Review Of "The Ethics of Romanticism" By L. S. Lockridge

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of some of Marx's themes. Pruzan may be right that Marx's refusal to detail his vision of communism makes his partisanship less persuasive.

The book contains virtually no discussion of literature beyond the mid-1970s. It is unattractively and inexpensively produced. It is long winded, repetitive, poorly written, and not carefully argued. P. G.

Ware, Robert, and Nielsen, Kai, eds. Analyzing Marxism: New Essays on Analytical Marxism.

This collection of nineteen original papers is divided into sections on "analytical Marxism," methodology and microfoundations, exploitation, and historical materialism and ideology. The editors caution that these divisions are arbitrary, and there is considerable overlap not just between sections but between papers. "Dialectical" as well as "analytical" approaches are represented (McCarney making out the best case for the former). As one would expect, the papers vary in quality. Most of the themes pursued during the flowering of serious philosophical interest in Marx in recent years are discussed. Van Parijs also takes up the neglected notion of abundance and defends the contemporary relevance of a suitably modified definition. The section on exploitation displays the most unity, centering on changes in Roemer's position and including a paper from him, expressing misgivings about the superiority of his "property relations" over an "unequal exchange" definition. For the rest, Schmitt and Ripstein usefully challenge the rational choice theory conception of rationality, Little and Cunningham raise awkward questions about the motivational efficacy of class identifications, and Reiman critiques the tendency to displace Marxist categories with those of distributive justice. The collection is a useful addition to the belated, sober examination of Marx's rich and complex thought. K. G.

Lockridge, Laurence S. The Ethics of Romanticism.

Lockridge traces the "ethical play of mind" (p. 2) of the major Romantic writers: Coleridge, Blake, Wordsworth, DeQuincey, Shelley, Hazlitt, Keats, and Byron. In reaction to secularization, each writer tends toward ideal utilitarianism and intense value pluralism. Seeing in themselves both the sympathetic imagination of the British tradition and the productive-cognitive imagination of the German idealist tradition, these writers regard understanding of value as simultaneously reinforcing individuality and social solidarity. "The oppositional character of European moral schools is inscribed internally in Romantic moral psychology" (p. 462). The resulting "richness in the sense of the good . . . problematizes action . . . [and] makes problematic a philosophy of right" (p. 147). But this is not a defect; rather, it is "illuminative . . . of the inadequacies of rigidly exclusivist theories to contain complex ethical vision" (p. 147).
Lockridge's readings of the Romantic writers are assured and accessible to nonspecialists in Romantic literature. It is perhaps not clear that all Romantic ambivalences are as compelling as Lockridge's admirable even-handedness in treating them suggests; the visions of Wordsworth and Coleridge have more to recommend them than those of the others. Moral philosophers ought to think more about the potential one-sidednesses of their theories of value and about the complex mental processes through which anyone might endlessly articulate a full ethical vision. Here the Romantics are a valuable object lesson. The Ethics of Romanticism makes this point with clarity, grace, force, and accuracy. R. E.


These essays, first presented at the Seventh Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, December 1986), reflect increasing awareness of the complexity of Kant's practical philosophy and growing dissatisfaction with the old habit of looking at the ethical writings for answers to utilitarianism. The opening essays on "fundamentals" explore metaphysical and anthropological dimensions of rational agency: "intelligible character" (Allison), dualism of standpoint but not ontology (Korsgaard), the meaning of ethical "form" (Rotenstreich), the various contexts of discussing agency in the Groundwork (O'Neill), and the will's supersensuous capacity (Gilead). The systematic framework of "criticism" encompassing moral philosophy is the focus in discussions of Kant's theoretical "practicism" (Prauss), the unity of Kant's system (Posy), and the interests of reason (Yovel). A section on the philosophy of law (Höffe), war (Philonenko), and history (Sakabe), and one on the contemporary uses or abuses of Kant in Rawls's constructivism (Heyd), communicative ethics (Ophir), and liberal individualism (Seidler), complete the volume. With its unusual breadth of subjects and scholarship, Yovel's collection is a substantial contribution to the appreciation of the full range and intent of Kant's practical philosophy. R. V.


The merits of this collection far outweigh whatever defects I might point out in any particular essay. This is because each of these essays is devoted to dealing with Hobbes's political philosophy in relation to very eminent practical concerns in human experience, such as war and peace. As such, these essays are an effort, as the editor, Peter Caws, suggests, to try to make philosophy relevant to politics, using the political philosophy of Hobbes as a means of demonstrating what I would call the intimate connection between "philosophy" and "politics" that we find in Hobbes's political writings.

This volume is a welcome antidote to conventional scholarly treatments of Hobbes that often seek to isolate Hobbes from any "practical" concerns, for each essay explores the kinds of practical lessons we learn about war and peace from Hobbes's treatment of these matters. Hobbesian political philosophy thus becomes