Centralization And The Transformation Of Public Education

D. Hogan

Marjorie Murphy
Swarthmore College, mmurphy1@swarthmore.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-history

Part of the History Commons

Let us know how access to these works benefits you

Recommended Citation
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-history/494

This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact myworks@swarthmore.edu.
Chapter 5

CENTRALIZATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

In 1892 John D. Rockefeller founded the University of Chicago and made William Rainey Harper its president. Two years later, in 1894, the Chicago Civic Federation selected Harper the first chairman of its educational committee; the same year, the federation nominated Harper for appointment to the board of education. Two years later, Mayor Swift appointed him. Then, in January 1898, following representations from businessmen, Progressive reformers, and the Civic Federation, Harrison created a blue-ribbon Educational Commission to investigate and report on the state of public education in Chicago. Members of the commission then chose Harper as chairman.1

Exactly one year later, the commission reported to the mayor, recommending “radical” reform of the “largely defective” administrative structure of public education in Chicago. In particular, the commission found that the administrative structure, with its “large” board of 21 members and 17 committees inefficient, subject to graft and corruption, and prone to unwarranted political influence or “pull.” The commission recommended that the board be reduced from 21 to 11 members; that board members continue to be appointed by the mayor rather than popularly elected; that administrative and legislative functions be clearly differentiated, with the administrative functions exercised by a highly paid superintendent acting as an educational “expert” with greatly enhanced powers and a six-year contract, and a business manager who would have “a free-

*Coauthored with Marjorie Murphy.
dom similar to that of the executive head in any well-conducted business enterprise.” The superintendent alone would determine the course of study, hire all teachers, determine “efficiency,” and recommend promotions. The commission concluded that “the established laws of business cannot be violated with impunity in the management of the professional details of our schools.”

Prominent national educational figures praised the commission’s report, but to the fledgling Chicago Teacher's Federation (CTF), formed two years prior to protect teachers’ pensions, raise salaries, and to “study parliamentary law,” the Harper Report boded ill tidings. The commission had included no teachers, women, or labor figures; it had not consulted teachers; it had made no provision for tenure; it had recommended that the process of teacher training and certification be revised to include a college education; and although it had recommended creating a system of teacher councils, they were to be advisory only and to have no say in the design of school policy or in the administration of the school system. When Harper engineered the appointment of Benjamin Andrews, a mentor of Harper's at Denison University, to the superintendency, and supported through the good offices of the leading expression of political progressivism in Chicago, the Civic Federation, a bill in the state legislature to institute the recommendations of the commission, the CTF feared that the material welfare and professional autonomy of Chicago's teachers stood in jeopardy. The union quickly mobilized to contest Harper and the Civic Federation in Springfield. The battle lines between business and the “administrative progressives,” as David Tyack calls them, and the CTF were drawn, and remained so throughout the next three decades.

At an immediate political level, three issues pitted the business community, the board of education, and the administrative progressives against the CTF: (1) business domination of the board, (2) imposition of a centralized and hierarchical administration modeled upon corporate industry and nourished by the same ideological developments that nourished political progressivism generally, and (3) the teachers’ conditions of employment. The conflicts generated by these differences were often characterized by sharp expressions of class consciousness and antagonism, but the origins, character, and significance of these conflicts cannot be adequately captured in terms of a simple categorical notion of “class politics.” Rather, the origins and significance of the centralization movement derived from the common vision of class relations and institutional alignments shared by progressives in education and civic reform and the complicated relationship between centralization politics and complex processes of class formation during the Progressive Era.
THE POLITICS OF CENTRALIZATION

When teachers founded the CTF in 1897, they were concerned with bread and butter issues—above all, salaries and pensions. Indeed, protection of their pensions against a proposed change in the state law regulating pensions for public servants precipitated the establishment of the CTF in 1897. When the Civic Federation proposed a bill based on the recommendations of the Harper Commission (the Harper Bill) in Springfield in 1899, the concerns of the CTF expanded from pensions and salaries to include teacher training, job security (entry, promotion, and tenure), and their professional rights and autonomy. Within a short time the leaders of the CTF articulated a philosophy of administrative structure and professional autonomy very different from that proposed by the administrative progressives.

To contest the Harper Bill, the CTF circulated a petition, gathered fifty thousand names, enlisted the support of the Chicago Federation of Labor, and lobbied extensively in Springfield. Margaret Haley, who with Catharine Goggin was at the time running for election to the top leadership positions in the CTF, compared the teachers' role under the Harper Bill with factory employees. "The teacher is the only person under the civil service law who has no right to trial before the Civil Service Commission," she argued. "Every other person from Superintendent to janitor has that right. We are given no more consideration than factory employees and our places will be dependent on the good will of the Principal and Assistant Superintendent." In terms resonant with the radical republican idiom of antimonopolism, equal rights, and fear of class privilege, the CTF warned that if passed, the Harper Bill would give the superintendent "autocratic powers unknown to the Czar of Russia." The direct relationship between the despotic power of Rockefeller—the greatest example of "one man power in American business"—and the feudal implications of the Harper Bill should escape no one. Moreover, the Harper Commission's recommendation that a college degree be made a prerequisite for entrance into teaching, thereby replacing the old apprenticeship system, outraged the teachers. Harper had impuned their cultural background (mainly working class) and their professional competence:

Uncouth and uncultured are terms which they freely apply to the unspecified element they desire to see eliminated from the schools. What constitutes culture they do not define, nor what incompetence. A college degree, however, they would probably accept as a certificate of culture. With all due respect for a college degree—there are many emergencies in the life of the public school teacher where it would be of considerable less value than the experience she has acquired during
the four years usually spent in college. . . . To make it a condition of entrance to teaching or to lower the requirements in favor of those who hold a degree would be to put a premium on the conventional and the conventional is the last thing to rely on the problem of dealing with children."

Teachers were not the only individuals upset. Members of the Chicago Central Labor Council argued that "making a college education a requisite for the position as a teacher" would severely limit the ability of working-class women to enter teaching, still, around 1900, the principal avenue of social mobility and respectability for working-class daughters. The new procedures represented "an unjust discrimination against the children of the common people who, with few exceptions, find it impossible to secure a college education, and who, for this reason, although qualified in all practical essentials, must give way to the college graduate." Two months later, after Andrews claimed that since schools had to teach morality, it was necessary that teachers had to be "properly" educated, another delegate to the Central Labor Council denounced Andrews as a "moral leper." "He is the creature of Rockefeller and his purpose is to promote Rockefeller's ideas. He talks about outsiders in the schools. The outsider he refers to is the child of the proletariat."

The combined opposition of the CTF and the CFL blocked passage of the Harper Bill, much to the chagrin of Superintendent Andrews, Harper, and the Civic Federation. Andrews blamed the failure of the bill directly on the teachers "who protect mediocrity and incompetency." The CTF, on the other hand, witnessed its membership soar to thirty-three hundred and confirmation of its political power in Chicago.

Defeated but not intimidated, Andrews decided to pursue the goals of the Harper Report indirectly, through administrative fiat. In June 1899 he fired a woman music teacher and replaced her with a man as part of a "reorganization plan" without notifying the school management committee, nominally responsible for such decisions. A week later, Andrews again irritated the committee when he issued a memorandum requiring a college degree for admittance to principal examinations, another Harper innovation. Immediately, school management committee members argued that they were not consulted and countermanded the memorandum. Nevertheless, Andrews was not without friends in higher places, for at the National Education Association (NEA) meeting that summer, Nicholas Murray Butler came to the aid of Andrews, angrily denouncing the teachers in Chicago as "revolutionist" and successfully sponsoring a resolution lauding Andrews.

Buoyed by his support at the NEA, in the fall of 1899 Andrews
continued to implement the recommendations of the Harper Bill through administrative fiat. He announced that all principals were to make reports on teachers, noting “their fidelity and consecration,” ability to govern, books they had read, and personal inquisitiveness. The teachers called it a police system “like in Russia.” In November Andrews proposed a plan of reorganization that included his own four-year tenure and a salary raise. The board refused. Andrews then rejected four principals recommended by the school management committee, and the committee ruled him out of order. The following day, board president Graham Harris announced he would accept Andrews’s resignation. Andrews refused to oblige, and continued to fight throughout the winter months of 1900 for the reorganization of the administrative structure. The board frustrated each effort. In February newspapers announced that “President Harper, the Civic Federation and the members of the Superintendents’ Department of the NEA are about to fire a 13-inch gun in defense of one-man power in the Chicago Public Schools.” But Andrews had lost his will to fight; in March he took a vacation and upon his return resigned.

During the search for a new superintendent, the Civic Federation announced the formation of a Commission of One Hundred to study the “reorganization” of the school system and set up committees around each of the major recommendations of the Harper Report. Among others, Nicholas Murray Butler and Andrew Draper, president of the University of Illinois, addressed the Commission of One Hundred. Draper, like Butler, encouraged the federation to pursue administrative reform and to secure the reduction of the size of the school board and the appointment to it of men “representative of the business and property interests, as well as of the intelligence and genuine unselfishness of the city.” Meanwhile, the board appointed Edwin Cooley to succeed Andrews. Cooley entirely sympathized with Andrews’s objectives but proved to be far more adroit politically than his predecessor, actively seeking out the support of leading board members and the business community while introducing administrative reforms with considerable bureaucratic finesse.

Cooley first concentrated on gaining control over entry into the teaching force. At the time of his appointment, high school graduates entered teaching either through an apprenticeship system or through graduation from a two-year program at the Chicago Normal School (until 1896, the Cook County Normal School). Upon completion of their apprenticeship or graduation from the Chicago Normal School, local school committees of the board of education hired the teacher for a local neighborhood school, very often the same neighborhood the teacher had grown up in, a situation highly suited to patronage politics and local control of
neighborhood schools." Shortly after his appointment, Cooley acted to overturn the existing system and locate control of the hiring process in the superintendent's office. At the beginning of the new school year, Cooley convinced a member of the board to introduce an "anti-pull" regulation to prevent political influence in the hiring of teachers. In November the board approved the regulation. Under the provisions of the new rule, Cooley drew up a list of all personnel appointments and submitted it as a whole to the school management committee in June. Should any board member, alderman, or political person discuss with Cooley any individual teacher, Cooley would expose both the lobbyist and the teacher, placing that person on the ineligible list."

Next, Cooley turned to the system of promotions. At the time, principals and local school committees controlled the promotions process; primarily they evaluated teachers for their ability to govern and to teach. When a financial crisis hit the school system in late 1901, Cooley took the opportunity to announce the introduction of a "new promotional scheme" and "merit pay system" in which salaries were tied to secret "efficiency grades" or "ratings." "Efficiency grades," in turn, were to be measured in terms of professional attainments, systematic work and results in scholarship, and "school interest"—cooperation with other teachers and with the principal—as determined by the principal. Efficiency grades determined whether a teacher could then take a promotional examination to gain a salary increase. From these evaluations a teacher was graded from 95 to 100 as "superior," 90 to 94 as "excellent," 80 to 89 as "good," 70 to 79 as "fair," and below 70 as incompetent. The grades were kept secret "to avoid comparisons and to avoid political "pull." The teachers were never notified of their exact grade and if they had attained above 80, they were simply told they were eligible to take a promotional examination. "The merit system," Cooley claimed in unconscious irony, "will make teachers progressive, not time servers."

With the antipull campaign in full swing and the new promotions scheme in place, Cooley turned to the transfer system. Normally, teachers transferred on the basis of seniority with the approval of the local school committee and the district superintendent. Cooley decided to "base transfers according to 'merit' " and the "needs of the entire system." Teachers had no court of appeal; those who appealed to their district superintendent, to board members, or their alderman Cooley accused of using pull."

The CTF reacted with immediate hostility to Cooley's proposals. The "efficiency ratings" failed "to take into account the qualities of soul and heart and mind, the really vital part, the character and personality of the teacher" and threatened to undermine collective solidarity. The new trans-
fer system, on the other hand, would destroy the ability of teachers to
teach in the school of their choice, often in neighborhoods where they
had grown up. The CTF leadership decided to boycott Cooley’s propos­
als, but the membership split: While many teachers would boycott the
system, others felt they could not afford to, a situation that created con­
siderable conflict and “bitterness” among the teachers, and ineffective oppo­
sition. Not until 1905, with the appointment of the first Dunne board
and the selection of Jane Addams to head the school management com­
mittee, did the teachers get their first real chance to force Cooley to retract
his promotions scheme.35

Cooley’s antipull crusade and his new promotions and merit pay
scheme won him immediate prestige and invitations to speak at the Mer­
chants Club, the Commercial Club, the Union League Club, and the Civic
Federation, a prestige he used in turn to further centralize power in the
superintendent’s office. 35 He engineered the reduction of the number of
board committees, organized along district lines, from more than sixty to
four on a city wide basis: school management, buildings and grounds,
finance, and compulsory education. In a series of moves, he gained control
of the appointment of Normal School faculty, the admission of students,
and the general policy of the Normal School. To destroy the power of
local superintendents and centralize power in his office, in 1902 Cooley
reduced the number of district superintendents from fourteen to six, sig­
nificantly reduced their powers (e.g., over transfers, curriculum, and text­
books), created three new assistant superintendents in the head office to
oversee day-to-day administration, and formed the six remaining district
superintendents into an at-large board of superintendents. The next year,
he codified the rules of the board of education, carefully delineating the
prerogatives of the board and inserting those prerogatives of the superin­
tendency outlined in the Harper Bill although not approved by the state
legislature. He began to refine cost per student categories in his annual
reports, and in 1904 started publishing the Chicago Board of Education
Bulletin. The contents of the Bulletin accurately reflected the more prosaic
preoccupations of the administrative progressives: average school mem­
bership total cost of educational supplies, and average cost per pupil of
supplies including chalk, crayons, erasers, drawing paper, arithmetic pa­
per, spelling paper, language paper, unruled paper, pencils, pens, and
penholders. The Bulletin listed these calculations by school so principals
could compare their cost-effectiveness in issuing supplies to that of other
schools. It also included curriculum outlines, suggested reading lists, and
recommended study lists for teachers preparing for exams, aiming to
achieve uniformity throughout the system. Pleased with the success of
Cooley’s efforts to achieve efficiency and economy, the board put aside its
financial worries momentarily to vote him a five-year contract and a $10,000 per annum salary. Yet for all his success in securing administrative centralization, Cooley remained discontented: He also wanted legislative endorsement of what he had accomplished covertly through bureaucratic fiat. In 1901 the Civic Federation, with the support of Cooley and board member Clayton Mark, a Chicago businessman and later head of the Commercial Club’s educational committee, sponsored legislation in the Illinois legislature proposing further reforms along the lines advocated by the Harper Report. But opposition lead by the CTF defeated the bill. Undeterred, the Civic Federation in 1903 supported another bill to increase the power of the superintendent to enable him to control appointment, promotion, and firing of teachers, to determine the course of study, and to reduce the size of the board from twenty-one to nine members. At the same time, Cooley and Mark supported a bill similar to the Civic Federation’s, except that the Cooley-Mark Bill did not stipulate any particular size for the school board. Both bills were designed to give legal sanction to what Cooley had already accomplished.

The state legislature refused to pass either bill, again due to the energetic opposition of the CTF and the Chicago Federation of Labor. The Civic Federation’s bill, Margaret Haley claimed, “is fundamentally wrong because it creates an administrative officer and confers on him all the duties and powers naturally and necessarily inherent in the whole teaching force, and the people, through their representatives, thereby setting aside the principles of democracy in the internal administration of schools, precisely as the same principles are set aside in the government of the schools, so far as the whole people of Chicago are concerned. . . .” To Haley, the bill expressed a nationwide antidemocratic sentiment:

The situation in Chicago as far as the relation of the teacher to the system is concerned, is not peculiar to Chicago, but is general throughout the country. The tendency in the field of education today is the same as the tendency in the commercial, the financial and the political world—that of concentration of power in one man or one set of men. This centralization of power has the effect of bringing the top captains of the world with untold power for good or ill to those under them and to those dependent on them.

But the bill threatened more than democratic principles and the professional autonomy of teachers. It also attacked their material security:

The whole bill is a denial of the rights of the rank and file, whether they be teacher or people. Teachers who have not only spent years in professional training, but have devoted their lives to the actual work of teaching, who are in fact the real
Contesting the Civic Federation's bills in Springfield represented only part of the CTF's efforts to protect democracy and the material interests of teachers. In 1900 and 1902 the union committed teachers to two unusual and controversial steps that challenged the board even further: In 1900 the CTF filed a tax suit against corporate tax evaders, and two years later it affiliated with the Chicago Federation of Labor.

In the wake of a threatened salary cut in late 1899, Margaret Haley instigated an investigation of the Cook County tax system. She found that several hundred corporations had avoided paying city taxes. She persuaded the CTF to file suit against the tax delinquent firms in the hope of increasing the revenues of the board of education—and the salaries of its teachers. Five public utility corporations alone owed taxes of $2,358,295. The courts decided in favor of the CTF in May 1901; in October the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the decision. Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. District Court; the court upheld the decision but reduced the sum to $600,000. In 1903-04, the delinquent corporations paid the sum to Cook County, which, in turn, passed the money on to the Chicago Board of Education. But in a quite remarkable display of arrogance and callousness, the board, rather than paying the increases in teachers' salaries it had promised years before, decided to pay the coal bill, reinstitute kindergartens, give the janitors a raise, and contribute money to the building fund. The board then added insult to injury by introducing the Cooley "merit pay" scheme. Their material needs denied and their professional competence impuned, the members of the CTF voted to affiliate with the Chicago Federation of Labor.

Haley justified affiliation as necessary to protect the material welfare of the teachers as wage earners and the need to join forces with those organizations struggling for a better education and democracy in America. "Two ideals are struggling for supremacy in American life today," she argued, "one the industrial ideal, dominating through the supremacy of commercialism, which subordinates the worker to the product and the machine; the other, the ideal of democracy, the ideal of educators, which places humanity above all machines, and demands that all activity shall be the expression of life." Because of the growing dominance of the industrial ideal and "the increased tendency toward 'factoryizing education,' making the teacher an automaton, a mere factory hand, whose duty is to carry out mechanically and unquestionably the ideas and orders of those clothed
Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

with the authority of position, and who may or may not know the needs of the children or how to minister to them,” teachers needed to affiliate with organized labor. Affiliation offered a means through which teachers could “rid themselves of the reactionary conditions in and out of the classroom which are crushing out their lives and that of the children.” Through organization and cooperation the teachers could “save the schools for democracy and save democracy in the schools.”

Affiliation with the CFL proved to be a bitter pill for a number of teachers, who resigned from the CTF in protest. But the dissatisfaction did not hinder the growing involvement of the leadership of the CTF in a number of reform movements, particularly municipal ownership and women’s suffrage, both of which Haley and Goggin identified with the expansion of democracy in America. The same year (1902) the CTF affiliated with the Chicago Federation of Labor, it joined the Illinois Federation of Women’s Clubs. Affiliation with the two organizations provided the necessary ingredients for a strategy of coordinated reform encompassing labor, teachers, and women, representing the factory, the school, and the home for the pursuit of social reform. While labor would “improve the standard of living of the poorest and weakest members of society” and democratize industry, and women would protect the integrity of the home and the nation through the ballot, teachers would fight to protect the material interests of teachers and to extend “democracy in the schools.”

Haley’s hopes for the alliance appeared well founded, at least in the short run. During the 1905–07 debates over a new charter for Chicago, the CTF, the CFL, and the women’s organizations combined to help defeat the educational provisions of the charter prepared by the Merchants Club and Theodore Robinson of the Commercial Club that proposed the selective appointment of school boards and administrative centralization. The CFL, for example, attacked the educational articles of the charter as an effort to transform public schools into “a cog in the capitalistic machine, so that . . . children reach manhood’s estate content in a condition of abject servitude.” There could be no other reason for centralized and autocratic authority, declared the CFL, than to impart a “reactionary mold to the minds” of future workers. Control of the school board and administrative centralization went hand in hand with controlling the content, pedagogy, and function of public education.

Meanwhile, in early 1904 the CTF brought a suit against the board for the board’s failure to increase teacher salaries with funds derived from the successful tax evasion suit; in August 1904 Judge Edward F. Dunne decided against the board and for the teachers. The following year, the CTF energetically supported Dunne’s successful bid to become mayor of
Chicago. Dunne responded by appointing seven new board members friendly to the CTF and, according to Jane Addams, "for the most part adherents to the new education": Jane Addams herself; Cornelia DeBey, a physician and child labor reformer; John Harding, business agent for the Chicago Typographical Union; Mrs. Emmons Blaine, the widowed daughter of Cyrus McCormick; Emil Ritter, a manual training teacher and president of the Referendum League; and two others to represent the Polish and Jewish ethnic groups in the city.*

In one of the board's first acts, it appointed Ella Flagg Young, an ardent advocate of democratic decentralized administration and teacher councils, to the principalship of the Chicago Normal School. Addams secured appointment to the chairmanship of the powerful school management committee, a role she believed would enable her to mediate between Cooley's "commercialistic" administration and Haley's CTF, since the "whole situation between the superintendent supported by the majority of the board, and the Teachers' Federation had become an epitome of the struggle between efficiency and democracy; on the one side a well-intentioned expression of the bureaucracy necessary in a large system but which under pressure had become unnecessarily self-assertive, and on the other side a fairly militant demand for self-government made in the name of freedom.""

It was not long, however, before Addams and Haley came to a painful parting of the ways. In May 1906 a dispute arose as to whether the teachers who had borne the cost of the tax fight should be the only ones to receive a salary increase. The CTF and Addams divided; Addams suggested that the CTF was "self-seeking." But what ultimately forced the issue was Addams's failure to allow the CTF to petition the board against implementation of the Cooley promotional system. Addams thought that Cooley's proposals would be of "undoubted benefit" and proceeded to find a compromise with Cooley: Cooley could keep his promotional scheme if he would allow teachers to substitute course work for the promotional examination. Cooley accepted. Haley was appalled and described the affair as "one of her keenest disappointments" and a sign that Addams had "compromised her principles." Haley decided to give up on Addams—who had become known as a "strong" supporter of Cooley—and to wait for seven more Dunne appointments before mounting a campaign to dismantle the Cooley administrative structure."

Dunne made seven new appointments in July 1906. Uniformly sympathetic to the vision of democratic administration sponsored by the CTF, the new members, particularly Ritter, Post, and DeBey, systematically
attacked the administrative philosophy of the centralizers. Ritter complained that former boards of education had been dominated by businessmen who had run “the schools on the factory plan.” Post criticized the “spoilsman” and the “business” board, denounced the “commercialistic ideal of the system,” the replacement by the “ethics of the counting room” of “democratic tendencies and educational ideals,” “high salaries for administrators with low salaries for teaching,” and the “conception of authoritative sequence” based on a docile board of directors, a dictatorial superintendent, department managers, bureau chiefs, and a body of teachers responsive as a vast mechanism, like factory workers, to orders transmitted from above. Post ticked off the despotic character of the administrative system under Cooley’s aegis—“the absurdly aristocratic marking methods, . . . the arbitrary salary-promotional device, . . . the silencing of the teaching body”—and decried “the irresponsible control which the Superintendent has over examinations for entrance, salary promotion and functional promotion,” the “atmosphere of secrecy in which the system is immersed,” and “the demand that the Superintendent be allowed complete control, either without supervision or under a Board with little other power than to register his decrees.” Finally, Post found fault with Addams’s compromise promotions and salary scheme of the previous year: “The recent modifications of the promotional test appear to have been introduced by way of compromise at a time when the Chicago Teachers’ Federation was urging the abolition of promotional examinations,” he argued. “While not open to some of the objections urged against the examinations, this test is equally objectionable as to its purpose, which is to create arbitrary conditions for salary advancement.” Instead, he recommended a new policy including strict probationary requirements for new teachers, a board of three examiners to conduct entrance examinations, that all teachers graded by their principals as “efficient” per se advance through the salary schedule on an annual basis, semiannual reports of principals on each teacher, and that teachers have time off to attend classes at the Normal School.

Cornelia DeBey added her voice to the chorus of criticism. Calling attention to the writings of John Dewey, Ella Flagg Young, and Albert Hart, DeBey decried the “despotic manipulation” of teachers by the “masterhands” and the hierarchical “methods of management . . . from the top downward.” She proposed instead a new system of management that worked “from the bottom upward”: the teaching force should have “advisory authority and responsibility on educational subjects and the relation of the teaching body to the school system,” while the superintendent
should have "administrative authority and advisory direction." DeBey also recommended that teachers be organized at the local, district, and central levels."

The broadsides against the philosophy of centralized administration provided the intellectual justification to dismantle the system of centralized administration desired by the reformers. The board repealed the Dawes antipull rule, altered the promotions scheme, dropped the previous board's appeal to the state supreme court in the tax case, raised teacher salaries, debated the Post and DeBey reports, increased the membership of the board of superintendents from six to ten, appointed women to the four new district superintendent positions, voted to make decisions in teacher transfers, changed textbooks to include teacher choices in spellers and union-printed textbooks, and, finally, reorganized administration into a decentralized structure that included district councils with teacher representatives. For the moment, at least, "democracy" had triumphed over "efficiency."

Partisans of business control and centralized authority did not, however, take all this lying down. Throughout the life of the Dunne board, the *Daily News* and the *Chicago Tribune* kept up an unremitting barrage of invective that was at times as inventive as it was vicious: "Freaks, cranks, monomaniacs and boodlers," the *Tribune* called the reformers. Jane Addams commented that "the newspapers had so constantly reflected and intensified the ideals of a business Board" that "from the beginning, any attempt the new Board made to discuss educational matters only excited their derision and contempt." At the same time, Chicago's leading businessmen continued their campaign to extend administrative centralization. Declaring that the schools should be run on a "rational and business-like basis," the Merchants Club, through the good offices of Cooley, brought Nicholas Murray Butler back to Chicago to define once again the goals of the efficiency movement and to rally the faithful. Butler ridiculed the idea of teacher councils for he would "as soon as think of talking about the democratization of the treatment of appendicitis" as to allow "the democratization of schools." For Butler, "democracy is a principle of government; and a democracy is as much entitled as a monarchy to have its business well done." He concluded—to great applause—that if he were a board member he would do his "best to have adopted a by-law which would remove from the school service any teacher who affiliates ... with a labor organization."

In the 1907 mayoral race, the Republican candidate, Fred Busse, defeated Dunne and installed a "business" board as he had promised. The new board, dominated, wrote Jane Addams, by men "representing
the leading Commercial Club of the city," immediately went about dismantling the work of the previous board and reactivating the centralization program. In a symbolic gesture of class consciousness, the board renamed the Henry George School the George Pullman School. The board also supported legislation, drawn up by members Theodore Robinson (vice-president of Illinois Steel, chairman of the education committee of the Commercial Club, and a leading advocate of charter revision and vocational education), to vest executive authority in the hands of a tenured superintendent and to reduce the size of the school board to fifteen members. The bill, however, went down to defeat, again largely due to the intense lobbying of the CTF and the CFL. Frustrated, Cooley resigned his position in March 1909, exclaiming as he did that no school reorganization program would be successful so long as the CTF existed.

Although a final showdown between the business-dominated board and the CTF appeared imminent, in a surprise move the board appointed Ella Flagg Young superintendent to succeed Cooley. Young's administrative philosophy, articulated as a student of John Dewey's at the University of Chicago and published in 1901, was almost an antipode of Cooley's. Where Cooley desired to centralize power in the superintendent's office, Young preferred a system of decentralized administration that gave teachers a significant role through a system of teacher councils. Mrs. Young acknowledged the increasing size and complexity of urban school systems but did not view centralization and bureaucratization as their inevitable concomitants. Indeed, Mrs. Young argued, centralization and bureaucratization were undemocratic and un-American: "No more un-American or dangerous solution of the difficulties in maintaining a high degree of efficiency in the teaching corps of a large school system can be attempted than that which is effected by what is termed 'close supervision.' " Power should be decentralized and decisions implemented through a federal system of teachers' councils ascending from the individuals' schools to districts to a central council. The councils would consider policy proposals and make recommendations; the superintendent would act according to her judgment but she would "be held responsible for the outcome."

Discerning the motives of the board's members who appointed Mrs. Young can only be guesswork. Perhaps they wished to lower the level of political conflict between the CTF and the superintendent's office; perhaps they imagined that the appointment of Mrs. Young would facilitate the implementation of a differentiated vocational curriculum. Mrs. Young, after all, strongly supported vocational education, and Theodore Robinson, a leading member of the board, was a major figure in the vocational education movement. In any event, the appointment of Mrs. Young cer-
tainly reduced the level of conflict between the CTF and the office as Mrs. Young adopted policies near and dear to the hearts of the CTF membership. She reduced classroom size, eliminated the secret marking system, modified the Cooley promotional plan, supported increased salaries, introduced teachers' councils, and consulted teachers on the selection of textbooks and curriculum development. As might be expected, the CTF thought very highly of Mrs. Young. The relationship between Mrs. Young and the board proved far less cordial, however, particularly after Mrs. Young publicly opposed the Cooley Bill in the state legislature in 1913. When she also refused to go along with the requests of two board members, William Rothmann and Jacob Loeb, to demote teachers who were leaders of the CTF or who opposed the efforts of Rothmann to gain control of the teachers' pension fund, relations between Young and the board deteriorated even further. In an intriguing move, wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of administrative centralization but accurately reflecting the concerns of the board with curriculum matters, the board voted to remove control over the course of study from the superintendent's office. Twice in 1913 Mrs. Young resigned her position (the second time the board split evenly on her reappointment), only to be reinstated by the board following widespread protests and pressure from Mayor Harrison.

Meanwhile, tensions between the CTF and the board also accelerated steadily. In 1912 and 1913 Harrison appointed several members—Rothmann, a lawyer, and Loeb, a real estate and insurance agent—intent on destroying the federation and gaining control of the teachers' pension fund. In 1913 the CTF secured the defeat in the state legislature of a board-sponsored bill designed to increase board control of its pension fund. In 1913 and 1915 the CTF led the opposition against the board-supported Cooley Bill. Thwarted by the CTF, Loeb bided his time. He eventually succeeded following a fiscal crisis in early 1915, the creation by the board of a committee of "efficiency and economy" to devise ways to lower costs (the committee recommended in May that teacher salaries be cut 7½%), the election of William Hale Thompson to the mayor's office in April 1915, the creation of a state commission (the Baldwin Commission) to investigate the board and the CTF (an investigation probably intended to be a CTF witch hunt), and the effort by a CTF sympathizer in the Chicago council to investigate the financial records of the board of education. On August 23, 1915, Loeb introduced a motion into the board committee meeting that denied the teachers the right to belong to any organization affiliated with trade unions or having paid business
agents. On September 1 the full board adopted the motion by eleven to
nine.

The Loeb Rule provides a classic example—indeed one of the first in
American history—of the application of the open shop philosophy to
public employees. As in the battles between labor and capital, the issue
centered on control of the workplace, but with one important difference:
The rhetoric of "professionalism" and "service" replaced the "harmony of
interests" doctrine of industrial life. "Teaching is not a trade, it is a profes­
sion, and one of the noblest professions," explained Loeb. "In principle
and in practice, trade unionism is inconsistent with and unnecessary to a
professional career. In the schools it makes for a divided allegiance, it
breeds suspicion and discontent. It destroys harmony and creates strife. It
interferes with discipline and halts efficiency." The CTF was "a curse to
the school system," its leaders "lady labor sluggers." "We've got to stop
this unionization of teachers once and for all. It has gone far enough.
These unions are growing like fire. They are taking over the schools and
turning labor on us. We will cut them off from labor. We'll cut their
professional throats if we have to."

Nine days after the adoption of the Loeb Rule, the Chicago Federa­
tion of Labor called a mass protest meeting at the Auditorium Theater.
Samuel Gompers and Louis Post, now assistant secretary of labor, came
from Washington to speak. For Post, the Loeb Rule represented yet an­
other effort by business to turn schools into factories by reducing teachers
into factorylike workers. Alderman John Kennedy declared that business­
men and their representative, Jacob Loeb, wished to transform the school
system "from a system of education for the development of the child, to a
system to prepare the raw material for their factories and their shops and
their mines and their stores. . . ." John Walker of the Illinois State Feder­
ation of Labor (ISFL) compared "the difference between school teachers
who are free and untrammeled and independent, who have the right to
act towards the school system as their knowledge of it and judgement
leads them to believe is right, and, on the other hand, school teachers who
will be held in the hollow of the hands of the direct representatives of the
business interests." The ILSF and CFL sent letters of protest to the
governor of Illinois, denouncing the Loeb Rule as an effort by "big busi­
ness" to have the schools "create for them a body of trained, efficient, and
somewhat servile workers" while providing "the cheapest possible sort of
education." Margaret Haley linked the "determination of 'Big Business'
to reduce the teachers to a state of servility" to the ongoing struggle
between democracy and monopoly:
The attack upon the teachers of Chicago . . . reveals the dearest ambition of the financial feudal lords of America who have agreed upon one economic and political principle that looks to the control of the Public School system in the country. The motive is simple. Profits are being reduced by a growing experimental control. Democracy demands that this control shall become more powerful in the future. The selfish interest of the wealth classes depends upon the breaking down of the popular power, therefore, your fight for life is as profound and as precious as the early struggles of the men who founded this nation."

On September 23 the CTF obtained an injunction against the enforcement of the Loeb Rule on the grounds that it was too sweeping. In response, the board on September 29 amended the rule to read “membership in some teachers organizations which have officers, business agents or other representatives of the teaching force.” The courts held, however, that no action could be taken until June 1916 when the teachers would be up for reelection. In June Loeb, now president of the board, dismissed sixty-eight teachers for failure to comply with the Loeb Rule (twenty-eight were federation members, including all eight of its officers). A storm of protest broke upon the board. On July 17, 1916, a public meeting, chaired by Mary McDowell, addressed by Janes Addams, Charles Merriam, and Helen Heffran of the Women’s City Club and president of the Illinois Congress of Parents and Teachers and provided with a statement prepared in part by Victor Olander and John Fitzpatrick, condemned the firings and called for the creation of a new citizens association. Shortly afterward, representatives from twenty-eight civic organizations, along with Jane Addams, Grace Abbott, George Herbert Mead, Charles Merriam, John Fitzpatrick, and Victor Olander, founded the Public Education Association (PEA). Not to be outdone, the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association (IMA) wrote the school board and Mayor Thompson supporting the Loeb Rule and created a rival organization, the Public School League (PSL). Two of the league’s directors were former presidents of the IMA; its president was president of the Rock Island Mining Company. Declaring that its goal was to “increase educational efficiency,” the PSL sought the “entire elimination of the Teachers’ Federation and its politico-labor activities.” Later that year, Loeb joined the PSL.

In the early months of 1917, the PEA, the PSL, and Robert Buck of the Chicago City Council each sponsored a bill in the Illinois legislature to settle the disputes over administrative structure and control once and for all. The PEA-sponsored bill (the Otis Bill) provided for an eleven-member, unpaid, appointed board, three principal administrators (the superintendent, a business manager, and an attorney), and teacher tenure after three years’ service. Angus Shannon, the attorney responsible for
drawing up the major provisions of the bill, explained to a City Club audience that the “primary idea” behind the bill “was to place the administrative phase of school affairs in the hands of experts, removed from political influence, and subject only to the approval or disapproval of a board of education, in matters of policy. Thus, all details of the actual work would be in the hands of specialists.” The PEA declared that among other objectives, the Otis Bill would allow “the board of education to organize the schools so that they shall employ the most expert people” while allowing for sufficient “progressiveness” in policy without jeopardizing “efficiency.” Although the bill included no provisions for teacher councils, increased the powers of the central administration, and provided for an appointed rather than an elected board, the CTF did not oppose the bill since it did include a tenure clause for teachers. On April 20 a version of the Otis Bill passed the state legislature. After nearly twenty years of intense battle, the major goals of the original Harper Bill had been enacted into law. Centralization by statute had at last come to Chicago.

The very same day that the Otis Law passed, the Illinois Supreme Court, in a decision that Ella Flagg Young called the “Dred Scott Decision of Education,” decided that “the board has the absolute right to decline to employ or re-employ any applicant for any reasons or for no reason at all . . . .” Elated, Loeb exclaimed that it was “the happiest day in my life, . . . there will be no more labor unions in the public schools.” Defeated, the CTF disaffiliated with the CFL, the ISFL, the AFT (founded the year before in Chicago with the CTF as Local No. 1) and the Women’s Trade Union League. The CTF never fully recovered from the blow.

The sequel to the passage of the Otis Law reveals little more than a series of comic opera sideshows, including doublecrosses between old allies, court battles between competing boards of education, hastily arranged marriages of convenience, the wholesale looting of educational funds on a scale unparalleled even for Chicago, three indifferent and colorless superintendents, a lawsuit by one superintendent against a board of education, a grand jury investigation, the jailing of several board members for corruption, and the defeat of Mayor Thompson in 1923. Under the circumstances, very little further centralization took place despite the demoralization of the CTF. When in 1924 a new board appointed a new superintendent, a disciple of Nicholas Murray Butler, the efficiency-conscious, single-minded, strong-willed William McAndrew, the process of centralization resumed with a vengeance.

Very little irritated William McAndrew more than “inefficiency,” “lax standards,” and the usurpation of the superintendent’s autonomy, whether
by teachers or the board of education. As much as anything else, McAndrew believed in social efficiency, the prerogatives of the superintendent, and "close supervision." He roundly condemned the board of education's meddling in the superintendent's affairs. Referring to the "tragi-comedy" prior to his appointment, McAndrew traced its source to "the outworn fallacy that a superintendent is the board's . . . executive to carry out their policies. He isn't. . . . They can't say what medicines shall be used or what operations shall be performed. Somebody had to tell 'em that."" Similarly, McAndrew had no use for the CTF or teacher councils. In 1927 he informed an audience that he had been brought to Chicago for the purpose of "loosening the hold of this 'invisible empire' within the schools, a weird system, a selfish system, doing everything to indicate a selfish purpose and demanding the right to govern the schools." And although required by board regulations to call meetings of the teachers' councils on a regular basis, he either refused to do so or allowed them to meet only under conditions specified by himself: meetings were not to be held during school hours, and principals could not be excluded as has been the custom, since to do so was "repugnant to experience, discipline and efficiency." The system of teachers' councils, he argued, violated the principles of "the standard works on school management in which there is a direct line of control from Board through superintendent and principal down to teacher. . . ." Teachers required not autonomy but "close supervision."

McAndrew's regime of "close supervision" introduced a series of reforms. He required every teacher to check a report sheet four times a day, established fixed criteria of performance that made no allowance for the size of classes or children's backgrounds, and introduced standardized tests and a system of "line and staff" supervision to ensure strict compliance. McAndrew's "Official Notice on Teacher Efficiency" for 1925–26 contained little that was different from Cooley's original scheme. Knowledge of subject accounted for 10 percent; teaching ability 20 percent; progress of pupils 30 percent; cooperation with pupils and community 10 percent; cooperation in school management 15 percent; professional standing and growth (including adaptability to suggestion for professional improvement) 15 percent. Finally, an open-ended category for "demerits" allowed a principal for any reason at all to take off as many points as he wished. McAndrew informed principals that they had "the iron hand" and should use it."

Although McAndrew flatly opposed efforts by politicians, businessmen, or teachers to dictate educational policy to the superintendent's office, he was by no means hostile to businessmen or to their interests.
McAndrew insisted on a “100 percent mastery program” in the basics—reading, writing, and arithmetic—favored by businessmen and solicited their opinion on the “efficiency” of the schools by sending out letters to members of the Association of Commerce under the heading “Customers’ Estimate of Service.” McAndrew did not send similar letters to leaders of the labor movement or to the parents sending their children to school.6 McAndrew organized the first of a series of “Citizens’ Sampling Days” to demonstrate to the school system’s “stockholders”—representatives from leading civic organizations—the quality of the schools’ “human output” and the degree to which the “human output” satisfied the “requirements” of the stockholders. On the appointed day, representatives from business firms, the Chicago Association of Commerce, the Union League Club, the City Club, the Women’s City Club, the Chicago Bar Association, the settlement movement, and other organizations pried the children with questions and tests of skill.7 For one invited citizen stockholder who did not attend, John Fitzpatrick of the CFL, there could be no doubting the meaning of “Citizens Sampling Day.”

I cannot understand what you and your assistants are thinking about when you talk about ‘output customers, Stockholders and Sampling Day’ unless you imagine that you are running some kind of a mill or factory while you are grinding out a certain kind of product or material and you are going to get the ‘stockholders and customers’ together and bring forth ‘samples’ as an exhibit of your ‘output.’

Thus ‘sampling day,’ as you present it, is nothing more or less than an exhibition of the effort and result of eight years’ schooling to make the youngsters think and act alike. . . . And the customers will be shown that the products of our public schools jump when the string is pulled, and they will be splendid material to draw upon for employees in stores, offices, shops, factories, or elsewhere.

The parents are not consulted as to whether or not they are satisfied with the kind of schooling their children are getting. But why should they be consulted? The schools are not being run for them but for the ‘stockholders and customers.’4

The following year, 1927, the voters of Chicago reelected William Hall Thompson as mayor of Chicago. During his campaign, Thompson, perhaps wishing to establish his presence in international affairs before running for the office of president of the United States, attacked McAndrew for allowing “pro-British” books into the schools and promised to “punch King George in the snoot.” After his election, Thompson promptly engineered a “trial” of McAndrew by the board and McAndrew’s dismissal.7 In a symbolic parting of the ways, the CTF and the CFL supported Thompson, while the Joint Committee on Public School Affairs, an umbrella organization of twenty-nine civic organizations and aging Progressive reformers, supported McAndrew.8 Yet, al-
Though Thompson dismissed McAndrew, the dismissal did nothing to undo the centralization of educational administration or to roll back the business-oriented ideology of social efficiency that dominated the administration and curriculum of Chicago’s public schools. McAndrew’s demise did not prelude an assault on centralization or on the ideology of social efficiency. McAndrew went, but centralization stayed; Thompson won, but social efficiency prevailed.

Centralization, Business, and Progressive Politics

Between 1899 and the mid-1920s, a coalition of school superintendents and businessmen, with the occasional support of other Progressives, managed to secure, through a combination of administrative fiat and legislative statute, the major recommendation of the Harper Report of 1899: “radical” reform of the “largely defective” administrative structure of public education in Chicago. The victory of this coalition raises three general questions: first, the character and significance of their victory; second, the nature of the coalition that achieved it—the relationship between the administrative progressives, the business community, and Progressive reform generally; and third, the character of the opposition that centralization generated.

The phenomenology of success is readily apparent. The coalition succeeded in securing the reduction in the size of the school board, the appointment rather than the election of school board members, and the nonremuneration of members. Board members had been appointed rather than elected prior to the Progressive Era, and they had not been remunerated for their services either, but in light of the demands of the CTF and the CFL for the election and payment of school board members, the continued appointment and nonpayment of school board members should count as victories for the reform coalition. The net effect of the reforms is also not difficult to discern. Although businessmen were highly overrepresented on the board prior to 1899, after 1900 they dominated it, with the sole exception of the Dunne board between 1905 and 1907. George Counts, in his study of school politics in Chicago, reveals that all 120 members of the board he studied between 1903 and 1926 “were drawn entirely from the middle and favored classes. . . . The Chicago Board of Education has been composed almost exclusively of persons engaged in proprietorial, managerial, professional, and commercial occupations—lawyers, physicians, corporation presidents, manufacturers, merchants,
publishers, real estate agents, bankers, architects, contractors, insurance agents, and dentists." Moreover, after the formation of the Association of Commerce in 1904, the association had, on average, three or four members serving on the board at any one time; during the first three years of McAndrew's administration, five of the eleven members were members of the Association of Commerce.*

In addition, the coalition drastically altered the administrative structure of public education in the decades after 1899: It secured the clear differentiation of legislative and administrative functions, and it imposed a hierarchically organized structure of authority, modeled on corporate industry, that located centralized power over the teaching force, the educational process, and the day-to-day operation of the school system in the superintendent's office. Cooley's "anti-pull" rule and his "promotional scheme" secured centralized control over the hiring, promotions, and salaries of teachers; other reforms secured centralized control over their training as well, while Loeb's Rule severely hampered the ability of the CTF to wield political power over the board or resist the superintendent's will. Although McAndrews failed to wrest control of the day-to-day operation of the school system from the local school management committees, Cooley succeeded. Securing control over the educational process proved a more complicated task. The organizational structure of the educational process—the fact that teachers taught in self-contained classrooms free from direct supervision of principals, and with some immunity from the imposition of more technical forms of control characteristic of industrial work processes—limited the ability of the superintendent's office to gain control over the educational process. Nevertheless, the administrative progressives succeeded in securing as much control over the educational process as its organizational structure would permit. Each superintendent, but above all McAndrew with his regime of "close supervision" and constant measurement, increased the control of the superintendent's office over grading standards, student promotional policies, textbook selection, and pedagogical methods—the bureaucratization of pedagogical practices described in chapter 2. Finally, the superintendent's office exercised monopoly powers over the course of study, although for a brief period during Ella Flagg Young's incumbency the board removed authority over the course of study from her office. In effect, centralized control over the day-to-day operation of the school system, over teachers, and—within the limits imposed by the classroom system—over the educational process represented the successful imposition of a hierarchical structure of social relations and the creation of what Willard Waller described as a "punish-
ment-centered bureaucracy” in which superintendents exercised “domina-
tive” authority over teachers, an educational version of the shift from
formal to real subordination characteristic of corporate industry.41

Two groups could fairly claim responsibility for the success of the
centralization movement: businessmen and their organizations, and an
ambitious but clear-sighted cadre of aspiring professional educational ad-
ministrators who, with one exception, occupied the superintendent’s office
between 1899 and 1927—Harper, Andrew, Cooley, and McAndrew. Of
the two groups, the administrative progressives were far more committed
in principle to centralization. Indeed, there are ample grounds for believ-
ing that many of the businessmen who supported centralization did so not
because they supported educational centralization as a matter of principle
but because they wished to engage in various forms of petty accumulation-
ist activity or pursue an open shop campaign. Membership on the board,
support for centralization, and opposition to the CTF were far from one
and the same thing.

Chicago’s administrative progressives pursued centralization for a va-
riety of reasons, although not because they were forced to, as Raymond
Callahan suggests. Callahan argues that educational administrators advo-
cated centralization for purely defensive reasons: by virtue of the “vulner-
ability” of their positions to business-dominated boards of education,
administrators adopted the ideology of social efficiency and pursued cen-
tralization to protect their jobs.42 This does not seem to have been the
case in Chicago. True, businessmen dominated the board of education
and superintendents served at the pleasure of the board. But the business-
dominated board of education did not impose the ideology of social effi-
ciency or the particular model of centralized and hierarchical administra-
tion on a recalcitrant Edwin Cooley or an unwilling William McAndrew.
Both men viewed themselves as apostles of the new order. Both whole-
heartedly, even passionately, believed in social efficiency and centraliza-
tion, proselytized on its behalf, and attempted, against bitter opposition
from the CTF and the CFL, to advance the cause of one and institution-
alize the other. The explanation of the adoption of social efficiency do-
ctrines and centralization by the administrative progressives lies elsewhere
than in the “vulnerability” of their positions.

In part, the centralized and hierarchical bureaucratic structure that
the administrative progressives and their business allies imposed reflected
a response to a genuine crisis of financial solvency and administrative
coordination associated with the rapid expansion of the school system in
the years after 1890. But problems of coordination and financial solvency
can explain only part of the popularity of the corporate model of admin-
Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

217

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

Centralization and Transformation of Public Education
Commercial Club collaborated with Edwin Cooley in drawing up another bill submitted to the state legislature in 1903; Theodore Robinson, also of the Commercial Club, assumed responsibility for drafting another version of the Harper Bill in 1909; Jacob Loeb broke the affiliation of the CTF with the CFL; the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association created the Public School League in 1916 to support Loeb’s efforts to dismember, as it were, the CTF.

But although businessmen dominated the board during the period when it imposed centralized administration, and although they assumed major responsibility for securing legislation sanctioning centralization, for the most part, businessmen supported centralization, or what is not quite the same thing, opposed the CTF, for very different reasons than those motivating the efforts of the administrative progressives. In general, relatively few businessmen were seriously interested in centralization per se, and even fewer supported centralization because they were philosophically committed, as a matter of principle, to centralization. Indeed, while reform of the conditions of board membership helped consolidate business domination of the board of education, it is fairly clear that in part business domination of the board did not so much reflect business preoccupation with principles of social efficiency and centralized administration but a belief among many businessmen that board membership represented an opportunity to engage in one form or another of petty accumulation. Some, like William Rothmann, for example, were little more than greedy, avaricious opportunists interested in tapping the revenues of the board (or the teachers’ pension fund) to line their own pockets, or they wished to punish, hobble, and, if possible, destroy the CTF for its efforts to expose public utilities, a major newspaper (the Tribune), and several dozen large corporations (including Pullman and Armour) for tax evasion, low property assessments, and the leasing of valuable school board property to businessmen for a fraction of its market value. For such businessmen, centralization, or opposition to the CTF, were matters of immediate economic gain, not political principle. On occasion some businessmen supported centralization or opposed the CTF as a matter of principle: The businessmen associated with the Merchants’ Club who drew up the educational provisions of the proposed city charter in 1905–07 were “better government” businessmen interested in keeping school costs and, therefore, taxes to a minimum as a matter of economic principle, while Jacob Loeb and the members of the PSL who battled the CTF were apostolic, anti-union, open shop ideologists committed to the destruction of the CTF and the labor movement generally.

Yet, not all businessmen supported centralization or opposed the
Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

CTF simply because board membership provided an opportunity to engage in petty accumulationist activity or indulge in open shop demagogy or to keep taxes low. Some, at least, had a broader view. The very same Civic Federation that sponsored Harper and then the Harper Bills in 1899, 1901, and 1903, also supported municipal reform through the Municipal Voters League, whose approach to public administration and politics differed not a whit from the views of the administrative progressives. Both looked askance on the corruption of democratic politics, both wished to separate as far as possible legislative and administrative functions, both endeavored to ensure economy and efficiency in government and the election of responsible citizens to elective office, and both imposed a hierarchical and centralized model of governance on public administration. Moreover, individuals and organizations closely linked to the centralization movement were also closely linked to the movement to vocationalize and differentiate the curricula of public education in Chicago. Both Clayton Mark and Theodore Robinson took responsibility for drafting versions of the Harper Bill and participated in the vocational education movement. Edwin Cooley advanced the cause of centralization and vocational education as superintendent between 1901 and 1909, and after 1910 played a key role in attempting to secure a system of differentiated education. Both Mark and Robinson, it will be recalled, were chairmen of the educational committee of the Commercial Club—the very same organization that sponsored Cooley's campaign to differentiate the public school system. In effect, the same individuals, the same organizations, and the same philosophy—social efficiency—guided both centralization and vocational education to victory. Where one set of reforms ensured that businessmen formally governed the school system and that superintendents administered the school system in a businesslike manner according to businesslike principles, the second transformed schooling into a business institution, an adjunct to the market economy.

Two groups, businessmen and the administrative progressives, deserve the bulk of the credit for the success of the centralization movement. But, on occasion, mainline Progressive reformers also provided important support. This is particularly apparent in the support of the Harper Bill by the Civic Federation in 1899, 1901, and 1903, in Jane Addams's qualified support for Cooley's promotion campaign in 1906, the foundation of the PEA in 1916 by Addams, Merriam, McDowell, Mead, Abbott, and others, passage of the Otis Bill in 1917, and the support of McAndrew by the Joint Committee on Public School Affairs in the mid-1920s (when McAndrew fought to introduce junior high schools, the platoon system, intelligence testing, and "close supervision," and fought off political inter-
The fact that Addams, Merriam, Mead, Abbott, and others protested the Loeb Rule in 1916, or that Addams supported the affiliation of the CTF with the CFL, did not represent an ambivalent or limited commitment to centralization; it merely indicated that they did not identify the cause of centralization with opposition to the affiliation of the CTF with organized labor.

If support among Progressive reformers for centralization did not necessarily involve opposition to the CTF, there can be no doubting the opposition of the CTF itself to centralization. At the time of its founding in 1897, the concerns of the CTF membership were limited to two issues: salaries and pensions. At the time, the question of tenure was not a live issue—Governor Altgeld in 1895 had managed to insert a limited tenure provision for teachers in the pension law of 1899. Yet within the space of three and a half years, between January 1899 and mid-1902, a series of events rapidly expanded the preoccupations of the CTF: the release of the Harper Report in early 1899, the sponsorship of the first of the Harper Bills in the state legislature later that year and again in 1901 and 1903 by the Civic Federation, the appointment of two self-confessed centralizers, Andrews and Cooley, as superintendents, the refusal of the board to increase teacher salaries in 1899 on the grounds of insufficient funds, Cooley's "anti-pull" crusade and his introduction of a "new promotional scheme" and merit pay system in 1901-02, and the refusal of the board to increase teachers' salaries in 1901 following the CTF's court victory in the tax case. In response to these events, the agenda of the CTF expanded to include issues involving conditions of entry and promotion, job control, and social reform. That agenda changed little for more than thirteen years until 1916 when the board's firing of sixty-eight teachers added tenure to the list. For almost two decades, the CTF actively pursued the cause of "democracy in the schools" and "democracy for the schools." The former focused on resisting the imposition of "close supervision" and hierarchical, centralized, and bureaucratic control within the workplace while attempting to secure a system of teacher councils, decentralized control, and professional autonomy, as well as job security. The latter, "democracy for the schools," centered on a variety of reform movements after 1900: tax reform, municipal ownership, antimonopoly, women's suffrage, and support for organized labor.

Teacher councils represented the core of the CTF's campaign for "democracy in the schools." Ironically, the Harper Commission first raised the possibility of a system of teacher councils in 1899, but the commission intended the councils to be without any formal authority—a mere tea-and-biscuits device, not an administrative agency or policy-making body.
Centralization and Transformation of Public Education

But the influence and writings of Francis Parker, John Dewey, Ella Flagg Young, and Cornelia DeBey suggested a far more substantial and agreeable system of teacher councils and decentralized administration. Many teachers, certainly the leadership of the CTF, were thoroughly familiar with Ella Flagg Young's *Isolation in the Schools*, and many had been deeply influenced by Parker and Dewey, some as students, or through attending their public lectures and reading their published works. Margaret Haley, for instance, drew upon Parker and Dewey to explain and justify her conviction that teachers, by virtue of the great responsibility they assumed for the training and cultivation of the minds, personalities, and character of children, required sufficient professional autonomy to be able to respond meaningfully to individual student differences and needs and a level of material security and professional prestige befitting the importance of their responsibilities:

To the teacher it means freedom from care and worry for the material needs of the present and future—in other words, adequate salary and old age pensions; freedom to teach the child as an individual and not to deal with children en masse. In other words, fewer children for each teacher. Last but not least, the teacher must have recognition in the educational system as an educator. The tendency is to relegate her to the position of a factory hand, or to the orders from above.

Indeed, teachers found the demand for teacher professionalism voiced by administrative progressives hypocritical and contradictory. They dismissed "professionalism as service" as a ploy to keep teachers' salaries low. To insist on professionalism while denying teachers control over the conditions of entry and certification requirements common to other professions, failing to provide adequate tenure, job security, and salaries, and refusing to institute a system of councils was sheer hypocrisy. What else could the teachers conclude of the decision of the Board to refuse to give teachers time off to attend a public lecture by G. Stanley Hall on the grounds that the board believed the teachers were not ready for Hall's ideas.

Teachers pursued job security, teachers' councils, decentralized administration, and professional autonomy under the banner of "democracy in the schools." But the quest for democracy also involved a wider political commitment to the extension of democratic principles to all aspects of social life. Like John Dewey, the CTF leadership argued that democracy in the schools could not be separated from—indeed in the long run necessitated—democracy in the wider society. Certainly, the fights against tax evasion by the utility corporations and the leasing arrangements between the board and several Chicago companies were motivated in part by the
decision of the board to renege on promised salary increases. But these struggles also expressed an antimonopoly and equal rights philosophy with ideological roots in Populism, Greenbackism, and the Knights of Labor (all of which were part of the political culture of Margaret Haley's family), and the single tax philosophy of Henry George's *Poverty and Progress*, a book that Margaret Haley had read and described as having "had a profound effect on me." Again, the support of the CTF for the municipal ownership movement, like the fight against the "industrial ideal" and "one-man rule" in education, expressed an antimonopoly and equal rights sentiment against "money power," class privilege, and the "concentration of power in one man or one set of men." The battle to elect Dunne mayor of Chicago, and the appointment of the Dunne school board, particularly Louis Post, a Georgite single taxer, reflected the CTF's efforts to secure a popularly based school board inspired not by the "industrial ideal" but by democratic principles. Affiliation with the Chicago Federation of Labor in 1902 represented more than a tactical move by the CTF to protect the material and professional interests of its membership. It also represented the commitment of the CTF to broader democratic political objectives. While the depth of support among the membership of the CTF for women's suffrage is unknown, Haley herself worked tirelessly on its behalf for more than a decade, lecturing, traveling, lobbying, organizing, and answering mail.

Finally, in pursuit of "democracy for the schools," the CTF played a leading role in founding the American Federation of Teachers in 1916, and in effecting, between 1903 and 1910, a number of significant reforms within the National Education Association. Through adroit political maneuvering, feminist fellowship and the garnishing of widespread grassroots support, the CTF fractured the power of the ruling oligarchy (led by William T. Harris and Nicholas Murray Butler) of the NEA, reformed selection procedures, elected Ella Flagg Young president in 1910, enlarged the size of the National Council on Education, refocused some of the NEA's energies and funds onto questions of teachers' salaries, pensions, and tenure, and secured the creation of the Department of Classroom Teachers.

The involvement of the CTF leadership in this broad array of reform movements on behalf of democracy for the schools and the protracted struggle of the CTF to secure professional autonomy and decentralized administration in the workplace preclude the conclusion, advocated by some historians, that the goals of the CTF were little more than expressions of an economistic philosophy of pure and simple unionism. Certain
Certainly the CTF leadership believed that the pursuit of these political objectives would enhance the material and professional well-being of teachers, but their commitment also reflected a larger political commitment to the extension of democratic social relations in America. Indeed, the politics of the CTF closely resemble the politics of “reform unionism” characteristic of the Knights of Labor during the 1880s rather than the narrow economic policies of “pure and simple” unionism of the 1900s. Like the unions that flocked to the Knights of Labor, the CTF pursued a program that combined improved material welfare, job autonomy, and the preservation—or restoration—of democratic social relations in America, and nourished its politics with the traditions of antimonopoly and equal rights radical republicanism. The CTF did not, admittedly, protest proletarianization as the Knights had, but it did protest the threat that the new training and appointment procedures represented to working-class women seeking respectability and a measure of economic independence.

Other parallels, besides those of politics and ideology, can also be found. Some historians of the Knights of Labor (Commons, Perlman, and Grob, for example) argue that the Knights articulated a “transitional” “pre-industrial labor consciousness” prior to the triumph of pure and simple unionism. Similarly, it could be argued (indeed, it is implicit in Robert Reid’s history of the CTF) that the CTF represents, as it were, a transitional or pre-professional consciousness prior to the triumph of pure and simple professionalism (to coin a phrase) and the organizational revolution. Neither interpretation, however, can withstand close scrutiny. To describe the consciousness of the Knights of Labor as a form of “pre-industrial labor consciousness” ignores the critique of industrial capitalism articulated by the Knights and the vision of democratic industrial organization that the Knights proposed. Moreover, the labor historians who described the Knights as a transitional phenomenon assumed a particular telos: the inevitable (and laudable) triumph of pure and simple unionism. But the Knights were not defeated by teleology. Rather, Haymarket, the shift from formal to real subordination, and the process of working-class formation—the replacement of the first generation of industrial workers by the second (largely immigrant) generation and the development of the labor aristocracy—destroyed the Knights. Likewise, a pre-professional consciousness did not characterize the CTF; instead, it developed an informed critique of centralization, while at the same time articulating an alternative model of administrative structure and professional autonomy. Moreover, the defeat of the CTF did not reflect the realization of an omniscient logic of professionalization or express an immutable bureau-
ocratic imperative toward administrative rationalization. Rather, it reflected the combined effect of particular and highly contingent political events and processes. Two of these were particularly significant.

First, the social authority of the ideology of social efficiency and the political power of the administrative progressives and their business allies enabled the apostles of centralization to push through a series of reforms that radically circumscribed the power of the teachers and limited the ability of the CTF leadership to sustain a militant unionist and radical political posture. The board’s adoption of the Loeb Rule in 1916, for instance, destroyed a major power base of the CTF—affiliation with organized labor—and broke the spirit of the CTF membership, or at least the spirit of its leadership. The success, moreover, of the administrative progressives in gaining control of teacher training and appointment enabled the superintendent to socialize teachers to the new pedagogical and administrative order and to tie the careers of teachers to the superintendent’s office rather than to local district committees. In effect, Cooley succeeded in breaking the nexus between working-class neighborhood politics, represented by the local school committee, and control of the workplace—training, appointment, and promotion. Finally, the expansion of the school system and the lengthening of job ladders (for women as well as men) created new job opportunities for ambitious middle-class college educated women and created a new faction, a labor aristocracy, within the teaching force—principals, vice-principals, specialists of various kinds—whose fortunes were closely tied to the new administrative order.

Second, the changing social composition of the teaching force undermined the capacity of the CTF leadership to foster the growth and maturation of a radical working-class organization. During the closing years of the nineteenth century, the social composition of the teaching force changed quite dramatically: between 1880 and 1900, for instance, the percentage of daughters of semi- and unskilled workers in the labor force dropped from 17.7 percent to 7.9 percent, and the proportion for all blue-collar daughters declined from 47.7 percent to 35.6 percent, while the percentage of daughters from high white-collar homes increased from 15.4 percent to 27.2 percent. A similar decline characterizes the ethnic pattern: among immigrant families, the percentage of daughters from households with one or more foreign-born or semiskilled or unskilled parents dropped significantly from a high of 22.7 percent in 1880 to 7 percent in 1900.* A noticeable shift in the demographic profile of the teaching profession thus occurred between 1880 and 1900, the very year the first cohort of teachers required to have three years of postsecondary education entered the teaching force, although we do not know whether,
or to what extent, the latter contributed to the former. There is every reason to suspect, moreover, that the demographic trend apparent by 1900 continued after 1900. Edwin Cooley had only to pay low wages (relative to office and factory work) to push the daughters of low white-collar and blue-collar origins out of a profession in the process of redefinition to accommodate middle-class daughters seeking temporary employment before marriage. Expanding opportunities in clerical work attracted women out of teaching, but the disincentives to stay in education encouraged the most assertive and militant to give up any ambitions they may have had in the schools and leave. What had initially been an occupation of working-class women was still, in 1902, the year the CTF affiliated with the CFL, dominated by women from a working-class background, but the writing was on the wall. By the time the board adopted the Loeb Rule in 1916, the membership of the CTF had probably become predominantly middle class in character, and after 1916, middle class in outlook as pure and simple professionalism replaced reform unionism.

In opposing centralization, the CTF received support from several sources. It received support from mainline Progressive reformers in 1916 during the crisis over the Loeb Rule, not because Progressives opposed centralization, but because Progressive reformers were dismayed by Loeb's hard line, open shop tactics and confrontational politics. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Loeb crisis, the organization created by the Progressives, the PEA, worked energetically to secure passage of the Otis Bill, which gave legislative sanction to centralization. The CTF also received support from members of the Dunne board, particularly Ritter, Post, and DeBey. Jane Addams supported the CTF on some issues (e.g., affiliation with organized labor) but opposed it on others (e.g., with regard to Cooley's promotions and merit pay scheme). Ella Flagg Young supported the right of the CTF to affiliate with the CFL, but more importantly, supported decentralized administration and teacher councils.

The CTF's most important and persistent support, however, came from organized labor, particularly the CFL. The CFL strenuously supported the industrial policies of the CTF to improve conditions of employment and gain a measure of job control through decentralized administration and teacher councils, but the support of the CFL for the CTF went far beyond fraternal duty. The CFL's support also expressed a deep sympathy to the political orientation and commitments of the CTF—its efforts to create a democratic education for a democratic society. Like the leadership of the CTF, the CFL feared that centralization represented an effort to prevent the democratic control and administration of education in order to create a class-stratified system of education to serve the
needs of business. Hence, the considerable resiliency and potency of the factory metaphor in the rhetoric of the CFL (and the CTF): their belief that businessmen and Superintendents Andrews, Cooley, and McAndrew wanted to create a factory-like education, governed autocratically by businessmen and the superintendent's office, in which factory-like workers (teachers) would train in a factory-like manner in specialized production processes (differentiated curricula) future factory workers.

For a little over a decade and a half, the coalition between the CTF and the CFL, with the support of the Dunne board and the occasional support of Progressive reformers, hampered the efforts of the administrative progressives to secure centralization through administrative fiat and blocked passage of legislation imposing centralization. In the long run, the coalition proved unable to prevent the triumph of centralization.

Its failure strikingly illustrates the character of progressive reform and the larger social processes associated with America's Great Transformation that shaped the reform movement. Essentially the failure of the CTF and its allies does not so much reflect the inevitable triumph of an organizational imperative as it does the greater political, ideological, and industrial resources of the administrative progressives, the impact of on-going processes of class formation and reformation, and the transformation of public education into a labor market institution. The Loeb Rule destroyed the CTF as an industrial force, while the slow accretion of centralized power under Andrews and Cooley and the Otis Bill doomed the vision of decentralized power and professional autonomy that the leadership of the CTF supported. In a sense the imposition of a hierarchical and centralized system of educational governance, the bureaucratic rationalization of pedagogical practices, and the day-by-day control of teachers through "close supervision" constituted an educational version of the shift from formal to real subordination characteristic of corporate industry. At the same time the clash between the CTF and the administrative progressives reflected the impact of processes of class formation and contributed to them in turn. On the one hand, administrative progressives aspired to advance the claims of meritocratic expertise as a legitimate source of social authority, to proselytize on behalf of social efficiency, institutionalize a hierarchical structure of social relations and administrative arrangements within public education, and create an occupation at once lucrative and prestigious. Their successes in this enterprise contributed to the making of a nascent professional middle class. On the other hand, the political conflicts associated with centralization at first advanced the making of a radical working-class organization practicing a politics of reform unionism. Later, the Loeb Rule, the changing social composition of the teaching force, and the
successful redesign of administrative arrangements within public education stopped this process of working-class formation dead in its tracks. In effect, the CTF appears to have been both a product and a victim of processes of class formation.

Finally, the victory of centralization is closely related to the transformation of public education into a labor market institution. Because the CTF and organized labor opposed not only the Harper Bill but also the Cooley Bill, not merely the imposition of a corporate model of educational administration and the formal control of public education by businessmen but the stratification of the curriculum under the aegis of social efficiency, opposition to the CTF and support for centralization came to be closely connected, in terms of ideology and personnel, with the drive to vocationalize and differentiate public education. In short, centralization consolidated business control of the board of education, transformed the administration of the school system along corporate lines, and advanced the transformation of public education into an adjunct of the market economy. In the last analysis, the defeat of the CTF symbolized the triumph of one form of social organization over another: the imposition of hierarchical social relations and centralized, corporate, and bureaucratic structures of control on a public institution against the wishes of a radical reformationist movement protesting the subordination of public education to the imperious demands of the market and advocating nothing more revolutionary than democracy in education and an education for democracy.
Notes

185. *City Club Bulletin*, October 6, 1924, iii.
191. “Excerpts From Reports of Representatives of the South End Public School Association on Visits to Junior High Schools in Chicago,” May 2, 1927, Victor Olander Files, box 10, Chicago Historical Association.
192. Ibid.
193. Ibid., May 6, 1927.
194. Ibid., May 9, 1927; May 13, 1927.
195. Ibid., February 20, 1928 (box 16).

Chapter Five: Centralization and the Transformation of Public Education

2. The Harper Report covered twenty main topics: the organization of the board of education; the business management of the board; the system of school supervision; the examination, appointment, and promotion of teachers; the elementary schools; the high schools; the normal school; special studies; resident commissioners; textbooks; the evening schools and free lecture system; vacation schools and school playgrounds; ungraded rooms and schools; the compulsory attendance law and parental school; teacher compulsory attendance law and parental school; teachers’ institute and library; school faculties and councils; the school census; school accommodations; teaching citizenship; and school buildings and architecture. The quotes are from p. 14.
3. Nicholas Murray Butler, for instance, praised the Harper Report as “at once the most complete and most illuminating document on the organization and administration of the school system of a large American city that has ever been published. It may be commended to students of educational administration at home and abroad as representative of the broadest knowledge, the highest skill, and the wisest experience that America has to contribute to the discussion and understanding of this important subject” (*Educational Review* 17 [March 1899]: 261–86).
4. David Tyack argues that “the administrative progressives” represented one wing of “progressivism” in education that “constituted a political-educational movement with an elitist philosophy and constituency. They tried to transfer control of urban education to a centralized board and expert superintendent under a corporate model of governance.” Tyack also argues that the administrative progressives also took the lead in “differentiating the structure and fulfilling the goals of social efficiency and social control,” and concludes that “they were primarily
concerned with organizational behavior and the linkage of school and external control, with aggregate goals rather than individual development" (D. Tyack, *The One Best System* [Cambridge, Mass., 1974], 196). In general, our argument is similar although not identical to Tyack's. In particular, we do not include "social control" among the objectives of the "administrative progressives," we argue that the objectives of the administrative progressives were successfully implemented through the combined efforts of a coalition of businessmen and "administrative progressives," we emphasize the links between administrative progressivism in education and administrative progressivism generally as a key component of political progressivism discussed in chapter 1, and we do not believe that the administrative structure the administrative progressives imposed was modeled entirely on corporate industry. The conflict between the board and the CTF has been analyzed in several works: Reid, "The Professionalization of Public School Teachers"; M. Murphy, "From Artisan to Semi-Professional: White Collar Unionism Among Chicago Public School Teachers, 1870–1930" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Davis, 1981); S. Diner, *A City and Its Universities: Public Policy in Chicago, 1892–1919* (Chapel Hill, 1980), ch. 5; C. W. Collins, "Schoolmen, Schoolma'ams, and School Boards: The Struggle for Power in Urban School Systems in the Progressive Era" (Ed.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1976); M. Herrick, *The Chicago Schools* (Beverly Hills, 1979), ch. 5; J. Wrigley, *Class Politics and Public Schools: Chicago, 1900–1910* (New Brunswick, 1982), chs. 4, 5.

For details, see Herrick, *The Chicago Schools*, 96–97; Murphy, "From Artisan to Semi-Professional," ch. 1; Collins, "Schoolmen, Schooima'ams, and School Boards," 197–61. The papers of the CTF are held by the Chicago Historical Society.


7. *CTF Bulletin*, March 6, 1900; *Chicago Tribune*, February 19, 1899; M. Murphy, "Margaret A. Haley and the Chicago Teachers Federation, 1897–1917" (M.A. thesis, San Jose State University, 1974), 8.


16. Andrew Draper, "Common School Problems of Chicago," address delivered at a citizens meeting under the auspices of the Commission of One Hundred of the Civic Federation of Chicago, December 1, 1900, 30.

17. *Chicago Tribune*, May 20, 1900; June 10, 1900; June 20, 1900.


23. Cooley's antipull campaign received a wide press. Ten feature stories on "school shake-ups" were reported in 1903, four in 1904, and ten in 1905, and when Cooley was having greatest difficulty with the board in 1906, twenty-one such articles appeared in the *Tribune*. One board member openly accused Cooley of using the list (Chicago *Tribune*, January 1, 1905), and another accused Cooley of abusing "pull" by publishing names selectively and "intriguing to keep himself in power" (Chicago *Tribune*, April 11, 1905). The Tribune used the issue to portray teachers as corrupt boodlers in headlines such as "Teachers Want Pull" (Chicago Tribune, January 30, 1906). See also, Chicago Tribune, November 14, 1902; March 29, 1904; June 10, 1904; February 11, 1905; September 3, 1905; January 9, 1907.


28. Ibid.


31. Wayne Urban asserts that "the CTF lost ... an undetermined but large number of its total membership through resignations." We found no evidence to support the inference that a "large" fraction of the membership resigned. See Urban, *Why Teachers Organized* (Detroit, 1982), 82.


34. Chicago *Tribune*, August 23, 1904; J. Addams, *Twenty Years* (New York, 1910), 231; Murphy, "From Artisan to Semi-Professional," ch. 6; Reid, "Professionalization," 69–106. Dunne was elected on a reform ticket that emphasized municipal ownership and "democratization," much to the dismay of Clayton Mark.
and the board of education but to the delight of the CTF. During the mayoral campaign the CTF came under a barrage of criticism—particularly from the business community, Clayton Mark, and the Reverend Rufus White, a member of the board of education and the Civic Federation’s education committee—for its affiliation with the CFL and its involvement in political affairs. Reid, 100–104.

35. Addams, Twenty Years, 234.

36. Ibid., 331; Murphy, “From Artisan to Semi-Professional,” 122–29; Reid, “Professionalization,” 108, 111–12; A. Davis, American Heroine (New York, 1973), 132–34. The clash between Haley and Addams is quite revealing of the major differences between the two women. Addams viewed her role—as she did in most situations—to be that of arbitrator and compromiser, traditional roles for women, only transplanted into the social arena. Addams had a morbid fear of class consciousness and saw no need for it; Haley, on the other hand, did not shrink from calling a spade a spade. Of the two women, Haley seems much the stronger, incisive, and forceful. See Murphy, ch. 3; Chicago Tribune, June 21, 1906; and Collins, “Schoolmen, Schoolma’ams, and School Boards,” 295–96.


41. Chicago Tribune, October 10, 1906; Addams, Twenty Years, 337.

42. Chicago Merchants Club, Public Schools and Their Administration, 40; Chicago Chronicle, December 9, 1906.

43. Shortly after his election, Busse and his cabinet were wined and dined by seventy-five “representative” businessmen at the Atlantic Club. The Chicago Association of Commerce bulletin remarked that “it was a meeting auspicious of the new era now dawning in the civic history of the city. It was a conference of the new municipal authorities with the city’s business interests, and its effect upon a participant was inspirational. No partisan note was sounded to check the growing hope that it is possible to conduct the municipal business of Chicago as if it were a vast institution in trade or manufacture” (Chicago Association of Commerce Bulletin, April 26, 1907, 10). The new members of the board appointed by Busse were all businessmen or professionals: One was the president of a large corporation; one had been president of the board at the time the Tribune had been granted its infamous lease; one the head of a large firm of real estate operators; one a president of a big coal company; one a vice-president of a steel company. See Chicago Tribune, June 26, 1907; CTF Bulletin, June 25, 1907; G. S. Counts, School and Society in Chicago (New York, 1928), 248–49; Reid, “Professionalization,” 114.

44. Chicago Board of Education, Proceedings, July 3, 1907, 6, 30; Reid, “Professionalization,” 135.


46. E. F. Young, Isolation in the Schools (Chicago, 1901), 6–11.

48. McManis, Ella Flagg Young, 163; Donatelli, “Two Contributions,” 359–60; Smith, Ella Flagg Young, 214.

49. In 1912 Alfred Urion, president of the school board and corporation counsel for Armour and Company, requested Mrs. Young to persuade teachers to accept greater school board representation on the pension board. William Rothman, in particular, wished to gain appointment to the pension board. There can be little doubt that Urion and Rothman wished to use the pension board as a means of controlling the activities of the CTF or to use it as a source of investment funds. As Armour corporation counsel, Urion was, at the time, defending Armour against the tax suit brought against Armour (and nineteen other companies) by the CTF. Rothman's law partner was the president of the Board of Review, named in the tax suit for its failure to properly assess the corporations. Margaret Haley believed also that Rothman had kept all the interest from a police pension fund that he had formerly supervised. M. Haley, “Alderman Kennedy's Four Points,” Margaret A. Haley's Bulletin, October 21, 1915; Smith, Ella Flagg Young, 188; Wrigley, Class Politics and Public Schools, 133–36.

50. Smith, Ella Flagg Young, 187; Wrigley, Class Politics and Public Schools, 128.


52. Smith, Ella Flagg Young, 193.


56. Stenographic report of Jacob Loeb's testimony before the Baldwin Commission, Chicago Teachers Federation Collection, Chicago Historical Society.

57. Cited by B. Rinchart, “Mr. Gompers and the Teachers,” Changing Education 1, 7 (Summer 1966): 15. Speaking before the NEA in 1916, Loeb denounced the CTF's affiliation with organized labor as unethical and unprofessional and urged that businessmen with their commitment to economy and efficiency be placed in charge of school systems. See J. Loeb, “The Businessman and the Public Service,” NEA, Addresses and Proceedings (1916): 344. Freeland Stecker, a Chicago high school teacher, elected the first secretary of the American Federation of Teachers in 1916, believed the Loeb Rule was aimed at the CTF “not merely because it was the oldest of the teachers unions and had more members, but because it had full-time officials, and intricate political connections.” The CTF, moreover, “became the vanguard of the backyard rebellion against the centralization of authority at a time when Chicago was very much in the national educational spotlight. At the turn of the century, Chicago seemed to be the political...
national laboratory of school affairs, or so, at least it was frequently expressed. However, the effort to regiment the Chicago schools for the benefit of spectator city school systems was not an entire success. For example, the Chicago Teachers' Federation had become a militant organization, reflecting the spirit of the Irish who were predominant among elementary teachers, and evolving the best leadership the school world had known. Catharine Goggin and Margaret Haley, with an able staff, had turned many a trick, proved themselves the equals of City Hall and Board of Education politicians and had won the support of thousands of teachers, and a growing admiration throughout the land (Stecker, "The First Ten Years of the American Federation of Teachers" [1946], Arthur Elder Collection, Archives of Labor History, Wayne State University; Murphy, "Battleground," 121).


9. Letters of protest to the governor of Illinois signed by Fitzpatrick and Noccles of the CFL, Walker and Olander of the ISFL, and Flood of the AFL. See CTF, minutes of meeting of September 5, 1915; and the minutes of the meeting of October 17, 1915. Many individual unions also adopted resolutions condemning the Loeb Rule; for details, see Wrigley, Class Politics and Public Schools, 132.


63. Reid, "Professionalization," 175-86.

64. Carl Scholz (president of the PSL) to Harry Judson, November 20, 1916, President’s Papers, Special Collections, University of Chicago Library.

65. The Buck Bill was the outcome of an investigation by the city council's committee on schools, fire, police, and Civil Service in 1916. The investigation—suggested by Haley to Buck—called on a large number of "educational experts" including William Maxwell, Leonard Ayres, Charles Judd, and Frank Spaulding, who advocated "efficiency" and administrative professionalization. They were not sympathetic to "democracy in schools," but they did support tenure for teachers, the primary goals of the CTF in those beleaguered days.


Notes


71. For the history of these events, see Reid, “Professionalization,” 193–200; and Herrick, *The Chicago Schools*, 137–43.


78. CFL, *Federation News*, June 12, 1926.


83. See W. Waller, *The Sociology of Teaching* (New York, 1932). My formulation differs slightly from Waller’s: Waller believed that school bureaucracies were primarily dommative because of the need to contain student-staff conflict and to mediate local community demands upon teachers. The Chicago example suggests that concern over labor productivity and the need to prevent coalitions rather than isolating teachers from political pressures was more salient. See also R. Edwards, *Contested Terrain: The Transformation of Work in Twentieth Century*
NOTES


Cherry Collins has, in a suggestive application of Amitai Etzioni’s typology of organizational affiliations, pointed out that the administrative progressives “wanted the relationship between superintendent and the school board to rest on normative-moral considerations only (that is, those appropriate to professionals) but wanted the relationship of superintendent and grade teacher to be remunerative—calculative (associated with strictly material considerations in employer-employee relationships). The . . . teachers, on the other hand, wanted the whole system to operate by normative-moral compliance” (“Schoolmen, Schoolmen’s and School Boards,” 285). She recognizes, however, that Etzioni’s typology fails to appreciate the fact that professional aspirations were not limited to an official acknowledgement of the authenticity of the professional organizational position, but also included a demand for autonomy—based on their scientific training—and power. Moreover, Etzioni’s typology does not provide an account of the mechanism of change in the structure of decision-making within the organization. Collins recognizes this also and uses Cyert and March’s coalition theory of organizational decision-making to fill in the lacuna. While their model heads in the right direction, more useful are the accounts provided by Heydebrand, Benson, Gintis, and Edwards.

84. R. E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency: A Study of the Social Forces That Have Shaped the Administration of the Public Schools (Chicago, 1962), ch. 3.

85. The distinction between control and coordination is drawn from Edwards, Contested Terrain, 16-22. It is also central to the argument of Wolf Heydebrand’s “Organizational Contradictions,” and J. K. Benson’s “Organization: A Dialectical View,” Administrative Science Quarterly, March 22, 1977, 1-21. The genesis of the distinction, however, rests ultimately in the long theoretical attack upon the Weberian model of bureaucracy, a history described by C. Perrow in his Complex Organizations (Glenview, Ill., 1972).

86. In only the most brazen example, the board leased property on the corner of Dearborn and Madison to the Chicago Tribune for thirty thousand dollars a year, about half of its actual leasing value, and then rented back some office space to the board for thirty-one thousand dollars! The president of the board of education, a member of the committee on school fund property, was at the time the Tribune’s general attorney. For the history of the board’s continuing fiscal crisis, see Herrick, Two Chicago Schools, 75-79, 99-106, and Murphy, “Taxation and Social Conflict,” 232-60.

87. The most useful study of the endeavor to create a science of educational administration is Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency, ch. 8. At the University of Chicago, for example, the number of courses offered in educational administration increased from two in 1915 to fifteen in 1917 (Callahan, 199). A nationally prominent educator at the University of Chicago, Charles Judd, was anything but shy in advocating meritocratic expertise as the preeminent form of social authority. Judd wanted to generate “a movement to abolish school boards” in order to ensure “the simplification of government” and “reliance upon experts” (L. Cremin, The Transformation of the School [New York, 1961], 138-39). An
excellent theoretical analysis of the importance of an adequate cognitive base for professionalization is outlined by M. S. Larson in *Rise of Professionalism* (Berkeley, 1977).

88. On the "collective mobility" aspect of professionalization, see Larson, *Rise of Professionalism*, pt. 2. Edwin Cooley is a case in point. Cooley's national reputation as an administrator was built on the foundation (Margaret Haley considered it to be built on the backs of Chicago's teachers) of the merit "promotional" scheme. Within two years of announcing the scheme, Cooley had been made head of the NEA's prestigious department of superintendents; in 1905 he was admitted to the National Council of Education, and finally, in 1907, he became president of the NEA. Despite the misleading thrust of the point, Robert Wiebe's suggestion that the "heart of progressivism was the ambition of the new middle class to fulfill its destiny by bureaucratic means" is not without its relevance (R. Wiebe, *The Search For Order* [New York, 1967], 166).


90. Haley, "Why Teachers Should Organize," 146; M. Haley to Stella Crothers, September 10, 1905, in Murphy, "Battleground," 104.


94. The motto, interestingly enough, of the AFT was "Democracy in Education: Education for Democracy." Its largest local was Local No. 1, the Chicago Teachers Federation. Reid, "Professionalization, 246–55; Collins, "Schoolmen, Schoolma'ams, and School Boards," 266–73.


96. Wayne Urban, for example, describes the CTF in these terms and argues that the pursuit of such political objectives as women's suffrage and affiliation with organized labor were "part of their pursuit of economic benefits" (Urban, *Why Teachers Organized*, 68). Neither of these claims, we think, are supportable. Two oversights explain Urban's difficulties: a failure to examine the history of the CTF in the context of the political battles over centralization, and a failure to approach the history of the CTF from the perspective of class formation. Urban's study fails to advance beyond the conceptual limits and theoretical conclusions of the Commons school of labor history.

97. Both Reid, and his mentor, Robert Wiebe, explain the behavior of the CTF as an expression of the process of professionalization. Reid, "Professionalization," ch. 7; Wiebe, *The Search for Order*, 120.

98. The original table for this information appears in Marjorie Murphy,
“From Artisan to Semi-Professional,” 106. This is a study of Chicago public school teachers and clerical workers in 1880 and 1900. Each teacher and clerk, of which there were 1,275 and 709 respectively, had a record of socioeconomic background collected from the 1880 and 1900 United States census using a cluster sample of six of sixteen reels for 1880 and ten of fifty-two reels for 1900. A cross-tabulation of clerks and teachers by the occupational rank of fathers (using S. Thernstrom’s model) for 1880 produced a table with five degrees of freedom; Cramers $V = .24$; Contingency Coefficient $= .23$ with a total of 229 cases in 1880; for 1900, there were five degrees of freedom with Cramers $V = .34$; Contingency Coefficient $= .32$.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

2. In a review of the historiography of the Progressive Era, Rodgers concluded that “those who called themselves progressives did not share a common creed or a string of common values” but that they did possess “an ability to draw on three distinct clusters of ideas—the distinct social languages—to articulate their discontents and their social visions”: the rhetoric of antimonopolism, the language of social bonding, and the language of social efficiency. “Together,” he suggests, “they formed not an ideology but the surroundings of available rhetoric and ideas—akin to the surrounding structures of politics and power—within which progressives launched their crusades, recruited their partisans, and did their work” (D. P. Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism,” in *The Promise of American History: Progress and Prospects*, ed. S. I. Kutler and S. N. Katz [Baltimore, 1982], 123).