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1991

### State-Level Radicalism

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#### Recommended Citation

Richard M. Valelly. (1991). "State-Level Radicalism". *Political Parties And Elections In The United States: An Encyclopedia*. Volume 2, 1045-1047.

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include women's suffrage in the Fourteenth Amendment. After the Republicans successfully opposed this maneuver, she and her coworker, Susan B. Anthony, turned to the 1867 Kansas campaign to convince them of its popularity. The Republicans continued to oppose women's suffrage, instead supporting Black male suffrage. This encouraged Stanton and Anthony to appeal to Democrats and enlist the aid of the Copperhead, George F. Train. His white supremacist arguments on behalf of women's suffrage further angered reformers. The defeat of both referenda ended any lingering attempts to link women's suffrage with suffrage for African-Americans.

Stanton petitioned, campaigned, and published the *Revolution* on behalf of the cause. She and Anthony attempted an alliance with the National Labor Union in 1868. They not only encountered the opposition and hostility of working men but also were unable to convince working women that the vote would improve their economic status. While the effort exposed Stanton to the needs of workers, its failure encouraged her to rely on white middle-class women.

Stanton's split with the reformers was completed when she and Anthony unsuccessfully demanded that the Republican-supported Fifteenth Amendment include women. They opposed the amendment as written and challenged the credentials of the Republicans as the party of reform. Stanton concluded that suffrage could only be successful as an autonomous movement of women. To that end, she helped to create, and became president of, the National Woman Suffrage Association in 1869. Opponents formed the American Woman Suffrage Association. When, at her urging, Senator Aaron A. Sargent of California introduced a women's suffrage amendment in 1878, she testified on its behalf in congressional hearings. She also tried to test the constitutionality of the local laws by trying unsuccessfully to vote on several occasions.

Unlike Anthony, Stanton believed the movement should ally as a strong independent force with other political groups supporting radical change. In the early 1890s, she was enthusiastic about the Populists and by the end of the decade, she was expressing sympathy for the growing Socialist movement.

While Stanton continued to work for the vote, she considered it a vital part of a much larger program of women's emancipation, including an end to economic discrimination and

more liberal divorce and property laws. Her writings and speeches became a staple of feminist thinking, and she urged women to challenge and question any limitation whether imposed by tradition, church, or state.

After relinquishing the presidency of the newly united National American Woman Suffrage Association in 1892, she devoted her last years to a critical analysis of organized religion.

*See also:* Abolition Movement, Susan B. Anthony, Copperheads, Fifteenth Amendment, National American Woman Suffrage Association, Suffrage, Woman Suffrage Movement

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#### State-Level Radicalism

A type of party politics that appeared in several state jurisdictions outside the Northeast and the South, state-level radicalism flourished between 1916 and 1941. Its politicians proved capable of mounting statewide campaigns, of electing members of Congress, and of electing governors. Because it was a politics of coalition and of economic protest, it sought to join farmers, workers, and small businessmen behind policy ideas that prescribed government action to reduce market hazards for these three categories of producers. The 1920s and 1930s saw several examples of this type of party politics, including quite successful organizations, like the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party (1918-1944), and brief, "movement" organizations, such as End Poverty in California (1934).

America's experience with state-level radicalism was not unique. Relatively "new" nations with federal systems, former colonies of England, with large agricultural economic sectors as well as industrialized sectors have had analogous experiences. "Province-level radicalism" emerged in Canada; out of it grew the New Democratic Party. The development of Australia's party system developed in a similar way.

State-level radicalism was stronger, more common, and more significant for national and state-level public policy in America than most earlier literature on American party politics has suggested. When the "national realignment" perspective on American party politics grew up in the 1950s, mainly in response to the New Deal's impact on American politics, it deflected attention from state-level radicalism by emphasizing the periodic diffusion of balanced, two-party competition throughout American jurisdictions as a central tendency in American party politics. But implicit in the national realignment perspective was the idea that American party politics has often been typologically diverse and, at the electoral level, behaviorally diverse. Implicit in any theory of central tendencies is an emphasis on diversity. In this vein of appreciating diversity as well as central tendency in American party and electoral politics, observers have been reconsidering state-level radicalism: its emergence, its policy impact, and the logic of its disappearance as a type of party politics.

Among the more important conditions for the emergence of state-level radicalism was the greater political decentralization of America before the New Deal. Between 1916 and 1926, state-level radicalism was diffused from North Dakota, where the Nonpartisan League was born, through north central, northwestern, and southwestern states. But by 1926 the first wave in the diffusion of state-level radicalism had left only one self-sustaining organization, the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party.

State-level radicalism made some difference to national agendas and national policymaking during the 1920s, helping to set the stage for Robert La Follette, Sr.'s 1924 presidential campaign and playing a significant role in the organization of La Follette's campaign itself. La Follette's performance in 1924, in turn, played a role in stimulating a reform of agricultural policy in the late 1920s (i.e., the adoption of a surplus purchase policy), and in a reform of industrial relations (i.e., the Railway Labor Act of 1926).

At the state level, the influence during the 1920s of "contagion from the left," to use Maurice Duverger's term, was strong in some states, notably North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota. In these three states, at any rate, "contagion from the left" led to banking, electoral law, and tax reform, and to more regulation of labor markets and public utilities.

The unusually strong revival of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party in the 1930s contributed

to the establishment of the Wisconsin Progressive Party. The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and the Wisconsin Progressive Party were very activist during their periods of dominance. They changed labor law and systems of collective bargaining in the two states; they moved to make the tax systems of these two states more progressive and to increase the incidence of corporate taxation; they acted, relatedly, to lighten the tax load on farmers and urban homeowners; they sought to insulate small business and country bankers from competition with larger organizations; and they sought to slow the rate of mortgage foreclosure on farms.

At the national level, the Farmer-Labor and Progressive delegations in Congress had some influence on the formulation of foreign policy, farm policy, unemployment insurance policy, youth employment policy, and old age insurance policy. Also, between 1934 and 1938 these delegations pursued a strategy of building a national third party by staking out positions to the left of the New Deal.

But the most important national policy legacy of state-level radicalism during the 1930s resulted from litigation. Through successful defense of the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act before the Supreme Court, the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party was able to achieve lasting legitimacy for presidential and gubernatorial efforts on behalf of redistributive welfare measures.

Yet by helping to legitimate the general thrust of New Deal policies the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party's leaders only strengthened the kinds of political structures that eventually constrained them and their counterparts in Wisconsin. Successful implementation of New Deal policies changed the interest group politics of rural and industrial society. The Agricultural Adjustment Act strengthened a conservative organization, the Farm Bureau. The Wagner Act helped to deepen the split between the American Federation of Labor and the Committee for Industrial Organization. These changes made it much harder for Farmer-Labor and Progressive politicians to keep their coalitions together. As the public became more aware of interventionist, macroeconomic management, possibilities for periodic discontent with a new welfare state grew. Sharp dissatisfaction emerged during the Roosevelt Recession of 1937. By 1938 Farmer-Labor and Progressive organizations were badly weakened, never fully to recover. Eventually both organizations disappeared in the 1940s.

The development of the national political economy in the 1930s destroyed once prospering state-level organizations.

See also: AFL-CIO COPE, Robert La Follette, Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party, Nonpartisan League, Wisconsin Progressive Party

Richard M. Valelly

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## State Party Committees

The formal structure of contemporary American state party organizations was fixed with the rise of the convention system of nominating Presidents in 1832. With some variations among the states, the caucus, committee, and convention structure is intact 150 years later. European scholars grudgingly acknowledged the advanced standing of American party organization in the nineteenth century, making reference to the party machines that operated under the guise of the traditional structures. Led by a new breed of party managers, the parties preceded business corporations and government agencies in achieving hierarchical ordering of constituent units, in fielding disciplined cadres of workers in large numbers, and in acquiring and employing large resources toward organizational goals.

Although the old forms persisted, an accretion of circumstances—including the Australian ballot, the primary, and New Deal intrusions on party functions—had sapped the strength of the party machines by the 1950s. New means of communication and transport, the introduction of new skills and ways of organizing and servicing campaigns, and the movement of interest groups and nonparty candidate-support groups into campaign roles changed the relations of candidates and parties. This erosion of old ways and intrusion of new forces, especially when accompanied by shifts in voter attitudes toward political parties, led to a period of scholarly uncertainty of the consequences. This uncertainty gave way to a widespread perception of party decline.

Some of the signs also showed that the changes in process might not have an entirely negative impact. Party organizations at the state level were the source of financial support for the national parties, and this structure suggested at least some organized capacity for replenishment of resources by the state parties. Hesitant

signs of incubating bureaucracy were present in the institution of paid professional leadership in some parties. And competitiveness, often linked by scholars to strengthening of party organization, was increasing.

One deterrent to recognition that the parties might be entering a new stage of organization building was the shift of research focus from institutional studies of politics to survey research on the attitudes and behaviors of the presidential electorate. With the neglect of systematic cross-sectional observation of party organizations and the availability of national-level survey data over time, scholars and journalists increasingly accepted survey data on the partisanship of the electorate as indicators of the state of parties, including party organization. Conventional wisdom that parties as organizations were increasingly inactive and irrelevant lessened the sense of need or of interest to study party organizations, and theories of electoral politics developed in the decades prior to the 1990s, omitted party organization.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s some political scientists discerned signs of a stronger organizational infrastructure at the state party level than were generally acknowledged. This insight led scholars to devise measures to permit assessment of state party organizations. Lack of resources and of relevant data sets put a premium on improvisation and somewhat limited the usefulness of the resulting composite measures. In 1976 Huckshorn's seminal study of state party chairs confirmed these impressions and, more importantly, the feasibility of collecting systematic cross-sectional data to cast light on the condition of the party organizations. State party organizations had been rediscovered. Subsequent investigation confirmed that the fate of the political machine did not predict the future for party organizations, which, since the 1950s, have increased in organizational and programmatic strength and become more effectively articulated into national networks of constituent units.

## Origins, Persistence, and Change

State party committees developed within a decade of creation of the convention system for nominating Presidents. In his study of party formation in the 24 states admitted to the Union by 1824, Richard McCormick concludes that by 1836 every state but South Carolina either had a two-party system or the "basic outlines . . . had been delineated." By the election of 1840 Whig