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THE PLACE OF CULTURE IN PSYCHOLOGY

A social constructionist standpoint

Kenneth J. Gergen

In the attempt to establish a psychology where culture counts, how are we to define the concept of "culture"? Some hold culture to be simply a shared way of life, while others view culture in terms of the manifestations of a people's arts and intellectual achievements. For many anthropologists culture is defined in terms of shared symbol systems; psychologists often focus on shared beliefs; others focus on accumulated knowledge. In effect, the concept of culture can be approached from multiple and diverse standpoints (Jahoda, 2012). This multiplicity should not be viewed as a weakness, as each perspective opens possibilities for inquiry, understanding, and action. If this seems reasonable, however, we may also conclude that a culturally sensitive psychology is open to multiple interpretations. And by reflecting on such a venture from different standpoints, its dimensions and potentials may be enriched.

In this chapter I offer a social constructionist view of the growing concern among psychologists to include culture within its formulations. What progress has been made thus far in such efforts, and what challenges lie ahead in achieving a culturally inclusive psychology? Here I will briefly retrace the intellectual trajectory out of which cultural psychology emerged, and its relationship to both cross-cultural and indigenous psychologies. This analysis enables us to confront a range of significant challenges to cultural inclusion. These challenges, I propose, pivot about a single, major concept inherited from the Western tradition: the concept of knowledge. Here I will contrast the traditional empiricist account with a social constructionist view. As I will show, the latter enables us to overcome major problems in making a place for culture, and to solve the critical problems of cross-cultural understanding, and the contemporary dissolution and transformation of culture.

Culture in psychology: Routes and refutations

To illuminate the life of a single individual is a contribution to history; to illuminate what is true of all human beings is to make history. Such is the underlying

logic of psychological science since its inception. The major search has been – and continues to be – toward establishing fundamental principles or laws of perception, cognition, motivation, emotion, learning, aggression, and so on. In contrast, case studies, biographical research, and life-history research occupy but a minor and typically neglected niche in disciplinary structure. Psychology is not alone in this penchant within the social or behavioral sciences. Particularly within sociology and economics, the search for general theories is dominant. This universalizing posture owes its existence, in important part, to natural science research and to the supporting role of twentieth-century philosophy of science. As the twentieth century unfolded, the generalizing sciences of chemistry, physics, biology, and medicine had demonstrated substantial productivity, and logical positivist meta-theory provided a congenial rationale for privileging the general over the specific. In effect, a fully sophisticated and empirically grounded theory of the general would be able to account for all particulars, while a focus on particulars could never yield a general theory. Counter-intuitively, here was indeed a first step toward the inclusion of culture in psychological science. That is, psychology is the study of universal mental processes; all cultures are included. And all cultures are invited to join in the inquiry.

From the universal to the culturally specific

In my view, this still dominant view of psychology as a universal science was both well intentioned and naïve. It was well intentioned because there was reason to hope that the kinds of contributions achieved in the natural sciences could be duplicated in psychology. All cultures would gain through psychology's research into basic processes of learning, motivation, mental illness, and so on. Initially, the development of cross-cultural psychology merely provided a qualification mechanism in the grander design for generating universal truth. It was simply the task of cross-cultural psychology to test the universal claims in contrasting cultural settings, thus yielding validation and/or qualification. Exemplary is Eckman and Friesen's (1971) research in which claims were made to the universality of emotional expression, but with variations attributed to local rules of emotional display. This commitment to a universalist psychology remains pervasive within cross-cultural psychology, as exemplified in Matsumoto's Preface to the 2001 edition of the *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology*. As he points out, a major theme across all chapters of the Handbook is "A vision of the future as continued evolution of cross-cultural psychology, particularly as it aids in the creation of a universal psychology that is applicable to all people" (p. viii).

Yet, the question of why certain universal hypotheses do not generalize across cultural settings also led cross-cultural psychologists to inquire into the specific cultural conditions and cultural proclivities at stake. In effect, the focus on universal psychological functioning invited curiosity into specific cultural processes. The classic work of Triandis (1995) and others on individualist vs. collectivist cultures is exemplary. In turn, this concern with specific cultural conditions invited a much more radical view, to whit, varying cultural conditions give rise to differing processes

of psychological functioning. If fully extended, this line of reasoning would mean the collapse of a universalist psychology. The entire ontology of mental life might vary from one cultural setting to another. However, the movement toward a specifically, cultural psychology has continued to avoid such a conclusion. Rather, drawing from Vygotsky (1978), Bruner (1991), and Shweder (1991), among others, the conceptual centerpiece of the cultural psychology movement has been "human meaning," or more formally, "cognitive content." Exemplary here is the work of Markus and Kitayama (1991) on cultural variations in the concept of self.

In effect, while a full-blown cultural psychology would threaten the universalist fantasy, there are many ways in which the fantasy is simultaneously sustained. There is first the dualist assumption common across the spectrum of cultural psychology. In all cases one presumes that there are "minds within bodies," with such Western concepts as cognition, emotion, the self, inter-subjectivity, and values dominating the spectrum of inquiry. Further, research in cultural psychology embraces empiricist assumptions concerning the use of methods (e.g., experiments, surveys, ethnography) to establish validity in representation. Thus, while the search for general laws or principles is subverted by the cultural psychology movement, the possibility remains inherent of establishing a universal, scientifically based account of psychological functioning, as it varies from one culture to another.

The seeds for a more radical departure from Western universalism are found in the indigenous psychology movement. Here we find a strong motivation to combat the otherwise imperialistic thrust of the West. As often argued, Western psychology defines itself as a universal psychology, and thus functions as a suppressive form of colonization. Increasingly, then, attempts have been made to recognize, appreciate, and develop psychologies specific to particular peoples and traditions. Illustrative are indigenous movements in China (Huang, 2012), India (Misra and Kumar, 2011), and the Philippines (Pe-Pua and Protacio-Marcelino, 2000). Such movements would not stand in some lesser position to Western universalism – mere footnotes to an otherwise general psychology – but stand on equal footing. For, as it is reasoned, Western psychology is simply one more brand of indigenous psychology (Gergen et al. 1996; Greenfield, 2000).

Yet, there are many within the camp of cultural psychology, in particular, who question the indigenous movement. At the outset, to the extent that conceptions of knowledge are culturally specific, then indigenous psychology would fall outside the Western concept of science. Differing conceptions of mind – or indeed the lack of any conception of biologically based mental process – would prohibit movements toward integration and generalization. Indeed there would be a balkanization of the discipline, with psychology no longer existing as a singular field of study, or indeed a discipline of study at all.

Particularly worrisome is the question of communication. As the argument goes, if each culture lives and understands the world from within its own framework, how would cross-cultural understanding be possible? One could only understand another in his or her own terms. Thus, for example, one would not be able to translate across indigenous movements. Attempts to translate would invariably function

imperialistically, reformulating the otherwise exotic into the familiar. In effect, indigenous systems of understanding and action are fundamentally incommensurable, worlds in themselves.

The implications of this argument are profound indeed. Ultimately at question is the capacity of any scientist/scholar to generate a valid representation of the peoples of any culture, save in the terms of that culture itself. Validity is fundamentally a local matter, achieved only through local negotiations. Or, to extend the argument, no one can legitimately represent anyone else, and the attempts of science to describe and explain human action are a disservice to those who are objectified in these terms. Such conclusions have been far too radical for the profession, and many arguments have been made for a more integrative approach to indigenous psychology. For example, Kim, Yang, and Hwang (2006) propose that indigenous psychology advocates multiple methods and perspectives, with a final goal of "discovering psychological universals." Needless to say, this proposal is scarcely satisfactory to many in the indigenous movement.

As we find, in its current state, the issue of a universally shared, or culturally inclusive psychology is fraught with conflict. There is first the tension between advocates of universal principles and who view such research as blind to cultural variation. Among those concerned with cultural variation, there are tensions between those favoring an empirical assessment of a given psychological universe, and those who question the adequacy of any over-arching concept of knowledge or of the person. Further, there are reverberating concerns with the imperialist thrust of any set of truth claims or universal rationalities issuing from a singular cultural location.

Added to these problems are critiques emerging from cultural studies and anthropology. As argued in the former case, virtually all attempts to characterize culture in general are misleading. Within local venues and local conditions, people will develop unique forms of understanding and patterns of behavior. In effect, what we call "culture" represents a gloss on what is more properly understood as an immense array of subcultures. One cannot speak of Chinese, Indian, or American culture, for example, because there are enormous variations among subcultures as you move across the lands.

Coupled with this critique of cultural analysis is the emerging lament in anthropology over the disappearance of culture. Given the global diffusion of the world's peoples, along with the globe spanning circulation of ideas, values, and images on the internet, the idea of coherent, geographically based cultures becomes moribund. Cross-cultural comparisons become irrelevant (Hermans and Kempen, 1998). Anthropologists increasingly turn their attention to the global flows of peoples, along with those of media, technology, ideas and habits (Clifford, 1997; Appadurai, 2001). Concern with shifting identities, colonization, and hybridization all become prominent.

Although this array of conundrums is indeed formidable, I do not believe that our hopes for a culturally inclusive psychology are thus destroyed. In particular, many of the existing problems derive from assumptions that are not themselves placed under scrutiny. If the assumptions can be challenged, the force of "the

problems" is subverted. A number of the pivotal assumptions have been placed in question by proponents of a social constructionist view knowledge. In what follows, I will briefly outline several significant strands of constructionist thought. With these ideas in place, we can return to the challenge of cultural inclusion, and open paths to more promising potentials.

The social construction of knowledge

Although one may trace certain roots of social constructionism to Vico, Nietzsche, and Dewey, scholars often view Berger and Luckmann's (1966) *The social construction of reality* as the landmark volume. Yet, because of its lodgment in social phenomenology, this work has largely been eclipsed by more recent scholarly developments. One may locate these primary stimulants in at least three, quite independent movements. In effect, the convergence of these movements provides the basis for social constructionist inquiry today.

The first movement may be viewed as critical, and refers to the mounting ideological critique of all authoritative accounts of the world, including those of empirical science. Such critique can be traced at least to the Frankfurt School, but today is more fully embodied in the work of Foucault (1978), and associated movements within feminist, black, gay and lesbian, and anti-psychiatry enclaves. As underscored by this movement, there are no value neutral accounts of the world. All have social and political ramifications. The second significant movement, the literary/rhetorical, originates in the fields of literary theory and rhetorical study. Post-structural literary theory has been especially prominent, including deconstructionist theory. Rhetorical study, in particular, demonstrates the extent to which scientific theories, explanations, and descriptions of the world are not so much dependent upon the world in itself as on discursive conventions. Traditions of language in use construct what we take to be the world. The third context of ferment, the social, may be traced to the collective scholarship in the history of science, the sociology of knowledge, and social studies of science. Here the major focus is on the social processes giving rise to what is accepted as knowledge, both scientific and otherwise.

In what follows I shall briefly outline a number of the most widely shared agreements to emerge from these various movements. These lines of argument tend to link the three movements and to form the basis of contemporary social constructionism.

The social origins of knowledge

Perhaps the most generative idea emerging from the constructionist dialogues is that what we take to be knowledge of the world and self finds its origins in human relationships. What we take to be true as opposed to false, objective as opposed to subjective, scientific as opposed to mythological, rational as opposed to irrational, moral as opposed to immoral is brought into being through historically and culturally situated social processes. This view stands in dramatic contrast to two of the most important

intellectual and cultural traditions of the West. First is the tradition of the individual knower, the rational, self-directing, morally centered, and knowledgeable agent of action. Within the constructionist dialogues we find that it is not the individual mind in which knowledge, reason, emotion, and morality reside, but in relationships.

The communal view of knowledge also represents a major challenge to the presumption of universal truth, or the possibility that the accounts of scientists, or any other group, serve as valid representations about what is the case. In effect, propose the constructionists, no one arrangement of words is necessarily more objective or accurate in its depiction of the world than any other. To be sure, accuracy may be achieved within a given community or tradition – according to its rules and practices. Physics and chemistry generate useful truths from within their communal traditions, just as psychologists, sociologists, and priests do from within theirs. But from these often competing traditions there is no means by which one can locate a transcendent truth. Any attempt to establish the superior account would itself be the product of a given community of agreement.

The centrality of language

Central to the constructionist account of the social origins of knowledge is a concern with language. If accounts of the world are not demanded by what there is, then the traditional view of language as a mapping device ceases to compel. Rather, constructionists tend to draw from Wittgenstein's (1953) view of language as a form of language game. And, given that games of language are essentially conducted in a rule-like fashion, accounts of the world are governed in significant degree by conventions of language use. Empirical research could not reveal, for example, that "emotions are oblong." The utterance is grammatically correct, but makes no sense within Western tradition. At the same time, our discursive conventions enable us to speak effortlessly about emotions varying in intensity or depth.

Constructionists also tend to accept Wittgenstein's view of language games as embedded within broader "forms of life." Thus, for example, the language conventions for communicating about human emotion in the West are linked to certain activities, objects, and settings. The very study of the emotion in the West will necessarily rely on Western conventions of understanding, and any measures will essentially reflect patterns of action that are sensible within this setting at this time in history. As constructionists also suggest, playing by the rules of a given community is enormously important to sustaining these relationships. In the West, for example, we live with a tradition of how, when, and where to speak of our emotions and how to act accordingly. Conformity to the tradition affirms the reality, rationality, and values of the community. To abandon the discourse would render the accompanying practices unintelligible. Without conventions of construction, action becomes pointless.

The politics of knowledge

As constructionists reason, when authoritative claims to knowledge are circulated through the society, they act as invitations to believe. As people embrace these claims,

so do they come to act in ways that support them. Or, in Foucault's (1980) terms, claims to knowledge function to build and sustain structures of power. Thus, for example, when an authoritative group singles out certain behaviors and call them indicators of "psychopathology," develops measures that claim to be valid indicators of mental illness, and uses these to support the profession of psychiatry and pharmaceutical industries, they sustain a position of profit making power in society. More broadly, these critiques raise questions regarding the ideological and social outcomes of all forms of research. One could begin to see how social science terms such as "conformity," "prejudice," "obedience," "aggression," "altruism," "human development," "cognitive capacity," and "emotional intelligence," are all saturated with value, and how such values would not only color the interpretation of findings, but the way in which such findings are presented to and used by the public.

Reflective pragmatism

As should be evident, social constructionism is closely allied with a pragmatic conception of knowledge. That is, traditional issues of truth and objectivity are replaced by concerns with that which research brings forth. It is not whether an account is true from a god's eye view that matters, but rather, the implications for cultural life that follow from taking any truth claim seriously. This concern with consequences essentially eradicates the longstanding distinction between fact and value, between *is* and *ought*. The forms of life within any knowledge making community represent and sustain the values of that community. In establishing "what is the case," the research community also places value on their particular metatheory of knowledge, constructions of the world, and practices of research. When others embrace such knowledge they wittingly or unwittingly extend the reach of these values. This line of reasoning has had enormous repercussions in the academic community and beyond. It suggests that evaluations of the pragmatic consequences of a given line of inquiry cannot be separated from political, ideological, and moral issues. In this way, social constructionism invites a posture of reflective pragmatism. The question is not whether a given line of research is true or false in all worlds, but what does it contribute to the world, how does it sustain or transform our ways of life, for whom is it useful, what is eradicated or marginalized? These become central questions in evaluating inquiry.

Culturally inclusive psychology revisited

Given this brief account of a social constructionist view of knowledge, how are we to address the prospects of a culturally inclusive psychology? Let us return to three central problems that have thus far occluded the path to a culturally inclusive psychology. In each case we can locate an alternative orientation of some promise.

Toward pluralism in orientations to culture

There is first the current condition of conflict among the various orientations to culture – from universalism at the one extreme to indigenous psychology at the

other. If we follow the constructionist lines of reasoning, and view all truth posits as both derived and validated through social process, then we can dissolve many of the traditional lines of argument separating the various encampments. At the outset, we remove from the table the issue of empirical validity. Universal psychology is no more or less valid that cross-cultural, cultural, or indigenous psychology. For the constructionist, none of these orientations can legitimately make claims to transcendental truth – beyond history and social setting – whether speaking of humankind in general or any particular cultural or subcultural group. Further, in abandoning the validity as a warrant for truth claims, we also subvert the otherwise oppressive effects that are carried by such claims. No researcher community can make claims to truth, regardless of what others may think or feel.

This is not at all to undermine the process of research in any of these cases. Rather, it is to raise other questions concerning the function of description and explanation. As outlined above, for constructionists the concern turns to matters of pragmatic consequence and the values implicit or explicit in these consequences. In other terms, who is benefited by the various representations, in what ways, and with what sociopolitical implications? In this light let us reconsider the universalist form of Western psychology. We first remove the truth warrant of its claims and the rational foundations for its methods of inquiry. We may then ask about the utility of such inquiry and its associated values. What do the world's peoples gain by asking them to "try out a lens" in which they see themselves as sharing the same emotions, motives, or processes of reasoning as everyone else? It's as if to say, "You thought we were all different, but what happens if you look at us as fundamentally the same"? How would our actions be affected by viewing human beings from a universalist perspective?

There are no easy answers to the question of pragmatics, and indeed this should be subject to continuing debate. One could venture, for example, that most scientific inquiry of this kind has little value one way or another, as it seldom escapes the pages of a discipline's journals. However, should a more public audience be reached with psychological research, one could go beyond the critique that universalism is equivalent to imperialism. More positively, one might explore the contribution of universalism to international collaboration and solidarity. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, is implicitly based on the assumption of a shared humanity.

In turning to cross-cultural psychology, we may again consider issues of pragmatics and politics. To what kind of world does such work contribute, for example, in differentiating between collective as opposed to individualist cultures, or to suggest that people in one culture are more or less extraverted, agreeable, or conscientious than those in another? On the negative side, one might certainly be concerned with the stereotypes generated or supported by such descriptions. To appreciate the point, one may recall the intense resistance to earlier research attempting to document racial differences in IQ, and gender differences in traits. On the other hand, one might argue more positively that these cultural stereotypes help prepare Western professionals who are collaborating or counseling those from

other cultures. Being informed that others are "less individualistic" may, in terms of Western understandings, contribute to more adequate forms of relating.

Cultural psychology plays an interesting and significant role in the attempt to integrate culture into psychology. On the one hand it serves as an important barrier to an all-encompassing universalism. It asks its audience to appreciate the intricate complexities and dynamics of particular cultural traditions, while warning against relying on simple, linear dimensions to understand cultural differences. At the same time, cultural psychologists typically draw from the Western empiricist tradition in their research methods. They observe, interview, employ standardized measurements, and so on, separating themselves as impartial scientists from those they study. While one may see this is a significant limitation of cultural psychology, it also enables scholars from differing cultural traditions to communicate and to appreciate. Most cultural psychologists are cognizant of the way in which a fully particularistic orientation to culture would render it impossible for people of diverse cultures to understand each other. In this way, they are also open to positing a limited number of universals. One might say that cultural psychology lies in a unique position of allying the concerns of both the universalists and particularists.

Indigenous psychologies have been particularly important in both resisting the universal sweep of Western psychology, while simultaneously revealing the cultural premises upon which the science rests. And too, indigenous psychology has supported scholars who wish to enable their own traditions to flower, and to share as equals in the global flow of ideas. When such accounts of the person are shared with those outside the culture in question, they can invite an empathic curiosity in "the other." They ask that one suspend the common sense assumptions of his or her home culture, and to imagine oneself into another form of understanding and action. In so doing, they lend themselves to harmonious relations. At the same time, there is no viable account within the indigenous movement of how inter-cultural understanding could occur. Finally, echoing earlier arguments, the indigenous movement runs the danger of insularity and self-destructive recalcitrance to change.

In sum, from a constructionist orientation there is no fundamental antagonism among these various orientations to inclusion. All represent possible ways of constructing the world. There is no compelling reason to abandon any of them, nor to glorify one to the exclusion of the others. Each offers valuable potentials. At the same time, the realization of these potentials carries with it an array of sociopolitical consequences that deserve continuing scrutiny.

The problem of communication revisited

A second major impediment to a culturally inclusive psychology is traced to the problem of communication. As we saw, when the argument for either a cultural or an indigenous psychology was fully extended, it posed a major threat to the very idea of communicating across cultures. So long as communication is understood as a form of intersubjective connection – a view shared from all four standpoints in question – then valid communication is precluded. We are ultimately left with a search for

the meanings residing in other minds, supplied only with constructs (cognitions, meaning systems, construals) supplied by our own culture. In effect, understanding can only take place in terms already in our possession. We can never know whether the emotion of love, for example, is experienced in other cultures, because the only means of understanding is through our own culturally based categories.

A constructionist orientation provides an escape from this distressing conundrum. First of all, constructionism enables us to suspend the terms in which the problem has been formulated. As Rorty (1980) has explored, for example, the centuries old problems plaguing the philosophy of epistemology are all based on positing two worlds, an inner or subjective world, on the one hand and an external or material world on the other. However, the inner/outer binary is optional; suspend the binary and the traditional problems of epistemology drop away. In the same way, if we suspend the presumption that valid communication is based on some form of intersubjective resonance or connection, the longstanding problem of cross-cultural communication can be suspended. And, in turn, we can devise alternative conceptualizations of greater promise.

Just such a conceptualization has emerged within the constructionist dialogues. Bakhtin (1981), Wittgenstein (1953), and Derrida (1976), for example, all attempt to account for linguistic meaning without subscribing to a view of communication as intersubjective connection. For Bakhtin and Wittgenstein in particular, the origins of meaning are traced to the coordinated actions among persons – to dialogue in the former case and language games in the latter. Or, in brief, language attains its meaning from its use within relationships. On this account, meaning does not reside in the heads of individuals, but emerges from the process of coordination itself. Thus, understanding is achieved in a relationship, not when the parties can each penetrate the mind of the other, but when they have achieved mutually satisfactory forms of coordinated action – linguistic and otherwise. A more extended account of this relational orientation to meaning can be found in my 2009 book, *Relational being: Beyond self and community*.

In brief, this account suggests that culture is always under construction in terms of its patterns of coordinated action. Culture is not buried deeply within the minds of its participants, but is carried within the taken for granted forms of relating, and these within the array of material objects, structures, and the like that derive from and support these coordinations. A subculture of soccer, for example, is sustained not only by a language (e.g., "goal," "defender," "yellow card"), but an array of coordinated actions (among players, referees, coaches) and a range of objects or structures (e.g., ball, goals, field). Understanding the culture of soccer is not a matter of translating this vast domain of coordinations into another language (e.g., scholarly inscription), but participating in the process in a mutually congenial way. Understanding across cultures, then, is more like dancing together than interpreting hieroglyphics.

Cultures in transformation

A final problem plaguing the various attempts at a culturally inclusive psychology concerns the very attempt to characterize culture. How is it possible to describe or

comprehend a "culture" without obliterating subcultural variations, and ignoring temporal transformation? And in the latter case, given the global flow of people, ideas, values, and so on, it is increasingly difficult to speak of culture in terms of a stable, geographically located people. In effect, as the argument goes, characterizations of culture are misleading or erroneous in their inattention to variation – across both space and time. Although this line of critique may seem condemning to the future inclusion of culture in psychology, a social constructionist orientation invites a reexamination.

At the outset, it is important to recognize that the very idea of culture is a construction. Whether the idea of culture is intelligible, and the varying ways in which culture has been characterized across time and place, make clear the negotiated character of the concept. The same holds for characterizations of any "subculture," along with accounts of temporal change of diffusions in culture. So, from a constructionist standpoint, it makes little sense to criticize traditional accounts of "culture" for being "misleading or erroneous." Abandoning questions concerning "the truth about culture," we are moved again to consider the pragmatic and political consequences of making characterizations of culture, subcultures, or cultural change. We have already considered some of the advantages and disadvantages of characterizing cultural analysis and differences. Many of the same arguments are relevant to characterizing subcultures. In "making real" the existence of subcultures, the scholar shifts the focus from what is general across a group of people, to what is unique within its ranks. Curiosity and creativity may result, with the attendant danger of generating distance and alienation.

At the same time, the more recent concerns with "culture on the move" are important in opening new vistas of theory and practice. Traditional accounts of culture emphasize stasis, locking in a particular view along with recommended forms of practice. By shifting the scholarly gaze toward change, we invite the development of a new array of concepts and practices. At the outset, psychologists may focus increasingly on cultures in the making. Such work now enters our journals more frequently (for example, Gemignani, 2011; Perriera & Ornelas, 2011). But with the massive flows of immigrants around the world, the challenges of understanding and integration are enormous. More radically, psychological inquiry may shift from documenting what is the case, to actively creating futures (Gergen, 2015).

In conclusion

Tensions between various approaches to culture in psychology have been intense. Critique across the various enclaves has led to alienation and isolation. As I have proposed, by removing the vision of truth making we also remove the barriers to mutual understanding. We realize the advantages for multiple perspectives. There is much to be gained at this point from engaging in the kind of coordinated activities that will foster both appreciation and expand critical sensitivities. From the present standpoint, psychology as a field of inquiry can also be viewed as a cultural process

in continuous transformation. By joining into dialogue, we may create a more richly inclusive cultural future.

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