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CHAPTER 4

SCHIZOANALYZING ANOEDIPAL ALLIANCES

Tamsin Lorraine

1. The Charge

On February 7, 2017, the US Senate, while debating confirmation of Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama to become Attorney General, voted along party lines to uphold Presiding Senate Chair Daines's invocation of an obscure rule in order to silence Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts. Following the vote, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said, "Senator Warren was giving a lengthy speech. She had appeared to violate the rule. She was warned. She was given an explanation. Nevertheless, she persisted" (Wang 2017). The Senate's attempt to silence Senator Warren backfired when the phrase, "Nevertheless, she persisted," rather than expressing the (patriarchal) view that she had refused to act appropriately, evolved into a meme expressing women's persistence in the face of being silenced or ignored.

Senator McConnell's remark was meant to put Senator Warren in her place. We could say that this situation is a telling demonstration of oedipal subjectivity in action; Warren was charged with taking up the same kind of space as a non-lacking (i.e., male, white, able-bodied, etc.), phallic subject—that is, a subject entitled to be heard due to inhabiting the privileged side of the binary positioning oedipal sexual difference instigates. Anyone who has ever been "put in her place" could resonate with the intensities of Warren's situation—the tightening of the throat, the sense of shutting down, the doubt that arises, the kick in the gut in a push-back against being silenced. One is being parsed by the abstract machine of faciality—one's actions defined as inappropriate, one's subjectivity positioned as other.¹ If this event had precipitated Warren (or her spectators) into a tailspin of despair, she (or they) might have visited her psychoanalyst in order to remedy her depression. Transference, in a Kristevian version of analysis, might have allowed repressed semiotic material to emerge and the relation of affect and words to be reworked, enabling a revitalizing reinterpretation of her situation.² Julia Kristeva is not sanguine about contemporary possibilities for this kind of reworking of soma and psyche. Whereas in the past religious ritual—with its richly sensual representations of difficulties in personhood that invited the subject into an affective process of self-reworking (Kristeva 1983: 379–82)—might have provided support to the subject, "modern man is losing his soul, but he does not know it, for the psychic apparatus is what registers representations and their meaningful values for the subject. Unfortunately, that darkroom needs repair" (Kristeva 1995: 8). The argument of this paper is that considering Deleuze and Guattari's notion of schizoanalysis, in the context of a conception of subjectivity drawn from Deleuze's work as well as his work

with Guattari, can inspire dynamic, flexible ways of grounding nonbinary forms of subjectivity in affective experience. While psychoanalysis works to support an oedipal subject and the binary form of sexual difference that structures it, schizoanalysis works to unfold contemporary subjectivity toward anoedipal forms of subjectivity that rework not simply the soma and psyche of individuals with respect to paternal law, but that reworks paternal law itself by directly addressing the social field that supports it. Such reworking can not only provide material support for feminist struggles as they are lived in disparate locations but also help us to go beyond a form of subjectivity premised upon subjugating an other that entails impoverishing disconnection from creative possibilities in action and alliance with others.

One worthy feminist response to a situation like that of Warren would be to defend one's right to speak by insisting that one is equally entitled to the phallic, active role of the right to be heard. The "Nevertheless, she persisted" meme demonstrates one way among many that alternative possibilities in anoedipal responses already with us might actualize. Instead of opposing the message of McConnell's words, the viral event of many different people in multiple walks of life embracing the phrase and passing it along created a machine or assemblage in touch with a virtual past of multiple moments of persistence. Such machines enable the extension of the subjectivities of the people involved to a collective form of subjectivity, thereby opening them to empowering capacities in affecting and being affected. Schizoanalysis promotes such anoedipal moments by focusing on the transversal connections that liberate flows of desire rather than the interpretations that reinforce the sex and gender of a self stabilized in terms of a familial tale of personal identity. Reworking relations to the familial triangle may enable regrouping of affective charge in the privacy of the psychoanalytical office; schizoanalysis directs one's attention to the intensities in motion within and among embodied individuals that can be reworked on the social field itself.³

Guattari's work with borderline clients in the experimental setting of *La Borde* prompted him to theorize a form of intervention that operated in the open space of the institution rather than the closed space of the dyad formed by psychoanalyst and analysand. This larger context provided multiple points of contact at which not just the clients, but doctors and staff as well could stabilize new habits that allowed enlivening affect to flow. Tapping asignifying semiotic energy in the context of the myriad desiring-machines operative at *La Borde* facilitated the release of blockages and enabled new machines to form. It was this experience that provided the background and theoretical spark for the critique of psychoanalysis and oedipal subjectivity that emerges in *Anti-Oedipus*.⁴

The ontology Deleuze develops in his own work, and in his work with Guattari, suggests that we emerge out of an open-ended whole of heterogeneous durations unfolding manifest forms implicated with a continually accumulating virtual past.⁵ Insofar as we open ourselves to a world much richer than our representational conceptions suggest, we can rework the connections of the many working machines of which we form a part and invent new forms of existence more in keeping with present flows of life. At this point in time, oedipal subjectivity and its concomitant binary form

of sexual difference, could be construed, from a Deleuzian and Deleuzoguattarian perspective, as a constraint on other, more creatively productive forms subjectivity could take. One might say that the concepts Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, create, by virtue of intensifying already existing flows of life, provide some of the support for anoeidipal forms of subjectivity that would otherwise be, as Irigaray puts it (in a different context), in a state of “dereliction.”⁶ Far from wanting to leave us to the fate of psychotic unraveling or an apersonal, nonhuman chaotic flux unsustainable in our day to day lives, Deleuze and Guattari provide us with the theoretical means to intensify experiments already in play that could refigure our self-understanding in ways that bring us into more productive alignment with the world. In this sense, their projects are not those of leaving subjectivity behind (as some have seemed to suggest), but rather of reverting to a tradition of philosophy that depicts philosophy as a process of self-transformation—one that intervenes in life in order to promote flourishing.⁷ Their work suggests that a human being, as a process of individuation, can ground itself in the specific capacities unfolded at its location and that this grounding can be understood as an inflection of a durational whole that encompasses commonalities shared with others in ways that traverse and complicate oppositional binaries like organic/inorganic, human/nonhuman, self/other, and male/female. This kind of subject, rather than assuming an identity positioned within symbolic binaries organized with respect to a majoritarian subject, can experience itself as unfolding capacities that become-other along with and through the unfolding capacities of the life of which it forms a part. This kind of self-understanding, in turn, could facilitate anoeidipal forms of subjectivity that could creatively evolve beyond fixed identities and symbolic positioning through the communal naming of unfolding powers resonant with asignifying affect shared with others.

2. The Gap

When I first started reading about Warren’s moment on the Senate floor, I experienced my usual moment of panic when presented with a woman standing up for herself in a bastion of male power—a sense of wanting to lower my eyes, pull in my breath, become very still, and refuse to see what would come next. Would I be treated to yet another moment of defeat, one that would reverberate with the accumulating effects of countless such moments, or would I be able to vicariously experience a moment—however fleeting—of pride as a woman was able to hold her ground and somehow, against the odds, assert herself? The “Nevertheless, she persisted” meme appearing on my social media platforms suspended this flow of affect and thought. Yes, she *had* been booted from the senate floor, but instead of ending in the shamed silence of the abjected other—the passive object of the active subject’s prerogative—countless echoes of the charge meant to humiliate her circulating with viral speed focused on that moment of persistence. This moment, rather than a moment meant to defy or crush the opposition, was a moment of refusing to fall in with the positioning of the faciality machines. The meme, instead of celebrating a moment of phallic triumph, celebrates a moment of quiet persisting, and

instead of celebrating just one such moment, celebrates a never-ending series of such moments in which bodies continue to unfold what they can do. This kind of shift in attention disrupts the typical movement oscillating between the rebellion of the abjected other and crushing blow of the active subject to humiliated silence of the one-who-would-dare and creates an alternative moment of suspension. Like the “jamming of the theoretical machinery” advocated by Irigaray, this moment refuses alignment into the typical oppositions between entitled subjects and those forced to fall in step and instead opens up space for another kind of possibility (Irigaray 1985b: 78).

The moment named as “Nevertheless, she persisted” is a configuration of intensities—a moment of anti-production that resists any one form that desire can take, any one way for persistence to occur. This moment of suspension in which a body without organs is created in the wake of the habitual working of the faciality machines allows a gap to emerge. It is in such gaps between stimulus and response that something can happen and habits can be reworked. The words that might have been experienced as the dead-end of a humiliating moment of silencing shift meaning in this circulation of affect, creating transversal connections by naming a configuration of intensities rather than a person as a reference point of identification for the many people who embrace the meme. The resulting machine enables a transversal subject who reverberates with a movement that is no longer a dead-end, a subject who experiences her marginalized self—whether she is actually female or feminine or not—in terms of an inclusive use of disjunctions where “she” is “all the names of history”—all the moments of persistence named by the meme in the images flashing on the video and computer screens and t-shirts and artwork, as well as others that are never explicitly mentioned. The plateau thus created is an event that is unrepresentable and opens onto a pure past that never actually existed, but rather reverberates with movements beyond the bare need of survival of any one physical body or conditioned ego to include access to a range of movements of similar intensities that affect “her” beyond the reach of the intellectual representations with which “she” might attempt to express its power.

In such moments the personal identity designated through oedipal positioning falls away and a multitude of embodied individuals with all their differences in experiences and locations on the social field reverberate with intensities both within and beyond their specific autobiographies. The “molar” segments of ranked social positioning, rather than being directly opposed, are superseded in deference to configurations of intensities forming patterns intuited at “molecular” levels below that of cognitive categorization or recognition. Intimations of a virtual past beyond recognition and any possible description we could give it inform the complex joy we share as a configuration of intensities is highlighted in a shared inflection of a durational whole. Further moments with similar intensities—from the #metoo messages proclaiming persistence in the face of sexual assault (Gilbert 2017) to the football players persisting in the face of condemnations of the form their patriotism takes (Carissimo 2017) to a parrot trapped in a cage refusing to be quiet to a plant struggling to unfold toward the light—all these moments of persisting (or others specific to the multiple places on the social field from which they arise) reverberate with the images of the “Nevertheless she persisted” meme thus amplifying its

power. The immanent plane this creates touches us upon a pure past from which each of us draws and in which we are all grounded. The moments evoked by that meme are not the moments of my personal self and yet I resonate with them, I am them, as I am all the names of history, a thread through time that collects and accumulates toward Warren's moment on the Senate floor, a moment that I share with her, a moment in which my personal identity recedes as I reverberate with durations larger than that of any one embodied existence, never mind that of a personal self.

3. Dissolving Machinery

The kind of moment where business as usual is suspended and something else is evoked is an important moment in Deleuze's philosophy—a moment where the new can emerge, a moment where opinion can be superseded, where the shock of thought can occur, where life can be transformed, where we can become worthy of the event. Deleuze has approached this moment from various perspectives. We might think of the Bergsonian gap between perception and action of the *Cinema* books. We might think of Spinoza's third kind of knowledge when through an apprenticeship with life we have learned enough about what causes us joy to be able to be in a world where, as Simon O'Sullivan puts it, "[t]he entire world affirms one's being/capacity to act" (2008: 94). We might think of the third synthesis of the eternal return where instead of being trapped into habitual repetitions that reinforce a representable identity we metamorphose with the release of tensions among the ever-evolving relations of forces that move us on toward an unknown future (Deleuze 1994: 90–1). The subject able to open to such moments of suspension, rather than needing the recognition of the opposed other, the mirroring reflection, say, of the feminine other, to support the delusion of self-sufficient survival, or the affirmation of others whose identity it shares, can celebrate its existence as the unique inflection of a durational whole from which it has no need to separate.⁸ This subject has no need of demanding the recognition of an abjected other because it is precipitated from a whole with which it reverberates even as it uniquely inflects that whole from a specific location. It is such a subject that Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari seek to promote and support with theoretical interventions. Reading the syntheses of time, Deleuze presents in *Difference and Repetition* with the anoedipal subject of *Anti-Oedipus* that schizoanalysis is designed to evoke suggests a conception of subjectivity able to evolve beyond the oppositional binaries of an oedipal form of sexual difference.

The first synthesis of habit Deleuze presents in chapter 2 of *Difference and Repetition*, inspired by Hume, suggests that the habits of the larval selves of the organism begin to knit together the basis for sustained sentience from an embodied perspective. As John Protevi puts it, Deleuze isolates "a 'primary vital sensibility' in which we have past and future synthesized in a living present. At this level, the future appears as need as 'the organic form of expectation' and the retained past appears as 'cellular heredity'" (Protevi 2011: 33–4).⁹ The account Deleuze gives in his book on Hume suggests that the mind precipitated from organic syntheses is initially no more than a collection

of impressions that begins to organize itself through principles of association and to individualize itself through principles of passion that depend upon the “circumstances” of one’s social field and biography (Deleuze 1991: 103).¹⁰ Although Deleuze drops the vocabulary of the principles of association and passions in his later work, he never drops the notion that the subject is a process of individuation generated through organic and social processes that are precipitated from time as a self-differentiating force.¹¹ Over time beliefs emerge and stabilize, stabilizing perception and experience. These beliefs inevitably extend beyond the given impressions, “fictioning” (as Jeffrey Bell puts it) the subject and objects bound by time, space, and causality, thus stabilizing a reality shared with others (Deleuze 1991: 78–80). These beliefs depend not just on organic syntheses but also on perceptual syntheses that are inflected by what Hume calls “institutions” and what we might call the social field. Thus, the subject is precipitated out of a process in which the intertwining of organic syntheses and perceptual syntheses produces an increasingly complex mesh of habitual beliefs that inevitably go beyond the given and that are informed by the specific experiences and social field of the embodied subject.

In the second synthesis of memory, inspired by Bergson, the habits of the first synthesis become organized in keeping with the investments of an embodied, sentient being who remembers in order to survive. Embodied consciousness attends to (and thereby filters) that part of the whole necessary to its survival, but the virtual past is always present in the sense that its insisting potentials can be accessed in keeping with shifting interests of the subject (Bergson 1991: 151–3).¹² The third synthesis of the empty form of time suggests that the force of time is a dynamic duration or process of differing from itself that opens the subject to the future in contact with the virtual past. If we correlate this synthesis of the future with the synthesis of consumption described in *Anti-Oedipus*, in which the peripheral subject can cry “yes, that’s me!” we can depict oedipal and anoedipal versions of living this synthesis of the future.¹³

For the oedipal subject, the peripheral subject is constrained to the ego positioned with respect to Daddy–Mommy–me. Furthermore, this ego is taken to be the “quasi-cause” or source of the subject’s perceptions and actions; the perceptions and actions emerging from the production of desiring-machines (in *Anti-Oedipus*) or passive syntheses of time (in *Difference and Repetition*) come to be seen as originating in a representation of the moment of anti-production (the body without organs) that by virtue of resisting a particular configuration of desiring-machines “records” those desiring-machines by distributing them across what becomes one surface (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 11–12). Oedipalization constrains our access to the accumulating reverberations of our world by curtailing desiring-production in keeping with “the exclusive use of the disjunctions of the unconscious” (59). Experimental connections are excluded in deference to connections that affirm the sexually differentiated positioning of one’s personal biography or the series of identifications organized via the abstract machine of faciality described in *A Thousand Plateaus* through the binary sexual difference of oedipalization. Either one’s positioning is affirmed or one is faced with the terrors of the collapse of the ego and dissolution in an undifferentiated abyss.

An oedipal understanding of personal identity suggests that when two subjects are in conflict, one must “win” and the other must “lose.” Winning means that one retains one’s higher status in a ranking oriented vis-à-vis what we might call the majoritarian subject (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 105–6). But according to Deleuze and Guattari’s characterization of subjectivity, a symbolic designation of personal identity can be no more than a representation of a process of individuation abstracted from time and thus stripped of its unfolding potentials to affect and be affected by a world in which it is always immersed. The majoritarian subject, then, is a chimera; only a subject stripped of its world can be self-sufficiently whole. To conceive of one’s agency and power in relation to such an ideal is to deny one’s on-going and all-pervasive contact with (and inevitable “contamination” by) the world as well as one’s inevitable transformation through, with, and by that world. Recognition, then, cannot confer agency but can only confer the status of a particular position in a hierarchy of social positions and the channeling of social energy—be it facilitating or impeding—that accrues to that position. This molar channeling of social energy, however, may or may not be reinforced by the molecular flows that occur above and below the thresholds of socially recognizable identities.

For the anoedipal subject, the moment of anti-production of the third synthesis is approached in terms of the inclusive disjunctions promoted by schizoanalysis. This subject’s possibilities can play out not just in terms of a biographical, personal memory, but in terms of possibilities implicit in the present moment conditioned by the durational whole extending beyond the bounds of the organism or individual psyche out of which that particular state of the embodied subject emerges. Subjectivity is grounded in the unfolding flows lived by the organism as tensions of related forces shift. Representations of moments of anti-production where desiring-machines are distributed across one surface are named in keeping with the intensities of particular moments rather than referred to a preestablished identity; the peripheral subject consumes moments of intensities and moves on. The force of time that insists in the present moment always exerting its influence on an embodied subject, when taken in the more encompassing sense of Bergson’s notion of a virtual past, is neither something that can be accounted for in a representational description of the subject at a given moment of time (that, according to both Bergson and Deleuze would overlook the impetus of time’s durational force) nor something that can be accounted for in a psychoanalytic biography of the subject that might explain what it does next. To account for what the subject will do next in terms of its personal biography would dictate the movement of an ego with a fixed relation to sexual difference motivated by the desire to fill in its lack. But what are materially available to the subject are all the possibilities in desiring-machine production insisting in the present. These potentially energizing connections to others and one’s world exceed organization of desire in terms of the “global” persons of Daddy-Mommy-me or transcendent Phallus. Instead, they comprise a full range of connections to part-objects available in the forces pushing one toward connection and disconnection with the world.

This subject, rather than identifying with particular individuals, identifies with the “names of history, with zones of intensity on the body without organs” (Deleuze and

Guattari 1983: 21). These names indicate not the fixed ego of a person with whom one identifies, but rather configurations of intensities that might unfold in keeping with manifest forms in ways that evoke other similar patterns of durational unfolding. Furthermore, these kinds of identification, rather than resting upon a prohibition that threatens loss of self, instead rests on naming reverberations of intensities insisting within the material situation of one's present. Pursuing all the names of history refuses the positioning of the abstract machine of faciality—it is a form of identification premised on signs or symptoms of what is yet to unfold as opposed to a form of identity that represents a moment of time as the paradigm for how the subject will always be. What has the force to unfold will change in keeping with what actualizes—as some forces unfold, manifesting new states of affairs in the process, what was once impossible becomes possible and vice versa. What earlier could not “discharge its strength” due to the way forces were balanced is now able to unfold, precipitating further effects in the process (Nietzsche 2002: 15).¹⁴

A molecular understanding of conflict suggests that rather than pit oneself against the other, one can simply “persist”—that is, unfold becomings rumbling at molecular levels beneath the threshold of molar identity in order to make whatever connections are available to be made. The Senate succeeded in shutting Warren down—the woman, Elizabeth Warren, was escorted off the floor. But Warren is not just Warren, a particular woman. “She” is a self-organizing process precipitated from the durational whole of time. This is not to deny that Warren is to be admired for her persistence—along with all the others persisting in similar situations. It is to acknowledge that her persistence did not originate in a self-sufficient agent to be found on the Senate floor, but rather emerged from durational flows preceding and exceeding the specific form she then took. Acknowledging this, from a Deleuzoguattarian perspective, rather than undermining autonomy, empowers subjectivity by demonstrating its grounding in resources beyond the boundaries of personal identity. The meme celebrating her persistence unfolds anodipal subjects from various partial objects and affects. Warren could not continue on the Senate floor, but bits of her—the sound of her voice, her facial expressions, the look in her eyes, her quiet persistence—precipitate converging and diverging vectors of force that by virtue of the meme (here understood as a machine connecting multiple forces) intensifies a novel inflection of the pure past. The subjects precipitated through this meme are both a group-subject of an event of persisting as well as individual processes counter-effectuating that event in terms of the capacities and affects of bodies in specific locations. Capacities are unfolded in keeping with asignifying intensities available at these different locations rather than with respect to alignments with molar identities that entail shaming the opposition in order to assert their own legitimacy.

4. New Habits

Desiring-machines could be seen in light of Deleuze's discussions of habit in *Empiricism and Subjectivity* and *Difference and Repetition* as a means to enabling new habits to

form: the body as a sensitive plate for impressions unfolds into patterns where some energy flows are enabled versus others. According to Deleuze's account of Hume's characterization of this process, it precipitates a faculty of imagination that over time extends a notion of a subject beyond what is actually present (which is no more than a collection of impressions). The principles of association enable enough organization so that the passions that impel an organism in the context of that human being's "circumstance," which includes the social field, can unfold a more specific instantiation of human subjectivity. This suggests what Bell calls a "historical ontology": the reality we perceive, the objects we assume are stable, the selves we assume are identical over time, are no more than imaginative extensions of the flux of impressions we actually experience—extensions that allow us to maintain a recognizably human existence, extensions whose specific forms can change as our circumstances change.¹⁵ Thus, the stabilizing forms our subjectivity take—the ways we have of acting, feeling, representing, and thinking our subjectivity that orient us to our world—can change over time and in concert with the social field that supports us. Memes can come and go, but when their effects are carried forward by experiments in living the possibility for new habits arise.

As a subject precipitated from the collective assemblage of enunciation formed by the "Nevertheless, she persisted" meme, I am able to name a set of intensities—a collection of selected impressions—and thus facilitate the "fictioning" of a self that extends beyond the given of fleeting affects and sensations the meme evokes. This "identity" is doubly articulated from, as Bell puts it, "[A] transcendental field of pre-individual singularities and virtualities that are presupposed by the actualities of conscious experience" (Bell 2009a: 14). The meme could thus enable the organization of molecular aspects of experience that would otherwise remain nonconscious into a stable experience. Although I could marginalize this experience in deference to a personal identity intent on maintaining symbolic positioning, this experience, by virtue of the transversal connections it might evoke, could trouble that positioning. A schizoanalytic practice could promote practices that honor such challenges rather than exclude or marginalize them by, for example, encouraging me to act in keeping with affinities the meme might provoke in defiance of my typical alliances. Such practices, in turn, could lead to new habits where asignifying affect could settle into new patterns of meaning thus grounding shifts in the social field that might unbalance stabilized tendencies and set off rejuvenating lines of flight.

One could say that the gap in humans between perception and action, complicated as it is by the circulation of social meaning through the accumulation of cultural knowledge—encompassing everything from the technological invention of instruments that expand the kind of sensory information available to human beings to the ability to record and share centuries of human experience—has opened us to a virtual past that surpasses that of other species. This ability to rework passions through the feedback loops of culture and institutions allows us to access implicit tendencies in our present in ways that exceed the survival of organisms and extends our creative participation in life. We have multiplied our frames of reference and our powers of affecting and being affected. We regularly take in perspectives on experience formed by other humans who live lives

different from our own and we have expanded our imaginative connection to nonhuman others as well as remote parts of the world and the universe. Our lives are constantly exceeding the binaries through which we try and organize them. This presents problems for subjects dependent upon traditional forms of sexually differentiated identity as well as the binary identities it anchors—maintaining oedipal positioning requires constant reinforcement of binary oppositions—but it also precipitates rejuvenating experiments in living that could reverberate throughout the social field.

Theoretical developments from various areas including biosemiotics, animal research, neuroscience, new materialism, and affect theory, allow for the articulation of multiple registers of nonconscious aspects of human existence. This in turn can call attention to molecular processes typically below the threshold of conscious experience, thus facilitating the stabilization of new ways of experiencing our affective connection with the world.¹⁶ Vocabularies drawn from this research—along with aesthetic practices that rework our relation to the world—can intensify aspects of lived experience involving the environments and human and nonhuman others with which we come into contact in ways that defy self-other dichotomies and evoke our commonalities without canceling out our differences. The ontologies drawn from molecular process that a Deleuzoguattarian perspective inspires foster the kind of attentiveness to the singular configurations of forces unique to specific times and places that could enable creative solutions to problems reframed as emerging from plateaus resonant with overlapping commonalities. The more flexible, creative subjectivity that emerges from this kind of grounding in multiple registers of embodied experience will be able to evolve with the durations it lives without fear of its boundaries crumbling; instead of pursuing objects it fantasizes will fill in a lack that becomes manifest only with respect to an impossible ideal, it will be able to pursue immanent forms of desire that unfold in concert with the movements of life. Rather than the either/or of bifurcated forms of sexed and gendered existence, it could unfold serial understandings of multiple connections with the world that reverberate in accumulating ways that could be elaborated in practices that celebrate the evolving realities multiple subjects unfold together.

The anoedipal subject that can conceive of itself as an inflection and reverberation of the whole is a subject who is completely implicated in the materiality of its place and time and yet is free to creatively evolve by “probing” the riches of an infinite with which it is always in touch (O’Sullivan 2010). In the Bergsonian view adopted by Deleuze, it is intuitive receptivity to the virtual that allows the subject to unfold novel solutions to life’s problems in connection with the actual forms it takes and the virtual tendencies those forms intensify. Such receptivity is increasingly demanded of us in a world that is becoming so densely interconnected that our problems increasingly defy the categories, causality, and temporality of representational thought. If we are to intuit our present in terms of intensifying tendencies toward a future, we can no longer predict on the basis of representations of our past, we must be willing to embrace change in ourselves as well as our world. A feminist refusal of oedipal positioning along with a persistence in evolving with new anoedipal forms of being fosters alliances across differences crucial to our future flourishing in harmony with a world of which we form an inextricable part.

Embracing serial forms of identification with “all the names of history” allows us to mutate in keeping with the selection of active forces of the eternal return; rather than repeating representable forms of identity, we can instead unfold the tendencies in our current situations in the process of becoming—those tendencies that by virtue of intensifying in tension with what is are ready to actualize in concert with an evolving world.

The persistence to which the “Nevertheless she persisted” meme calls our attention is the persistence of incipient tendencies building in strength in relation to other such tendencies in disparate locations on the social field ready to unfold in ripple effects from multiple places at once—tapping into what bodies can do rather than the status attached to a particular identity. Deleuze’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s work suggests that oedipal identity—in particular one’s sex or gender as well as any other molar identity of the abstract machine of faciality that establishes boundaries between individuals—is belied by the microprocesses of life that are always present at subthreshold levels of molecular, transversal connections. Such an identity, in other words, can be no more than a representation of a moment abstracted from an ongoing process of individuation that always unfolds with and through the durations that encompass it. But even if such representations can constitute galvanizing vectors of meaning for particular individuals and groups of people at particular times by virtue of intensifying specific aspects of their lives in ways that precipitate flourishing, they can also precipitate disconnection from groundedness in material being and abject submission or violent domination of subordinate others in attempts to maintain delusional forms of autonomy. Personal identity from a Deleuzian and Deleuzoguattarian perspective can be seen as an often necessary and yet always strategic negotiation of an array of either/or binary categories extant in the abstract machine of faciality of one’s location. As such, it is something to be held lightly with full acknowledgment of the complexity it defies.

A schizoanalytic look at the “Nevertheless, she persisted” meme suggests that it is an example of a machine that makes transversal connections among people and experiences, thus enabling extension of the capacity to affect and be affected in which a put-down is transformed and circulated in excess of oppositional binaries in a reality shared across disparate regions of the social field. Rather than the exclusive disjunction of oedipalization that renders one subject to the either/or disjunctions of the faciality machine, one is returned to nonlinguistic signs of affective life experienced through the multiple patterns and rhythms of body-in-world-and-living-with-others that defy the subject–predicate grammar of representational thought. Such moments can open a gap that touches one upon the virtual. Where and when such gaps are opened, there’s a moment of surprise, something that moves one out of the exclusive disjunction of active subject *or* passive object to an inclusive disjunction of an in-between, serial movement of evolving possibility—a moment where intuition of a pure past never lived that goes beyond representational thought can come to the fore evoking creative possibilities not yet unfolded.

If there is any truth to the psychoanalytic characterization of the oedipal subject, then we could say that sex and gender act as a kind of fault line in a form of subjectivity that maintains personal identity through the bifurcations of a binary form of sexual

difference. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the oedipal subject, far from universal, is a form of subjectivity historically specific to capitalism. The family is the delegated agent for constraining desire to a personal identity that can act as a limit to the schizoid unraveling capitalism precipitates, but in their view, schizoanalysis could promote other, less repressive, forms of subjectivity. The viral event of “Nevertheless, she persisted” is an example of an anoedipal form of subjectivity already in action. It may be that reflection on emerging forms of subjectivity that challenge the status quo are part of a larger challenge to how we perceive reality as well as how we negotiate our relations with human and nonhuman others, and the interdependent global community of which we are a part. If the rapid change of contemporary life is pushing us toward conceiving a future beyond anything we could predict on the basis of our past, then it may be that the movement toward more fluid forms of identity attested to by, for example, various forms of trans existence as well as increasing challenges to the patriarchal and anthropocentric status quo, may be part of a creative evolution of the modern subject toward more flexible and viable alternatives.

Theory as a vector of force, by highlighting certain aspects of an event over others, can aid in the intensification of an event into a plane of immanence. Such planes of immanence, by virtue of fostering the circulation of affects, can facilitate transversal alliances as well as emergent forms of subjectivity able to creatively evolve with such alliances. Instigating and disseminating experiments in subjectivity can dissolve oppositional binaries, undermine patriarchal (as well as anthropomorphic) conceptions of the subject, and facilitate creatively flexible subjects able to maintain themselves in the face of difficult encounters and lives of continual change. The effects of the “Nevertheless she persisted” meme can be lost in the dereliction of a subjectivity without support, or we can carry them forward as we let the differences of our respective identities recede in light of shared reverberations, materially grounded in life’s durational flows, intimating ways of being that go beyond the binaries that divide us.

Notes

1. See Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 170–91) for their notion of the abstract machine of faciality and Bogue (2003: 91–2) for a succinct definition.
2. Kelly Oliver presents a particularly compelling account of this process in *Reading Kristeva* (1993: 116–19).
3. For a compelling example of how schizoanalysis can rework the social field, see Deleuze and Guattari’s account of a schizoanalytic cure drawn from a culture where subjectivity had not yet been fully oedipalized in *Anti-Oedipus* (1983: 167–9). I elaborate this example with reference to Victor Turner’s anthropological description of it in *Deleuze and Guattari’s Immanent Ethics* (Lorraine 2011: 45–7).
4. See Guattari’s characterization of this process as well as his conception of schizoanalysis as metamodelization (1995: 69–72 and 58–76). Janell Watson comments on Guattari’s characterization of schizoanalysis as metamodeling that the maps of schizoanalysis “must not only be made fresh every time, they must also change over time” (2009: 11). François Dosse

presents a vivid description of Guattari's role at La Borde in chapters 2 and 3 of *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives* (2010: 40–75).

5. Boram Jeong presents a helpfully illuminating account of Deleuze's conception of time as self-differentiation and a reading of Deleuze's interpretation of Kant's syntheses that develops the notion of a subject as a precipitate of time (2017: 31–7 and 40–64). Also see Daniel Smith's lucid account of Deleuze's conception of the "empty form of time" (2012: 131–3).
6. For an explanation of Irigaray's notion of dereliction, see Whitford (1991: 77–89).
7. As Todd May puts it in *Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction*, "How Might One Live?": "Philosophy does not settle things. It disturbs them. Philosophy disturbs by moving beneath the stable world of identities to a world of difference that at once produces those identities and shows them to be little more than the froth of what there is" (2005: 19). In engaging this kind of philosophy, Deleuze "offers us a radically different way to approach living, and an attractive one, as long as we are willing to ask anew what it is to be *us* and what it is to be *living*. As long as we are willing to accept that ontology does not offer answers but rather ways to approach the question of living" (2005: 25).
8. For vivid characterizations of the feminine other as mirror, see Irigaray's classic, *Speculum of the Other Woman* (1985a).
9. Protevi presents a detailed and fascinating reading of this first synthesis in relation to "enactivists" like Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, Alva Noe, and Shaun Gallagher.
10. My reading of *Empiricism and Subjectivity* is indebted to Jeffrey Bell's book *Deleuze's Hume* as well as Jon Roffe's essay and book on Deleuze's interpretation of Hume (Bell 2009a, Roffe 2009, Roffe 2016).
11. See Roffe (2009) for a succinct account of how Deleuze's later work departs from his earlier work on Hume.
12. See Alia Al-Saji's particularly insightful rendering of Bergson in relation to Deleuze on this point (Al-Saji 2004).
13. See Steven Shaviro's (2008) blog entry for a helpful characterization of the peripheral subject.
14. See chapter 2, section 1 of Deleuze's book on Nietzsche for this notion of a body as a relation of forces (1983: 40).
15. Bell presents an enlightening discussion of the term "historical ontology" along with its genealogy in "Deleuze's Humean Historiography" (2009b).
16. I can do no more than hint at what I have in mind here with a few examples: (1) biosemiotics, by suggesting a form of sense-making at the cellular level evokes a molecular way of thinking about intelligence (Hoffmeyer 2010); (2) neuroscientific research suggests commonalities in the affective lives of human and nonhuman animals (Panksepp 2010) as well as undermines traditional distinctions between affective and rational life (Damasio 2003); and (3) "new materialists" like Jane Bennett are problematizing the traditional distinction between inert matter and intelligible form (Bennett 2010).

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