Oedipus And The Anoedipal Transsexual

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According to at least one version of the Lacanian psychoanalytic account of subjectivity, a speaking subject would not be possible if incestuous desire were not constrained by the imposition of paternal law. It is only because the subject has been able to defer satisfaction of incestuous desire that she or he is able to take up a position as a subject who either is or has the phallus. It is only by going to one side or the other of the sexual divide that the subject is able to organize his or her imaginary anatomy with reference to a privileged body part (the penis) and organize his or her desire in terms of the transcendental signifier of desire (the phallus). This is what allows the subject to separate him- or herself from the world, take up a social position with respect to other social subjects, and speak in a coherent and sensible way as an "I" who can communicate his or her position to those around her. Thus the unconscious is knotted around the secret kernel of incestuous desire that is then displaced in the signifying chains that allow that desire to be deferred and displaced onto more socially acceptable objects of desire. And it is that kernel of desire that will manifest in the symptoms of the unconscious that betray the fantasies, dreams, and obsessions the subject is not aware of on a conscious level.

In 1972 the publication in France of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's book *Anti-Oedipus* resonated with the growing challenges to structuralism and Lacanian psychoanalysis that arose along with the political upheaval of May 1968. In this book they argue that incestuous desire, far from being the secret kernel of all desire, is an impoverished form of a nonlacking, productive desire that participates in the ongoing dance of life, and that human individuation requires neither an unambiguous separation of the subject from other life processes nor the establishment of a stable ego. On their view, the
forms that social repression and subjectivity take shift with changing historical circumstances; although psychoanalysis helpfully delineates the oedipal subject of a capitalist social formation, other, equally viable, forms of subjectivity could emerge in concert with a changing social field. They insist upon a notion of the unconscious that emphasizes its productive connections to the individual’s milieu, and they proffer an alternative form of analysis—schizoanalysis—designed to investigate the individual and collective flows of desire of specific social formations.

Rather than promoting a normative form of subjectivity, Deleuze and Guattari hope to promote a subjectivity that goes past the limits of oedipalization, simultaneously bringing flows of social desire past the limits of capitalism. Capitalism’s drive for ever-new sources of profit fosters innovating flows of desire that, if left to themselves, could so alter capitalist formations that the latter would no longer be capitalist. Oedipalization is a form of social repression that funnels the productive capacity of the unconscious back into the constricting channels of oedipal desire. Following oedipal subjectivity to its limits and beyond entails liberating unconscious production so that desire can create new realities. Whereas oedipal desire constitutes the subject as lacking the object desired, the goal of anoedipal desire is immanent to its process: it seeks not what it lacks but what allows it to continue to flow. In order to flow, anoedipal desire must mutate and transform in a self-differentiating unfolding implicated with the social field of forces of which it is a part. Schizoanalysis is not meant to represent reality without affecting it, but rather to participate as one force among many in the creation of reality. The question for Deleuze and Guattari is not whether their theory is right or wrong but how effective it is in fostering the creative productions of the unconscious. They reject the psychoanalytic contention that the only alternative to oedipal subjectivity is psychosis and instead explore anoedipal flows of desire and the schizo who is a functioning subject of such desire. Their notion of the unconscious suggests ways of approaching its “symptoms” that point to possibilities for creative transformation inevitably linked with social change.

In what follows I explore Deleuze and Guattari’s alternative conception of the unconscious as a productive factory and the schizo subject able to pursue anoedipal desire, and then I consider the particular case of sexual identity. The fluid identity of the schizo allows a form of transsexuality that many have already experienced in one form or other. The experiment a schizoanalytic approach to such sexuality makes is to ask what might happen if binary sexual difference was not the inevitable endpoint of fluxes in sexed identity. Considering the case of anoedipal transsexuality challenges conceptions of the unconscious that take the subject as its point of origin and presents fascinating possibilities for future forms of subjectivity as well as collective forms of living.
OEDIPUS AND THE SCHIZO

Gilbert Simondon, an important influence on Deleuze and Guattari's thinking about individuation, argues that the individual has traditionally been defined in terms of a state of stable equilibrium. That is, the individuated being is assumed to be in "the sort of equilibrium that is attained in a system when all the possible transformations have been achieved and no other force remains to enact any further changes" (Simondon, 1992, p. 302). This approach not only excludes the notion of becoming from our thinking about individuation but strips the individual from the interactions with its surrounding milieu that make it what it is. Simondon suggests understanding the individual as a relative reality—"merely the result of a phase in the being's development"—instead of a completed totality. Thus individuation could be viewed as "a partial and relative resolution manifested in a system that contains latent potentials and harbors a certain incompatibility with itself" (Simondon, 1992, p. 300). The tensions arising from the incompatible forces of a specific phase of development precipitate the individual into its next phase of development. To capture the notion of tension at issue here, the system of the individual's reality must be conceived as "replete with potentials" (Simondon, 1992, p. 316). It is in part because of the force of potentials in the process of becoming that the individual moves from one state of its being to another. Individuation entails not a synthesis that finally brings a being into a state of completion but, "rather[,] the being passing out of step with itself" (Simondon, 1992, p. 314). Accounts of the subject that attempt to sum up its essential attributes fail to capture the shifting movements of its unfolding; Simondon's account suggests that any individual is a series of metastable states, no one of which captures the essence of what that individual is.

In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze develops a way of understanding individuals in terms of the problems inherent in a given process of individuation. Like Simondon, he contends that examining only the final states of equilibrium in which a process results (however we may define such states) gives us an impoverished understanding of the individual at issue. Individuals, including the human subject, would be better understood in terms of a self-differentiating series of states comprising virtual potentialities as well as material forms that unfold in response to the problems of life. Each state of the series is replete with the potential to move into any number of other states in concert with its surrounding milieu. The individual subject, on this view, is not what remains the same throughout all the changes it undergoes but, rather, is a conjunction of states that includes the dynamic force inherent in each state. The states of a process of individuation are not clearly defined but entail the infinitesimal movement of elemental particles toward a limit that marks a qualitative change in an open-ended set of particles. This limit is the virtual event or singularity that oversees the actualization of the
series; it is the problem insisting in the unfolding of a series of points. For example, the point on a vector where water begins to boil is a singularity. That singularity inheres in a state of nonboiling water as a virtual possibility. Although it has not yet actually manifested, it insists in that state as a potentiality, a kind of problem that will only be resolved when the incremental movements of multiple elements coalesce in a specific way. The singularities of freezing and evaporation also inhere in nonboiling water as virtual possibilities. Any one of these singularities only become actualized given the convergence of a whole set of forces that include processes beyond those defining the individual at issue. The virtualities of boiling, freezing, and evaporating constitute part of the incompossible field of virtualities that condition the next state the water actually reaches. The entire field of the virtual must ultimately include the conditions not just for a given process of individuation but for all of life, since all the forces of life ultimately affect one another. Transitions across the multiple thresholds involved in a given process of individuation happen in infinitesimal degrees that fall below the identities perceived in ordinary awareness. The psychic self and coherent body of conscious awareness, from this perspective, are the emergent effects of unstable processes in continual movement that unfold over time and entail a field of virtual potentialities as well as the determinate configurations of material elements.

In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari describe human subjectivity in terms of three syntheses of the unconscious: connective syntheses that join elements into series ("desiring-machines"), disjunctive syntheses that resonate series in metastable states ("bodies without organs"), and conjunctive syntheses that gather metastable states into the continuous experience of conscious awareness. What Deleuze and Guattari call "desiring-machines" are the partial objects of Kleinian psychoanalysis that flow and interrupt flow, forming connective syntheses of "then . . . and then . . . ." Primary repression occurs when a determinate configuration of desiring-machines is repulsed in a moment of antiproduction that resists any and all determinate forms of production. What Deleuze and Guattari call the "body without organs" is the stasis of antiproduction that constitutes a kind of recording surface. The determinate organization of a phase of individuation is implicated with the virtual forms it could have been. The body without organs that repulses any determinate form of the working machines of the body distributes the disjunctions of "either . . . or . . . or . . . ." that include the virtual potentialities of the individual as well as the disjunctions that have been actualized. While connective syntheses go from one flow to an interruption in the flow to another flow, disjunctive syntheses distribute a network of connective syntheses across this recording surface. In the process, the desiring-machines come to appear as if they emanate from the body without organs. That is, the tension between the working machines of the body and the force of other potential configurations of desiring-machines that have not yet been played
out bring the individual into a state of equilibrium. The body without organs can be seen as a state in which the incompatibilities of the heterogeneous elements of the individual are temporarily resolved. Instead of being the ultimate state of the individual—the essence of who that person is—this state is a metastable state that will immediately shift into something else. The conjunctive syntheses of the unconscious connect the different states of the individual in terms of the "and . . . and . . ." of the states through which the individual mutates. These syntheses constitute "something on the order of a subject" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 16). This subject may be, but does not necessarily have to be, the oedipal subject described by psychoanalysis.

Deleuze and Guattari agree with the psychoanalytic account that the coherent body-image and sense of self of a sentient subject is the result of a mostly unconscious process that unfolds over time. They also agree that oedipal subjectivity is one form that human sentience can take. The syntheses they describe, however, have oedipal and anoedipal forms. Schizoanalysis is designed to foster the latter. The subject, as a process of individuation emerging from the social field, is an inevitable coparticipant in the creation and mutation of social formations. Deleuze and Guattari contend that unconscious investments in the social field take precedence over conscious investments in personal identity. Schizoanalysis, rather than tracing all desire to the positions of an oedipal triangle, wants to attain "the immediate productive unconscious" that affects and is affected by the breaks and flows of the larger social field (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 98). They characterize capitalism as a social formation that is a process of individuation comparable to that of any other individual, including the human subject. Thus, capitalism also has a body without organs constituting the plateau of anti-production from which all its concrete manifestations appear to emanate. Considering capitalism from this perspective allows us to situate the trajectories of oedipal and schizo subjects' processes of individuation with respect to the individuation of the social formation from which they emerge.

At the level of capitalist society, breaks and flows are created in the desiring-machines of labor. For example, chocolate is produced in a process that entails breaks and flows of milk, cocoa, and sugar, as well as stirring, pouring, and heating. The productive connections of these desiring-machines appear to emanate from the body without organs of capitalism when it appears as if the production of chocolate is caused by the capital invested in the factory. Capital or money is the full body without organs that resists any given determinate form of capitalist society and provides the surface upon which the disjunctions of capital are recorded and distributed. Whatever businesses are in operation could always be organized differently. Just as the body without organs of the individual constitutes a metastable state of partial resolution that repulses a given arrangement of desiring-machines, so is what Deleuze and Guattari call the "socius" of capitalism a moment of stasis that repulses a
given formation of the circulation of money only to unfold into the next formation. Just as the body without organs comes to appropriate a given arrangement of desiring-machines by appearing to be its source, so does capital come to appropriate a given arrangement of capitalist institutions by acting as its quasi cause (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 10). The drive for profit is the inherent problem overseeing the capitalist process of production, the virtual potentiality toward which a self-differentiating series of states tends, that which gives a capitalist formation its mark, even when the specific form that it takes cannot be predicted in advance.

Deleuze and Guattari claim that capitalism came into being when “flows of production” were decoded in the form of money-capital and “flows of labor” were decoded in the form of the worker free to sell her labor-power. Instead of coding (or overcoding) flows of desire, thus making sure that “no flow exists that is not properly dammed up, channeled, regulated,” capitalism “has created an axiomatic of abstract quantities that keeps moving further and further in the direction of the deterritorialization of the socius” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 33). That is, capitalism’s emphasis on the abstract quantification of money and labor (what matters is how capital and labor circulates—not the specific form wealth takes or who in particular does what) encourages desire to permute across the social field in unpredictable ways. Capitalism as a social formation that seeks to replicate itself depends on oedipalization to manage this tendency toward deterritorialization. Oedipalization entails replacing the connection of partial objects with a regime for the pairing of people. “Partial objects now seem to be taken from people, rather than from the nonpersonal flows that pass from one person to another. The reason is that persons are derived from abstract quantities, instead of from flows” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 71). On the body without organs, desire is the only subject. It passes from one body to another, producing partial objects, creating breaks and flows, “following connections and appropriations that each time destroy the factitious unity of a possessive or proprietary ego” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 72). Oedipalization makes it appear that partial objects are possessed by a person and that it is the person who desires. The exclusive disjunctions of oedipalization designate global persons “who do not exist prior to the prohibitions that found them” rather than intensive states through which the subject passes on the body without organs. The designations of the exclusive disjunctions differentiate among global persons and situate the ego vis-à-vis those persons (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 78).

The axiomatics of capitalism do not care about preserving the content of a given capitalist formation; the specific forms that places of work take with the concomitant identities of employers and employees matter much less than that capital flows and the market flourishes. For example, the Internet and e-commerce are instigating a whole new way of doing business with
new roles requiring different ways of thinking about oneself and one's function in the working whole. Such changes are not only welcomed but required by capitalism. Yet if capitalism is to replicate itself despite the mutating forms of the institutions and people who manifest it, it must make sure that the deterritorializing flows of capital do not mutate to the point of rendering capitalism unrecognizable to itself. As a process of individuation, capitalism passes beyond itself in a series of states of partial resolution that contain incompatibilities and latent potentials. For the tensions in these states not to rupture this process entirely (thus ending in capitalism's demise), they must be resolved from state to state. Oedipalization is useful to the replication of capitalism because by making sure desire is always constrained to the personalized triangle of oedipus, the inherent deterritorialization of capitalism is effectively managed. Despite the radical innovations precipitated by the Internet, e-commerce has quickly recuperated its possibilities into business as usual. As long as oedipal subjects want to either wield or be the phallus, they identify with the social positions defined by the oedipal triangle, and their desires are those relevant to those positions. Oedipal subjects maintain the innovations of deterritorializing capital within the tightly bound parameters of a personal identity and familial life (or the triangulated authority relationships that mimic oedipus in the public realm). It is Deleuze and Guattari's contention that this is precisely the process that psychoanalysis would foster and support.

Schizoanalysis would encourage capitalism's inherent deterritorialization to approach and move past its limit and foster the schizo subject whose desire moves past the constraints of oedipalization. Instead of referring the body to a model of totalized body parts referred to a privileged signifier (the phallus), the schizo experiences her body as a field of multiplicities vibrating in an intensive field with no external point of reference or culmination. According to Deleuze and Guattari, oedipalization constitutes an illegitimate restriction on the syntheses of the unconscious because it emphasizes global persons (thus excluding all partial objects of desire), exclusive disjunctions (thus relegating the subject to a chronological series of moments that can be given a coherent narrative account), and a segregative and biunivocal use of the conjunctive syntheses (thus reducing the identity of the subject to a coherent or static set of one side of a set of oppositions).

Life itself is an activity of production. Whether a subject is oedipalized or not, she is a process in full participation with life as process; the elements of her body and psyche are in constant movement, making, disrupting, and remaking various connections. The conscious awareness of both the oedipal subject and the schizo are the emergent effects of myriad processes. But while the oedipal subject is subjected to the dominant signifier of the phallus, the schizo is able to experience her surroundings in terms of partial objects and nonspecific connections, inclusive disjunctions, and nonsegmen-
tary, polyvocal conjunctions. She still experiences a sense of wholeness, a sense that the various states through which she passes are experienced by her. But the subject of her experiences is not the global person whose identity is fixed on either one side or the other of various oppositional divides (male or female, white or black), and she designates the various pleasurable and painful states through which she passes in terms of intensities that are always becoming-other rather than as attributes of an unchanging being. Because her unconscious productions defy the constriction of oedipalization, her reality is different from that of the oedipal subject; her sensations, emotions, and thoughts defy oedipal categorization. The schizo experiences the body without organs as a "harrowing, emotionally overwhelming experience, which brings the schizo as close as possible to matter, to a burning, living center of matter" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 19). The schizo who no longer designates the states through which she passes in terms of what is possible for someone with her personal identity does not stop producing connective, disjunctive, and conjunctive syntheses. Thus, she continues to produce a form of subjectivity even if it is not an oedipal form, and she continues to experience life even if her experience defies common sense. But while the oedipal subject experiences the world in terms of the possibilities posited by dominant reality, the schizo is sensitive to the singularities that could produce alternative realities. And, furthermore, given that the schizo does not come up against the blank wall of schizophrenia, alcoholism, or some other form of a failed or empty body without organs, her production of this reality reverberates with and through the realities of others.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the unconscious neither symbolizes, imagines, nor represents but, instead, engineers. Deoedipalization would release desire from the regulated channels of oedipal desire and allow the creative proliferation of desiring and social machines. Energy, instead of encountering the blank wall of oedipalization, would produce innovative forms of subjectivity with different ways of interacting with others and the environment and new forms for collective living. Perhaps more importantly, these fresh formations would be lived with an intensity and excitement unavailable to oedipalized subjects. Human beings as biological processes immersed in a living world would share in the joyfully creative processes of life that always moves onward, generating new forms in response to the mutating forces of becoming.

SEXUAL IDENTITY AND DEOEDIPALIZATION

The sex of an oedipalized subject is consolidated through an arduous process that entails subordinating the desiring-machines of the body to the phallus as the transcendental signifier of desire. Anoedipal desire that pro-
duced partial objects by connecting and breaking flows of movement is now subordinated to desire associated with totalized persons. Desiring-machines are ordered and synchronized in keeping with an ideal referent, and desire comes to be associated with lack—the lack of the global person who either has a phallus and so wants to satisfy his desire for the prized object or the person who does not have a phallus and so wants to be the object of desire. It is only thus that a whole set of desiring-machines can come to have one sex or the other. But on Deleuze and Guattari's view, this one sex results from the statistical domination of either male or female particles. Desiring-machines—presumably through some kind of analogy to the working parts of an ideal man or woman (for Deleuze and Guattari such rigid designation of the ultimate ideal is part of an oppressive oedipalization better deterritorialized)—could be called male or female. Even if one has managed to attain the persona of masculinity required by oedipalization of those with a penis, such a “man” “at the level of elementary combinations” would have female as well as male desiring-machines (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 69).

According to the exclusive disjuncts of oedipus, subjects are either male or female. One cannot be both at once or shift erratically between one and the other. But on the view of Deleuze and Guattari, the torturous process of stabilizing a sexed identity described by Freudian theory is neither necessary nor desirable. Yes, oedipalization requires that we commit to one side or the other of the sexual divide; but on their view this entails an illegitimate use of the syntheses of the unconscious. It is through the unconscious syntheses that the fluxing processes of our body constitute a kind of whole. This whole is not the totalized whole posited by oedipalization with reference to the phallus but, rather, a whole that neither unifies nor totalizes the parts of the body “though it has an effect on these other parts simply because it establishes aberrant paths of communication between noncommunicating vessels, transverse unities between elements that retain all their differences within their own particular boundaries” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 43). That is, metastable states of partial resolution distribute desiring-machines on a plane that resonates with the force of virtual possibilities, most of which will never come to pass. The body without organs renders the body whole by establishing “aberrant paths” of communication among shifting desiring-machines rather than by integrating the desiring-machines into an organic whole where each part has a stabilized place and position vis-à-vis the other parts.

Deleuze and Guattari say that the schizo is transsexual (as well as “transalivedead,” “trans-parentchild”). Her sexual identity is not confined to the exclusive binary of female or male (thus the pronoun she is used here only for the sake of convenience). She inhabits a space where her proper name no longer designates a person but, rather, “singularities flocking from all sides, evanescent agents of production” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 77). The
anoedipal transsexual is a faceless, transpositional subject who does not have to blunt the differences among the positions she takes up because no attempt is made to consolidate her identity into one final state that includes all the actualized attributes of her previous states. Instead, she is a conjunction of metastable states—states that distribute specific configurations of partial objects and virtualities and are then joined into an incompossible whole. Her proper name doesn't represent her but, rather, designates a class of effects within fields of potentials (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 86). This subject, rather than the effect of exclusions, is the effect of modifications that pass through all possible predicates in an "inclusive disjunction that carries out the synthesis itself in drifting from one term to another and following the distance between terms" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 77). The series constituting the desiring-machines of connective syntheses are distributed in the disjunctive network of the body without organs, and the states through which a transpositional subject passes are experienced as intensive states in the conjunctive syntheses. But the resulting "me" "is merely the residual subject that sweeps the circle and concludes a self from its oscillations on the circle" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 88). Such a subject has no difficulty in moving from a state identified as "female" to one identified as "male"; she is able to uphold the differences between the terms because she can shift so easily from one modification to the other without excluding either one.

One might say that psychoanalysis performs a service for those made miserable about being unable to find a place for themselves within the collective structures of capitalism. But to do this, psychoanalysis posits a notion of the unconscious that assumes that for a subject to be possible, a certain price must be exacted. The sacrificial logic that suggests that any socialized subject must sacrifice a portion of his desires and accept his lack in order to take up the mantle of selfhood is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, a product of capitalism. Anoedipal desire is fully productive, and the schizo's identity, inherently nonlacking. The anoedipal transsexual does not share the anxieties about identity of the oedipal subject. Her most secret desire can not be represented in terms of persons: she does not want to kill her father and sleep with her mother or sleep with her father and kill her mother. She does not long to possess a mother-substitute that proves she has the phallus or win the favor of the father-substitute in order to prove she is the phallus. Instead she is a resonating field of intensities hungry for connection with other intensities. Furthermore, her identity is not the result of a process of imaginary displacements from the distribution of positions allowed by oedipal triangulation. Her identities range freely across the entire social field. Whereas oedipalization (and psychoanalysis) suggests that the only option to oedipalization is psychosis, Deleuze and Guattari contend that it is the process of oedipalization itself that has created the false dichotomy between a constrained personal identity with its truncated unconscious and the terrifying abyss of a complete lack of identity.
For the transsexual able to thwart oedipalization and allow her desiring-production to exceed the constraints of daddy-mommy-and-me, sexual identity is liberated from the illegitimate syntheses of the unconscious; connections and disconnections are made without regard for persons, identities incompatible with the oedipalized position of the subject are not excluded, and the pleasures and pains experienced by the subject are not constrained to those of one who feels and wants only what is not excluded by her membership in a particular set of compossible identities. Thus, her desiring-machines produce an anoedipal reality; partial objects are created in the immanent unfolding of connections created without reference to global persons. Instead of referring her identity to a totalized ideal in comparison with which she must inevitably be lacking, she easily shifts identities. She lets each state go and the next state come without worrying about whether the state she is experiencing is appropriate for the consolidation of a substantial self that she is supposed to be. Because the codes she uses to designate her states are not subordinated to a transcendental signifier, they shift and mutate in keeping with the circumstances of the moment. She can identify as her own son or father, the king of Siam, or the nomadic hordes descending from the steppes. It is not that she has lost touch with reality; to believe that she is the king of Siam is to assume that as a totalized whole she can be represented as being like an ideal referent. Rather, she designates her state as a set of effects within a field of potentials in the way that physicists have designated the effects of varying relationships (e.g., of heat, power, and work) with the name of the physicist who determined a law of interaction (e.g., the Joule effect or the Kelvin effect)—a configuration of relations comparable to (rather than identical with) other such configurations generates comparable effects (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 86).

The anoedipal transsexual does not believe in representations because she does not believe in totalized wholes. She is neither saying that she essentially is the king of Siam, nor is she saying that she is metaphorically like the king of Siam. The myriad processes constituting her construct a body without organs of material elements in determinate configurations and virtual potentialities that include linguistic as well as organic processes. In identifying with the king of Siam she is not representing a totalized self but, rather, experiencing an intensive state in which dynamic potential inheres in the sense of the words she uses as well as in the configuration of elements of her physical state. That is, her words play a constitutive role in the intensive state she experiences. The different states through which she passes are continuous fields of intensity that are always becoming-other. The pleasures and pains she consumes in the conjunctive syntheses in which she experiences a self-differentiating series of states as her own are not confined to those that can be referred to a consolidated oedipal position. Instead she shifts through a wide range of states, experiencing the incompossible pleasures and pains of a fractured subject. The proper name she may attach to all
the series she experiences designates an accumulation of specific effects rather than any one essence. The pieces of the world she experiences cannot be integrated into one organic whole because its spatial and temporal coordinates are ruptured in a proliferation of incommensurate viewpoints. Thus her narratives are splintered, her sense of time and place is skewed, and her experience is akin to the refracted dimensions of a cubist painting.

The erotic possibilities of the anoedipal transsexual are immense. Her perceptions are sensitive to the singularities of processes normally excluded from the disjunctions tolerated by oedipal subjectivity. Her desire unfolds according to the problems inherent to unique encounters. She sees a lizard scuttling along in front of her on a rocky trail. She wonders what it feels like to have reptilian skin, a long tail, to move so closely to the ground. She is a becoming-lizard as she crouches slightly and slinks smoothly along the path, feeling the sun beating down on her back, the heat rising up from the rocks around her. Later, when she gets into her car to drive home, she feels the steering wheel reverberate under her hands. She is a becoming-car as she swerves around corners, speeds along the open road. The problem becomes not how to move under the sun but how to keep wheels on pavement as one’s weight is shifted with centrifugal force. When she gets home, she greets her lover. She is a becoming-other as she feels her lover’s heart beat against her breast, senses the stiffness in the embrace, the slight dampness of arms wrapped around her. Her lover is a becoming-catatonic. She resonates with intensities that manifest stimulus-overload. The problem becomes how to ward off further stimulus. She is a becoming-catatonic too. But her lover is also responding to her, and becomes-lizard and car, and then is a becoming-less-catatonic. The problem shifts, what is the point of intersection in their becoming-one? The anoedipal transsexual has no need to reference these encounters to a substantial self grounded with respect to oedipal relations. Her identities wander from state to state and designation to designation. She has no need to exclude her identities of lizard, car, or catatonic because there’s no need to organize her experiences with respect to a circumscribed set of identities (woman, daughter, and lover; professor, citizen, and neighbor). She is free to drift from one identity to the next, partaking of the perceptions, emotions, and thoughts available to all her incompressible identities.

Of course, it is hard to imagine how the schizo could survive in our culture. In fact, we can each point to examples of strange people who do not quite “fit” and may suffer greatly as a result; even those comfortable with fluctuating identities are often forced by the discomfort of those around them to conform to a more acceptable set of identity constraints. But Deleuze and Guattari search for a different “cure” than that of enabling the analysand to perfect a process of oedipalization that has gone awry. Their intent is to promote the tendencies toward deoedipalization already pres-
ent, push them to their limits, and, thus, support the creation of a social formation able to support subjects of a completely different kind. Thus, "it is not the purpose of schizonalysis to resolve Oedipus" but, rather, to explore various relationships between psychic and social repression, desiring-machines and specific social formations, and to consider how to foster the creative productions of unconscious desire (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 81). Deleuze and Guattari are quick to grant that the experiments promoted by schizoanalysis can be dangerous. There are reactionary as well as revolutionary unconscious investments of desire (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 105). Revolutionary groups can and will become fascist, schizos will go psychotic, catatonic, or reterritorialize onto neurosis. It is because the productions of the unconscious meet the blank wall of an oedipalizing capitalism that schizophrenia as a painful and unfortunate clinical disease occurs. Subjects need to be able to connect with the larger social flows around them. Being walled into their own intensities leads to an empty body without organs that is a kind of living death. For the schizo to survive as a nomadic subject she must make connections with other schizos. She must make working desiring-machines with her surrounding environment and with others that transmit fluxes and flows along lines of flight that extend beyond herself to ripple across the social field. It is only when she has affected and been affected by others that she can become part of a reverberating, resonating field of intensities and her body without organs can connect with the bodies without organs of others to create a plateau resonant with new possibilities. Schizoanalysis cannot simply foster the anoedipal desiring-production of a subject's unconscious, it must also foster productive connections of that desiring-production to the desiring-production of others and the world.

Thus, schizoanalysis can never simply analyze an individual; the individual must always be analyzed as a porously responsive and responding multiplicity that changes and mutates in keeping with the multiplicities surrounding and running through her. The time and space of such a subject is as fractured as her identity. In her free-floating associations with the world (none of which she truly believes) her time becomes the virtual totality of all time and her space becomes the virtual totality of all space. The unconscious of such a subject cannot be construed as the black box of any one psyche; it occupies the impossible time and space of incompossible perspectives and incorporeal virtualities as well as the actualized forms of material processes. Each one of the states through which the subject passes may actualize a specific time and space according to standard chronologies and topologies, but on this view consciousness is no more than the emergent effect of unconscious forces that ultimately coincide with the chaos of the cosmos, the transcendental field of the virtual as the dynamic force experienced by any given subject in terms of concrete actualizations. In the cosmic scheme of things,
everything that is is linked by the transcendental field of the virtual that is the condition of any actualization. The unconscious of the individual ultimately expands to include this transcendental field while the concrete experiences of the individual is the angle(s) or perspective(s) refracting that virtual field in an actualized set of experiences.

Nietzsche describes the arduous process human beings had to undergo in order to get to the point where they could make promises they could keep (cf. Deleuze, 1983, p. 134). It is this ability to make promises that allows a culture of forward-looking memory where what matters is not that everyone has the same repertoire of memories of the past, but rather that everyone is able to make a pledge to the future. The schizo and the society of schizos that would bring deterritorialization along with capitalism past its limit would not root their common ground in carefully homogenized recollections and narratives of the past but would rather deliberately foster the cacophonous explosion of incompossible creations drawn from the virtual totality of time in ever-differing ways. Instead of demanding a coherent self with a past narrated in keeping with a standardized chronology and played out in a space carefully coordinated with respect to the space of all other admissible subjects, the new society of schizos would pledge themselves only to a promise of collective living. This promise would constitute a commitment not to the shapes and forms of the past or present moment but to the ongoing interconnections that would be honored and maintained despite all the transformations to come. Such a commitment would depend on a continuous flight from rigidifying forms in keeping with unconscious desire in its immanent production of working machines. Rather than the narcissistic pursuit of personal gratification, such unfolding could only occur in the attunement of a collective of schizos openly responsive to the transforming affects of others as well as fully engaged in transformative activity of their own. It is only in the commitment to the eternal return of a collective becoming-other that the unconscious as the vibrant force of creative evolution could unfold in a joyous dance of communion.

There are obvious risks with such a vision. Even those with already manifest tendencies toward anoedipal transsexuality may fear the explosive results of a whole society of transsexuals. Deleuze and Guattari’s celebration of the schizo entails a deep belief in the creative productivity of the human unconscious as well as of life itself. Life processes will always entail the stabilization of patterns of living as well as the creation of new forms. For Deleuze and Guattari, it can only be to our benefit to attend ever more closely to the pulse of the living rather than become fixated on past creations. Capitalism as a social formation is already reaching the limit point where it will be precipitated into a qualitatively different state. It is up to us to be full participants in the creation of our next incarnation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


