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### Review Of "Faith And Knowledge In Early Buddhism: An Analysis Of The Contextual Structures Of An Arahant-Formula In The Majjhima-Nikaya" By J. T. Ergardt

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people" (p. 214). Recent studies testify to the continuing vitality of Hinduism and some temple communities elsewhere in India. Jindel's book, with its richly documented details, invites comparisons with studies elsewhere and points to possible regional differences in religious change.

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**Faith and Knowledge in Early Buddhism: An Analysis of the Contextual Structures of an Arahant-Formula in the Majjhima-Nikāya.** BY JAN T. ERGARDT. Leiden: E.J. Brill (Studies in the History of Religions [Supplements to *Numen*] XXXVII), 1977. xii, 182 pp. Bibliography, Index. D.Gld. 48.00.

The avowed purpose of Jan T. Ergardt's study of faith and knowledge in early Buddhism is to relate these two concepts to one of the Arahant formulas (denoted as formula A) found in the 152 Suttas of the *Majjhima Nikāya*. The most frequently found and evenly distributed of four such formulas is as follows: "Destroyed is birth, brought to a close is the Brahma-faring, done is what was to be done, there is no more of being such or such." (*khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyam, kataṃ karamāyaṃ, nāparamitthattāya*). It is expanded in a formula, denoted as *eA*, by the sentence "In one who is released, there is/was the knowledge that he is released" (*vimuttasim vimuttam iti nānam hoti/abosi*).

Operating on the sound premise that a Sutta was intended to be heard or understood in toto, the author proposes to investigate the place of faith and knowledge in the salvific process through a structural analysis of thirty-five Suttas in which formulas A and *eA* are used. He hopes to demonstrate that such an analysis will show that final emancipation is a cognitive experience, that freedom (*vimutti*) and knowledge (*nāna*) presuppose one another, that the underlying hypothesis behind the salvific process or the attainment of arahant-ship is the *anattā* concept, and that *anattā* and *nirvāna* must be fundamentally congruent concepts. Few students of Theravāda or early Buddhist thought would argue with these points; however, Ergardt's study leading to these conclusions has some noteworthy flaws. Before analyzing them, however, the author's methodology deserves further description.

Ergardt begins with an analysis of the quotation verbs of the Arahant formula—*paṭjanāmi, paṭjanāma, paṭjanati, abbaññāsim, abbaññāsi*—to make the point that knowledge of the Arahant formula is experiential and built on a distinct juncture in a person's life. He then organizes his analysis according to those Suttas where the formula is the starting point; where it is closely connected with *parinibbāyat*; where the focus is on the relationship between the formula and the Arahant-state; on formula *eA* after various introductory phrases, e.g., "seeing thus"; and the same formula after a discussion of various *kamma*-experiences, and after the stipulation of certain preconditions, e.g., a Tathāgatha arising in the world.

The author's analysis of each Sutta is, in fact, much like a summary outline in terms of which he draws certain conclusions from the particular contexts surrounding the Arahant formula. For example, in the three Suttas where formula A is the starting point, the structure or outline is: formula A, instruction and teaching *dhamma*, knowing and seeing for oneself, release. The connecting thread Ergardt finds through these common structures is the "verifiability of all knowledge through one's personal experience" (p. 23). Although such Sutta outlines serve to structure

various aspects of the interrelationship between process/path and goal, or on a more philosophic level, between knowledge and reality, it is debatable whether this method provides us with new insight into the soteriology and epistemology of early Buddhist thought. In particular, if the author's task was to unpack the relationship between faith and knowledge in the salvific process in early Buddhism, it seems that the focus on the Arahant formula is too narrowly conceived. Such a concentration makes the relationship between faith and knowledge secondary at best.

A further question might profitably be raised about structural analyses of Sutta materials. While the systematic unfolding of the development of Sutta is important, there may also be a deeper grammar, different structural and/or symbolic levels of meaning that should also be unpacked. Here our studies will benefit from the insights of literary and philosophical hermeneutics. It is precisely at this point that this reviewer finds some confusion in Ergardt's interpretation of *anattā*. At times he states that this key concept is a predisposition verified in meditation, whereas elsewhere he takes an annihilationist view that *anattā* means the extinction of the life processes of the Arahant (p. 157).

Lack of clarity appears on other fronts, in some instances stemming from very awkward sentences, e.g., "If someone claims to have perfect knowledge, and if someone claims that he knows the status of an Arahant, but does not really know it, the Buddha sees it as his duty to teach *dhamma*, and this teaching is further described" (p. 13). Of more serious consequence is the confusion over the relationship between experience, knowledge, and verbal statements, signs or concepts. It is unclear whether Ergardt thinks that *statements* are experienced and, hence, verified, or whether a claim like the Arahant formula is a verbal expression of knowledge gained through personal experience. This distinction is not clearly made and maintained. Finally, while I applaud Ergardt's position that we should study Sutta texts in toto because that is how they were heard and learned, one of his major reasons for this position seems rather odd: namely, that because the Suttas he investigated were addressed to an educated elite, we should expect there to be a correlation between the description of the religious goal and the concept of personality. In my opinion, normative rather than contextual questions are at issue here.

Jan T. Ergardt's book does provide a helpful view of the structure of the salvific process in the *Majjhima Nikāya*, and the relationship of the Arahant formula to it. His determination to analyze whole texts is a noble one, even though this reviewer believes that the method was not adequately exploited and that there are some noteworthy unresolved confusions in the book.

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**The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969–1971.** BY HERBERT FELDMAN.  
London: Oxford University Press, 1975. xi, 210 pp. Appendixes, Index.  
\$14.50.

This book, covering the three most turbulent years of Pakistan's political history, is a part of a trilogy by the author. In the first two chapters, the author describes the return of martial law and the shift of power from the Ayub regime to the Yahya-led junta. Later in the book, he deals with the political development at the center and in the two parts of Pakistan. The last four chapters are devoted to the Pakistani military crackdown, the Indian involvement and the December War,