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Review Articles

SECURING AUTHORITY:

The View from the Top

By RAYMOND F. HOPKINS*

Warren F. Ilchman and Norman T. Uphoff, *The Political Economy of Change*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969, 316 pp. \$8.50.

Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority*. Chicago, Markham Publishing Co., 1970, 174 pp. \$6.95.

W. Howard Wriggins, *The Ruler's Imperative*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1969, 275 pp. \$10.00.

ALTHOUGH the literature on political development has been remarkably insightful, hopes for a science of "nation-building" have not been realized. While numerous works have described the effects of traditional patterns, ethnic and linguistic cleavages, and rapid mobilization, and have investigated factors such as culture, bureaucracy, ideology, and parties, we have learned very little about how to alter favorably the political conditions these have fostered.¹ Political scientists, more often than not, have documented obstacles to, and failures in, political change desired by leaders in new states, rather than explored strategies whereby such change might be realized.

The three books under review here move toward filling this gap. In a manner reminiscent of Machiavelli, they focus upon strategies of leadership for maintaining or building authority.² Political scientists, argue Ilchman and Uphoff, have developed macro-theories useful for explanations and descriptions, but not suited for policy evaluation. They propose an approach that treats government policies as independent variables which can be assessed as to the productivity of their conse-

* I am grateful to Ruth Collier, Harry Harding, Donald Rothchild, and Kenneth Prewitt who read and commented upon an earlier draft of this article, and to the International Development Research Center at Indiana University who supported my research and study in 1971.

¹ See, for instance, Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton 1960); Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge 1966, rev. ed.); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton 1965); David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965); and Dankwart Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington 1967), as well as numerous country studies.

² Both Ilchman/Uphoff and Wriggins note the similarity of their analytical posture to that of Machiavelli.

quences. In a similar but more homely fashion, Wriggins' approach is to explore the policy perspective of the president or prime minister, as he puts it, by looking "out his window to see his problems as he sees them" (p. 5); Leites and Wolf focus more narrowly on the contest for supremacy between an established authority and a rebellious group. All three raise the question of how authority is built. As Wriggins states the case, this is the fundamental task, the imperative for a ruler. Each examines constraints and pressures under which established leaders may find themselves, and then analyzes and evaluates the effectiveness of alternative strategies of resource allocation.

I. A MODEL OF EXECUTIVE STRATEGY

Although Ilchman's and Uphoff's *The Political Economy of Change* is the most ambitious and comprehensive of the works, all three have a number of the characteristics of a general model of executive strategy in common. I shall elaborate this composite model briefly, discuss some problems it raises for analysis, and then explore the role of legitimacy and support for establishing authority.

Ilchman and Uphoff present a conceptual framework for political analysis based on an extended analogy from economics. In presenting their model, the authors use terms drawn from macroeconomic theory, such as investment, productivity, interest, sector, and inflation. "Political economy" involves exchanges between a regime and its sectors that determine the increase or decrease in political resources available to a regime and its populace over time. Following the analogy from economics, then, a regime may accumulate resources by saving or investing them, and may secure needed resources, such as taxes, from business, labor, and other "sectors," in exchange for regime resources such as authority, status, or the abstention from coercion. The focus on the economics of authority and upon "choice" leads to considerations of the costs and benefits of a particular strategy. The authors claim that policies derived from their analytical framework will prove more useful than those derived from studies cast within the framework of political culture or socialization, since the latter frequently are unable to forecast the costs and benefits in the various decisions facing "statesmen."

Wriggins' *The Ruler's Imperative*, in contrast to the Ilchman/Uphoff volume, is written in a readable and jargon-free style useful for introductory courses. Wriggins lists eight strategies for "aggregating power" commonly used by a ruler "to rally support for himself so that he can stay in power long enough and with sufficient capability . . . [to] get things done" (p. 5). These range from the appeal of personality to the

strengthening of a party. Such strategies used by leaders in "emerging Africa and Asia" are delimited partly by the weak authority and fragmented social systems of these societies. Wriggins' discussion of this political context and the goals of the leadership in new states is a succinct summary of conventional wisdom. He describes a variety of "social or organizational groups" including the bureaucracy, land owners, and trade unions, whose support or opposition may be critical for the success of a leader, but he ignores class conflicts and the inter-generational transfer of wealth that may act as constraints on political action.

His eight strategies are described in terms of their costs and benefits, but only in the most general fashion. Relationships of one strategy to another are glossed over, and the strategies lack the qualities of a typology such as mutual exclusiveness or exhaustiveness. As a result, in his concluding chapter on strategic mixes, Wriggins can do little more than list some of the assets and liabilities of each strategy. His propositions about their employment have the unfalsifiable quality of an astrologer's advice. For instance, he states that a leader will project his personality because doing so is easy, ambiguous (and therefore capable of wide appeal), and expected (for African and Asian states are charisma-hungry). On the other hand, Wriggins states that a wise leader will not over-use this strategy; it can be risky, since the emotions it evokes are volatile and the diminution of its returns set in fairly rapidly.

The study of rebellion and authority by Leites and Wolf focuses upon the strategies used to maintain or challenge authority. In pursuing their goal to move "the discussion of insurgent conflict toward the level that has been attained in the better discussions of nuclear conflict" (p. v) they attempt to increase their rigor and precision by using the vocabulary of economic analysis. They advocate a "systems" approach that examines the supply and demand of inputs needed by authorities and rebellions, in preference to the conventional "hearts and minds" theory of insurgency which holds that insurgents have their principal basis of support in the affections of the populace.

Leites and Wolf illustrate rather than test their propositions by using examples drawn largely from third-world conflicts such as those in Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the Middle East. Their main point is that rebellions are not dependent upon popular support, but rather upon securing the resources, both internally and from abroad, that are needed to maintain and expand their operations. A small leadership cadre with adequate resources can, even if it is unpopular and few share its ideology, expand its extractive capability and secure compliance. Caught in a struggle for control of the authority structure, the

populace may be more motivated by profit-maximization or by damage-limiting goals than by abstract loyalty.

The model of executive authority that can be extracted from these books contains categories of variables that are roughly equivalent: rulers (or the executive), ruled, resources, and goals. Table 1 summarizes these. Executives pursue goals, the primary one being the maintenance of authority, by investing and spending resources in various combinations of strategies including the buying or coercing of support. Leites and Wolf do not disaggregate variables to the extent the others do because their focus is narrower. Ilchman and Uphoff distinguish another category of variables, "political infrastructure," which includes parties, elections bureaucracy, and information systems. Since the others discuss these phenomena as strategies, this distinction may be unnecessary.³

Within this general framework a variety of partial analyses can be undertaken, including the struggle between an authority and a rebellious group, such as that discussed throughout by Leites and Wolf (and by Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 44-45). In competing for power, exchanges between a sector (or a coalition of sectors) and those in authority often attempt to destroy each other's resources rather than to increase them. However, the same general cost/benefit frame of analysis can be used for investigating these non-productive cases.

What benefits can we expect to derive from the analytical posture of the approaches outlined in the three books, and what costs might be entailed? Some benefits seem clear—notably the role that their common emphasis upon executive leadership can play in making more productive and satisfying political choices. By evaluating the consequences of various strategies and tactics with respect to values, resources, and relevant groups, more efficient ways to achieve goals might be charted and insights might be obtained into the problem of establishing authority, as viewed from the top.⁴

In using this approach, however, one encounters certain limitations, difficult choices, and ambiguities that need to be considered in weighing its merits. I shall not comment on all of these, but rather shall focus on six of them: (1) the conservative nature of the ruler's viewpoint, (2)

³ Moreover, infrastructure for them is only an analytical distinction from that of resources; consequently, conceptual overlaps and confusion are possible. "The fact that the line between resource and infrastructure cannot always be discerned should not cause undue concern, since the distinction is ultimately an analytical one" (p. 73). Some of the items they label infrastructure might be considered part of the regime, e.g., legislatures and police; others might be included among sectors, e.g., political parties; still others might be counted as resources, e.g., ideology.

⁴ Leites and Wolf, for instance, have numerous suggestions about how authorities might more effectively counter insurgencies.

TABLE I⁵

	<i>Ilchman/Uphoff</i>	<i>Wriggins</i>	<i>Leites/Wolf</i>
Rulers	Regime	Leader	Authority
Ruled	Sectors feudal land owners middle peasantry money lenders landless laborers teachers regionalists merchants military civil servants, etc. Anti-statesmen	Groups bureaucracy military traditional attachments landowners students/intel- lectuals businessmen trade unions media elite	Population in rebellion regular populace
Resources	Goods and Services Status Information Force Legitimacy Authority	None listed explicitly, though a variety are mentioned in discussing strategies, e.g., jobs, police, skilled personnel, social recognition, etc.	People Food Material Information Efficiency leadership discipline
Goals	Stay in power: present and future Cope with and induce social and economic change Build up political infrastructure	Legitimacy Independence National unity Social transformation Economic development Association in wider political body	Maintain and harden authority Counter rebellions Strengthen productive capacity

the question of short- versus long-term analyses, (3) the types of resources, (4) the question of disaggregation, (5) internal and external exchanges, and (6) confusion between costs and ethics.

Taking the viewpoint of those in authority has an inherent conservative bias since their *sine qua non* is preservation of their position of

⁵ Categories of ruled are discussed in Ilchman and Uphoff, p. 40, and Wriggins, pp. 60-88; resources are described in Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 58-91, and Leites and Wolf, pp. 32-42.

power. This need not be deplored, but it should be recognized. Any policy-oriented inquiry probably must begin with this assumption as a constraint in assessing alternatives. The result is that more "radical" social analyses and emphases on change are less likely to emerge, while law and order will usually be considered an important value. Leadership strategies tend to be regime-building rather than nation-building. Thus, in exchanges with the populace, a high priority is placed on consequences for the regime rather than for the society. Although in many instances these may not conflict, some policies drawn up with the clear purpose of strengthening the coalition that most strongly supports the government may create social discontent by fostering a bourgeoisie that is loyal but is disliked by the populace, or by antagonizing groups outside the core coalition. (Menderes did this to the previously favored urban and modern sector of the population in Turkey when he adopted policies popular among peasants.)

Wriggins is less self-conscious about, and less conscious of, this regime bias than the others, perhaps because he has more explicitly assumed the perspective of the political leader. The other authors deny that a bias exists in their analysis. Ilchman and Uphoff assert that their study is as relevant "to the choices made by revolutionaries as it is to those made by authorities" (p. 29), and Leites and Wolf maintain that they have tried to consider both the viewpoints of rebellion and of authority. But both admit that their presentations may not be balanced. Leites and Wolf, for example, state "sometimes the posture of the authority and, specifically, of U.S. policy in relation to authority, is adopted more completely than perfect balance would warrant" (p. vii). Any apparent preference for established authority is attributed to the exigencies of presentation rather than inherent bias.⁶ Yet in spite of these explicit assertions, the tone and emphasis of the authors' analyses make it difficult to accept their statement. Ilchman and Uphoff label a group seeking to gain authority as "the anti-statesmen"—not a particularly neutral term. Furthermore, they make no distinction between those in authority roles and the role structure itself. Thus the anti-statesman, whether competing in an election or a revolution, is a pure antagonist of authority (p. 186), and possibilities for a change of personnel are presented in a harsh and overdrawn fashion. Lyndon Johnson, among others, has been accused of equating attacks upon himself with attacks upon the Presidency; surely this confusion should not be encouraged in a sophisticated framework for analysis. That it is, is due to Ilchman's

⁶ Ilchman and Uphoff assert that their "restricted focus on the statesman's choices has been a matter of exposition rather than a matter of ethics" (p. 282).

and Uphoff's simplifying assumption that all authority belongs to the regime, their treatment of a regime as monolithic rather than as composed of factions or disaggregate entities such as a legislature or contentious groups within a cabinet, and their equation of regime structure with individual role occupants (an equation that Wriggins also usually makes).

Similarly, Leites and Wolf focus on the rebellious tactics of violence and coercion rather than on the strategies of Gandhi, Lenin, or Nyerere who effectively used a withdrawal of legitimacy. When a change requires structural alterations first, those in authority frequently oppose it, although it may be desirable from some other perspectives. Moreover, their equation of campus rebellions with those in Vietnam and elsewhere, and their emphasis on rebel tactics of lawlessness and terror make the reader feel that Leites and Wolf have little sympathy with rebels, in spite of their profession of equal empathy. Even where leaders are consciously attempting to bring about structural transformation, as in China and Tanzania, the goals of maintaining power and social redefinition may conflict, although in such cases maintaining authority may be a requisite for serious change.

The second major consideration that emerges from these analyses is the trade-off between long-term and short-term strategies. In spite of Keynes' well-known dictum about the long run, the arguments for pursuing short-term rather than long-term policies are not fully convincing. As we begin to recognize that the effects of political and social policies may accumulate relatively unnoticed until they suddenly become visible upon crossing a threshold, or that lags may occur in the effects of any policy so that short-term positive outcomes may eventually be outweighed by long-term losses, the need to consider both short- and long-term effects becomes clear.

Wriggins counsels against strategies that have rapidly diminishing returns after a short period; but Ilchman/Uphoff and Leites/Wolf explicitly favor short-term policies. The strategies a leader may pursue are frequently interchangeable and, as Wriggins argues, the shorter his time-perspective and the more focused his goal toward simply staying in power, the more indifferent he will probably be toward the strategies he uses; any of them will help secure this short-term, albeit fundamental, goal. However, in the case of leaders who have long-run purposes, strategies must be examined more critically, and the costs and benefits weighed more carefully, with respect to their consequences over a number of years.

Ilchman and Uphoff take the opposite view, arguing that a short-

term perspective is more realistic, less risky, and likely to yield quicker returns (pp. 260-272). Probably Leites and Wolf emphasize short-term strategies because of their focus on conflict situations where long-term considerations are frequently irrelevant. In situations where legitimacy is weak initially, such a short time perspective may be appropriate. But the manipulative tactics that are encouraged by such a perspective tend to depreciate in effectiveness. The popularity of leaders who enjoy the privileges of a former, foreign elite can dissipate quickly; those intimidated by threats of coercion may find that their tolerance for violence increases over time, so that their compliance can be secured only by increasing demonstrations of repressive force. Thus, coercion and the appeal of a popular or charismatic personality tend to have short-run benefits, but they have dangerous potentials for the long run. On the other hand, building a party can bolster authority over longer periods—even through successive changes in the legitimizing ideology of the political system.⁷

A third feature of the model which raises questions for analysis is the nature of resources. Some resources are said to be relatively constant, so that competition over their allocation resembles a zero-sum game. Status, power, and information all are considered to decline in value if they are widely shared (Wriggins, p. 29; Ilchman/Uphoff, pp. 60-70, 100, 178). This interpretation emphasizes the distributive rather than the productive quality of resources and the resultant intense competition. Other resources, in contrast, such as goods or services, are seen as expandable rather than "relational." But is it empirically true that one can gain status or authority only at the expense of another? I think not. "Relational resources" may be increased by expanding the number of positions of status or authority, by enlarging their scope, or by increasing their value (which frequently results when wider participation expands demand). Although the norms in various societies can more or less keep resources constant, only a narrow definition fostered by a zero-sum mentality requires certain resources to be merely "relational."⁸

Another question concerning resources is what should be included as a resource. Wriggins, for instance, emphasizes the importance of individuals as a factor in developing strategies and managing resources. He states that "to generalize without close appraisal of the personal

⁷ See Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York 1970), especially Moore's essay, 48-60.

⁸ For example, Jack Potter and others, eds., *Peasant Society* (Boston 1967), especially the essay by George Foster on the notion of the "Limited Good," which describes how economic goods are treated as a zero-sum resource in some societies, 300-323.

characteristics of specific leaders invites easy error" (p. 12). The value hierarchies of "statesmen" are considered important by Ilchman and Uphoff in determining "rational" strategies, and Leites and Wolf note the value that insurgencies derive from the frequent austerity of their leadership and from its ability to use calculated and discriminating violence, but neither recommend analyzing the differences that individuals can make upon strategies that are being pursued. From a macro-perspective the impact of an individual personality may not be large enough to warrant its inclusion in the analysis. Nevertheless, it seems likely that in situations where precedents are lacking, not only the preferences of a leader or set of leaders will be important in shaping policy, but also their individual skills. Ilchman and Uphoff write, "a statesman (or anti-statesman) does not win conflicts over authority and policy solely on the basis of his resource position. His skill at resource management counts as well" (p. 161). Personal skills of leaders, whether those of a Hitler-like propagandist or an intelligent social analyst, might also be counted as resources within the model.

The number and complexity of disaggregations is the fourth problem in a model of executive strategy. Since reality is complex, a large number of distinctions can be made. But the more distinctions one includes in the model, the more difficult it is to measure and relate the resulting variables. Leites and Wolf make few distinctions, separating out as actors only a populace caught between the two extreme competitors of authority and rebellion. Although a number of sub-populations having different responses could be distinguished, these disaggregations are not necessary for their purposes.

On the other hand, Wriggins, and especially Ilchman and Uphoff, propose a multitude of distinctions and variables. Since Wriggins' presentation is less formal, aimed primarily at description, a good bit of underbrush must be cleared away before his work can be used with quantitative data. Ilchman and Uphoff's heavily theoretical presentation is complicated by their elaborate disaggregations. "Currencies" such as support and allegiance are distinguished from resources, sectors are overlapping and extensive in number, and similar processes are given different labels. For instance, mobilizing a sector—that is, increasing its awareness, importance, and influence—and building an infrastructure may be analyzed in identical terms. As a result, their verbal distinctions far exceed their capacity to measure or test. We are told that the absence of empirical data and measures is due largely to their desire to publish a manageable theoretical book (see pp. 74, 273), and that empirical work that would operationalize their model, and measure its variables,

is under way and will soon be forthcoming. However, until such operationalized tests of their model prove me wrong, I suspect that many of their variables may be too disaggregated, too complex, and too ambiguous to be measured. As a result, we have more a verbal paradigm than a model. If Ilchman and Uphoff had attempted to build a formal model, as is done, for instance, in computer simulations, I am sure their complex distinctions would have been abandoned in favor of fewer, more critical disaggregations. In such a model it is important to keep disaggregations at a minimum, choosing a strategy that maximizes the explanatory capacity of a manageable number of variables. It is possible to represent a number of complex relationships and to evaluate the implications of various policies in a fairly simple twelve-equation model of politics and economics, as the work of Brunner and Brewer has shown.⁹ In constructing a model, critical simplifications help organize complexity more usefully than adding refinements and disaggregations. Perhaps the general framework and the complex verbal components of *The Political Economy of Change* can serve best to clarify choices in building models, especially those that explore a single policy area or set of exchanges.

The relation between internal and external transactions is the fifth important point raised in these volumes. Leites and Wolf stress the important role that "exogenous" inputs such as foreign support and supplies play in a rebellion. Wriggins cites foreign policy as one major strategy tool for leaders. However, he warns of the disadvantages of foreign inputs. "Resources from abroad . . . may subject the regime to accusations of failing to protect national integrity and independence" (p. 257). Ilchman and Uphoff include "external governments" as "sectors" and agree with Wriggins that these may donate resources, including legitimacy, to a regime (p. 47; Wriggins p. 228).

Although they recognize the importance of foreign inputs, all three books ignore serious and, among third-world states, highly salient questions of foreign transfers, namely imperialism and neo-colonialism. In a number of third-world states, conservative oligarchies are assisted in retaining power by external transactions with both governmental and non-governmental agencies, while foreign corporations maintain control over large areas of economic decision-making. Such control can be pervasive and difficult to avoid.¹⁰

⁹ See Ronald D. Brunner and Garry D. Brewer, *Organized Complexity: Empirical Theories of Political Development* (New York 1971).

¹⁰ Even in a "radical" state such as Tanzania, the price and sales of one of its important export items, pyrethrum, are determined by one firm in London. The Tanganyika Extract Company (TECO) limits output, yet controls all purchases. In 1968,

A model focusing on political leadership could clarify and pinpoint many of the fuzzy areas in theories about imperialism in its many forms, and provide a useful framework for gathering data to test these theories. However, a study that documented the exchanges between a regime and foreign agencies, no matter how valuable a guide to policy it might be, would be encouraged by few governments. Since data for such a study would be difficult to amass without the encouragement and cooperation of policy-makers, such an inquiry is unlikely.

This observation relates to the last question concerning the analytical model that the authors have in common, namely the role of ethics and choice in policy analysis. Some policy inquiries may require a costing of strategies that would result in serious deprivations for some groups currently rewarded by authority. Most "statesmen" are not receptive to policy inquiries that run counter to their own predispositions or involve severe deprivations for a group within their coalition. What role can a social scientist play in a regime whose goals and values foreclose consideration of certain relevant policy alternatives, or whose values would be deplored by most social scientists?

This question of ethics in policy choices is the final problem to which Ilchman and Uphoff address themselves. If we assume that alternatives should be weighed on a cost/benefit basis, how are alternative strategies to be evaluated? For what benefits is one willing to use massive violence to pursue a successful rebellion, or a counter-insurgency operation? To what end could Leites and Wolf justify building the intelligence systems they describe, which resemble those used by South Africa and Nazi Germany, to monitor and crush opposition? Whose values does one use in determining the "cost" of various alternatives?

Aside from the underlying goal of maintaining authority, two of the books ignore the relationship between strategy and substantive goals. Wiggins fails to relate his eight strategies or tactics to his list of goals. Leites and Wolf simply exclude goals other than survival, except to note the extra burden such responsibilities can impose on authorities. Ilchman and Uphoff, on the other hand, tackle the problem theoretically, claiming that with their model "it should be possible to impute the costs and consequences of policy choices, *after* which ethical and intelligent judgments could then be made" (pp. 282-83, italics added). An intelligent analysis of consequences, they argue, improves ethical considerations by clarifying costs and benefits of choices. Such a posi-

as a result, the local market value of pyrethrum flowers declined by 45 per cent. I am indebted to Idrian Resnick, economist in the Tanzanian Ministry of Development Planning, for pointing this out.

tion ignores the fact that the operation of calculating costs and benefits involves basic normative or ethical considerations. One cannot postpone these until after cost has been determined, since normative assumptions are made in constructing measures for pricing and predicting consequences of policies. Realizing this, we could begin to add some of the classical political values—such as equality, freedom, and justice, which are notably absent from the analysis in all three volumes—to the measures of exchange in the model.¹¹

II. LEGITIMACY, SUPPORT, AND AUTHORITY

Perhaps the central element underlying the permanent establishment of authority is legitimacy. Political legitimacy refers to the degree to which the exercise of political authority, by individuals through a set of institutions, is regarded as right or appropriate.¹² What clearly distinguishes authority from coercion and force on the one hand, and “leadership” on the other, is legitimacy.¹³

All three volumes recognize the importance of legitimacy, although only Ilchman and Uphoff explicitly discuss it at length. According to Wriggins, legitimacy is the first goal sought by new leaders who, “having legitimacy . . . are assured of their authority” (p. 39). A principal concern of Leites’ and Wolf’s study is “how to maintain and strengthen” authority, which they define as the “legal and legitimized right and capacity to command” (p. 4).

In rapidly changing societies, especially ones with new regimes, legitimacy is frequently weak or eroded. On this point all three books agree. As a result, authority tends to be vulnerable. On the other hand, a large portion of the population is usually politically distant from the central regime, and, compared to states which have completed social mobilization,¹⁴ fewer exchanges occur between center and periphery. For a regime’s “legitimacy must be acknowledged not just by citizens, but, more importantly, also by those who control other valued re-

¹¹ These concerns need not be excluded from the rigorous analysis imposed by the discipline of “political economy.” See, for instance, the article by Thomas Gale Moore, “An Economic Analysis of the Concept of Freedom,” *Journal of Political Economy*, LXXVII (July/August 1969), 532-42. Curiously, articles from this journal are nowhere cited by Ilchman and Uphoff.

¹² For a discussion of legitimacy, see Dolf Sternberger, “Legitimacy” in David Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, IX (New York 1968), 244-48; and David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York 1965), 348-72.

¹³ Robert L. Peabody, “Authority,” *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, I (fn. 12), 473-76.

¹⁴ This term is used by Karl Deutsch to describe the effects of literacy, urbanization, industrialization, and other aspects of modernity upon society. See K. W. Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” *American Political Science Review*, LV (September 1961), 493-514.

sources.”¹⁵ Thus, the legitimation of authority is critical in the mobilized sector of a society, while the residual or more traditional sector remains apart and largely passive, accepting the “modern” government for whatever traditional symbols it retains and simply because it is there.¹⁶

Legitimacy is an attribute ascribed by individuals and groups to the governing process in which they live.¹⁷ Moreover, it is a continuous rather than a dichotomous variable, fluctuating over time. It is composed of hundreds of evaluations made by individuals and groups regarding the actions of the authority structure, both past and future. Principles held by individuals concerning the policies, personnel, and procedures that are right or appropriate for a regime may be based on a mixture of influences, such as religion or precedent, that are seldom explicit, consistent, or easily articulated. Such principles can check a regime’s prerogatives and limit the alternatives it can pursue since, if a regime wishes to retain legitimacy, its policies and procedures must be largely in accord with the normative expectations of the populace.

To be sure, legitimacy is difficult to measure. Ilchman and Uphoff suggest it might be measured as the amount of compliance and support that a regime enjoys after the effects of coercion and other inducements have been accounted for. Similarly, Fred Riggs notes that “we find people—citizens, bureaucrats, and others—who show a willingness to follow instructions . . . [when neither immediate reward, coercion, expertise, or solidarity] motives are present. This willingness involves legitimacy.”¹⁸ Operational tests to calibrate this residual willingness to comply would require enormous skill and imagination, since legitimacy and compliance may be only weakly related, especially when the sanctions commanded by a regime to enforce its rule are numerous and effective. Moreover, a focus on compliance behavior as a manifest consequence of legitimacy directs our attention away from the phenomenon of legitimacy itself, and muddles the concept. Essentially, the political legitimacy of a regime is found and best measured in the attitudes of a population toward its regime. Compliance behavior and attitudes of support should be treated as distinct, although interdependent, variables.¹⁹

¹⁵ Peabody (fn. 13).

¹⁶ See Fred Riggs, “Administration and a Changing World Environment,” *Public Administration Review*, xxviii (July 1968) on this point.

¹⁷ This is similar to the categorization used by Richard M. Merelman, “Learning and Legitimacy,” *American Political Science Review*, lx (September 1966), 548-61.

¹⁸ Riggs (fn. 16).

¹⁹ In the last decade dozens of articles and books have repeatedly referred to legitimacy. In most cases, however, no careful analysis for clarifying the concept was

Legitimacy is a nettlesome concept, and it is easy to disagree over how it relates to other aspects of the political process. Nevertheless, two propositions about legitimacy that are advanced by Ilchman and Uphoff seem erroneous and should not be allowed to pass. First, the authors assert that "it is possible, at least in theory, that occupants of authority roles could have no legitimacy whatsoever. With enough other resources, compliance with public policies might still be secured" (p. 81). But with no legitimacy, it would seem to be an error in semantics to say that a regime had authority. Authority is legitimized power according to many standard definitions (including that of Leites and Wolf), and occupants of authority roles in a regime (or in a business, trade union, or church, for that matter) would have to have at least some legitimacy.²⁰

The second assertion by Ilchman and Uphoff that seems questionable is that support freely given may "be freely withdrawn," while support that is coerced or bought may be more stable (p. 79). This is reminiscent of Machiavelli's dictum that between fear and love as the basis for a prince's rule, fear is the more reliable. However, support that is based on legitimacy is freely given and is more stable than coerced or bought support, which is likely to disappear wherever the regime is short on inducements. Such support, engendered by legitimacy, is less readily affected, since legitimacy is based on slowly changing norms and accumulated evaluations.

Similarly, Leites and Wolf argue that supply (resources) is more important than demand (popularity) in establishing authority. "The progress made by each side in the conflict influences the affiliations of most of the population as much as or more than it is influenced by those affiliations" (p. 151). But substitution of other resources for legitimacy can lead to a dangerous deflationary spiral that prompts insurrection. As Eric Nordlinger suggests, "once governments rely upon force, they tend to overreact to demands with the application of excessive force; the value of organizations with force at their disposal (the army and the police) is heightened; there is consequently a further loss of legiti-

presented, and an empirical investigation of the phenomenon was rarer still. For instance, a most extensive research effort by David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy* (New York 1969) focused only on the acquisition of attitudes of "diffuse support" (Easton's definition of legitimacy) by children, and used few if any questions which relate directly to "the general idea of legitimacy," namely, the ethical acceptability of government (see p. 414).

²⁰ When legitimacy is quite low, authority becomes naked power, whereas when other resources vanish, authority is merely formal, not effective. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven 1950), 135-41.

macy; and finally the population itself turns to violence. . . ."²¹ While some regimes with low legitimacy may retain authority by using a great deal of coercion, few (perhaps Haiti) have survived over a long period without using other strategies. On the other hand, regimes with high legitimacy can generate support freely given, without a *quid pro quo* (see Ilchman and Uphoff, p. 74).

The position of legitimacy within the exchanges between a regime and the populace is outlined in Figure 1. The downward arrows indicate the regime's outputs that serve as objects for response and evaluation, and the upward arrows illustrate "flows" of legitimacy, compliance, and support. Legitimacy may be accorded to the personnel, policies, or procedures of a regime. While a particular government action might initially contravene expectations, so that a large part of the

FIGURE 1. LEGITIMACY PROCESS: MACRO LEVEL

²¹ Eric A. Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change," *World Politics*, xx (April 1968), 508.

population would feel that it was wrong, it might be accepted as legitimate, provided most other actions were seen as rightful. An overflow from these other legitimate acts could legitimize the action, possibly altering norms. If the government is generally trusted to do what is right, a few questionable actions may not affect overall legitimacy.²²

Figure 1 illustrates how the populace evaluates the effects of a regime's activity: through the appeal of its personnel, the costs and benefits of its policies, and the justice of its procedures. It may calculate "rationally" that it is to its advantage to comply with and support the regime, entering into what Ilchman and Uphoff refer to as "mutually beneficial exchanges." The effect upon support would be fairly immediate. But this calculation is essentially separate from the legitimation process, and is shown only because legitimacy affects similar variables, namely compliance and support. The legitimacy exchange illustrated involves a greater lag in response, as the government's actions affect the level of legitimacy.

Changes in principles or ideas about what is rightful for government are shown (hypothesized) to be based on the *interaction* of two variables. One is the degree of satisfaction with the policies of a regime; the other, a conglomerate and exogenous factor, is one's store of values based on experience in daily social, economic, and cultural activities. Social mobilization tends to alter this latter variable, creating new values and ideas about political participation and rights and the range of personal needs for which government is responsible. Changes in these two variables (and expanded demands on government may reduce policy satisfaction, although policies are unchanged) affect the evaluation process by eroding old ideas of what are just procedures on the part of leaders, and reinforcing those that conform to current values. The impact of mobilization and modernization upon values has altered the normative structure of societies, slowly eroding transcendental justifications of authority. Nevertheless, because legitimacy generally changes rather slowly, it can dampen the effects that fluctuations in performance may have upon support.

Four strategies for increasing legitimacy, and consequently support, are mentioned in the books under discussion: pursuit of satisfactory policies, possession of effective power, responsive action, and the shaping of normative structure. Ilchman and Uphoff state, "to acquire and

²² See William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill. 1968), 45-54, whose concept of "generalized trust" parallels that of Easton's idea of "diffuse support" and may be related to legitimacy. A government is more likely to be seen as legitimate when one trusts that it will do what it should do, and there is a high probability of preferred outcomes being achieved.

maintain legitimacy the statesman or anti-statesman must confer benefits. . . . Sectors will not grant legitimacy to the regime unless the regime in turn in some way enhances their well-being" (p. 74). The provision of desired benefits is similar to the strategy for building legitimacy suggested by Seymour Lipset. He states, "prolonged effectiveness over a number of generations may give legitimacy to a political system. In the modern world, such effectiveness means primarily constant economic development."²³ Another form of effectiveness considered more by Hobbes than by Lipset is the ability to maintain compliance through the judicious application of force. Force, rather than positive incentives, is usually considered an inefficient way to maintain a regime and hence is generally associated with regimes that lack legitimacy. However, the ability to deal out negative reinforcements to individuals who fail to comply with the regulations of the regime may also be an important source of effectiveness.

The second strategy by which a regime may gain legitimacy is by having the support of powerful sectors of society. This strategy is *apparently* the one Wriggins would recommend. Although he lists legitimacy as the first goal of leaders, he ignores legitimacy in his concluding section which relates strategy to goals. However, he does conclude that without building an "aggregation of power," "governance is impossible" (p. 263); Wriggins only briefly elaborates on this central concept, suggesting that aggregation entails acquiring the support of "individuals and groups who have power over still others" (p. 8). Since all of his eight strategies are supposed to help in aggregating power, their success presumably should aid in creating legitimacy.

Arthur Stinchcombe has suggested that "a power is legitimate to the degree that, by virtue of the doctrines and norms by which it is justified, the power-holder can call upon sufficient other centers of power, as reserves in case of need, to make his power effective."²⁴ From this Richard Flacks concludes that we may "predict that individuals will tend to perceive the action of an authority as legitimate if that action has or is likely to have the support of other centers."²⁵ An individual also might accept a regime as legitimate on principle even when he did not like or trust it, if he felt most others accepted it as legitimate. Evidence of failure of officials in the regime or in other key institutions to support national authority would be a clear sign of eroding legiti-

²³ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y. 1960), 70.

²⁴ Arthur Stinchcombe, *Constructing Social Theories* (New York 1968), 162, cited in Richard Flacks, "Protest or Conform: Some Social Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy," *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, v, No. 2 (1969), 134.

²⁵ Richard Flacks, *ibid.*

macy. Conversely, if the populace perceived that key sectors accord legitimacy to a regime and make themselves available to help implement its policies, their "demonstration effect" should maintain legitimacy even when public opinion shifts against current office holders.

A third strategy for increasing legitimacy is responsiveness to expectations of right and justice. In more traditional society, rules grounded in religious doctrine could check a ruler's power and insure that his conformity to procedures and policies was responsive to the fairly limited and static needs and expectations of the populace. In modern society, various legitimizing principles have evolved to replace traditional ones. These doctrines usually aim at insuring responsiveness of regimes and avoiding tyranny. They nearly always include some notion of popular sovereignty and, frequently, means of protecting minorities.²⁶ Delegation of authority, limitation of power, and access to and participation in the decision-making process are perhaps the basic ways to insure a regime's responsiveness (Ilchman and Uphoff, on pp. 201-02, mention delegation of authority). This access, participation, and incorporation of individuals or groups in the regime may insure the desired responsiveness to their needs and values. Elections, legislatures, and local government are common devices to increase responsiveness. Since these devices tend to check "arbitrary" (illegitimate) power, a regime can promote its legitimacy by adhering to them. Greater access for individuals and groups to the decision-making process, through these popular mechanisms, is likely to increase negative (corrective) feedback in the system. Those with a cybernetic view of politics might argue that structures for participation help solve communications and control problems; thus, the political doctrines and myths of representation have been imbued with sanctity *because* of their efficacy.

Responsiveness may often take the form of symbolic output: a regime that is ineffective in providing improved living standards or in accumulating force to insure the compliance of subjects may nevertheless legitimize itself through words rather than deeds. Such a regime, by symbolic outputs responsive to the sentiments, expectations, and identities of the population, may elevate national self-images and secure support and legitimacy from the population even though, for example, living standards may be falling.

The fourth strategy for increasing legitimacy aims at shaping a society's normative structure through manipulation of political doctrines and formulae. Since the ideology of a populace, in the broad sense of the

²⁶ The Federalist Papers are a classic illustration of the history of the formulation of such doctrines.

term used by Robert Lane,²⁷ contains the norms that determine what is considered legitimate, strategies to alter the ideological beliefs of a populace are needed in order to change the range of the legitimate use of power by authorities. Such strategies might involve using various agencies, such as the educational system, the press, or a political party to communicate new ideology which justifies changes in the "political formula" or myths that define accepted practices for a regime.²⁸ The introduction of new ideological components, either *sui generis* or by adoption from abroad, is a strategy frequently used in developing states to change the content of legitimacy norms (see Wriggins, pp. 129-44 and Ilchman/Uphoff, pp. 239-41). Such forms of "legitimacy investments" involve manipulating the normative structure (Ilchman and Uphoff, p. 201). For instance, Donald Rothchild suggests that in Kenya the regime might "move to the left" in order to increase its legitimacy through the popularity which leftist egalitarian doctrines could generate.²⁹

If the anticipated *consequences* on legitimacy were included when alternative strategies are weighed, better, more realistic policy assessments would result. The effects of legitimacy are quite tangible, but they often are long-term and overlooked. The Vietnam war, for instance, may have affected legitimacy within the United States, perhaps with consequences for several decades, owing to its special impact on people at impressionable ages—much as the depression of the 1930's had lasting effects on an earlier generation. Greater attention to legitimization processes could bring such consequences more clearly into focus.

By assessing a regime's *level* of legitimacy, priorities among policy alternatives can be more easily determined. If a regime is in dangerously short supply of legitimacy, it may wish to concentrate on actions to bolster its position; if it has a large stock, it may wish to expend some of it on policies that will be unpopular in the short run but are likely to yield high long-run dividends. Where legitimacy is low, manipulation of support is higher and the conditions for challenging a regime's authority are improved. Wolf suggests that the probability of insurgency seems to increase with economic development "over a considerable range" (p. 51). This apparent relationship may result through the effects of legitimacy as an intervening variable. Since economic change tends to create frustrations and weaken normative order, it is likely

²⁷ See Robert Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York 1960).

²⁸ See Lasswell and Kaplan (fn. 20), 126-34.

²⁹ This might also be a responsiveness strategy. See Donald Rothchild, "Kenya's Africanization Program: Priorities of Development and Equity," *American Political Science Review*, LXIV (September 1970), 753.

to reduce legitimacy. If so, its effect upon legitimacy may be one of the reasons why economic change appears to create political unrest and increase the chances of insurgency.

III. POLICY STUDIES OF THE FUTURE

The merits and faults of these works suggest several recommendations for future policy-oriented empirical studies. First, the more analytical frameworks are relevant for the study of *any* political system, from the university to the modern nation state, the more useful they are likely to be. Wriggins' framework, especially, lacks the benefit of such universal applicability. As his purpose was to discuss politics in the African-Asian context, this may be an unfair criticism. However, a study of executive leadership in these environments need not be divorced from a study of executive leadership in general. A study of authority maintenance in "more developed" states should be as valuable an exercise as such a study in a "less developed" one, and the categories of analysis should be similar. Ilchman's and Uphoff's analysis, for instance, could have drawn more heavily on examples from developed states, particularly the United States, for which more data may exist that are relevant to the variables they wish to measure. Economists have, after all, had much more success in building models and predicting effects of policies in the more developed economies.

Second, studies that apply the model of executive strategy might usefully focus on the *important areas* that executives control. Instances of imperialism (neo-colonialism) and corruption in third-world states should be susceptible to analysis since these practices, however defined, include, or rest upon, the actions of leaders themselves. Among industrialized states, studies of political leadership and "political investment" strategies should be especially valuable since the resources controlled by leaders in these states are so great. In such studies, we can more readily move from a focus on political development that conceals our political preferences and confines the concepts we use, to a focus on political change.³⁰

A third feature of future policy studies should be an emphasis upon *measuring* the processes of change. Within the general approach suggested by these books, measures of system performance are needed in addition to the more specific measures discussed, such as percentage

³⁰ Samuel P. Huntington makes a strong argument for shifting our attention from viewing the political process in terms of "development" to examining politics in terms of "change" in his essay, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," *Comparative Politics*, III (April 1971), 283-322.

of voter turnout. For instance, could we calculate, over time, the total effects of a regime's policies on net national power (perhaps the average value of resources that maintain authority)? Such measurements could be one of the most critical new areas for imaginative research and inquiry in the social sciences. Focusing on the macro-effects of an executive strategy would require a technique for calculating equivalences between different kinds of resources. Ilchman and Uphoff describe such conversion rates between resources, but are unable to suggest how they might be calculated. However, if such measures were designed, we might be able to examine the gross and net effects of a particular policy on national resources.

We need empirical applications devoid of unnecessary concepts and theorizing. Ilchman and Uphoff state that "the more encompassing an explanation is, the less testable, the less varifiable, and the less certain it is as a causal explanation, and thus the weaker it is as a basis for prediction and choice" (p. 261). Unfortunately, the analytical frameworks discussed tend to be so encompassing that manageable research using selected variables from them will be difficult. Albert Hirschman has argued that there are hindrances to understanding that accompany a premature paradigm and high level of generalization. If paradigms or even extended economic analogies are used without caution, they may inhibit the flow of insights and understanding of specific contextual events, and result in mindless theorizing.³¹

Finally, ethical considerations can and should play an important role in the policy sciences. Otherwise, the view from the top tends to be a bloodless one, dominated by cold calculations of costs and benefits in a market place of competing interest groups, classes, or sectors, with one authority acting more in order to preserve itself than to deliver political goods such as liberty, security, welfare, or justice.³² One can accept the need for and value of policy research without agreeing with Ilchman's and Uphoff's efficiency criteria of political man. They believe that wise statesmen are "political," maximizing efficiency in pursuing "collective ends" (p. 282); but the economy of a leader's choice is *not* independent of the ends pursued. Both those whose ends are "collected" and the content of these ends can affect the efficiency criterion.

Economists, for good or ill, have become regular advisors on domestic

³¹ Some of the diagrams in Leites and Wolf and the distinctions made by Ilchman and Uphoff occasionally leave this impression. For the critique of "mindless theorizing" see Albert O. Hirschman, "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding," *World Politics*, xxii (April 1970), 329-43.

³² See J. Roland Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods," *World Politics*, xviii (April 1966), 415-34.

policy, while political scientists are seldom consulted.³³ There is a definite position that could be filled by policy scientists devoted to questions of political strategy, if political scientists can develop the capacities to play such a role.³⁴ As economically developed societies seem to give greater attention to questions of value, ethical concerns will increasingly be considered an important part of policy analysis. Future "political economists" need not abandon the humanist's concern or relegate it to the last stage of analysis in developing the quantitative rigor and the focus on policy choice that a model of executive strategy will require.

³³ In the United States, for instance, there is no functional equivalent to the National Council of Economic Advisors for political policy, at least not one staffed by professional political scientists. Those who serve as advisors in the U.S. or abroad are nearly always specialists in comparative politics and political development who are asked to advise on policies of foreign and military strategy, or specialists in public administration and law who are consulted on problems in bureaucratic and agency performance. One reason for this situation is that until recently there has been little scholarship devoted to planning and policy among professional political scientists.

³⁴ James (Samuel) Coleman, at an International Political Science Roundtable on Quantitative Methods, in Mannheim, Germany, July 5-10, 1971, suggested that the impending important dispute in political science was likely to be between "political economists"—that is, a group who seek greater rigor in theoretical models and quantitative techniques—and those "behavioralists" who are satisfied with established data analysis and descriptive statistical approaches.