represented “the true ideal of martial comradeship and lofty aspiration?”) (1:16). As in the comedies of Plautus, spendthrifts dreamed of their father’s death to pay their debts, and sometimes moved on to parricide in real life. More visibly, bands of violent children, gangs, gang rapes, vandalism, thieving, and brawls “without cause” or “out of malice” (1:188) demonstrated prowess and made terror reign.

Brutality, arrogance, and self-assertion were not confined to towns. In Grisons villages, described by Schindler, young men were known as Matti—madmen (1:250)—evocative of recent and contemporary locutions describing reckless belligerents: loco, fou, crazy. “Wild” village bands, their playfulness close to vandalism, manned local militias, organized carnival and charivaris, but also frightened folk: “typical of young men’s behavior” (1:258). They were no different from the village youths whose doings Daniel Fabre traces in a fine essay on “Doing Youth” (faire la jeunesse) in an Occitan village, where the boundary is quickly crossed from the licit “boys will be boys” to unacceptable “hooliganism” (2:61).

If the disruptive activities of rowdy youth surface less often, though often enough, in volume 2, that is in part because, as the nineteenth century ends, compulsory elementary schooling and conscript armies conspired to inculcate literacy, civics, hygiene, and a common language, but also acculturated, domesticated, house-trained, and civilized more of the young and soothed some savage breasts. Education, as François Guizot explained, would anchor social order. More or less. Even Jean-Claude Caron’s chapter on schools features a section on youthful violence that ranged from hazing, ragging, and interschool brawls to college riots, mutinies, violent rebellions, and bloody battles put down by armed force (2:151–59).

Sergio Luzzatto’s splendid overview of young rebels and revolutionaries between 1789 and 1917 describes one reason why “young people inspired fear throughout the 19th century” (2:175): politics. Beginning after Thermidor, as Luzzatto tells us, when gangs of muscadins replaced equally terroristic Jacobins, a variety of Jeunes—young German, young Poland, young Switzerland, Jeunes France, and, of course, young Europe—etched out a revolutionary geography of the continent. “Dangerous Boys,” as Daumier’s cartoon portrayed them (2:209), attacked old regimes and “Old Corruption” before moving on to attack their elders. As Honore de Balzac warned, increasingly controlled, restrained, and governed youth “burst out like the boiler of a steam engine” (2:133). It continued to do so with “dangerous dynamism” (2:291) even under Mussolini; or in the gangs, mobs, and other groups of wild votaries of jazz, “hot,” and swing pursued by the Gestapo.

All chapters, even dull ones, have interesting things to tell; but some relevant questions are not broached. Religion does not even make the index. The role of nineteenth-century schools in training rebels and that of twentieth-century schools in keeping millions off the labor market are ignored. The upswings of juvenile delinquency in wartime, when the policed surface strains and cracks, are not considered; nor are the excuses that resistance (and liberation) offer to transgressors. Only a section of the final chapter provides a cursory look at America in the fifties, encapsulated between the Federal Youth Corrections Act of 1951 and the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961, and reflected in two significant films of 1955: Rebel without a Cause and The Blackboard Jungle. Those who have read to that point will know that, despite its anachronistic presentism, Paul Goodman’s Growing Up Absurd (1960) reflected continuity, not rupture.

The crowd is lonelier today than it once was, but the need to prove one’s prowess is
just as ardent; the world is very different, but is no less absurd perhaps than it could seem in Cicero’s day, or Plato’s, to those poorly integrated in it. Parricide would be less relevant when fathers are less in evidence than they were, but challenging gerontocracy (a word coined in the nineteenth century) is as popular; so is hooliganism (another nineteenth-century coinage for rowdysim of old). The “orgy of order” of new “enlightened” states that discomforts Schindler (1:279) did not go far or last for very long. Gangs still assert themselves over territory, village, or street, ruling by force and intimidation. More generally, the young continue to disturb. As this review is written, the New York Times (June 26, 1997) reports that American adults view young people with alarm or fear and find them “rude,” “wild,” and “irresponsible.” What the young think about their elders is less accessible. We know what the young, some young, do, not what they think; and this history, like all histories, reflects documentation bound to remain one-sided.

Within those limits, one is moved to ask, what else is new? Our daily newspapers chronicle “the bloody vicissitudes of struggles between factions” (1:202) that Crouzet-Pavan related to medieval Italy, where “the law of the giovani was a law of total license” (1:220). “Scoundrels ruled the streets” in medieval cities (1:219), and children were quick to violence there too (1:218). Not much seems to have changed, not even the inevitable exaggerations; and nineteenth-century “complaints about the arbitrary reign of terror imposed by young men’s groups” (1:280) carry familiar sounds to late-twentieth-century ears. On June 23, 1997, the New York Times quoted the pastor of a Baptist Church in Flint, Michigan, where three teenagers fell to murderous thieves, describing violent local youths: “‘They don’t have a conscience,’ he said. ‘They will step on someone just like I step on this blade of grass here.’”

That may not be what the editors had in mind when they set out “to emphasize the specific nature of youth” and “its marginal or liminal character” (1:1, 2). But there it is: the centrality of marginal violence is nothing new. The flags over the liminal masses may change color, but they flutter as ominously as ever.

EUGEN WEBER

University of California, Los Angeles


Making few concessions to the general reader, this rich, detailed, capacious book plunges deeply into what used to be called “the Eastern Question” from the standpoint of the Damascus Affair of 1840, a clash of local, international, religious, ethnic, and political interests over a charge that dated back to the twelfth century in Europe—that Jews in the ancient Syrian capital had committed a ritual murder, killing an Italian monk and his servant in order to steal their blood and use it for ceremonial purposes. For months, as the ghastly process proceeded—interrogating the accused, hunting down suspects, and torturing supposed witnesses—wild polemics whipped up imaginations both on the spot and across Europe. To many Jews, it seemed like a return to the Middle Ages. In response, the Jewish world mobilized in its own defense. In France, the famous trial lawyer and liberal journalist Adolphe Cremieux, vice-president of the Jewish Consistory, spoke up for the Jews, as did the Baron James de Rothschild, whose family’s wealth and influence were celebrated in the Jewish world. In England, the leading
champion was Sir Moses Montefiore, president of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, related to the Rothschilds by marriage, and an acquaintance of the viceroy of Egypt, Muhammed Ali.

In the classic, 1870 interpretation of this affair by the Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz, the Damascus Affair was understood as a momentous confrontation between ancient prejudices and the advancing tide of European civilization. According to this understanding, the fanatic instincts of the Muslim mob, the corruption of the local authorities, and the blindly antisemitic prejudices of some of the Christian inhabitants of Damascus had conspired to revive an ancient libel and to defame the entire Jewish people. To Graetz, and to many subsequent Jewish interpreters, the successful mission to the Middle East of a Jewish delegation headed by Cremieux and Montefiore was a sign that European civilization was on a march toward the full integration of the Jews, even as barbarous residues remained, particularly in the mysterious East, and also that a modern, proud, self-assertive Jewish community was capable of international action on its own behalf. Thanks to the Jewish campaign in 1840, and with the help of outspoken Christian leaders who brought pressure to bear on the rickety governance of the Ottoman Empire, and thanks finally to enlightened opinion in Europe, the historic blood libel was finally discredited. As the author points out, this view of 1840 “expressed the liberal faith of the Jewish intelligentsia in the period of emancipation” (p. 432), and it remained the classic view even afterward, when there were ample reasons to reexamine some of the fundamental premises of that era.

In the first full-dress account of the Damascus Affair in more than a century and a half, Jonathan Frankel of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem challenges this view in some fundamental ways and provides a much-needed integration of the affair into its Middle Eastern and international context. Looking closely at the way the accusation of ritual murder escalated in Damascus (and also on the island of Rhodes, where a similar affair played itself out), the author establishes that the mainspring of the accusation was not the Muslim population but rather the European consular corps, especially the French envoy Count Benoît Ulysse-Laurent-François Ratti Menton. Unluckily, the Jews in Damascus became pawns in a highly intricate game of power politics played out between the various European capitals, the Ottoman leadership in Constantinople, the ambitious Muhammed Ali in Alexandria, and his subordinate in Egyptian-occupied Syria, Governor-General Sherif Pasha. Once launched, the affair attracted European interference like a bear to a honey pot. Newspapers fastened on the sensational side of the story, and a surprising number of respected journals either supported the accusation or held its veracity to be an open question. European rulers took sides, too—Count Metternich in Austria, Lord Palmerston in England, Tsar Nicholas I in Russia, and Adolphe Thiers in France—jockeying for position in a continuing contest for influence in the Ottoman Empire, a contest that threatened the peace of Europe. Tellingly, the Jews received the strongest support from the supposedly reactionary Habsburg Empire and faced the most consistent opposition from the France of the Louis-Philippe, supposedly heir to the liberal and emancipatory traditions of the French Revolution. Mainly, according to Frankel, this is explicable with reference to power politics, heavily preoccupied with the question of who would hold sway in the Egyptian territories of the Ottoman Empire.

More deeply, Frankel notes at the conclusion of his exhaustive and splendidly researched study, the affair revealed how the new, democratic order in Europe was no guarantee of Jewish security and “was potentially more dangerous for Jews than the old” (p. 441). During the affair, myth making about Jews appeared in the most unlikely places. Demagogic charges and inflammatory rhetoric sprang to the lips of democratic
politicians and to the columns of otherwise sober publications. And far from disappearing in the second half of the nineteenth century, accusations of ritual murder recurred, drawing on the mythic residues of the Damascus Affair—elements of which persist in the Middle East even today. The affair also generated a mythology for Jews, as the author points out. In refutation of the charges in Damascus, Jewish protonationalism came to the surface, as did a Christian protozionism inspired by hopes of converting the Jews and preparing the way for the coming of the Messiah.

Frankel takes us slowly through this cause célèbre, moving from one event, and one opinion, and one location, and one reaction to the next. This is not a book for the impatient reader and is not an account with interpretative waystations, enabling one easily to skim. If there is any information on the affair left out of these nearly 500 pages it must be truly insignificant. This is a learned, thorough, demanding, wide-ranging, and carefully considered work.

Michael R. Marrus

University of Toronto

Enlightenment and Religion: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain.
Edited by Knud Haakonssen. Ideas in Context, volume 41. Edited by Quentin Skinner et al.

In recent years British historians have shown a renewed appreciation for the centrality of religion to Stuart and Hanoverian political life. Whether in reappraising the Civil War, the Restoration, or the “long” eighteenth century, a predominantly secular academy appears to have “found” religion. A collection of essays on the so-called Rational Dissenters, Enlightenment and Religion provides more evidence of this conversion to the idea that religion mattered to early modern Britons. This volume attests to the continuing vitality and fruitfulness of this line of historical inquiry, making an important contribution to the debate over the politics and culture of those Britons refusing to conform to the established church.

The Protestant Dissent with which this book is concerned dates from the 1660s, when the government sought to enforce religious orthodoxy in the wake of the Civil War and Interregnum by penalizing those who could not accept the doctrines and episcopal government of the Church of England. Not repealed until 1828, the Corporation Act (1661) and the Test Act (1673) excluded Dissenters from civil and military posts. This as well as subsequent discriminatory legislation faced eighteenth-century Quakers, Methodists, Congregationalists, Baptists, and Presbyterians, and from these last three Dissenting confessions, “Rational” or “Enlightened” Dissent emerged as an alternative to orthodox Calvinism. Extolling a rationalistic and natural religion rather than a revealed one, many Rational Dissenters questioned the doctrine of the Trinity, and some became full-blown Unitarians. Convinced that neither churches nor governments ought to impose religious dogma on individual consciences, they championed religious liberty.

As the editor, Knud Haakonssen, reminds us in his introduction, the story of Rational Dissent is “exceedingly complex” (p. 7), and indeed the contributors usefully complicate it by overturning a number of received notions. David L. Wykes takes the famous Warrington Academy down a peg or two, questioning both its influence and its curriculum. In terms of the number of ministers produced and the theology and ethics taught,
the Dissenting academy at Daventry was actually “the more important for liberal Dissenters” (p. 136). M. A. Stewart shows that the philosopher Francis Hutcheson’s theological moderation owed as much to his experience with Irish Dissent as to his studies at Glasgow. Martin Fitzpatrick argues that undue attention to its leaders, Richard Price and Joseph Priestly, has obscured the diversity of thought within Rational Dissent and overemphasized its reformist character (pp. 83–85). In separate essays John Seed and Alan Saunders correct the caricature of Dissenters as fire-breathing revolutionaries by underscoring their social conservatism (pp. 164–65, 241–42). Wilfrid Prest goes too far, however, in trying to claim novelty for Priestley’s “emphasis on the law’s value as a source of historical evidence” (p. 187); decades earlier, Robert Brady and Laurence Echard, among others, had incorporated important legal evidence into their histories of England.

For many contributors to this volume, the works of J. C. D. Clark (English Society, 1688–1832 [Cambridge, 1985]) and James E. Bradley (Religion, Revolution, and English Radicalism [Cambridge, 1990]) provide the major scholarly points of reference for the politics of Dissent. Crudely put, Clark has emphasized the socially and politically unifying impact of an Anglican hegemony, while Bradley has instead stressed the religious and political pluralism of English society. By demonstrating how the political activism of a metropolitan coterie of Dissenters radiated into the provinces, Seed lends some support to Bradley’s thesis. By documenting the success of Dissenters in pursuing legal careers, Prest confirms Bradley’s point that some scholars have exaggerated the effectiveness of penal legislation in excluding Dissenters from the professions. Several essays seek to refine the theology found in Clark and Bradley. Saunders takes Bradley to task for minimizing theological differences along the broad spectrum of Dissent (pp. 246–49), while John Gascoigne criticizes both Bradley and Clark for failing to appreciate the significance of the latitudinarian tradition on the Church of England’s liberal wing (p. 221). A. M. C. Waterman’s essay offers the book’s most concerted theological exposition of Rational Dissent. Taking up Clark’s suggestion that political radicalism was a logical consequence of the Socinian heresy, Waterman posits that a denial of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation brought “the entire structure of establishment social theory” (p. 216) crashing down. When Rational Dissenters attacked the Christian claim that Jesus Christ served as mediator between God and man, they upset the principle of subordination in both church and state, a concept traditionally expressed in terms of a “head” having authority over the interdependent “members” of an intermingled ecclesiastical and civil “body.” Although Waterman admits that Socinians did not of necessity come to hold democratic principles, his exegesis of orthodox Anglican ecclesiology generally endorses Clark’s theoretical linkage of political and religious heterodoxy.

More significant than this book’s helping to fill out a scorecard on the Bradley-Clark contest, however, is its commitment to theology. As the essays by R. K. Webb on rational piety, Alan Tapper on Priestley’s theodicy, and Iain McCalman on philosemitic millenarianism also make clear, if we are going to study the history of religion, then we must obviously learn some theology. In this regard, Waterman’s technical mastery of both orthodox and heretical theologies marks a high point in a volume that is not without a few low points. An intermittent lack of focus prevents the book from really hitting its stride until chapter 5, while an incomplete index and an occasional failure to furnish sufficient background may discourage neophytes. Some contributors have not kept up with the literature, almost entirely neglecting, for example, Clark’s The Language of Liberty, 1660–1832 (Cambridge, 1994), which in fact highlights the religious divisions within English society. Moreover, this volume tends to assume a relationship between Dissent and its other announced theme, the Enlightenment, rather than to explore that
relationship explicitly. These reservations aside, *Enlightenment and Religion* powerfully enriches our understanding of its subject. Anyone interested in the varieties of British religious experience or in eighteenth-century political culture will profit handsomely from reading this book.

**Philip Hicks**

*Saint Mary's College, Indiana*


Here is a book that deserves a wider readership than its $70.00 (predictably prohibitive Clarendon) price will allow, for it is the most careful, scholarly, and disinterested look to date at what William Cobbett famously and unforgottably called “Old Corruption.” Corruption: “perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favor,” my dictionary says, and this is broadly what Cobbett meant. For him, the term suggested a parasitic system—“The Thing,” he sometimes called it—that taxed the wealth of the nation and diverted it into the undeserving pockets of a “narrow political clique whose only claim to privileged status,” Harling explains, “was its proximity to the sources of patronage” (p. 1). More insidious and far-reaching than simple favoritism, Old Corruption was “a unique political formation” (p. 1) that in the early nineteenth century had a number of distinctive features, including sinecures, reverted offices, undeserved or excessive pensions, places, and what Cobbett called “jobs” (fraudulent government contracts). Its significance to the workings of eighteenth and early nineteenth century politics has long been appreciated, but Harling’s is the first systematic study of its extent and, more especially, its demise. *The Waning of “Old Corruption”* is best read, I think, as a study in the making of the famously frugal, relatively pure, mid-Victorian state.

Harling would have us read it more expansively as a study in the persistence of the old regime. How was it, he asks, that England’s narrow landed elite managed to retain its political power right through the Age of Revolution and on into the Victorian era? If the economic flexibility of the English elite, together with its dexterity in shaping a new ethic of respectability, accounts for its social resilience, what, Harling asks, accounts for its political resilience in an age of gathering democracy? His answer, in a phrase, is economical reform. By removing the grievances that lay at the heart of the Cobbettite challenge to oligarchy, by reducing and redistributing the tax burden, that is, by eliminating sinecures and pensions, by purposefully dedicating itself to public service rather than the defense of privilege, the Pittite elite was able to insulate itself from charges of Old Corruption and sustain itself in power. What we have, then, is “a ruling-class success story” (p. 2), one that focuses on the cleanup in government as an explanation for the dissipation of radical energies after 1840.

This aspect of Harling’s book is, I think, a little overwrought and tends to obscure the greater significance of social changes such as factory reform to the preservation of (the old) order. But that “the politics of economical reform has not been given its due in explanations of the transformation of the British state from the immensely expensive military juggernaut of the late Georgian era . . . to the ‘cheap government’ of the mid-Victorian era” (p. 6), one can well believe, and this is where Harling’s book is most valuable. He has traced the origins of the minimalist state into the 1780s, when Pitt
and his followers began to champion frugality and honest stewardship not as ends in themselves but as means of securing broader public confidence in government. Pitt’s accomplishments as a fiscal reformer are well known, and Harling does not belabor them. Instead, he links them usefully and originally to the declining fortunes after 1780 of the parliamentary reform movement. The case for reform had always rested on suspicions of ministerial extravagance, and Harling is thus able to show how a 30 percent reduction in government spending between 1783 and 1792 had the effect of killing off interest in constitutional change.

From 1793, of course, the vast expense of the French Wars slowed the pace of administrative reform and sullied Pitt’s reputation for disinterested management. The same William Pitt who had been the hope of reformers in the 1780s was, by the time he died in 1806, the widely despised architect of a nefarious “System” that had to be rooted out. These transformations were largely matters of perception, and Harling is able convincingly to show that, even as the Cobbettite attack on Old Corruption reached its height toward the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Pitt’s successors were working responsibly to eliminate it. Radical historians have relied heavily on John Wade’s sensationalist Black Book of 1820 to affirm the notion of a regency state shot through with Old Corruption, but Harling actually scrutinizes the Black Book and finds it a tissue of tendentious allegations and “misleading inaccuracies” (p. 148). Old Corruption was less a fact, he concludes, than a perception, a sort of “metaphor for a wide assortment of war-related social, political, and economic changes that [popular radicals] presumed to be detrimental to the people’s well being” (p. 150).

This point is unassailable, it seems to me, and suggests the need for a more culturalist study of Old Corruption than Harling is disposed to offer. Having arrived midway through his book at the recognition of Old Corruption as metaphor, he proceeds to complete the story of its waning through a point-by-point history of administrative reform. Against those historians (W. D. Rubinstein chief among them) who have seen Old Corruption growing fatter and fatter until 1832, only then to be dismantled by reform-minded Whigs, Harling sees it growing leaner and leaner in the 1810s and 1820s, thanks to the admittedly defensive efforts of Tory reformers motivated less by meritocratic ideology than by a natural disposition to preserve their claim on power. It is an interesting and important, if ultimately unsurprising, finding. It adds a dimension of explanation to the persistence of the old regime and helps considerably to lengthen our perspective on the origins of the liberal, disinterested, let us say, Gladstonian, state.

Stewart A. Weaver

University of Rochester


Simon Green’s revisionist study of the decline of organized religion in three industrial cities of West Yorkshire is a major contribution to the history of modern European religion. Although unwilling to launch a frontal assault on secularization theory, Green challenges two of its most important elements at the levels of causation and chronology. Urbanization in his story is not a cause of religious decline, as in the classic theory of secularization, but instead an opportunity for religious expansion. Furthermore, from a late twentieth-century perspective, the decisive turning point in English religious his-
tory is no longer the late eighteenth-century industrial revolution or the mid-nineteenth-century crisis of faith but the institutional decline of the Protestant churches in the decade preceding World War I. (A second wave of decline, beyond the scope of this book and encompassing Roman Catholicism, occurred only in the 1960s.) Many scholars have called the theory of secularization into question. Green goes further and tells a new story of early twentieth-century decline without reference to the hidden hand of secularization.

In Green's account, the history of nineteenth-century religion is a story of aggressive institutional adaptation to a new religious situation. No longer taken for granted as essential to the social order, the churches of urban Europe refashioned themselves as voluntary institutions campaigning for both influence and members, with innovations that encompassed unprecedented forms of piety and entirely new institutions. The success or failure of nineteenth-century urban churches was not a foregone conclusion but depended on their organizational efficiency and their ability to negotiate the dangerous shoals of social stratification and political polarization.

In three industrial cities of West Yorkshire—Halifax, Keighley, and Denholme—the churches had achieved by the late nineteenth century a pervasive religious presence, one strongly marked by social class but transcending class boundaries. Although a minority of the population were regular, Sunday-morning church attenders, a majority were drawn into religious institutions for the traditional rites of passage and the Christmas and Easter services, or for urban innovations such as harvest festivals, Sunday School anniversaries, New Year's watch night services, church and chapel choirs, flower services, and “fruit banquets.” Green is particularly good at explicating the decentralized finances of urban religious expansion. Wading through hundreds of financial accounts, minute books, parish and chapel histories, and biographies of clergymen and ministers, he explains (among other things) the economics of the church bazaar and the logic behind the displacement of pew rents by the weekly offertory envelopes. He provides the reader with a strong sense of place and an even stronger sense of the tenacious commitment of late nineteenth-century men and women to their churches and chapels.

The most successful of the churches' achievements was the Sunday School, which drew all but the very poorest, and very wealthiest, of West Yorkshire urban children. Green explains how Sunday Schools became popular, communal institutions, and how they contributed in a wholly unanticipated way to the decline of the churches and the subsequent decline of religious belief in the twentieth century. The Sunday School was based on a new psychology of the relationship between adolescence and religion. Designed to provide a form of religion custom-tailored for the young, they inadvertently propagated the notion that Sunday School attendance is the quintessential religious observance and that religion is only or especially for the young. By the early twentieth century, Sunday scholars graduated, not to regular church attendance but to indifference, sending their own children off to Sunday School while sleeping in on Sunday.

Other internal bureaucratic changes contributed to the decline of the churches. A new liturgical emphasis was especially noticeable in the Nonconformist churches, where ministers stressed Sunday-morning church attendance, regular communion, and even chanting in church, thus widening the gap between official religion and the popular piety of the Harvest Festival and Sunday School anniversary. Green documents the ways in which church leaders simultaneously became demoralized over falling church attendance and less interested in religious recruitment, concentrating on the “quality” of religion among the shrinking remnant of churchgoers while ignoring the task of replenishing the church membership rolls.

Green’s focus on the inner working of church administration and debate has its costs,
leaving him little time to concentrate on important external changes that made the churches’ task more difficult. For example, he says little about the institutionalization of state-funded primary education which, with its prominent religious component, made the role of the churches more marginal. In West Yorkshire, as in Europe generally, the churches fought hard for religious influence in education, politics, and later broadcasting. Time devoted to extending their influence over nonattenders was time taken away from recruiting new members, an essential task of any voluntary organization. Further, in his focus on the young, Green neglects the distinctive generation gap within the Nonconformist chapels and only mentions in passing the heavily gendered character of religious practice.

Green contributes to a growing body of scholarship in the social history of European urban religion—by Mark Smith, Hugh McLeod, Callum Brown, Peter Van Rooden, Hans Otte, Thomas Kselman and others—that calls into question any predictable link between religious decline and urbanization. The implications of that argument for the broad history of religion in modern Europe deserve careful attention. In general histories of twentieth-century Europe, the churches are barely mentioned except to note their obsolescence. The decline of religion is attributed to the delayed but irresistible effects of industrialization and urbanization or to the receding sea of faith in the nineteenth century, which made religion less plausible. Green implies that the decline of orthodox Christian religious belief in the twentieth century is a consequence, not a cause, of the decline of the churches. Internal changes in the churches affected their ability to recruit. Instead of ceasing to attend church because they ceased to believe, people ceased to believe because they no longer attended church.

Jeffrey Cox

University of Iowa


Simon Szreter’s monumental work builds on a Cambridge Ph.D. dissertation completed in 1984, but we learn from the acknowledgments that the seeds were sown much earlier by Peter Laslett. The result is an arguably overlong but nearly always stimulating treatise in intellectual, social, and demographic history. In effect Szreter offers two books in one. The first is a critical history of earlier interpretations of the decline in marital fertility in England and Wales and of the thinking that influenced the General Registration Office for England and Wales (pts. II and III). The second offers Szreter’s own model of that fertility decline and a test of it with 1911 census data (pts. III and IV).

Throughout Szreter’s target is what the dust-jacket blurb dubs the “national, unitary, class-differential model of fertility decline.” He submits this “professional” model to a cross-sectional test with data from the 1911 census of England and Wales, which included a special section on marital fertility. The outcome is a rejection of the story of gradation from professional to working-class, blue-collar couples. It turns out that there is considerable variation across occupations within broad aggregated classes (class 1–class 5) and several anomalous patterns. By the same token Szreter dismisses the famous Princeton model of convergence through modernization as well as the traditional emphasis on the primacy of a shifting cultural norm toward the small family type.
Szreter promises a “general” approach applicable to “a variety of historical and even contemporary contexts” (p. 5).

How does Szreter account for the anomalies left unexplained by the professional model? For him the driving mechanism behind fertility decline was not cultural change but a rise in what he calls “the perceived relative costs of childbearing” from the final decades of the nineteenth century on (p. 445). This may sound like just another way of describing the cost of children as measured by followers of economist Gary Becker. However, there are very few pounds, shillings, and pence in this work, and Szreter deems economic considerations secondary, referring to the “rich range of meanings” for “perceived relative costs” (p. 445). He stresses the impact of institutional factors such as trade unions, factory legislation, compulsory schooling for children, and the earning power of women—as if these were outside the realm of economic calculation. True, the impact of such factors is not easy to measure, but it is not impossible. Qualitatively, Szreter is quite persuasive, but this reader is left with the sense of a rich, implicitly economic model, not rigorously tested.

The main quantitative focus, both in the rejection of the “professional model” and the test of Szreter’s proposed alternative formulation, is on the range of fertility variation found in the census of England and Wales for 1911. Focusing on the fertility of unions involving twenty- to twenty-four-year-old brides who married between 1881 and 1885 reveals a huge variation, ranging from an average of 3.2 children for barristers and men of means to 6.6 for bricklayers and 7.5 for coal miners. Unionized workers with dependent wives (e.g., in mining areas) had lots of children; lower-paid workers who were not unionized and had economically active working wives (e.g., in cotton textile districts) had fewer children.

The database is subject to a number of limitations. First, focusing mainly on the cross-sectional riches offered by the 1911 census means that the time-series dimension cannot be adequately covered. Second, the aggregated data as presented make it difficult to separate out the effects of geography and economics. Third, the census concentrates on the averages for each occupational category, but it also matters a lot how much variation was within occupational categories and what accounts for such variation. Though the discussion notes the importance of factors such as geography, religion, education, and the urban/rural divide, their quantitative impact is not measured. Household-level data like those available to researchers in Irish or U.S. demographic history would be a help.

Szreter offers a judicious critique of earlier survey evidence in arguing that attempted abstinence was the most widely used method of birth control before 1914, with artificial contraceptives becoming increasingly important after then, and abortions still relatively few in the 1930s. He also marshals a compelling case for the importance of “spacing” as distinct from “stopping” as a birth-control strategy. Traditional interpretations of the fertility decline were parity-specific, and the Princeton model stresses the strategy of stopping at some target number of children. However, the 1911 census contains strong evidence for the alternative scenario of couples spacing the target number of births over the fertility span. Such an interpretation was argued by Stanford economic historian Paul David for the United States and for Ireland in the 1980s; here Szreter presents the case for England and Wales, largely on the basis of other evidence. As he notes, family planning activist Marie Stopes was an enthusiastic proponent of “spacing,” and the letters to her from hundreds of correspondents in the 1910s and later sought information on precisely this point.

Despite the promise in the title, Szreter does not offer the reader much about trends in Scotland. Nor is he precise on how his model might be translated to other settings.
or on how the relative power of the factors listed above in different settings might be measured. One senses that the model was built to fit the data, rather than the data analyzed to test a ready-made, generally applicable model. Had it been the other way around, he might have adopted a less insular and more comparative stance. But, such reservations aside, one leaves this long book respectful of its clever arguments and illustrations and convinced of the need to consult it often in the future.

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Vivre en prison au XVIIIe siècle: Lettres de Pantaléon Gougis vigneron chartrain (1758–1762). By Benoît Garnot. La France au fil des siècles. Edited by Françoise Hildesheimer and Odile Krakovitch.


Thanks to Benoît Garnot, we can now add Pantaléon Gougis to the select company of crafty commoners in premodern Europe whose stories are illuminating the humble face of the past. Like his sixteenth-century predecessors, the Friulian miller Menocchio (C. Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms [Baltimore, 1980]) and the Gascon peasant-turned-soldier Arnaud du Tilh (N. Z. Davis, The Return of Martin Guerre [Cambridge 1983]), Gougis, a peasant from Chartres, ran afoul of the authorities in mid-eighteenth-century France. Accused of arson in 1758, when he was thirty-nine years old, Gougis spent four years in the Conciergerie prison in Paris, followed by a brief stint at Bicêtre before his release in 1762. Garnot's slim volume brings these events to life through the eyes of a resilient peasant who, despite the loss of his fortune, maintained his faith that justice would ultimately be served.

Garnot's book consists of three sections. The introduction establishes the historical context of the documents, making them accessible to a nonspecialist audience. This opening is followed by a chronologically arranged series of forty-four letters written while Gougis was a prisoner at the Conciergerie from 1758 to 1762. Garnot has reproduced the letters but has corrected spelling and punctuation absent from the originals. Thus, his text conveys the flavor of Gougis's style while removing the barriers that might deter a modern reader. Gougis's letters are followed by a brief correspondence between two notaries, the Chartresian Leroy and the Parisian Dahault, who dedicated themselves to securing Gougis's release from Bicêtre. Finally, Garnot includes relevant financial documents, family charts, and a glossary of eighteenth-century judicial terms.

Gougis came from a family of peasant farmers who lived in the faubourg Saint-Jean situated just outside the walls of the medieval cathedral town of Chartres. The evidence suggests that Gougis was a comfortable peasant who owned his own land, hired men to work his fields, and even kept a domestic servant. Like many eighteenth-century cultivators, Gougis diversified his crops, planting a combination of cereals on the majority of his land while reserving a small amount of soil for grapes. In 1740, at age twenty, Gougis married Marie-Catherine Courtois, the daughter of a neighboring peasant family. Obliged to marry young because Marie-Catherine was pregnant, relations between the two quickly soured. Although they produced four more children, the two spouses spent many of the ensuing eighteen years apart. In August of 1758, the couple filed for a separation. While the courts were reviewing the case, Gougis was accused of setting fire to his sister-in-law's house in late September of 1758. Thus, Gougis was simultaneously defending himself against two charges, one of which, arson, carried a
severe penalty. Moreover, the two disputes were linked because the same witnesses testified against him on both counts. In 1759, while Gougis was still in the Conciergerie for the arson charges, the court finalized the separation settlement, granting his wife custody of the five children and forcing Gougis to sell all of his belongings to pay his wife.

Gougis’s letters evoke a broad spectrum of Old Regime life ranging from the peasant village and its internecine conflicts to the corridors of the Parlement of Paris and the antechambers of secretaries of state. At the same time, Gougis’s correspondence offers a glimpse into the fascinating underworld of the Old Regime prison and the individuals who provided for its inhabitants. The majority of Gougis’s letters were written to his one powerful friend in Chartres, the notary Monsieur Leroy. Gougis was continually giving instructions about managing his land and his ongoing legal battles, gleaning information from the criminal law manuals he was diligently reading in prison. The letters oscillate wildly in tone, capturing the anxiety that was an inevitable product of prolonged incarceration, lack of outside information, and a dwindling sense of control. Gougis was by turns confident (p. 66), desperate (p. 82), resigned (p. 133), and angry (p. 111).

This book would make a wonderful classroom text if translated because it conveys the mental world of an early modern French peasant in his own words. Such sources remain all too rare. Moreover, it highlights the complicated workings of Old Regime justice as well as Gougis’s faith in this system and his ability to operate successfully within it. Two minor criticisms should be mentioned before concluding. First, there is a confusing discrepancy between the notes and their numbers in the text. Second, it would have been useful to include the notes at the bottom of the page rather than at the end since the constant flipping back and forth interrupts the flow of the reading. These are small complaints, for the fact remains that nobody who meets Pantaleon Gougis will easily forget him. The documents Garnot has so painstakingly gathered allow for an encounter with the past that is both vivid and moving.

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Biography haunts art history with an intensity and persistence that is unique among the humanities and social sciences. As Donald Preziosi has put it, the art historian-critic (for these two roles are, in practice, conflated) is imagined as a “tracer of lost person(a)s, . . . a forensic detective,” whose job is to “remove . . . the opaque roof from the labyrinthine chambers of the artistic mind.”¹ The art historian-critic attempts to excavate the “artistic mind” through a complex logic of interpretation: the art object is understood to be a transparent purveyor of artistic intentionality and personality; by analyzing its formal

structure, the art historian is seen as uniquely able to reveal its “original” meaning as putatively expressed by the artist at creation and return it to its proper place in the teleological flow of images and objects that is the history of art.

Art history is thus obsessed with the individual artist; it involves, primarily, “the production of an artistic subject for works of art.” What are the stakes behind such a production? The more exalted the artistic subject, the more (literal) economic value accrues to the work of art within the art market. Unlike any other field involved in the study of Western culture, art history is linked to a thriving commodity system: there is a direct correlation between the value ascribed to individual artist-names (as supposedly translated directly via the work of art to the trained observer) and the value assigned to the unique (or pseudo-unique, in the case of photography and other replicative media) objects they have produced. Ultimately, the value assigned to these objects and, correlatively, to their authors/origins reflects back onto the art historian himself. At the most basic ideological level, the stakes of the biographically invested practice of art history involve the very authority of both art history as a disciplinary practice and the art historian-critic as its practitioner.

That said, I must insert myself here and make clear that I do not consider it possible, nor desirable at this point, to attempt to disinvest ourselves from the biographical axis of the study of visual culture. We are too entranced by the texture of individual subjectivity, a texture that seems to enhance the very surfaces and depths of the objects before us: it is the romance of intersubjective connectedness that the arts in general offer us and that motivates our ongoing production and reception of culture. What use or interest would paintings, novels, or ready-mades be to us without the enticing promise of fulfilled desire that they endlessly proffer? (And, there is no desire without other subjects, however these might be construed.)

It is at this point that a figure such as Marcel Duchamp enters—or, rather, bursts—into the situation. For, it is precisely Duchamp who, beginning just before the First World War, most dramatically assisted in the explosive disruption of the assumptions of biographically oriented engagements with visual art. And yet, paradoxically, it is also precisely Duchamp who (along with Pablo Picasso and Jackson Pollock) has been the most important biographical fetish in the history of twentieth-century Western art and who has, in the last twenty years, emerged as the obsessively reiterated trope (usually biographically accessed) of contemporary art or postmodernism tout court.

Given the above analysis, which lays bare my ambivalent position vis-à-vis art historical uses of biography, I am in the somewhat difficult position of reviewing two books—Jerrold Seigel's *The Private Worlds of Marcel Duchamp* and Calvin Tomkins's *Duchamp: A Biography*—which specifically revolve around or (in the case of the Tomkins book) are situated specifically as the artistic biography of Marcel Duchamp. My difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that I myself have written a book (*Postmodernism and the En-Gendering of Marcel Duchamp* [Cambridge, 1994]) that attempts to interrogate the premises of biographically oriented histories of art, in particular the way in which Duchamp has been obsessively positioned by art historians-critics as an originary figure—contradictorily, even as the inventor of postmodernism's critique of unique authorship. I am thus bound to have, at best, an equivocal if not highly critical relationship to Tomkins's and Seigel's texts.

The two books at hand both assume biography to be essential to the comprehension of not only artistic objects but modern history in the broadest sense. At the same time,
both disdain engaging with issues raised in discussions of postmodernism, which puts them at a distinct disadvantage, since most of the work on Duchamp in the last twenty years has indeed examined his oeuvre from this point of view. Seigel exposes his own ignorance and his anxiety about recent debates about Duchamp's role in visual culture by, at the very end of the book, writing disparagingly of postmodernism, which he places in scare quotes and identifies with the litany of "feminism, gay liberation, and multiculturalism" (p. 249). Given the importance of these latter models not only to rethinking the epochal importance of Duchamp's work but also to exploring the meaning of visual culture today, it seems a shame at this point to produce yet another rendition of Duchamp's works (as translations of his life, and vice versa) within a framework of historical understanding that eliminates contemporary concerns.

Seigel proclaims right away in his preface, "I have sought to make Duchamp accessible to those who know little or nothing about him" (p. vii). Thus, Seigel's reading assumes an access to meaning in a way that, in my view, goes completely against the grain of how Duchamp's works have come to mean in recent discussions, where the ready-mades are compellingly viewed as having completely unhinged the modernist conception of the art work as having a unique and fixed value and the complex, playfully open-ended figure of Duchamp is seen as confusing modernism's desire for coherent, originary subjects of intentionality. My language points to my resistance to the notion that this radical interrogation of meaning and subjectivity is inherent to Duchamp's objects and self-performances; such a claim would contradict my point that there is no "correct" meaning embedded in them. Rather, I see Duchamp's oeuvre (including his self-presentation, his production of himself as an artistic subject) as engaging in specific, recognizable, social discourses and offering the possibility of opening up the determination of meaning and value as a process of exchange among artists, objects, and interpreters.

Seigel attempts to cover his bases right at the beginning by letting us know that he is "not trained in art history," arguing that his perspective "as a student of modern culture more generally is appropriate to a figure whose relationship to painting was usually distant and ambiguous" (p. 15). Although I would certainly agree that a cultural historian has much to bring to the study of this broad-ranging artist, it is also clear that all of Duchamp's thinking was done in relation to, if obviously not in agreement with, the Western painting tradition. For this reason, Seigel's lack of art historical background cannot absolve him from familiarizing himself with the myriad discussions of Duchamp's position in the history of art that have been generated from within the discipline of art history-criticism in the last twenty years.

Because it does not address the masses of recent material that have been published, Seigel's book offers very little to the art historical audience that would surely have otherwise comprised his primary readership. Also, because of its apparent lack of familiarity with these modes in which Duchamp has been extensively discussed, Seigel's analyses are superficial and, at times, even cliched. He describes the ready-mades, for example, as having "mounted their challenge from outside the recognized sphere of artistic practice; their novelty," he argues, "consisted precisely in breaching the boundary between art and non-art" (p. 115). Seigel is writing here about a set of objects that have been discussed through thousands, probably millions of pages—in texts by au-

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thors as diverse as Thierry de Duve (a Belgian art historian well known in the United States), Peter Bürger (a German theorist of the avant-garde, also known in the United States), and David Joselit (a younger-generation U.S. art historian-critic). It is simply not enough at this point to reiterate the most obvious and, even so, contested aspects of the ready-mades.

In spite of his distance from the discipline of art history, Seigel, in a move typical in this discipline, takes for granted the idea that the author’s intentions, first of all, were transparent and untroubled in their first expression by the artist and, second of all, are now easily discernible by the sensitive reader (i.e., himself) via a combined reading of the forms of the works of art and the extensive interviews and texts that Duchamp himself supplied. These latter, by the way, are texts that Seigel himself admits are equivocal at best and deeply confusing or abstruse at worst; and yet Seigel is still determined to provide “accessible,” finalized meanings for the texts and the works they seem to define or obscure, and, most problematically, “to show that his career forms a coherent whole” (p. 12). Duchamp’s works are seen as having “defined Duchamp as a person and an artist,” and they “fit together like the pieces of a puzzle” (pp. 12–13).

While this locution might seem to be a twist on the typical art historical model, where the artist (as his identity is interpreted) is superimposed onto the works as their explanation, I would argue that it is actually born of the exact same logic: the works define Duchamp the person (they are claimed to “mirror his mind’s contents” [p. 85]); but the “person” Duchamp is continually invoked to give meaning to the works throughout (“[b]ehind the continuity of these themes in Duchamp’s work there stood some persistent and recognizable features of his personality” [p. 97]). The book is not short on psychobiography and the “puzzle” at hand here emerges as a realist image of “Duchamp,” whatever or whomever that might be (the elusiveness of this project of definitively fixing “Duchamp” is evident in the contradictions that rupture the realist facade at every point).

Still, as he himself hopes, Seigel’s book may indeed provide a useful entree for non-art historians into Duchamp’s life and work (if not, unfortunately, into the complex field of Duchamp studies, as this research is hardly discussed). While I have, myself, been too immersed in this field to read Seigel other than critically, I appreciate the broader armature that he attempts to bring to his examination of Duchamp’s life and work. For example, in the chapter “Motions and Mysteries,” Seigel offers a useful contextualization of Duchamp’s 1912 “virgin” and “bride” paintings via a reading of Raymond Roussel’s Impressions d’Afrique. But often even this important attempt at a broader intellectual contextualization of Duchamp’s work gets caught up in its own contradictory logic. In the chapter “Subjective Spaces,” where Seigel explores Duchamp’s early paintings of his family, for instance, he attempts to explain their apparent ambivalence via what he identifies as the tension Duchamp himself supposedly experienced between wanting to “escape into himself” and wanting to separate art from “individual self-expression” (p. 42); he then extends this tension into nineteenth-century modernism through rather superficial readings of paintings by Manet and Caillebotte in terms of the split between public and private. Although this raises some interesting questions, the tautological logic of reading Duchamp’s ambivalence through his paintings and writings and then turning it back on these images/texts as an explanation for their ambivalence undermines Seigel’s own desire to propose this context as definitive.

As an academic historian, Seigel lacks the journalistic flair of Calvin Tomkins, who knows how to reduce one of the most complex and nonconventional creative lives of this century to a readable story. Yet Tomkins, too, weakens the punch of this excellent tale by reiterating Seigel's distaste for new discussions that place Duchamp in relation to political, sexual, and other broader social concerns. In dismissively noting “the increasing tendency among younger artists to deal with the ‘issues’ (as they like to call them) of gender, sexuality, and the human body in their work” (p. 461), Tomkins reveals that the true threat here is the very exposure of erotic desire—the interestedness of interpretation that the discourse of feminism, in particular, has sought to expose. This eroticism (interestedness) lies at the root of all interpretation but, as feminism points out, is veiled in the psychobiographical study of art history, which poses as “objective” rather than acknowledging its implication in this circuit of desire. The threat of, especially, the feminine seduction (of the text) is also inadvertently exposed in many of Tomkins’s obviously interested descriptions of the women in Duchamp’s life, which verge on misogyny (do we need to know that, in Tomkin’s view, Lydie Sarazin-Levassor, Duchamp’s first wife, was “extremely fat” and “never understood” anything about the brief relationship and its breakup [pp. 277, 283]? or that Peggy Guggenheim was, in Tomkin’s estimation, “gauche, insecure, overbearing, and ravenously promiscuous,” as well as being “ugly . . . with her dyed black hair, bulbous nose, blotchy skin, and smeared lipstick” [pp. 315, 341]? or that Gala Dalí was a “voracious man-eater who had left the poet Paul Eluard because she sensed that she could get more mileage out of Dalí’s genius” [p. 293]?). Among other questions we could ask of these singularly harsh evaluations (the reader is hard put to find any similar descriptions of men), the most obvious would be: where is the “objective” evidence for such claims?

I find myself tempted to posit an inherent meaning to Duchamp’s works here to support my own readings (which are overtly invested in the “issues,” as I like to call them, of “gender, sexuality, and the human body”); these are readings that would see Duchamp’s sixty-year span of work as, precisely, insisting on the implication of gender, sexuality, and the human body (not to mention the “issue” of economics) in the production and reception of works of art. These are readings that would take issue with such naturalized, and insulting, descriptions of women which contrast so strongly with Tomkin’s sympathetic descriptions of men. But I won’t posit such meanings, for I do believe they are motivated by my own particular investments.

In spite of this rather unpleasant moment at the end of Duchamp: A Biography, in the hands of Tomkins, the artist’s life generally becomes a compelling narrative of impressive complexity. If anyone could write a successful biography of Duchamp, it is Tomkins, who interviewed the artist in the late 1950s for Newsweek and has dwelled on his legacy over almost forty years of entertaining essays on the contemporary art scene in the New Yorker and other venues. Tomkins makes a real effort not to reduce Duchamp’s biography to a simplistic, and finished, tale of a singular persona and he largely succeeds even if he does, obviously, stick very close to the traditional biography format.

Ironically, though, given his own apparent aversion to “issues” of sexuality and politics, Tomkins is at his best when narrating Duchamp’s sexual and political alliances (or lack thereof), his “emotional deadness” and inadequate response to World War I as well as his “callous behavior” toward important women in his life, such as Mary Reynolds (pp. 208, 258). In spite of my suspicion toward psychobiography, I continually found myself drawn into Tomkin’s usually even-handed accounts of Duchamp’s complete lack of political and sexual responsibility. Tomkins is deeply enamored and respectful of Duchamp but doesn’t spare us from some of his more unsavory traits (though, out of
my own bias, which parallels Tomkins's, I still found it impossible to see Duchamp in an antagonistic light). In reading this book I was forced to confront my own desire to “know” (and to love) Duchamp.

All in all, the Tomkins book is an extraordinary achievement and a stellar addition to the field of Duchamp studies—though the question of how this biographical narrative can be usefully mobilized in art historical research and writing will continue to remain open. One is constantly overwhelmed by the wealth of information, much of it previously unpublished, that is casually and pleasurably recounted in this lengthy account. As a historian, I found myself wishing only that Tomkins were less resistant to other views, more open to new research approaches in relation to Duchamp, and more clear about some of his sources. The book is not footnoted, and only direct quotes are attributed in the back; as an unfortunate result of this trade book format, there are numerous times when specific (and dramatically new) information is given with no indication of the source. While I have no reason to doubt Tomkins, I would want to know where he obtained such information as Katherine Dreier, Duchamp’s friend and patron, was “awed by a nasty strain of anti-Semitism” (p. 380) and Duchamp felt a “natural sympathy for the women’s suffrage movement” in 1915 (p. 153), and so on.

One wishes, finally, that Tomkins had restrained his desire to belittle “Duchampian idolaters” (p. 351), especially since he could certainly be counted among us. Both Seigel and Tomkins weaken otherwise interesting accounts of this major artist through their anxious attempts to diminish the work of other, especially younger scholars invested in “issues” that go beyond the biographical details of Duchamp’s individual life (as if these could be singularly staged and retrieved, or separable from the social dimension of Duchamp’s practice, then and now).

It is clear that Duchamp’s works still have much to teach us. It is my view that the most interesting lesson that might be had from the ready-mades has strategically been overlooked by zealous explainers who want answers from Duchamp’s oeuvre. The ready-mades highlight the tautological logic by which art historical accounts give works of art value by associating them with an author-name, pointing to the way in which such a circuit of meaning-attribution is a closed one. That is, the ready-mades, which are initially objects with no value other than use value (a bottle rack, a snow shovel, a urinal) are turned into objects with aesthetic value (by definition having no use value whatsoever) through the very act of authorial nomination and signing. It is the act of authorial identification and (as I interpret Duchamp’s oeuvre as suggesting) the way in which aesthetic, political, or economic value are assigned, which together initiate the circuit of meaning production.

This circuit, as the ready-mades suggest, is dramatically conditioned by the participation of the interpreter (art historian, critic, historian), whose own projected desires, assumptions, and fantasies position the work culturally and historically. As Duchamp stated in his important lecture “The Creative Act” (1957): “In the last analysis, the artist may shout from all the rooftops that he is a genius; he will have to wait for the verdict of the spectator in order that his declarations take a social value and that, finally, posterity includes him in the primers of Art History. . . . All in all, the creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work in contact with the external world by deciphering and interpreting its inner qualifications and thus adds his contribution to the creative act” (Tomkins, p. 510).

Duchamp has plainly drawn the attentions of posterity. Rather than relying unquestioningly on the biographical armature of conventional modes of art historical analysis in order to assign definitive meanings to his life and work, however, one wishes that those who choose to delve into the Duchampian oeuvre at this point would be equally
suspicious about assigning meaning through a search for artistic intentionality and would engage in the existing, very lively and contentious debates that, as Duchamp seems to have suggested in his lecture, surely condition the way in which his life and work have come to mean.

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**Jean Monnet, 1888–1979.** By Eric Roussel.

The former British Prime Minister Edward Heath described Jean Monnet as the man who made things happen; the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Michel Rasquin, said that he enlarged the possible. Many have described him as ranking among the dozen most influential statesmen of the twentieth century. He therefore deserves a biography. Since he himself published his *Memoires* some twenty years ago, in a volume of some 642 pages, it is natural that any biographer who is going to consider his life in its fullness should ask his readers to accept an even longer volume. And Eric Roussel, who is already the author of a work on Georges Pompidou, more than justifies the length of his volume by carrying out an amazing amount of research and consulting the public archives of the United States and of the relevant European countries, as well as the private papers of most of the statesmen with whom Monnet was concerned (the notable exceptions being Churchill and de Gaulle).

Roussel begins his work with a description of Monnet in his retirement, at the age of eighty-eight, living in his thatched house in the small commune of Bazoches-sur-Guyonne, in the Ile-de-France. All the villagers know Jean Monnet by sight, because early every morning he sets off for one of his walks across the woods and fields. Few of them know anything about him, although there are rumors that he once was important. There is, in contrast, one other famous person who comes intermittently to stay in the village, a certain Brigitte Bardot. She is well known to the villagers. But it is the elderly man with the battered hat and walking stick that, on February 2, 1977, a host of distinguished visitors comes to see. They are from several European countries. They present him with a document. The governments of the European Community and the European Council have made him an honorary citizen of Europe.

The honor is unique, but Jean Monnet is unique. Eric Roussel leads us through the story of his life and we can see that his achievement was not merely that of having had the concept of Europe and making it a reality. He played a remarkable role from the day in September 1914 when he saw the French Prime Minister Viviani and was then sent by him to meet the minister for war, Millerand, to May 9, 1975, when his Action Committee for the United States of Europe was dissolved and he announced his retirement.

Monnet was the son of a brandy producer in Cognac and was there born to a reasonably comfortable living. Brandy was a great stimulant for him, but to sell and not to drink. Soon he was traveling widely. In Egypt, he caught a pulmonary infection that prevented him from being called up in 1914. But in Canada he developed a connection with the Hudson Bay Company, whose products he made available for French government purchasing. Then, through his meeting with Viviani, whom he greatly impressed as a man of energy and determination, he was able to arrange for the French and British allies to cooperate in their acquisition of material for the prosecution of the war. That
Allies should work together rather than compete was a simple idea. It was one of the simple ideas that Monnet was to follow throughout his career. He always said that what he set out to do was to follow the dictums of common sense.

Also, even in this early period, Monnet became known as a contact man, and as such his usefulness, to put it mildly, became essential. This was acknowledged by the newly born League of Nations when it appointed him to be its deputy secretary general in 1919. Monnet, then thirty years old, stayed in the post for only four years, but his taste for the corridors of power became insatiable. During the interwar years, he worked as an international banker and as an ally of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, but his ability for being in the right place at the right time was confirmed by his presence in London during the dark days of 1940, as chairman of the Franco-British Coordination Committee, concerned, as in 1914, with the purchase of materiel. It is here that Roussel’s book becomes essential reading.

It was on February 23, 1943, that Monnet left Washington, D.C., where he had been living since the summer of 1940, for Algiers. Theoretically he went there at the request of General Giraud, de Gaulle’s rival for power in French North Africa. This request had come via a certain Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil, who is described as “an adventurer” by Roussel and as “a fascist” by the British Foreign Office. But the real instigator of Monnet’s journey was Franklin D. Roosevelt, who saw him as his personal representative. Under cover of a technical appointment, Monnet was to advise General Giraud, who was known to be lacking in political acumen, and to seek every means of strengthening his military power. In this way, de Gaulle would be frustrated in his attempts to establish himself in Algiers. Recounting the complicated maneuvers that followed, Roussel has amassed a typically impressive documentation. He has used the memoir Monnet wrote in the 1970s, recounting his mission, and in particular we should note his use of the Robert Murphy papers and the papers of Colonel de Limares, Giraud’s chef de cabinet, as well as the testimony of his son.

Monnet was himself suspicious of de Gaulle, believing that he had dictatorial rather than democratic intentions. But his chief contact with Giraud was through Colonel de Limares, who supported de Gaulle, admiring in him “the soul” of the French resistance. Giraud was loyal to his superior, Pétain, and in favor of Vichy’s National Revolution. In the middle of this imbroglio was General Catroux, a well-respected figure who could lay claim to being something of an independent Gaullist.

This story ends with the triumph of de Gaulle. The Americans, especially Robert Murphy, accused Monnet of being a traitor. De Gaulle dismissed Monnet contemptuously as “that little financier” who was in the pay of Great Britain, while other Gaullists (Couve de Murville is quoted) considered him to be an American agent. Giraud simply recalled, with wry amusement, that Monnet had caused him to make the only democratic speech of his life.

Monnet was at times irritated, and even angry, but we are shown the real figure of the man. He was always at work. The small apartment in the rue Michelet did not recognize Sundays or public holidays, as one of Monnet’s team regretfully recalled. Monnet wrote unceasingly, letters and memoranda, often at great length (and quoted in extenso by Roussel). There were meetings, telephone calls, conversations that became administrative or political gestures. And all the time there is the man who is dependent on his wife and family and who is waiting for their letters. But we do not get very close to that Monnet, other than to record his existence. The real Monnet, as presented here, quickly erased his irritation at de Gaulle’s success and Giraud’s failure and settled down at his work, continuing to strengthen the government and the army. The real Monnet was the man who lifted his eyes from the harassments of Algiers and reflected on what
should happen after the war. From April 1943, he considered the future of Europe and especially the future of two states, France and Germany.

Roussel does not write dramatically. It is not his style to present to the reader the picture of a middle-aged man, in the summer of 1943, marking out the steel-and-coal-producing areas of the Ruhr and Lorraine and explaining to a friend that they must be taken away from France and Germany. He reproduces the memorandum that Monnet wrote on that occasion. Nor is he critical of Monnet, since one can ask if he really understood de Gaulle. In this respect, Roussel differs from his predecessor as biographer, François Duchene (Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence [New York, 1994]). Nor does he explore how, in his negotiations, he would sometimes say opposing things to different people (as shown in Serge Bernstein, ed., Le M.R.P. et la construction européenne [Paris, 1993], which is not in the bibliography). But this work of great scholarship shows us the persistence, the concentration on the essential and the endless capacity for bold negotiation that made Monnet important. For this work, Eric Roussel was awarded the Guizot Prize for History in 1996.

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Silvana Patriarca's *Numbers and Nationhood* is an important contribution to a dynamic and growing literature on the history of European statistical writings in the modern period. Patriarca's study examines the role played by statisticians in producing an image of the Italian nation from the years immediately following the Napoleonic Wars up through the first decade of national unification in the 1870s. Patriarca's sensitive and wide-ranging analysis concentrates on "the place that statistics occupied in the formation of a liberal and nationalist outlook, and . . . on the contributions [statistics] gave to the very imagining and shaping of a national space" (p. 5). The story she tells does not neglect the important influences of British, French, and German statistical theories on Italian social scientists, but Patriarca rightly emphasizes the particularity of the Italian context, which is not without its own ironies. The universal dreams of an objective and statistical social science, she argues, did much to create a convincing and legitimized image of a unified nation among Italian elites between the 1820s and the 1860s. After unification, however, this same allegedly universal statistical method gave scientific credence to an alternative political idea: the powerful myth of "two Italies," which has done so much to separate the nation into a wealthy region in the north and an economically impoverished region in the south.

One might have expected Italian statisticians to show a closer affinity to the German and Austrian tradition of *Staatenkunde* or *Statistik*, if only because of the close involvement of the Hapsburgs in the affairs of Lombardy and Venetia in the late eighteenth century. Patriarca argues, however, that the Napoleonic tradition of descriptive statistics had a much more marked influence on early nineteenth-century statistical researchers in Italy. Former officeholders from the Napoleonic regimes preserved the administrative procedures of this new governmental science, eventually producing a wide body of statistical work on cities, communes, provinces, and states between the 1820s and the
1850s. Two figures stand out in Patriarca’s analysis as essential reference points: Melchiorre Gioia (1767–1829) and Gian Domenico Romagnosi (1761–1835). Both men emerged from Milan’s lively intellectual community during the revolutionary decade of the 1790s, and their careers ran roughly parallel, embodying two strands of the Enlightenment tradition as it was carried into the nineteenth century. Gioia, an enthusiastic Benthamite and a follower of the French ideologues, was a passionate quantifier and author of an early plan for a statistical study of the Italian Kingdom in 1808, the Tavole statistiche ossia norme per descrivere, calcolare, classificare tutti gli oggetti d’amministrazione privata e pubblica (statistical tables or norms for describing, calculating, and classifying all the objects of private and public administration [Milan, 1808]). Gioia’s materialist empiricism, and his enthusiasm for counting, was counterbalanced by Romagnosi’s more philosophical predilections. If Gioia provided Italian statisticians with a practical model of the indefatigable researcher, Romagnosi gave their work a theoretical legitimacy. His philosophy of incivilimento established statistical research as a necessary part of a wise government in a society devoted to economic and political development with no impediments to free trade. The generation that followed Gioia and Romagnosi, including such figures as the Venetian Adriano Balbi (1782–1848) and the Swede Jakob Graberg till Hemso (1776–1847), established important and lasting connections between research in political economy and geography in Italy, linking the study of land, the environment, and civil society in ways that would have important repercussions in the political realm.

Works such as these, argues Patriarca, were marked by certain common methodological and epistemological concerns reflecting the attitudes of a liberal and bourgeois intellectual community during a period of aristocratic reaction. The proponents of statistical research on population and economic activity criticized the official administrations of the Italian states for not making their accounts public. Like their counterparts in northern Europe, these writers saw statistics through the filter of a kind of anatomical realism, whereby their quantitative work would lay bare the sinews of the “social body,” making clear its organizing principles and establishing the proper diagnosis of its “pathologies” (pp. 61 ff). Patriarca’s book is especially enlightening in these sections, in which she examines the different conceptions of the state that emerged in the decades before national unification as well as the various models of selecting and presenting statistical data that accompanied these political programs. Arguing that these works were intrinsically pedagogical in their function, Patriarca’s discussion concentrates on “the powerful rhetoric of the ‘natural’” that accompanied these works, a rhetoric that “visualized for the reader the necessary relations linking different parts of reality to each other, . . . [making] immediately apparent a hierarchy of things and a scheme of causality” (p. 64).

In the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s, a tradition of “patriotic statistics” developed on the Italian peninsula, aimed both at countering the negative stereotypes of Italian culture that were common elsewhere in Europe and at the lingering conservatism of traditional elites at home. As Patriarca writes, “the statistical descriptions of Italy produced before unification were an overt rhetorical weapon in the hands of Italian reformers and patriots: by responding to the ‘false’ images produced by foreign observers and to the ‘useless’ representations of antiquarians, they aimed at establishing Italy’s ‘true picture,’” constituting “a precise political statement about the legitimacy and viability of the future nation” (p. 125). Typical of these works was Luigi Serristori’s Statistica dell’Italia (Florence, 1835–39) which covered not only each of the Italian states but also areas belonging to other countries that geographers considered to be a part of the peninsula.
Serristori (1793–1857), who had studied mathematics at the University of Pisa, developed a set of quantitative indicators to measure the material prosperity and “degree of civilization” attained by each of the Italian regions. Chief among these indicators was population density, which Serristori believed to be a key element in the development of commerce, communications, and a high degree of culture.

As Patriarca’s book convincingly demonstrates, it was precisely these kinds of quantitative comparisons, dressed up in the guise of “moral statistics” and later Lombroso’s “criminal anthropology,” that did so much to undermine the political unity established during the 1860s. As Darwinian ideas of biological determinism, evolution, and racial typology were imported into Italy, statistics were soon used to recast the differences between the inhabitants of the various Italian regions, inscribing the divisions between north and south or urban and rural in a newly rationalized hierarchy of progress and backwardness. No longer universalizing in its intent, the statistical “rhetoric of the natural” soon attached itself to quite different political agendas, which would have been unrecognizable to Enlightenment figures such as Gioia or Romagnosi. The great virtue of Patriarca’s work is thus to illustrate the variety of ideological positions that oriented themselves around statistical portraits of the Italian nation in the nineteenth century, remaining ever attentive to the complexity of that elusive nexus between knowledge and power in the modern world.

*University of Georgia*


In his foreword, James Tracy wonders whether two books on Erasmus by one scholar are not enough, but the reader of this easily readable third one will welcome its publication as it is not a rehash of previous work. Tracy introduces much recent scholarship and does so unobtrusively even where his insights diverge from other treatments. In many instances, this biography rounds out the portrait of Erasmus.

There are other benefits as well. While one may not pick up a study of Erasmus to learn about the complicated political and social situation in the Low Countries, the first chapter is a fine thumbnail sketch of post-Burgundian developments. Tracy correctly suggests (p. 3) that, without an understanding of these, the student of Erasmus is likely to miss the full meaning of his vision of the “spiritual commonwealth of believers” and of the many currents of religious thought from which he distilled that vision. And in his chapter on Erasmus and his readers, Tracy usefully relates the importance of the “prince of humanists” for the beginning of the Polish Reformation through the work of Jan (II) Laski (Johannes a Lasco) and others.

Not the least benefit lies in the organization of the material that is presented in three parts: “Bonae Literae: The Making of a Low Country Humanist, 1469–1511”; “Philosophia Christi: Erasmus and the Reform of Doctrina, 1511–1522”; and “Second Thoughts, 1521–1536.” Tracy justifies this division in his introduction. Each of the three parts is also preceded by a brief guide to the topic announced. While one may quibble with so strict a chronological approach, Tracy overcomes its possible problems by refreshing the reader’s memory whenever he discusses the deepening of Erasmus’s mind or when he examines the “second thoughts” of his later life. Incidentally, the chronolog-
ical approach makes this biography into a useful companion volume to Erasmus’s correspondence that is edited, for example, in the splendid English translations in *Collected Works of Erasmus* (ed. James K. McConica et al. [Toronto, 1974–]), which are in the process of publication.

As could be expected from the author of an earlier study on the mind of Erasmus, the strength of Tracy’s new biography lies in the exposition of Erasmus’s major writings. From these he makes a judicious selection for a closer examination (in which he follows the example set by Erasmus in his own educational essays). He explains their salient points in the manner of a comfortable teacher in a “friendly and familiar” rather than “contentious” speech (p. 29) and he works “bits of” the writings “into the flow of his language” (p. 37). One could only wish that there would have been more space for a more extensive treatment (for which that of the *Praise of Folly* is a good example) of other works as well. And I regret that the essay on repairing the unity of the church (1533) is only mentioned in passing.

Because sixteenth-century studies are dominated by the religious reformations, Erasmus’s *Philosophia Christi* has received so much attention that contributing something new poses a real challenge. But here too most readers are well served by Tracy’s succinct treatment of Erasmus’s insistence on being guided by the words of Christ. He places Erasmus in the long tradition of safeguarding the *doctrina* of the church; he also sets him off against such others as the earlier Lorenzo Valla, his contemporary and collaborator Juan Luis Vives, and the later John Calvin. Tracy uses Calvin to discuss a road not taken by Erasmus. Here it would have been useful for a general reader also to have had Erasmus set off against the official teachings of the church as defined by the Council of Trent. In the council’s final sessions, its theologians were so absorbed by their defense of orthodoxy against the Protestants that the road Erasmus had mapped out was not taken by the defenders of the church he had refused to leave.

I first learned about Erasmus from Jan Romein and Annie Romein’s *Er¯aters van onze beschaving* (*Testators of our civilization*) (The Hague, 1940). The Romeins pay much attention to Erasmus’s emotional disposition. He was self-centered and, I would say, almost pathetically so. Tracy avoids speculations about this aspect of Erasmus’s life. But I would have liked to read, for example, Tracy’s considered evaluation of Erasmus’s disavowal of such early influences on his development as that of Cornelius Gerard (Aurelius) or of his failure to intervene with Henry VIII in 1533 on behalf of his friend Thomas More. From the safety of Freiburg in Germany he might well have afforded this act of loyalty, the more so as he then no longer needed to rely on the largesse of patrons. Self-centeredness also comes out in Erasmus’s perception of his mission, already outlined in his *Antibarbari*, as a restorer of the Christian Republic for which he worked so zealously once he had made a name. In pursuit of this mission he tolerated little criticism, and that not simply because some of this criticism resulted in accusations of heresy. Fear of such accusations, as much as his desire to preserve the peace he thought necessary for the success of his mission, caused him to look for the dissimulating and even ambiguous formula, which—as Tracy points out—was one reason why his influence waned in the heat of the Protestant-Roman polemics. Erasmus’s intolerance stands in contrast to his own disdain for the theologians he chastised for their self-esteem in his *De contemptu mundi*.

On Erasmus and Philip Melanchthon, I would have made use of Heinz Scheible’s “Melanchthon zwischen Luther und Erasmus” (in A. Buck, *Renaissance-Reformation: Gegensatze und Gemeinsamkeiten* [Wiesbaden, 1984], pp. 155–80). I looked in vain for a discussion of Erasmus’s sharp attack on the Pseudo-Evangelicals (1529) in Ger-
many, who then included a fellow Dutch humanist, Gerard Geldenhouwer (Noviomagus). Erasmus had no second thoughts when it came to reformers whose expansions on his own work endangered his mission as he saw it.

But these desiderata for satisfying my curiosity hardly reduce the value of this very helpful introduction to an important figure in the history of Western civilization.

Derk Visser

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These two weighty volumes, of which the first is a revision of a book originally published in 1974, will finally replace the work of Friedrich Paulsen from the late nineteenth century as the indispensable starting point for an understanding of Prussian secondary education in the era between Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck. Although Paulsen's study ranged more broadly over other German states, Karl-Ernst Jeismann's thorough research in Prussian state and regional archives and his skillful use of recent scholarship in educational history give his work greater insight and balance than Paulsen's had.

Jeismann defines the “Prussian Gymnasium” of his title more narrowly than might appear at first glance. He distinguishes it clearly from the Latin schools (Gelehrtenschulen) of earlier centuries, using the introduction in 1787 of the first Prussian regulations for a secondary school diploma, or Abitur, as the point of departure for his study. More unusual is his distinction between these new schools of the early nineteenth century and the “humanistic gymnasium” that emerged after 1859, the year that Prussia introduced “first-class Realschulen” (later, Realgymnasien) of equivalent length and rigor to the classical schools. In Jeismann’s view, from the 1810s through the 1850s, the Prussian gymnasium served as “the municipal secondary school,” offering education for almost all boys interested in going beyond the elementary level (2:21). Thereafter, it became one of several competing schools and focused more closely on pupils intending to graduate and less on those who stayed only a few years.

Although Jeismann's portrayal of the Prussian gymnasium as “the municipal secondary school” suggests the triumph of the plans for a single form of secondary education put forward by Wilhelm von Humboldt and his associates in the Prussian reform era, the main thrust of the first volume is actually a partial debunking of these reformers. Without denying the importance of the introduction of certification for secondary teachers in 1810 and the revised Abitur regulations of 1812, which were accompanied by the first recommended curriculum, Jeismann argues that Humboldt and his immediate successors “only continued the reform initiatives of the two decades before 1806, although at an accelerated pace” (1:233). Of particular value in this regard is Jeismann's investigation of the plans and initiatives, generally neglected by other scholars, made under the leadership of Julius von Massow between 1798 and 1806, the era when neutral Prussia stood aside from the Napoleonic Wars.
Jeismann also stresses the difficulties of implementing the decrees of the reform era, examining in particular the struggles after the wars to introduce the gymnasium curriculum and Abitur in the newly acquired provinces of the Rhineland and Westphalia. He notes as well that only thirty-nine secondary teachers had taken the certification examinations as of 1815 and thus that the “real creation of the profession of secondary teaching does not fall in the reform era, but is a work of the restoration” (1:341).

The second volume extends this upward revaluation of the restoration era, with Jeismann expressing “amazement” at “how energetically” officials pursued implementation of the reforms (2:42). He attributes the continuity in policy in large measure to the long term of Karl von Altenstein as the Prussian Minister of Religion and Education from 1817 to 1840 and the even longer tenure—from 1818 until 1859—of Johannes Schulze as the official in charge of secondary schools. Despite the increased bureaucratization and curricular rigidity that emerged in this era, Jeismann finds the overall trend in secondary schooling to have been improvement, not retreat.

Among the numerous themes that Jeismann examines in the second volume are foreign educators’ views of the Prussian gymnasium, the fate of the politically suspect gymnastics movement in the schools, the gradual emergence of Realschulen designed for boys not interested in university studies, the growth of pedagogical training for secondary teachers, a major controversy in the 1830s about the overburdening of pupils, and the development in the 1840s of attacks on the “pagan” gymnasium by Christian conservatives. This reviewer found particularly interesting Jeismann’s discussion of the controversial topic of the “Catholic educational deficit,” the underrepresentation of Catholics in Prussian secondary and higher education compared to their proportion of the overall population. Noting that, “for Catholics in the western provinces there were more ‘reachable’ Gymnasien than for Protestants in the eastern provinces” (2:404), he argues vigorously that “Prussian educational policy is not one of the reasons” for the Catholic deficit (2:412). He does not, however, discuss how priestly celibacy, in contrast to the fecundity of most Protestant pastors, contributed to this deficit.

The revolutions of 1848–49 produced numerous initiatives toward educational reform, but as with so much else in that era, they generally came to naught. Yet as with the restoration after 1815, Jeismann finds the 1850s less reactionar than they have often been portrayed: “In the context of the sharp attacks on the Gymnasium of the Altenstein era,” he writes, “the reform of 1856 appears quite remarkable,” bringing only modest changes in the gymnasium’s curriculum (2:607). More important, in his view, was the introduction of the first-class Realschule in 1859 as an equivalent, if not yet equal, type of secondary school. Even in this move to satisfy demands for a more modern form of education, though, Jeismann finds little influence of an emerging “economic liberalism,” much more of the Prussian educational administration (2:623).

Apart from its length and cost, Jeismann’s work invites serious criticism in just one area: its unclear contribution to a significant controversy about Prussian secondary education in the nineteenth century. In a major book published in 1977 (Sozialstruktur und Schulsystem: Aspekte zum Strukturwandel des Schulwesens im 19. Jahrhundert [Gottingen]), Detlef Muller argued that what Jeismann calls “the Prussian Gymnasium” had served as a “comprehensive school” (Gesamtschule), meeting the needs of the majority of pupils who did not graduate as well as the majority who did. According to Muller, the trend after 1859 toward what Jeismann calls the “humanistic Gymnasium” amounted to a socially defensive measure on the part of the educated classes who wanted to preserve their privileged status for their sons while pushing boys from the economic middle class into other schools. On the surface, Jeismann appears to agree with Muller: he certainly emphasizes how recent scholarship has rediscovered the large numbers of early leavers
from the Prussian gymnasium. Yet he insists that what he calls “the municipal secondary school” was not a “comprehensive school” in the sense meant by Muller, without adequately clarifying what the key differences were (2:151).

James C. Albisetti

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The history of poverty and poor relief in modern Europe has been enjoying something of a renaissance. German scholars have been among those revisiting the topic, with arguably the most impressive result to date being Christoph Sachsse and Florian Tennstedt’s Geschichte der Armenfürsorge in Deutschland. Despite innovations, however, historians have tended to follow the pattern of German national historiography by focusing primarily on welfare policy in Prussia and the Reich. As Susanne Eser points out in her study of nineteenth-century poor relief in Augsburg, this not only marginalizes developments in southern Germany, which deviated significantly from those in Prussia, it also fails to take into account the signal importance of municipal administration, which has almost single-handedly run German poor relief since the Middle Ages. Eser’s well-researched social and administrative history of poverty in one Bavarian city between 1781 and 1914 thus offers the means to assess empirically the conclusions of more general studies.

Eser begins her investigation at an unconventional point— with the laws of residency (Heimatrecht) in Augsburg. But it is the coupling of residency requirements with regulations about poor relief that, in her view, distinguished southern from northern German welfare in the nineteenth century. In the medieval tradition of distinguishing between residential and alien beggars, poor relief in modern Augsburg persisted in linking entitlement to benefits with proving one’s historical membership in the local community. This policy proved increasingly difficult to sustain as Bavaria liberalized laws on citizenship and migration in the 1810s and 1860s. This led city officials to embark on a “sealing-off policy” designed to award residency to only those with sufficient capital or property. Augsburg’s restrictive Ausländerpolitik was therefore conceived as a prophylactic Armenpolitik.

Eser then goes on to examine in detail the social world of Augsburg’s poor relief. What she describes is a welfare administration much the same as that elsewhere in Germany. Run on an honorific basis by local notables and financed mostly through the voluntary contributions of the bourgeoisie, welfare in Augsburg was a thoroughly local affair from 1816 onward. Yet, as demand for services grew and poor administration consistently ran deficits, bourgeois officials increasingly turned to stricter supervision over beneficiaries, emphasized services over compensation, and recruited the assistance of private charities to supplement public aid. The result was a welfare administration characterized by the very same processes Sachsse and Tennstedt have identified as most formative throughout Germany in the nineteenth century: secularization, municipalization, rationalization, professionalization, and bureaucratization.

Poor relief itself was divided into four branches of service: outdoor relief, residential care, employment, and child care (the last is not discussed by Eser). Outdoor relief
consisted mostly in establishing soup kitchens and distributing wood to the needy during winters. Both institutions, of only nominal importance before 1848, grew in prominence over the century as authorities placed ever greater emphasis on services rather than cash benefits. Residential care was provided for only the most destitute and decrepit, mostly by hospitals and the poor house. In practice, this meant that the municipal poorhouse served mostly as a supervised repository for the chronically poor and ill. With the creation of a separate facility for the homeless in 1884, the poorhouse took on the character of a nursing home and was later renamed the Municipal Home for the Elderly in 1920. Finally, all persons receiving outdoor relief and any poorhouse resident deemed fit were compelled to work. Bourgeois authorities perceived unemployment as a moral failing on the part of the poor and therefore embraced compulsory labor less as an economic than as a pedagogical solution. Women in particular “benefited” from the program, often employed as seamstresses on a putting-out basis. Nevertheless, the income that both the poor and the poorhouse received did little to make either party solvent. For most welfare recipients, compulsory labor proved to be the last station, rather than the beginning, of their working lives.

Eser’s most interesting findings may well lie in her analysis of the reported causes of poverty in nineteenth-century Augsburg and the effectiveness of public policy. Records reveal that poverty disproportionately afflicted single people, families with numerous or sickly children, and the elderly. The most consistent reason for seeking aid throughout the century was therefore the dissolution of or lack of ties with an intact household. As they have been since the Middle Ages, women—particularly widows—were overrepresented among all these groups, thus comprising around 70 to 80 percent of Augsburg’s welfare recipients.

Eser’s assessment of public policy’s impact on its charges is generally critical. Augsburg’s strict marriage laws, its disdain for monetary compensation, its moralistic embrace of compulsory labor, and its turn-of-the-century retrenchment policies tended to simply reinforce recidivism among those most vulnerable to poverty. The emergence of social insurance in the 1880s did provide a real measure of social security to many working poor and went some way in alleviating municipal welfare’s health care burden. Nonetheless, since social insurance covered only certain, mostly skilled, workers (and then, only for certain periods of time), there were numerous gaps in coverage. Poor relief was thus de facto called on to fill in these gaps. Social insurance therefore had its greatest impact by institutionalizing the distinction between the honor of work and insurance on one hand and the stigma of poverty and welfare on the other.

In the end, Eser succeeds in providing a “thick description” of municipal welfare in nineteenth-century Germany. Her findings on the reported causes of poverty, relations between social service branches, and the links between migration policy and poor relief offer solid data for comparison. While her results tend to support the conclusions of Sachsse and Tennstedt, however, this owes much to the fact that she assumes their categories as her standard of evaluation. More attention to a wider, less German-centered literature—as she does, for instance, when she sporadically invokes Pierre Bourdieu’s work—would have given her the means to appraise the state of German welfare historiography more effectively.

Greg A. Eghigian

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In this highly ambitious and thoroughly researched monograph, Kathleen Canning sets out to challenge both the methodological commitments and substantive findings of the main current in recent German labor history. For a variety of complex historical reasons, much recent labor history in Germany has remained fixed within the boundaries of a modernization model that privileges class formation and formal labor organizations. Although fully aware of critiques of this current within Germany and the proliferation of “postmodernist” attacks on class analysis, Canning positions herself as an outsider in relation to mainstream German labor history. She contests its basic tenets by deploying feminist and poststructuralist concepts and categories to explore the multiple meanings assigned to women’s labor in the textile industry of imperial Germany. Although Canning acknowledges that the textile industry was not representative of German industrial transformation, she justifies her research not only because it was an important industry with a largely female labor force but also because it served as a crucial laboratory for state officials and social reformers alarmed about the relations between industrialization and the fate of the working-class family, motherhood, and sexual morality.

Canning’s analysis is divided into three parts. In the early chapters, she discusses the gendered aspects of the transition from a household economy to a factory system in German textile regions. She carefully differentiates between patterns of feminization and the conflicts that resulted through four case studies in the Lower Rhineland and Westfalia. In the two cases in which gender-exclusive alternative employments were available, she finds that displaced male handweavers did not oppose female factory employment, although where no such alternatives existed, male weavers strongly resisted feminization. In the latter cases, male weavers revived a language of craft and reinvented guilds to halt mechanization and female employment. These weavers’ constructions of their plight shaped the positions of social reformers in the 1880s and led to calls to ban women from factory work. Canning is unable to determine, however, whether these regional patterns affected long-term work identities of female laborers.

In the second part, Canning subtly analyzes a wide array of contemporary social inquiries and policy literature to present a detailed and nuanced study of the genesis and development of public discourses about female factory labor in imperial Germany and the controversies and reform initiatives that ensued. The key agents are reformers from the educated professional middle class, including feminists, factory inspectors, and other officials, as well as Catholic social thinkers and Social Democrats. Divergences and convergences among their positions are painstakingly delineated. Absent, however, is any systematic probing of the discourses of political economy and the role business leaders played in these debates, despite their manifest power to impede reform. Canning distinguishes between three periods of discourse formation and policy prescription between the mid-nineteenth century and 1914, each with its own distinct physiognomy. She especially focuses on the two periods after Kaiser Wilhelm II’s announcement of a “New Course” in social policy in 1890 when political participation and the public sphere substantially expanded, socialists and feminists became active, women’s factory labor became grudgingly accepted, and issues of hygiene were recast in eugenic terms of countering the declining birthrate and strengthening female bodies for empire. Canning highlights the ways women workers became defined in labor legislation as needing protection to fulfill their marital and maternal roles in contrast to male “breadwinners” and citizens who could articulate their own interests.
The third part takes up the work identities and experiences of women textile workers. By undertaking a statistical analysis of factory records, Canning is able to dispel the common prejudice that women textile workers lacked long-term commitments to their work and is able to show that women's work was erroneously characterized as unskilled to maintain low wages and gender hierarchies. Because of fragmentary sources and interpretive problems, however, her treatment of other aspects of identity is less satisfactory. She uses the famous Crimmitschau textile strike of 1903 in which familial issues and women workers figured prominently to assert that female textile workers sought to dissolve the dichotomy between home and work. This appears to be an overstatement. Renegotiating a boundary does not eliminate it. Moreover, although growing numbers of women textile workers were married, the single childless young female workers, who were the majority, virtually disappear. Canning's evidence on women's opposition to factory sponsored dormitories and day care centers is limited or contradictory (pp. 302–3, 306–8) and many of her accounts of sexuality derive from problematic reports by middle-class observers. It is also difficult to tell from this section whether the discourses and legislation so carefully analyzed earlier mattered much to the identities of women textile workers.

Despite its dialogue with poststructuralism, Canning's book is a palimpsest of recent approaches to labor history. It shuttles between older structural analysis, an emphasis on agency and subjectivity characteristic of the E. P. Thompson school and its German offshoot Alltagsgeschichte, and poststructuralist textuality. In principle, there can be few objections to such theoretical and methodological eclecticism. The applications of these approaches, however, often seem arbitrary and inconsistent. A structural analysis of women workers who joined textile unions by type of production, region, and length of employment might have provided a more precise explanation of union membership. The writings of middle-class women reformers Maria Bernays and Minna Wettstein-Adelt, who were briefly employed in textile factories, cried out for discursive analysis to ascertain the degree to which their observations were prefigured by earlier texts about the sexuality of women workers. A more systematic account of the structured coercive hierarchies in which women workers were embedded within the factory regime, the family, and even by other workers might have led to a more critical evaluation of the romantic concept Eigensinn, the “creative reappropriation of the conditions of daily life” (p. 13). Canning ultimately hesitates to follow postmodernist logic of abandoning master narratives and deconstructing “class” to its disintegrative conclusion. Despite their different regional and religious backgrounds, occupational specialties and familial situations, Canning’s women textile workers approximate a collective subject, rather than merely wraithlike discursive objects. Canning asks serious questions about the relation of women textile workers and gender constructions to the rhetoric of “class,” class formation, and state labor policy. She certainly makes a major contribution to unpacking the complex and contested meanings of women's factory labor in imperial Germany. It is doubtful, however, that this rich work can successfully resist assimilation within a more gender-aware developmental model.

Derek S. Linton

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In this thoroughly researched, cleverly illustrated, and informative book, Christoph Nonn proposes to fill one gap in our knowledge of the German Kaiserreich on the eve of World War I: the role of the increase in food prices for the growing crisis of the Old Regime. At the same time that he explores the mobilization of the urban masses—women, white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, both skilled and unskilled—he traces the effects of the price increases on party politics and the attempts to force parliamentaryization. The growing opposition between urban consumers and agricultural producers in the decade before World War I acted as a rehearsal for the politics of shortage and dissatisfaction that culminated in the revolutionary situation of 1917–18.

Nonn singles out the increasing prices of meat as most disturbing for the urban population. During the two decades preceding the turn of the century, the lower classes enjoyed an increasingly diversified diet. As meat and milk were added to the staples of bread and potatoes, workers and others came to regard them as necessary not only for their higher nutritional value but as evidence of an increasingly dignified lifestyle. When price increases for animal products forced families either to buy less meat or to reduce expenditures for other household necessities, the result was anger and dissatisfaction with specific policies and with the prevailing system. While Nonn exaggerates when he contends that price increases in the decade before World War I represented a trend, he argues convincingly that the steep rise in meat prices in 1906, 1910, and 1912 affected party politics significantly.

The Social Democratic Party exploited consumer dissatisfaction with rising food prices to call attention to its long-standing opposition to the militaristic policies of the Kaiserreich and to the Prussian three-class suffrage. Nonn demonstrates that the party was most successful in arousing popular interest in these measures when it combined protest against them with agitation against tariffs and taxes that contributed to higher prices. At the same time, the party’s emphasis on lower grain tariffs and the expanded import of meat so alienated the agricultural population that the party was forced to abandon its recruitment of small farmers and agricultural day laborers. Instead it shifted its propaganda toward the urban white-collar consumer, particularly lower government officials. This new direction reinforced reformist tendencies within the party, accelerated its transformation from a workers’ to a people’s party, and led to compromises with bourgeois groups. As these compromises occurred, the possibility of a reformist bloc, representing a crisis for the Old Regime, emerged.

On the other side of the coin, consumer dissatisfaction led the bourgeois parties—the Center, the National Liberals, and the Left Liberals—to devise strategies that bolstered reformist tendencies. Because members and voters for all these parties resided in both town and country after 1900, party strength and unity were threatened by the growing opposition between urban consumer and rural producer. If the middle parties supported grain tariffs and meat import quotas, they were at the mercy of Social Democratic appeals to consumer dissatisfaction in the cities. When they appeased the consumer by favoring the cheaper import of foodstuffs, the aggressive propaganda of the Agrarian League drew away the votes of small and part-time farmers. In some regions, those who represented the opposing sides could no longer meet together in the same room.

In an attempt to retain both urban and rural voters, the middle parties increasingly adopted positions designed to satisfy both sides: tariffs and meat import quotas for the
countryside; the reduction of taxes on consumption, higher salaries, and social subsidies for the urban population. In order to achieve these aims, they had to combat the entrenched Conservatives. Hence they increasingly favored Prussian suffrage reform and parliamentarization. To the extent that these measures dovetailed with Social Democratic goals, an alliance of the middle with the left, such as occurred in the Reichstag elections of 1912, was possible. When rural opposition to this compact caused them to retreat to the smaller alliance of the middle, the bourgeois parties nevertheless continued to press for reforms that the Social Democrats supported.

Nonn has contributed a new dimension to our understanding of Imperial Germany: the significance of consumer dissatisfaction in creating the pressures for a reform of the Old Regime. Last, he demonstrates that the Agrarian League’s mobilization of the rural masses against consumer interests exacerbated those pressures. Although the governmental elite was prepared to adopt policies to placate the consumer, the attitude of Conservative rural producers hardened and prevented compromise. As the opposition between urban consumers and rural producers intensified during World War I, the economic and political dissatisfaction combined to produce crisis and revolution. Nonn’s thesis should inform not only the student of German history but all those interested in the interplay between economic and political factors in a consumer society.

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Beverly Heckart


The failure of the Weimar Republic at the national level has been the subject of repeated investigation. But Weimar also collapsed, perhaps more significantly, at the provincial level. It was not just in the urbanized regions and at the centers of political life that the party politics of parliamentary democracy broke down. It lost its following in political elections and popular opinion at the local level, in villages with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants—in rural Germany, according to the statistics. The loss occurred primarily among the Protestant agricultural population, where (as in the universities) the Nazi Party (NSDAP) was able to mobilize voters quickly and intensively. This electoral support among the rural evangelical populace gave the National Socialists a base from which to penetrate urban areas. The Catholic countryside, however, still belonged to the Catholic social milieu after 1919. Even during the political turmoil of the extended 1932 campaigns, rural Catholic voters remained within the fold of the Center Party.

The effect of National Socialism on the rural areas was a kind of political homogenization. This effect is especially surprising because up until 1919—in some areas until 1928—rural evangelical voters had cast their votes for an extremely diverse spectrum of political candidates. Liberals, conservatives, even anti-Semites had fared well. Though we do have studies of agricultural interest groups, the social unit of the village has been less well examined. Until recently it belonged more to sociology than to history. Studies of the history of politics, of society, and of organizations during the Weimar period tended to emphasize prominent historical actors in the metropolitan areas: industrial workers, the old and the new middle class, and, most recently, the Catholic
subculture. Regional histories, though they have increased significantly in number, have concentrated primarily on areas in the western part of the empire and so have not been in a position to offer careful analyses of the social and political character of the rural evangelical communities, which lay predominantly north and east of the Elbe. The prevailing view of Weimar society as an industrial one has served to screen out certain subjects as less worthy of historical investigation. As a result, the geographically uneven pace of modernization, industrialization, democratization, secularization, and so on has been all too easily forgotten. We still know far too little about the political attitudes and dispositions of modernization’s laggards in the countryside, the human reservoir whose anxieties National Socialism was able to exploit successfully in its quest for votes. The Cologne historian Wolfram Pyta’s habilitation thesis presents a wealth of observations and succeeds in awakening a renewed, deepened historical interest in the failure of the political and cultural project known as the “Weimar Republic” in the rural evangelical communities.

In order to explain the shift to National Socialism, Pyta has investigated the nexus of village and politics in the rural evangelical communities. Significant conceptual presuppositions are involved in this choice. The focus of his study is not socioeconomic interests. Nor is it social inequalities among the rural evangelical populace. Nor is it regional differences, though Pyta does clearly establish the distinction between manorial ownership and landlord ownership. He does not believe that the various dispositions of social and economic interests or the processes of class formation contribute much to explaining the success of National Socialism in the countryside, although this is the approach favored in social history. Rather, he emphasizes the autonomy of local politics and the web of local relationships. Methodologically, he attempts to construct political-social typologies in order to analyze the mechanisms through which public opinion in the villages was formed.

At the center of his investigation stands the village community (Dorfgemeinschaft), “a non-instrumental, not excessively codified, compact social entity, owing its origin to the intensive social contacts among a limited number of people living similar patterns of life within a small area, and consciously accepted by its members as a social unit” (p. 42). Pyta’s approach begins as it were from the bottom up, with “relationships” in the village. His framework is not that of society, nor that of the social-historical position of the village in the Weimar Republic, but rather the integral unit as it existed on the spot. Pyta does not put forward any regional-historical claim to have found, in one particular region, an exemplary model to illustrate how National Socialism penetrated local society. Rather Pyta constructs his typologies in order to reach general conclusions. By emphasizing the concepts employed at the level of the “community,” as opposed to the analytical framework of “society,” Pyta invites some attendant difficulties. The concept of community employed in this study cannot always shed the signs of its origin in contemporary self-understandings. Since “class” and “strata” are not terms available for Pyta to use in characterizing the social groups as they formed in the village, he resorts instead to the broader self-characterizations of “social standing” (Stand) and status formation (Standesbildung). Had he begun at the level of society (Gesellschaft), Pyta might have been able to analyze in a more critical way the contemporary self-descriptions and self-understandings and get beyond them.

The landowner, or the manorial lord in a manorial community, the pastor, and the schoolteacher regulated political processes in the countryside. The basis for the authority of these shapers of village opinion, their social prestige, derived from their social-economic, ecclesiastical, and cultural positions. At the same time, they represented points of contact between the regionalism of the village and the supraregional structures
and ideas in politics and culture. Not only did they contribute to the economic, religious, and cultural self-preservation of the village; they also mediated between the internal and the external, exercised political influence, issued election recommendations, and promoted particular clubs and organizations. They mediated between the space of the village community, on the one hand, and the political realm, on the other. Less well clarified in this study is the situation of the rural artisans, an important segment among the independent populace: the numerous smiths, barrel-makers, cabinet-makers, saddle-makers, coach-makers, food processors, and rural grocers.

In several steps, Pyta examines models for the formation and dissolution of village communities in order to make clear the attractiveness of the National Socialist political platform to the village elites. What emerges as characteristic for the political culture of the rural evangelical communities in the Weimar period is the fact that landowners, farmers, pastors, and schoolteachers, each in their own way, made a kind of transition from the idea of a village community (Dorfgemeinschaft) to that of the racial community (Volksgemeinschaft). Ideologically, National Socialism succeeded in overcoming the traditional manner in which the rural community insulated itself from everything foreign.

Pyta describes in detail the key National Socialist motif of the racial community and its idealized national images of farmers, large landowners, pastors, and schoolteachers. First he discusses the many immanent, and apparently insoluble, village conflicts, and then he reviews the platform of each political party in turn with respect to its potential attractiveness. At the beginning of the Weimar period, the traditional localism and political indifference of the rural populace had grown. After the agrarian crisis of 1928, the countryside became politicized again, this time thoroughly and extensively. Instead of bourgeois nationalism, a hierarchical notion of national identity, within whose stratified social order the landowner occupied the highest rung, became increasingly attractive to Protestant landowners. It served, after all, to lend stability to their crisis-shaken self-image. Where the bourgeois national idea rested on a doctrine of equality, the category of the race or of the racial community (Volksgemeinschaft) provided for farmers, landowners, pastors, and schoolteachers some degree of mediation between the level of the village and the level of national politics. It also helped to provide some grounding for their political demands on the state. Using the ideology of the racial community, the NSDAP succeeded in uniting the leaders of rural popular opinion. But the result was not a unique new social milieu alongside the other, older milieus. Despite the gains made by Hitler’s party among the rural evangelical population through its penetration of the older conservative clubs and organizations, its successes were due rather to a radical breakdown in the fundamental structure of the German party system.

SIEGFRIED WEICHLEIN

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"Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit. By Norbert Frei.

In a well-known “put-down” review, Moses Haddad declared that the book at hand “fill[ed] a well-needed gap.” Alas, Norbert Frei’s Vergangenheitspolitik fills a gap that has to be filled and, in so doing, both deals with and raises substantive issues with regard to modern German history.
Frei shows why a combination of circumstances was responsible for a rapid and thoroughgoing suppression of concerns about Nazism within a very short time after the conclusion of World War II. This is a very complex story, with a variety of themes interwoven, but is, at times, disturbingly synoptic.

Demands posed by reconstruction, the beginnings of the Cold War, and the all-too-human desire to minimize national guilt allowed for, in fact demanded, that painful singularities attaching to Nazism be suppressed. Indeed, Frei points out, for many Germans it became very easy to conflate Nazi horrors with the miseries endured by the German people during the last months of the war and in the period of confusion and uncertainties following its conclusion. In a word, the musings of the late Andreas Hillgruber over the sufferings of the German people toward war’s end and the heroic performance of the Wehrmacht, particularly on the eastern front, in defending this people, must be seen as grounded in a general German tendency toward self-pity.

With the emergence of the Cold War, German political and eventual military integration into the “West” came to be accepted as necessary. Thus, while individuals such as John J. McCloy, the American High Commissioner for Germany, tried, on occasion, to sustain the moral judgments flowing from the Nuremberg trials, and attendant efforts at de-Nazification, the perceived post-1945 political realities necessitated that Germany be allowed to engage in a comforting process of national amnesia.

For unreconstructed right-wingers who felt little, if any, guilt with regard to Nazi war crimes and who had no burning desire for German “integration” into Western Europe, this was a godsend. For Konrad Adenauer, since 1949 chancellor over a now military-unoccupied West Germany, national amnesia became an expression of Realpolitik. Unlike those who represented the German right, such as the Deutsche Reichspartei—which, along with communists, would in due course be abolished—Adenauer never denied German war guilt. Yet, concerned about German participation in a unified Europe, and strongly anticommunist, he had to be sensitive to the concerns of the radical right, concerns that found expression in elements of one of his coalition partners, the supposedly “centrist” Freie Demokratische Partei. Thus, Adenauer, for reasons personal and political, was driven to participate in a national fetish of forgetfulness. At the same time, unlike those on the right, he was compelled to be sensitive to American and non-German European public opinion. After all, Germany would not be fully sovereign before fall 1954.

In the immediate postwar period, hundreds of Germans accused of war crimes were “languishing” in jails throughout Western Europe. At the same time, the behavior of the Wehrmacht was often under strong suspicion. Frei does a masterful job showing how, because of German domestic pressures and Western concerns that Germany be brought into NATO, legal jurisdiction over such people was gradually handed over to German courts, which were relatively sympathetic to many of the defendants as matters worked out, while a general rehabilitation of German soldiery took place. Even Dwight David Eisenhower, a man genuinely appalled by Nazi atrocities, took part in this noxious process.

Thus, even before West Germany attained full sovereignty, a combination of Cold War and domestic considerations was responsible for a kind of reverse de-Nazification of West Germany. In a word, within an amazingly short period of time after the horrors of Nazism had been revealed, many Germans were quite willing to forget them, while Cold War considerations were responsible for Western concerns to trivialize such matters.

Yet, there were still nagging doubts, and Adenauer was sensitive to them. As mentioned earlier, egregiously right-wing organizations—and some individuals as well—
came under the purview of the emerging West German government. Some were “brought to book,” and West Germany, in the eyes of those who viewed the country as such, came to be perceived as a country in which both the radical left and the radical right were being suppressed—a country that was thus an ideal participant in the European community—an Adenaurean dream. By 1955, when public memorials to the Holocaust were being planned, West Germany indeed, at least on the conscious level, already had “mastered the past.” Adenauer’s own political concerns, foreign and domestic, fit hand in glove with foreign and domestic political needs and concerns.

In an interesting sort of sidelight to all of these considerations, prominent German Jewish leaders, some survivors of death camps, were often reluctant to raise substantive challenges to policies of forgetfulness, fearful, with good reason, as matters sometimes turned out, that such could bring continued latent German antisemitism to the surface.

To be sure, there would be efforts, the most notable of them British, to make certain that those accused of war crimes were brought to justice. For the most part, though, Allied governments, which, even after West Germany attained sovereignty in October 1954, could have maintained strong influences with regard to the processing of those accused of war crimes, allowed for releases, reduced sentences, and, as mentioned earlier, the deliverance of such folk to more lenient German courts. According to the author, this was, understandably, quite favorably received by the German public. After initial protestations regarding the “politics of forgetfulness,” even Adenauer’s political foes, the Social Democrats, for mostly tactical reasons, fell into line with major aspects of such politics.

Thus, because of circumstances dictated by the Cold War, Konrad Adenauer’s sensitivity to them, and a mixture of national self-pity and, in some cases, no sense of guilt whatsoever, “politics of the past” became congruent with this most recent of pasts being trivialized or, in some cases, forgotten or denied. Not until the 1970s would large numbers of Germans, of another generation, make serious efforts to come to terms with it.

Frei’s courageous, and, in some ways, groundbreaking book, is to be read by those with strong stomachs; people who, while unable to forgive the unforgivable, are able to reject opinions grounded in beliefs in national character.

Robert A. Pois

University of Colorado


He heaved himself, a lug of a man, up the steps onto the stage, panting, and he gushed forth learned splatter all over the assembled champs, mercilessly talking and talking.

“Cease, oh cease the chatter!” plead the tormented listeners’ eyes. But he shot off word after word—the guy just can’t stop talking!—one after the other, just as Ulysses of the legend emptied his quiver.
Petra Weber cites this self-ironic ditty by and about the post–World War II West German statesman, leading Social Democrat, and bon vivant Carlo Schmid in the middle of her massive biography (p. 309). He had placed these lines at the end of an elegy, “Battle of the Giants at Bebenhausen,” which mocked his fellow combatants in a heated parliamentary debate over the critical postwar issue of land reform that had taken place earlier that day in February 1948. The verse and the circumstances of its delivery tell the reader a great deal about this immensely popular statesman, who held a remarkable moral sway in the formative years of West Germany from the late 1940s through the end of the 1960s without ever holding any of the very top offices. They mark Schmid as a man of equal passion for politics and the philosophical and artistic. Though eager for political battle, he always preferred to come to a consensus at the end, and he did not spare himself to achieve a good political climate. Confident of his rhetorical prowess with which he crushed the best of opponents, including many a brilliant verbal victory over the wily first West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, he nevertheless showed the kind of gnawing self-doubt that speaks out of the ditty above, albeit brilliantly packaged in boisterous self-mockery.

Weber’s use of this poem to explore Schmid’s role in the land reform debate is characteristic for this splendid biography. It allows her to move beyond the analysis of his specific political and administrative actions to a deeper understanding of this remarkably cultured man in politics and, even more impressively, his impact on and interaction with the unique political culture of West Germany in its first three decades of groping toward democracy. In the process, she moves from the political to the artistic, philosophical, and pedagogical sides of his personality with the same ease as her subject did. She reveals gifts as a cultural historian that go well beyond the reputation she has already built as a historian of Social Democracy with her well-edited 1993 edition of the 1949–57 SPD Bundestag delegation protocols (Die SPD-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag: Sitzungsprotokolle [Dusseldorf, 1993]). The book is an intellectual delicacy, rich in sophisticated discussions of legal theory and literature as well as politics, and its style at times waxes almost poetic.

Weber’s basic thesis is that Schmid was more than a top-flight intellectual and legal theorist, whose greatest historical claim to fame is as “father of the (West) German constitution.” He was more than a moderate, thoughtful, and rhetorically gifted statesman, who at critical points helped balance West Germany’s still conflicted and at times unstable early democracy by mediating between the major parties and between centrists and impatient leftists in his own party. She sees him as a man with two equally potent souls—the political and the artistic—who, for all his extraordinary gifts and energy, often had great difficulty keeping his own psychic balance. Acclaimed as a writer and translator of fine prose and poetry, he was yet never satisfied with intellectual constructs per se; in fact, he often expressed distrust of only intellectuals and their political judgments, even though he was quick to defend their right to express their views. His own political ambition was strong. He passionately wanted to shape politics and society, and he was ready to seek compromise and consensus in a politics of the possible to exert influence and make a difference. Though not a blatant careerist, he fervently hoped to reach one of the top positions of government—chancellor, foreign minister, federal president, or at least president of parliament or minister of culture, none of which he attained even though he was a state prime minister, a federal minister, and for many years deputy president of the parliament and deputy chairman of his party.

Weber is a deeply empathetic biographer, but she is not blind to Schmid’s weaknesses. She readily acknowledges the many occasions when his vanity got in his way, when he was wily in pursuit of political ambitions, misjudged situations, and sup-
pressed some of his actions in his strongly pedagogical memoirs. Like so many men and women accustomed to power, influence, and esteem, he left the political stage unwillingly and with considerable bitterness. He had his greatest moments in deepest crisis situations—as occupation officer in France, in the face of total collapse in 1945–46 Germany, when the Allies appeared determined to veto a strong, sensibly federal constitution, and when in the 1955 Moscow negotiations the Soviets seemed unwilling to release the remaining German prisoners of war. Yet he found it harder to sustain longer term influence at the top. One suspects that Schmid himself would have been delighted that his biographer was still ready to engage with him critically in the year of his hundredth birthday. Yet Weber evidently shares his nonideological, humane socialism, even with its unabashed elitism; and she admires his devoted struggle for close relations with his mother’s native land, France, for rapprochement with Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe, for European integration, and, in opposition to the New Left’s postnationalism, a love of nation, which included the dream for the eventual German reunification that he did not live to see. This splendid book, based on extensive archival research in France and Germany, will undoubtedly remain the definitive biography of this fascinating political-cultural figure, whom Willy Brandt called “the secret father of the free, democratic Germany.”

Diethelm Prowe

Carleton College

Education and Middle-Class Society in Imperial Austria, 1848–1918. By Gary B. Cohen.

Gary B. Cohen’s latest book reminds historians of modern Europe that it is possible, if rare, today to employ a complex empirical analysis in order to make important arguments about cultural identity and historical experience. In his first book (The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861–1914 [Princeton, N.J., 1981]), a brilliant study of the German-speaking community in nineteenth-century Prague, Cohen deployed a sophisticated local statistical study to analyze the larger construction of national and class identities in Austrian society. This time he examines the backgrounds of secondary and university students in order to address questions of middle-class formation and social transformation in the Habsburg monarchy. Education and Middle-Class Society in Imperial Austria, 1848–1918 challenges several influential assumptions that have for too long structured thinking about imperial Austria’s middle classes. In place of these tired arguments, Cohen’s book offers a nuanced, richly complex, and comparative basis for examining the recruitment and comparative power of the Austrian Bürgertum. In particular, Cohen asks whether secondary and higher education perpetuated the social power and cultural values of elite groups in the monarchy, the traditional view, or whether it provided a means for members of diverse classes, ethnic groups, and religious minorities to gain social advancement on their own terms?

Cohen’s first chapters trace changing educational policy in imperial Austria, starting with the post-1848 reforms of Leo Thun, continuing with the generally expansionary policies initiated by the liberals in the 1860s and 1870s, and followed by the antiliberal backlash of the Taaffe years (1879–93). Here Cohen demonstrates the limits of state policy in shaping the educational choices of young Austrians. Targeted expansion of opportunity in the liberal era, for example, brought unexpected consequences in the
form of growing general interest in higher education, a trend the antiliberal policy makers of the 1880s and 1890s, try as they might, simply could not reverse. Enrollment numbers and specific educational choices (technical vs. classical secondary schools, for example) may have reflected changing economic opportunities, particularly during the depression years starting in 1873, but by 1900 demand for education had assumed its own powerful dynamic quite apart from state policy and economic growth. As increasingly mass-based political movements linked educational opportunities more explicitly to their own nationalist programs, the state could not ignore demands for expanded opportunities in higher education.

In the most compelling section of the book, Cohen examines first the changing backgrounds of secondary and university students, and then their changing social experience. Here he also addresses difficult questions about the larger functions of the Austrian educational system and, indirectly, about the power and influence of middle-class society in the empire. Did higher education serve to reproduce elite values and power, or did it tend to break down those values by admitting an increasingly diverse group into the ranks of the educated elites? Naturally, Cohen does not present the alternatives in such simplistic terms. On the whole, however, his work uses empirically based arguments to suggest that Austrian society was far more “modern,” far more democratic, and also far less paralyzed by nationalist conflict than historians have traditionally allowed.

It seems clear from Cohen's statistical analyses that, in ethnic, religious, and class terms, Austria's secondary and university students constituted a remarkably diverse group and that at least in ethnic and religious terms, this diversity increased steadily in the period 1848–1914. As one might expect from his previous work, the author does not shy away from complexity when he comes to speak about cultural identity. Cohen consistently takes care to emphasize the contingency of the very identities he examines. His statistics never simplify German-speakers into German nationals, or Polish-speakers into Catholics, for example. He is carefully attuned to the nuances of local constructions of cultural identity, as much for students in the Bukovina or Galicia as for students in Bohemia, Moravia, or the Alpine lands. We learn that while those who represented themselves as German-speakers maintained a far higher, if steadily declining, proportion of students than their numbers in the general population, Bohemia and Moravia produced relatively more of these students than the economically more isolated Alpine lands. Similarly, the remarkable statistical growth in numbers of Polish-speaking students around the turn of the century often included hidden others like Jews, Ukrainians, and foreign students. Cohen's analysis also enables him to link particular regional, ethnic, or religious groups to specific choices of faculty. Thus, in general terms, for example, the Galician Polish and Alpine German Catholics preferred the philosophical or theological faculties, while Jews chose medicine or law, and Protestants the technical faculties. It is a strength of Cohen's analysis, however, that even these generalizations are made not in static but in dynamic terms, as other factors came into play to alter the educational strategies of particular ethnic, religious, or occupational groups over time.

Cohen consistently places his analysis of the social background of students in the context of comparable developments in the rest of Europe, particularly those in Germany. As in Prussia, for example, the largest numbers of secondary school graduates in Austria came from lower middle-class backgrounds, the children of families without property holdings or higher education. Within this larger category, however, the proportions of students from white-collar backgrounds increased significantly as those from peasant and craft families slowly declined. And not surprisingly, matriculated students at the Czech University or Technical College in Prague were far more likely to come
from lower middle-class backgrounds than their counterparts at the German universities and technical colleges who generally came from higher, more educated social backgrounds. There were noticeable differences between Austria and the German states as well: Austrian secondary schools and universities, for example, produced comparatively more graduates from families of wage workers. And the number of students from propertied families grew more in Germany, where faster and earlier economic development strengthened the size and relative representation of the commercial, financial, and industrial classes.

One of the hallmarks of Cohen’s previous work has been his ability to relate local events to larger developments at the state level, to connect the situation of the individual to the construction of collective social identities. Although his first book more clearly articulated the different elements of micro- and macrohistories, this book makes sense precisely because of its attentiveness to local context in forging its larger theoretical arguments. If anything, this reviewer wished the book could have been longer in order to make room for even more local examples.

Historians of Central Europe owe Cohen an enormous debt of gratitude. His work invites us to discard popular but unproven paradigms and to view the society of imperial Austria in dynamic new terms. And, in a time of increasing polarization within academia over questions of method, Cohen’s authoritative voice demonstrates how creative and careful empirical study can help to answer the most difficult historical questions about cultural identity.

Pieter M. Judson

Swarthmore College

The Road to Romanian Independence. By Frederick Kellogg.

The Road to Romanian Independence represents a slightly revised and enlarged (by a single chapter) version of Frederick Kellogg’s 1969 dissertation, “Rumanian Nationalism and European Diplomacy, 1866–1878.”¹ (There is no indication of this, however, either in a note or in the bibliography.) Kellogg’s theses, which arrived twenty-six years ago, remain basically unchanged although more recent publications have been added to the bibliography.

Kellogg’s central theme is the influence of the diplomacy and foreign policy of the major European powers on the Romanian policy of independence, which formed a central component of Romanian nationalism in the period between 1866 and 1880. It came at the end of a period in which Romania belonged to the Ottoman Empire as a half-independent duchy; at the same time, since the Paris Treaty of 1856 Romania had possessed a collective guarantee of its autonomy by the major European powers. The beginning and ending dates, marking the election of Carol the First of the House of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen as the Prince of Romania in 1866 and the final recognition of an independent Romania by the European powers in 1880, delimit an important period in the gradual emergence of Romania as an independent state. One important goal of Romanian nationalism, complete independence, received a vigorous boost through the selection of a foreigner as prince, who pursued this goal consistently. Such

¹ Frederick Kellogg, “Rumanian Nationalism and European Diplomacy, 1866–1878” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1969).
a policy necessarily clashed with the interests of the Ottoman leadership, but it also led to conflicts with the guarantee powers, whose differing interests in the Balkans were affected by the Romanian demands. On the one hand, the half-independent status of the country permitted the guarantee powers to intervene directly and repeatedly into disputed issues in Romanian politics and to exert pressure on the country. On the other hand, the collective guarantee did provide the Romanians a measure of security in foreign policy and a certain freedom to maneuver. Romania was often able to exploit the prevailing disharmony among the great powers to its own advantage.

Kellogg investigates the areas of conflict that led to political differences and competing claims between Romania and the great powers: for example, the election of a foreign prince, the Jewish question, the status of foreigners, support for neighboring independence movements, railroad construction, the ratification of trade agreements, Romanian policy in the Orient crisis of 1875–78, participation in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877, and the preconditions for international recognition of the independence that had already been proclaimed in 1877. Kellogg still maintains, though not as vigorously as he did in his 1969 dissertation, that the European interventions served to stimulate Romanian nationalism (p. 80). Conversely, one can interpret independence as a fundamental position that Romania sought to have recognized by the European powers. The author illustrates the mutual interaction of “challenge and response” between the Romanian quest for autonomy and for its own place among the independent states of Europe, on the one hand, and the interests of the great powers, on the other. Kellogg attempts to set the impulse and strategies of Romanian nationalism within the context of the conflicts among the great powers. In view of Romania’s unique geopolitical situation at the crossroads of three great powers, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, this perspective turns out to be a fruitful one, provided that this interpretive scheme is not seen as the only possible one, and Romania is not viewed exclusively as a victim of the interests of the great powers.

Kellogg views the period under investigation as a transitional phase. At the start, Romania’s dependent status was somewhat counterbalanced by its protected status in foreign affairs. At its conclusion, Romania had achieved full sovereignty but its position in foreign affairs had become uncertain. The Romanians were willing to pay this price for their independence. Kellogg speaks of a process of maturation (p. 229), which implies a process of experience and learning to deal with the European powers. But the presentation of certain developments remains superficial because Kellogg for the most part forgoes a critical analysis and appraisal of Romanian politics. The contradictory qualities of Romanian nationalism in its confrontation with the major powers, its stabilizing as well as its destabilizing consequences, and its offensive as well as its defensive character are not brought out clearly enough. Some decisions are difficult to understand without a knowledge of internal political events. Domestically, this was not a peaceful period (p. 229). Precisely during the years 1866–71, the country was in the grip of a deep leadership crisis. Some statements, dates, and interpretations require correction. To give one example, Bismarck’s enormous pressure on the prince, and not the international impact of the Jewish question, led to the resignation of the radical-liberal government of N. Golescu in November 1868. A statement by the prince about the loss of Bessarabia (p. 190) is interpreted by Kellogg in an opposite sense, and this leads him to a mistaken appraisal of the prince’s position on this question. In a similar fashion he misinterprets the neutrality policy in the Orient crisis of 1876 when he claims that it

2 The incorrect data (p. 132, n. 54) regarding the circular note of L. Catargiu from January 4–16, 1876, are misleading.
was only good on paper (p. 124). In fact the Romanians observed a strict policy of neutrality in an effort to further their claim to their own neutral status, to be guaranteed by the great powers. After independence, this was the second most important goal of Romanian foreign policy. It was only when this aim could not be reached that they gave up their declared neutrality and sided with Russia in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877, in order to legitimate their independence militarily.

On some foreign policy topics, Kellogg's study complements a more extensive work with a similar title written by a German historian. In other respects, it does not achieve as much. This is the first study in English to treat this important period in Romanian history and, as a consequence, to shed light on an unfamiliar corner of European diplomatic history. It is based on an extensive study of the sources and the factual material. The book has a good apparatus, including a solid bibliography, a listing of the cabinet members for the relevant years, and an index. It communicates to the reader the specific problems of Romania during the age of nationalism. It also takes into account current interest in the region and in the historical roots of contemporary nationalism in the Balkan countries.

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For decades following the Bolshevik Revolution, scholars depicted imperial Russia's commercial-industrial elite as a "missing bourgeoisie." This absent class not only oppressed the urban proletariat in a highly exploitative manner, it failed to realize its most essential historical mission, the spearheading of a modern liberal opposition to the monarchy. Informed by a Marxist model of the French Revolution, Russian intellectuals and subsequent generations of historians blamed the missing bourgeoisie for the empire's economic "backwardness" and for the late imperial (and subsequent Soviet) divergence from the "Western" path of democratic capitalist development. With the advent of the "new social history" and the gradual opening of many Russian archives over the past thirty years, more complex and sympathetic appraisals of the tsarist bourgeoisie have emerged. Less ideological, better researched, and at times excessively celebratory accounts of commercial-industrial groups reveal levels of cultural sophistication, public activity, and political participation comparable to those of better-known (and more popular) elites, such as the nobility, intelligentsia, and professions. Waltraud Bayer's balanced study of art patronage among representatives of the Moscow business class exemplifies this valuable historiographical correction. Based largely on printed primary and secondary sources, with a sprinkling of archival documents, Die Moskauer Medici traces the contributions of businessmen to the Russian art world from the time of the Crimean War until the collapse of the Old Regime in 1917.

Focusing on pictorial art and crafts, Bayer describes two generations of Moscow patrons whose evolution paralleled the appearance of a modern middle-class culture (and self-consciousness), characterized by patriotic sentiments and unprecedented
involvement in public life. The first generation of bourgeois collectors, born between 1820 and 1850, entered a social arena already inhabited by art patrons from the court and nobility. Remaining relatively close to the patriarchal, orthodox values of the countryside, this generation favored native religious, landscape, and realist genre painting. Although their taste in art can be called “traditional,” their patronage goals extended well beyond the satisfaction of personal needs. In addition to collecting art and supporting painters, businessmen cooperated with the Slavophile nobility to establish cultural organizations, private galleries, and public museums. They also deliberately set out to popularize art by educating the public. In this spirit, P. M. Tret’iakov (1832–98) founded a unique public gallery that became the cornerstone for a Russian national museum. During the 1860s and 1870s, a period of intensified societal initiative inaugurated by military defeat in the Crimea and the great reforms of Alexander II, growing numbers of patrons and painters devoted their resources and talents to the creation of realistic renderings of national history and contemporary life. From the 1880s, they added the preservation and production of native (peasant) handicrafts to their cultural agenda. Their commitment to indigenous styles and themes, which at midcentury had implied a separation from the classical canons of official academy art, quickly became an integrative force uniting the state, nobility, educated elites, and economic bourgeoisie.

By the 1890s, a second generation of “bourgeois” patrons, born between 1850 and 1880, rose to prominence. Socially and economically more diverse than the older group, this generation comprised nobles who had adopted a middle-class lifestyle, the upper echelons of the commercial-industrial elite (including representatives of minorities), professionals, and academics. Their collecting habits were similarly varied. No longer content to promote popular realism, the younger Moscow patrons embraced new modernist and avant-garde orientations from Western Europe and Russia. Interest in religious and folk art continued, indicating the full elasticity of a novel middle-class aesthetics. Alongside the diversification of a common aesthetics, social and cultural distinctions between the producers and buyers of art became less pronounced. An expanding market allowed artists greater economic independence. Higher levels of education and the accumulation of wealth transformed middle-class patrons into art critics and amateur painters. The organization of exhibits and involvement in artistic and literary journals appealed to a wide range of educated people. Private salons and galleries enhanced personal contacts between painters and patrons whose sometimes antagonistic politics and lifestyles in no way dampened their shared desire to propagate art and modernism in life. Increasingly, elite culture constituted an emergent “bourgeois public sphere.”

Despite the originality and pan-European significance of Russian cultural production in the reign of Nicholas II, literature remains the only form of artistic expression that is relatively well studied. Bayer’s attractive book offers a fascinating, accessible glimpse of prerevolutionary art culture that should stimulate further research. The book provides a small sampling of high-quality reproductions as well as basic information about individual patrons and specific organizations and publications. The author also indirectly addresses crucial theoretical and historiographical themes, such as the development of “civil society” and a Habermasian “bourgeois public sphere.” She frames the development of Moscow patronage in terms of a self-conscious middle class committed to public service, free expression, and the idea of Russianness. This interpretation is appropriate; however, the relationship between patronage and the evolving social structure (or changes in social consciousness) remains problematic. Recent research shows that, by the late eighteenth century, culturally sophisticated and socially engaged merchant groups played visible public roles in the capitals and provinces. In addition, a self-
defined reading public (publika) of mixed social origins, united through multiple sites of sociability, had formed. The story Bayer tells, while substantive in its own right, also belongs to the larger context of Enlightenment culture as it evolved in Russia from the time of Peter the Great. This was not an exclusively noble or Westernized culture, superseded in the nineteenth century by a new, socially differentiated, and national-minded bourgeois culture. It was, like the cultural milieu Bayer analyzes, a broad-based literate, secular culture encompassing economic, noble, official, and educated elites—including women and minorities—whose beliefs, thinking, and sensibilities derived from an amalgam of Russian Orthodox, native ethnological, and European neoclassical and Enlightenment sources.

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This is an extremely important book, but it is not an easy one to read. The text is only 170 pages long, but it contains fifty-seven tables, and it is supported by fourteen statistical appendixes with another eighty-three tables on an additional 120 dense pages. I doubt whether many will read the entire book including the appendixes, but I am also sure that this book will be very widely cited. This book is the only critical account of one of the most important economic topics of twentieth-century history. It reconstructs and analyzes the statistical record necessary to provide an economic explanation of how the Soviet economy was able to absorb the effects of the massive German attack in World War II, and outproduce the war effort of Germany and occupied continental Europe. This achievement of the Soviet economy was quite remarkable. As Mark Harrison points out, “In both the world wars . . . when poor countries of similar or even somewhat more advanced development level and economic structure [as the USSR] were subjected to massive attack, . . . their economies soon disintegrated. This did not happen in the Soviet case” (p. 171). The importance of the fact that the Soviet economy did not collapse under the strain of World War II should not be underestimated. Recently, Western triumphalist claims that the Soviet experiment has been shown to be a total failure have tended to obscure this very important earlier success.

Prior to the publication in 1991 of the 1959 Soviet statistical handbook on the Soviet economy in 1941–45, the only quantitative information on how the Soviet war economy worked was a series of selective revelations of odd and occasionally contradictory secret figures, which various privileged Soviet officials had been authorized to reveal (Voznesenskii, head of Gosplan; Sukharevskii, head of sector of national economic balances in Gosplan; and a few Soviet historians). This information had been uncritically incorporated into both Western and Soviet economic histories of the period and had served as the very limited basis for previous Western assessments of Soviet economic performance during the war. Harrison takes us beyond these very limited sources and introduces us to the wealth of Soviet archival materials on the different aspects of the economy. He uses these materials to reconstruct the series of data on industrial production, gross national product (GNP), employment, and foreign trade, with an indi-
cation of how much of these items were devoted to military production and how much to the civilian sector.

Harrison's account is thoroughly quantitative, and he is naturally a little defensive of the widespread suggestion that all statistics are either lies or simply collections of anecdotes and that Soviet statistics were worse. Harrison takes a sophisticated but realistic attitude to what Soviet statistics can show us: "There is no single, objective truth waiting to be discovered beneath the surface of the lie. The Soviet GNP is not a hidden number awaiting discovery, but an aggregation of assumptions and hypotheses about a multi-dimensional reality which resists reduction to a unique figure" (p. 4) and "Soviet GNP can be measured" (p. 170).

Harrison points out that in 1940 the countries that would become the Allies overall had twice the population of the Axis powers, 2.7 times their gross domestic product (measured in 1985 international dollars), and consequently overall averaged 1.4 times their productivity per capita. With overwhelming population and economic resources, the Allies were bound to win in the long run if none of their members were individually knocked out along the way. But in the short term, the problems on the eastern front were massive, especially after the Soviet losses in the first year of the war (1941–42).

Harrison's GNP series show that Soviet GNP fell by a third between 1940 and 1942 and that the defense burden increased from 17 percent of all GNP in 1940 to 61 percent in 1942. Harrison explains the remarkable failure of the Soviet economy not to collapse under such a strain in terms of "the Soviet institutional capacity to manage shortages and distribute the defence burden" (pp. 126). This is further unpacked and explained as "the capacity to define priorities, to ration steel and power to the top priority users and deny these commodities to everyone else, to ration labour among the armed forces, defence industry, and the civilian economy when each sector required far more than was available, and to ration food among consumers when there was not enough food to keep everyone alive" (pp. 126). Harrison concludes: "This capacity made the difference between Russian defeat in World War I, and Soviet victory in World War II" (p. 126). An important section of this work looks at the scale and importance of Allied aid to the Soviet Union, and although Harrison concludes that this accounted for far more than the "only 4 percent" often cited in Soviet texts, he nevertheless argues that they were not substantial in the early critical stages of the war when the Soviet Union was absorbing the main thrust of German attack and that they only became significant after the main battles of Stalingrad and Kursk had been fought by early 1943. The effect of substantial U.S. aid in this later period speeded up the German withdrawal, which was as much to the interest of the United States and United Kingdom, as it ultimately diminished their human losses. Harrison suggests that, instead of seeing this exclusively in terms of economic aid from the rich to the poor, it should be seen to some extent as a transaction in human lives in which the richer countries were minimizing the losses of life of their soldiers by subsidizing a poorer country to do more of the fighting and dying for them. Ultimately, however, it was in the interests of both the United States and the USSR that Germany be defeated as quickly as possible.

The chapter on war losses surveys both demographic losses and other losses to the economy and argues that unlike the other countries these were permanent losses. The argument here is not simply that after the recovery process the overall trend was starting from a lower level but that the potential growth was retarded by technological inefficiencies introduced into the war economy because of such things as inefficient allocation and suboptimal scales of production.

In general, this book is a remarkable tour de force opening up for serious academic
investigation an important area that had previously only been studied at the superficial level of anecdotes and selective revelations. The only criticisms that could be made of the book would be the failure to carry the analysis further. How did the institutional capacity to manage shortages and distribute the defense burden work? What exactly were the technological inefficiencies that were introduced into the war economy that resulted in subsequent losses of inefficiency? And how was domestic Soviet agriculture operating? But, as Harrison points out, such questions set the agenda for future research.

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