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Swarthmore College, swarthmoreirj@gmail.com



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About *SIRJ*

Swarthmore International Relations Journal (SIRJ) is an undergraduate journal publishing works on global affairs. Established in 2016, *SIRJ* is student written, edited, and produced. The primary goals of *SIRJ* are twofold: to help foster a new generation of scholars, and to bring fresh, liberal arts perspectives to international relations. Through a peer-reviewed editing process, *SIRJ* seeks to become a major vehicle for undergraduate research on international relations, and encourage critical and intellectual dialogues among scholars.

Dear Reader

Dear Reader,

Thank you for your interest in the *Swarthmore Internationals Relations Journal*.

After three years of publishing undergraduate research on international relations, we have decided to pause production of this journal to rethink how Swarthmore can best contribute to a wide-reaching conversation about international relations and global affairs.

Particularly in light of Swarthmore's new Global Studies Program—spearheaded by Professors Ayse Kaya and Carina Yervasi—we wanted to take this opportunity to re-conceptualize this journal and its contributions to the study of pressing global issues on our campus.

While production of this journal will cease until further notice, we wanted to share with you two exemplary essays on the theme of Global Order in this special issue. We believe that these are timely and important contributions to current academic debates.

We would like to thank all of the students, alumni, staff, and faculty who have been involved in this publication since 2016.

Thank you for reading, and we look forward to sharing future projects from the Global Studies

Sincerely,
The *SIRJ* Advisory Board

Editor's Note

Thank you for reading the third issue of the *Swarthmore International Relations Journal (SIRJ)*. In light of contemporary currents in international relations, this special edition is dedicated to one theme: emerging challenges of global order. As the balance of global power shifts and emerging challengers become increasingly influential, international norms are contested in the landscape of international political change. In this issue, the essays focus on the dynamics of such contest and have gone through a rigorous review process. As a tradition of this journal, *SIRJ* has continued the blind-review practice to ensure quality of our articles. *SIRJ* has also continued to strengthen the collaboration among students, alumni, and faculty. I hope that this special edition will bring value to Swarthmore and a broader scholarly community.

In this special edition, you will find two articles on the theme of emerging challenges to global order. The first essay investigates how the Paris Climate Agreement shifts authority from state actors to non-state actors. This essay dives into the dynamics of power shifts and the relevant impact on emerging global order. The second essay analyzes the challenges faced by the European Union (E.U.). Through the lens of Sebastian Rosato's balance of power theory, the second essay discusses how the E.U.'s development implicates interstate cooperation. Both essays were carefully selected from a large volume of submissions and have made significant intellectual contributions to this forward-looking issue on emerging challenges to global order.

As the former student editors of *SIRJ* would attest, in addition to publishing great articles, there has always been a supportive and collaborative culture at this journal, including the desire to share credit for the success of this special edition. I am grateful for all who have involved with this journal for the past three years. I also respectfully add my thank you to all the people that our former Editor-in-Chief Elizabeth Tolley has mentioned. Furthermore, on behalf of myself and the rest of Editorial Board, I offer my heartfelt appreciation to Dr. Katie Price, Professor Dominic Tierney, Professor Ben Berger, Professor Emily Paddon Rhoads, Librarian Maria Aghazarian, and Editorial Fellows Lindsay Dolan and George Yin for their contributions towards making *SIRJ* what it is today.

Sincerely,
Editorial Board

The Paris Climate Agreement - Harbinger of a New Global Order

Shana Herman

Swarthmore College

I. Introduction

In recent decades, climate change has become an increasingly tangible threat to human existence on Earth. In fact, a combination of climate-related forces (e.g. natural disasters, extreme weather events, and droughts) and carbon-related forces (e.g. air pollution and asthma) already claim about five million lives annually.¹ This value is only projected to increase and will account for about six million global deaths per year by 2030.² While climate change has and will continue to disproportionately affect low-income communities, people of color, and indigenous populations, as well as poorer and smaller countries and island nations that are the least responsible for the carbon dioxide emissions that have contributed to it, climate change is indisputably a collective global crisis with shared consequences that will ultimately affect every country on Earth, regardless of affluence or military prowess.³

Recently, as the consequences of anthropogenic climate change have grown increasingly visible, countries have begun to come together to address this crisis on an international level. In November of 2015, leaders from 197 countries met with the goal of ushering in a new era of international climate change negotiations characterized by meaningful national commitments to mitigate climate change and secure a livable future for all. The product of this conference became known as the Paris Agreement. Since its conception, the Agreement has been praised—by politicians, international relations scholars, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and more—as “historic,” “a landmark agreement,” “a turning point” for our planet and for the international climate regime, and “the world’s greatest diplomatic success.”⁴ The Agreement has also been criticized for being “far too weak” and for providing the world with a sense of “false hope.”⁵

¹ *Climate Vulnerability Monitor: A Guide to the Cold Calculus of a Hot Planet*, report, 2nd ed., 15, accessed October 10, 2017, <http://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/CVM2-Low.pdf>.

² *Ibid.*, 17.

³ Julian Agyeman, Harriet Bulkeley, and Aditya Nochur, “Climate Justice,” in *Ignition: What What You Can Do to Fight Global Warming and Spark a Movement*, ed. John Isham and S. Waage (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2007), 136.

⁴ Daniel Bodansky, “The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?” *The American Journal of International Law* 110, no. 2 (2016): 289, accessed October 10, 2017. doi:10.5305/amerjintlaw.110.2.0288.

⁵ Tom Bawden, “Paris Climate Deal ‘Far Too Weak to Prevent Devastating Global Warming,’” *The Independent*, January 8, 2016, <http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/cop21-paris-deal-far-too-weak-to-prevent-devastating-climate-change-academics-warn-a6803096.html>.

This paper investigates how the politics of the Paris Climate Agreement – its design, ratification, and enforcement – both reaffirm and challenge the existing global order. Throughout this paper, “Party,” “state,” and “country” will be used interchangeably. The design and ratification of the Agreement have facilitated international cooperation by inhibiting free-riding through social pressure and transparency, and by enabling Parties to determine their own mitigation commitments; this in turn supports the existing global order in which states share and exercise power through international institutions. Simultaneously, the enforcement of the Paris Agreement has already begun to meaningfully challenge the existing global order by redistributing power among its actors, evident in the increasing influence of substate and nonstate actors in international politics. Overall, while some aspects of the Agreement’s development and function reaffirm the existing global order, the politics of the Paris Agreement provide clear evidence of a new emerging global order. The Paris Agreement therefore has very significant implications for the future of international relations.

II. Background

Before delving into how the politics of the Paris Agreement are indicative of a new emerging global order, it is essential to first clarify what is meant by global order. According to scholar Richard Falk, the global order refers to “the distribution of power and authority among the political actors on the global stage.”⁶ Power can be defined as “the means by which a state or other actor wields or can assert actual or potential influence or coercion relative to other states and non state actors because of the potential, geographic, economic and financial, technological, military, social, cultural, or other capabilities it possesses.”⁷ Soft power is of particular concern in this paper. In essence, soft power refers to “non-material capabilities such as reputation, culture, and value appeal that can aid the attainment of a state’s objectives.”⁸ As renowned international relations scholar Joseph Nye argues, soft power is not exercised through military or economic force, but rather, it is “the ability to shape the preferences of others” and “[get] others to want outcomes that you want.”⁹ The exertion of soft power by states is frequently facilitated through international negotiations and institutions. Collaboration through democratic international institutions, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), is a key norm that characterizes the existing global order that emerged after the end of World War II in 1945 and that is largely defined by liberal international relations theory.¹⁰

⁶ Richard Falk, “World Orders, Old and New,” *Current History* 98 (January 1, 1999): 29, accessed January 10, 2018, <https://search-proquest-com.proxy.swarthmore.edu/docview/1309780844?pq-origsite=gscholar>.

⁷ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations and World Politics*, 5th ed. (New York, NY: Pearson, 2013), 202.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 207.

⁹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 5.

¹⁰ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Will the Liberal Order Survive?” *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 1 (Jan. & Feb. 2017):, accessed January 7, 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/will-liberal-order-survive>.

Another key element of the existing global order is that, for decades, states (i.e. national governments) have been the primary actors in the international arena.

As previously mentioned, the Paris Agreement was the culminating product of the twenty-first Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 21), held in Paris in November of 2015. Of the 197 Parties that attended the Convention, 179 have ratified the Agreement to date.¹¹ While it is projected that more Parties will soon ratify the Agreement, many of those that appear to be hesitant are oil-rich countries that are heavily dependent on the petroleum industry.¹² The Paris Agreement has three key goals: first, to keep average global temperatures well below 2 degrees Celsius of warming above pre-industrial levels, and strive to limit this increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels; next, to increase adaptation and resilience mechanisms and development of technologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions without compromising food production; and finally, to allocate funds appropriately and efficiently in order to achieve the previously stated goals.¹³

The Paris Agreement differs from previous international climate negotiations, which have generally employed top-down command-and-control strategies involving legally binding obligations, in that it does not prescribe or mandate minimum emission reduction targets; rather, the Paris Agreement provides Parties with the flexibility to establish their own intended nationally determined commitments (INDCs or NDCs) to reduce emissions in a bottom-up approach.¹⁴ These NDCs are intended to go into effect in 2020, with the goal of countries peaking their emissions as soon as possible.¹⁵

While the Paris Agreement does not require that Parties meet specific emission reduction targets or reduce their emissions through any particular mechanisms, it does require each Party to “prepare, communicate, and maintain successive [NDCs]”, and “pursue domestic mitigation measures” to achieve the goals of these contributions.¹⁶ In essence, Parties are solely required to publish reports detailing their goals and progress. The agreement also contains a “ratchet mechanism.” Parties are required to communicate an NDC every five years, with the assumption that states will steadily increase the ambition of these commitments over time, ultimately achieving net zero emissions by the second half of the century.¹⁷ Through these NDCs, the Agreement introduces the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective

¹¹ “The Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification,” UNFCCC, accessed July 26, 2018, <https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification>.

¹² “Paris Agreement Ratification Tracker,” Climate Analytics, accessed January 14, 2018, <http://climateanalytics.org/briefings/ratification-tracker.html>.

¹³ “Paris Agreement,” UNFCCC, 2, accessed July 26, 2018, https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf.

¹⁴ Jennifer Jacquet and Dale Jamieson, “Soft but significant power in the Paris Agreement,” *Nature Climate Change* 6, no. 7 (July 2016): 644, accessed October 10, 2017, doi:10.1038/nclimate3006.

¹⁵ “Paris Agreement,” 3.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Sophie Yeo, “Timeline: The Paris Agreement’s ‘Ratchet Mechanism,’” *Carbon Brief*, January 19, 2016, <https://www.carbonbrief.org/timeline-the-paris-agreements-ratchet-mechanism>.

capabilities of different countries to address climate change, depending on distinct national circumstances; this approach is designed to increase equity in mitigation burden.¹⁸

III. The Politics of Design & Ratification – Facilitating International Cooperation

Despite the potential for increased equity to promote cooperation between countries, many realist international relations scholars argue that there exist significant barriers to cooperation. One of the core tenets of realism is that states are self-interested actors that are constantly engaged with other states in a perpetual struggle for power.¹⁹ Many realists attribute this struggle to states' inherent concern for their own survival.²⁰ This mentality of self-preservation may present an issue in international negotiations. According to realist thinker Kenneth Waltz,

Great tasks can be accomplished only by agents of great capability. That is why states, and especially the major ones, are called on to do what is necessary for the world's survival. But states have to do whatever they think is necessary for their own preservation, since no one can be relied on to do it for them.²¹

Since the Paris Agreement enables Parties to establish their own emission reduction commitments without imposing a minimum target, Waltz's claim implies that, because states are unlikely to place international interests above national interests, Parties may set low commitments so as to avoid jeopardizing national interests, such as economic security. In this way, Parties will benefit from the efforts taken by other states to mitigate climate change without making their own contributions, essentially free-riding.²² Realists argue that the Paris Agreement further enables free-riding due to its lack of enforcement and repercussion mechanisms for Parties that do not fulfill their NDCs.²³ Ultimately, realists believe that the free-riding produced by this Agreement will make international cooperation difficult to sustain.

Renowned realist John Mearsheimer asserts that "states can cooperate, although cooperation is sometimes difficult to achieve and always difficult to sustain. Two factors inhibit

¹⁸ "Paris Agreement," 2.

¹⁹ Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy*, no. 110 (1998): 31, doi:10.2307/1149275.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Kenneth Neal Waltz, "The Anarchic Structure of World Politics," in *Theory of International Politics* (McGraw Hill, 1979), 44, accessed October 10, 2017, http://www.drmlalcikk.atw.hu/wp_readings/waltz.pdf.

²² Susanne Dröge, "The Paris Agreement 2015: Turning Point for the International Climate Regime," *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, February 2016, 8, accessed October 10, 2017, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2016RP04_dge.pdf.

²³ Guri Bang, Jon Hovi, and Tora Skodvin, "The Paris Agreement: Short-Term and Long-Term Effectiveness," *Politics and Governance* 4, no. 3 (2016): 211, accessed October 10, 2017, doi:10.17645/pag.y4i3.640.

cooperation: considerations about relative gains and concern about cheating.”²⁴ In the case of the Paris Agreement, Parties worry that by substantially committing to reduce their emissions, they will benefit, but ultimately less than Parties that make smaller commitments, due to the national burdens of reducing emissions. Parties also fear that others will cheat by free-riding on their efforts, rather than establishing their own significant commitments.

Despite the validity of these concerns, the Paris Agreement combats these barriers to cooperation in several ways. Firstly, because other Parties will be reporting commitments and the progress that they have made in attaining these goals, the Paris Agreement fosters a strong culture of international social pressure.²⁵ It reflects poorly on a Party if they do not set forth and attempt to uphold meaningful commitments. Failing to take meaningful action to address the climate crisis and free-riding on the efforts of other countries, especially if this behavior comes from wealthier countries that are responsible for the majority of emissions, does not only harm a Party’s public image, but also its relations with other Parties.²⁶ The influence of social pressure, however, lies not in the Party’s public image itself, but rather how that image matches up to those of other Parties. As scholars Ann Towns and Bahar Rumelili argue, “[i]t is through comparative assessments — the normative ordering of states as superior and inferior and placement in a social hierarchy — that social pressure is exerted and states are prodded into action;” social pressure is powerful and effective because states do not want to rank low in this social hierarchy.²⁷ Parties, as a result, are likely to set meaningful NDCs and strive to achieve these goals in order to avoid such repercussions.²⁸

The Paris Agreement’s requirement for transparency through mandatory NDC reporting further pressures Parties to put forward and meet significant commitments. By making information regarding Parties’ commitments and progress (or lack thereof) publically available, the Paris Agreement encourages other Parties and the broader public to “name and shame” Parties that are not taking meaningful action to reduce their emissions.²⁹ If a Party sets forth a comparatively weak commitment (defying international normative standards) or if its actual behavior does not align with its stated commitments (hypocrisy), exposing and bringing public attention to these gaps “renders the targeted state as a transgressor or underperformer, which

²⁴ John J. Mearsheimer, “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power,” in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014), 51-52, accessed October 10, 2017, http://www.ucsf.edu/~russellw/Teaching_files/Mearsheimer%20-%20Realism.pdf.

²⁵ Bodansky, “The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?” 291.

²⁶ Samantha Page, “No, The Paris Climate Agreement Isn’t Binding. Here’s Why That Doesn’t Matter,” accessed October 10, 2017, <https://thinkprogress.org/no-the-paris-climate-agreement-isnt-binding-here-s-why-that-doesn-t-matter-62827c72bb04/>.

²⁷ Ann E. Towns and Bahar Rumelili, “Taking the Pressure: Unpacking the Relation between Norms, Social Hierarchies, and Social Pressures on States,” *European Journal of International Relations* 23, no. 4 (2017): 756, accessed April 25, 2018, doi:10.1177/1354066116682070.

²⁸ Page, “No, The Paris Climate Agreement Isn’t Binding. Here’s Why That Doesn’t Matter.”

²⁹ Catherine Martini, “Transparency: The Backbone of the Paris Agreement,” accessed October 10, 2017, <http://envirocenter.yale.edu/transparency-the-backbone-of-the-Paris-Agreement>.

produces embarrassment, shame, or status anxiety.”³⁰ Transparency therefore incentivizes Parties to attain their NDCs in an attempt to avoid international public judgement.³¹ The exposure of this gap alone, however, is not sufficient to influence state behavior; here, the concept of social hierarchies and the role that they play in producing social pressure are central. As Towns and Rumelili assert, “[s]tates do not simply respond to the exposure of a gap between a norm or commitment and actual deeds — they react to being compared as inferior or superior to other states by means of norms. [...] [T]he placement of states in a social hierarchy is a key dynamic in social pressure and in the generation of shame.”³² Social pressure to avoid being perceived as inferior to other states therefore epitomizes states’ ability to exercise soft power through international institutions.

In *Activists Beyond Borders*, authors Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink claim that “moral leverage may be especially relevant where states are actively trying to raise their status in the international system” (i.e. move up in the international social hierarchy).³³ As previously discussed, the realist view of international relations maintains that all states are in a perpetual struggle for power, obtained through positionality in the international system in relation to other states. According to this view, every state is therefore perpetually striving to achieve this goal. If moral leverage, such as that gained by meaningfully committing to reduce emissions and mitigate climate change (especially when other states commit less), does indeed play an important role in raising a state’s status in the international system, it is natural to infer that states will set forth and endeavor to attain meaningful commitments. Ultimately, the international social pressure produced by the Paris Agreement’s requirements for continual reporting and transparency inhibits free-riding with respect to mitigation efforts and facilitates international cooperation; this in turn reaffirms the existing global order in which states share and exercise power through international institutions because through this social pressure, states are collectively able to exert influence over certain states that may otherwise free-ride.

Beyond combatting issues associated with relative gains and free-riding, the politics of the Paris Agreement also promote cooperation by allowing Parties to determine their own mitigation commitments. Previously, international climate negotiations were centered around legally binding emission reduction targets based on a country’s historic emission levels and financial ability. This approach has historically deterred Parties, specifically more industrialized nations, from ratifying international climate negotiations, such as the Kyoto Protocol.³⁴ By altering its strategy and introducing the concept of NDCs, the Paris Agreement eliminates one of

³⁰ Towns and Rumelili, “Taking the Pressure: Unpacking the Relation between Norms, Social Hierarchies, and Social Pressures on States,” 757.

³¹ Bodansky, “The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?” 291.

³² Towns and Rumelili, “Taking the Pressure: Unpacking the Relation between Norms, Social Hierarchies, and Social Pressures on States,” 757.

³³ Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders* (Cornell University Press, 1998), 29.

³⁴ Robert Falkner, “The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics,” *International Affairs* 92, no. 5 (September 2016): 1108, accessed October 10, 2017, doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12708.

the greatest barriers to international cooperation surrounding climate change mitigation.³⁵ Eliminating this barrier to cooperation, however, may introduce a moral hazard problem since the Parties that will sign onto the Paris Agreement due to its non-binding and voluntary approach, but would not sign onto more stringent agreements, are likely the least committed states to developing and implementing comprehensive climate policy. Despite this concern, there is still value in attracting these countries to the Agreement since any contribution to mitigating climate change is better than none. Additionally, as Nye asserts, “attraction leads to acquiescence” through the exercising of soft power (e.g. social pressure).³⁶

As previously discussed, social pressure may also influence these states to take meaningful action. Overall, through encouraging cooperation between countries, the design and ratification of the Paris Agreement reaffirm the liberal global order defined by international cooperation and the sharing and exercising of state power through democratic institutions, negotiations, and treaties.

IV. The Politics of Enforcement – Increasing Influence of Substate & Nonstate Actors

While some aspects of the Agreement’s design and ratification reaffirm the existing global order, the politics surrounding the enforcement of the Paris Agreement are indicative of a new emerging global order. Firstly, the politics of the Paris Agreement redistribute power among the political actors on the global stage by increasing the power and influence of substate and nonstate actors. In recent years across many sectors of society, substate and nonstate actors—including civil society, NGOs, social movements, businesses, trade unions, regional and local governments, cities, municipalities, indigenous peoples, and youth—have become increasingly influential in the international political arena.³⁷ In the past several decades, substate and nonstate actors have increasingly taken action to address climate change independently, through transnational networks, and in collaboration with states and international organizations; such efforts multiplied greatly and garnered substantial attention in the lead-up to and during the negotiations in Paris.³⁸ The politics of the Paris Agreement exemplify the mounting influence of substate and nonstate actors in the international climate regime. In fact, a key element of COP 21 was the regime’s embrace of climate action by such actors.³⁹

At previous COPs, many substate and nonstate actors have participated as observer organizations. Under this role, they may attend certain intergovernmental negotiations and

³⁵ Falkner, “The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics,” 1108.

³⁶ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 6.

³⁷ Karin Bäckstrand et al., “Non-state actors in global climate governance: from Copenhagen to Paris and beyond,” *Environmental Politics* 26, no. 4 (May 26, 2017): 562, accessed January 7, 2018, doi:10.1080/09644016.2017.1327485.

³⁸ Thomas Hale, “‘All Hands on Deck’: The Paris Agreement and Nonstate Climate Action,” *Global Environmental Politics* 16, no. 3 (August 2016): 13, accessed January 7, 2018, doi:10.1162/glep_a_00362.

³⁹ *Ibid*, 12.

occasionally submit information and comments.⁴⁰ The Paris Agreement reaffirms this role, stating that “[a]ny body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by this Agreement and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object.”⁴¹ Many substate and nonstate actors have also organized side events, exhibitions, and protests during the negotiations.⁴² Such actors have historically played the role of activist, lobbyist, and information provider.⁴³ While substate and nonstate actors continue to be present at COPs as observer organizations, the design of the Paris Agreement provides such actors with a greater role in monitoring national action and experimenting with local, regional, and transnational approaches to mitigating and adapting to climate change.⁴⁴

The ways in which the Paris Agreement establishes a larger role for substate and nonstate actors, thereby increasing their influence, are evident in the text of the Agreement.⁴⁵ In “[r]ecognizing the importance of the engagements of all levels of government and various actors, in accordance with respective national legislations of Parties, in addressing climate change,” the Agreement explicitly seeks to “[e]nhance public and private sector participation in the implementation of nationally determined contributions” and “[t]o incentivize and facilitate participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by public and private entities authorized by a Party.”⁴⁶ Furthermore, the Agreement requires Parties to “cooperate in taking measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information, recognizing the importance of these steps with respect to enhancing actions under this Agreement.”⁴⁷ The Paris Agreement’s goal in expanding and strengthening the role of substate and nonstate actors is to assist Parties in implementing NDCs, and to increase public engagement and participation in order to enhance mitigation efforts. To reiterate, power essentially refers to the ability of actors to assert influence relative to other actors. Through explicitly providing substate and nonstate actors with a more significant role in the international climate regime, the Paris Agreement increases the power of

⁴⁰ Harro van Asselt, “The Role of Non-State Actors in Reviewing Ambition, Implementation, and Compliance Under the Paris Agreement,” *Climate Law* 6, no. 1 (2016): 4, accessed January 7, 2018, doi:10.1163/18786561-00601006.

⁴¹ “Paris Agreement,” 13.

⁴² Van Asselt, “The Role of Non-State Actors in Reviewing Ambition, Implementation, and Compliance Under the Paris Agreement,” 4.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Bäckstrand et al., “Non-state actors in global climate governance: from Copenhagen to Paris and beyond,” 562.

⁴⁵ Hale, “‘All Hands on Deck’: The Paris Agreement and Nonstate Climate Action,” 14.

⁴⁶ “Paris Agreement,” 1, 5.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

these actors, thereby challenging the existing global order, or distribution of power and authority among the political actors on the global stage.

As evidenced above, the Paris Agreement explicitly incentivizes substate and nonstate actors to make independent contributions and assume more of a leadership role in global climate change mitigation, highlighting the growing importance of these actors in international climate governance. As a result of this newfound influence, climate commitments have already been made by “[o]ver 7,000 cities from more than 99 countries with a combined population of 794 million (11 percent of the global population) and around 32 percent of global GDP,” as well as “[c]lose to 5,000 companies from over 88 countries representing over \$38 trillion USD in revenue.”⁴⁸ Additionally, many of these efforts account for significant emission reductions. In fact, the mitigation potential of only a handful of such initiatives is “in the range of 2.5-4 billion tons of CO₂ by 2020, more than India emits in a year, and similar in magnitude to the 4-6 billion tons that UN projects the national pledges adopted in Paris will cut by 2030, a decade later.”⁴⁹

In the absence of national leadership on climate change, the impact of such contributions is even more profound because of the structure of the Agreement in centering substate and nonstate action. For example, in July of 2017, after President Donald Trump decided to withdraw the United States from the Agreement, “California lawmakers approved an extension of the state’s cap-and-trade program. In August, a coalition of nine Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states—the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative—agreed to cut an additional 30 percent of climate-warming pollution from the region’s power plants between 2020 and 2030.”⁵⁰ Additionally, the governors of California, New York, and Washington recently created the U.S. Climate Alliance, which now includes 14 states and Puerto Rico. In their 2017 annual report, the Alliance reported that they are on track to achieve a 24-29% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 2005 levels by 2025 based on state and local initiatives.⁵¹

Beyond the actions taken by substate governments in the United States, the Paris Agreement has also influenced significant action by NGOs, businesses, and other organizations. Signify, major lighting company, is working to become carbon neutral in all of its operations by 2020 “[a]s part of its carbon neutral commitment announced in 2015 at UN Climate Change Conference COP21.”⁵² The company has already taken substantial steps to achieve this goal. For

⁴⁸ Angel Hsu et al., “Assessing the Wider World of Non-State and Sub-National Climate Action,” (New Haven: Yale Data Driven Environmental Solutions Group, December 10, 2015), 1, accessed January 7, 2018, <https://campuspress.yale.edu/datadriven/files/2015/12/Assessing-the-Wider-World-of-Non-state-and-Sub-national-Climate-Action-2d5oghz.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Hale, “‘All Hands on Deck’: The Paris Agreement and Nonstate Climate Action,” 13.

⁵⁰ Georgina Gustin, “14 States: We’re on Track to Meet Paris Climate Goals, Despite Trump,” InsideClimate News, September 22, 2017, accessed January 14, 2018, <https://insideclimatenews.org/news/21092017/states-paris-trump-climate-change-alliance-leadership-jerry-brown-cuomo-inslee-nrdc-2050>.

⁵¹ *U.S. Climate Alliance Annual Report: Alliance States Take the Lead*, report (2017), 7, accessed January 14, 2018, <https://tinyurl.com/y87467rc>.

⁵² “Signify Aims to be Carbon Neutral by 2020,” We Are Still In, accessed July 27, 2018, <https://www.wearestillin.com/success/signify-aims-be-carbon-neutral-2020>.

example, “Signify is purchasing 250,000 MWh of electricity per year over the next 15 years from the Hidalgo Wind Farm in McCook, Texas, to power all of its North American operations with 100% renewable electricity. This effort reduces carbon footprint by 125,000 metric tons yearly - the equivalent of CO₂ produced by over 26,000 cars in one year.”⁵³ Since the establishment of this carbon neutrality goal is a direct result of the Agreement, Signify’s efforts explicitly demonstrate how the Paris Agreement has empowered substate and nonstate actors to take meaningful independent action to address climate change, thereby increasing their influence as a key player in global mitigation efforts.

Since the creation of this Agreement, the Monterey Bay Aquarium has also taken action to combat the global climate crisis. The Aquarium has been working to increase energy efficiency, and was certified as a carbon-neutral organization in 2017.⁵⁴ More recently, “[o]n March 1, 2018, the Aquarium’s electricity became ‘carbon free’ when it enrolled in Monterey Bay Community Power (MBCP), a new community choice aggregator serving Monterey, Santa Cruz and San Benito counties.”⁵⁵ We Are Still In, a multi-organization NGO created in June 2017 in response to the U.S.’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and of which both Signify and the Monterey Bay Aquarium are constituents, explicitly states that the Aquarium has been taking “additional actions to meet or exceed the ambitious emissions targets set by the Paris Agreement as well as the renewable energy and electric vehicle targets set by the State of California.”⁵⁶ Since the aforementioned initiatives were implemented after the development of the Agreement in 2015, these efforts further illustrate how the Paris Agreement has enabled significant substate and nonstate action, expanding their role in international climate action.

These meaningful contributions, promoted by the Paris Agreement and the politics of its enforcement, exemplify increasing substate and nonstate power because, “[a]s cities, corporations and NGOs have begun to develop their own rules and standards that others chose to follow, they are no longer merely complying with the directives of nation-states or intergovernmental treaties. They have become governors in their own right and established ‘private spheres of authority’ dislodged from the sovereign state.”⁵⁷ By encouraging substate and nonstate actors to adopt independent mitigation measures, and by explicitly providing them with a greater role in the international climate regime, the Paris Agreement and the politics of its enforcement inherently increase these actors’ ability to effect change on an international scale; this in turn increases their ability to influence other actors, thereby augmenting their power.

In promoting meaningful involvement in implementing NDCs and ensuring public access to information regarding these commitments, the Paris Agreement also provides substate and

⁵³ “Signify Aims to be Carbon Neutral by 2020.”

⁵⁴ “Monterey Bay Aquarium – Inspiring Conservation and Taking Climate Action,” We Are Still In, accessed July 27, 2018, <https://www.wearestillin.com/success/monterey-bay-aquarium-inspiring-conservation-and-taking-climate-action>.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Bäckstrand et al., “Non-state actors in global climate governance: from Copenhagen to Paris and beyond,” 568.

nonstate actors with a larger role in monitoring and enforcing state-developed mitigation efforts. The enforcement of the Paris Agreement illustrates climate law and policy scholar Harro van Asselt's argument that substate and nonstate actors are crucial to the monitoring process because such actors are "not subject to the same political constraints as the intergovernmental process, and with the expertise and knowledge of the conditions prevailing in individual states, can thus supplement the formal process by making visible and accessible how much progress is made."⁵⁸ The Paris Agreement also empowers these actors to investigate whether action being taken by a national government is fair and ambitious. Such assessments can benefit the state that is under review by providing information regarding how to fill existing gaps and make greater progress in achieving a state's NDC. Additionally, this information can be used by civil society, state and local government officials, and other national and subnational actors to effect change on a smaller scale. In enabling substate and nonstate actors to facilitate transparency by assessing and publicizing progress, fairness, and ambition, the Paris Agreement entrusts these actors with a crucial role in enforcing NDCs and promoting compliance through the mechanisms of social pressure previously detailed.⁵⁹ The enforcement of this Agreement actively encourages substate and nonstate climate action, including monitoring state efforts, in the hope that such action will pressure state actors to put forward ambitious commitments and "ratchet up" these commitments over time.⁶⁰ By increasing the role of substate and nonstate actors in monitoring and enforcing NDCs, the Paris Agreement therefore provides these actors with a greater ability to influence state behavior, consequently shaping international politics and augmenting the power of these actors.

Overall, the text of the Paris Agreement indicates that authority is no longer vested solely in state actors and national governments. As Karin Bäckstrand, Jonathan Kuyper, Björn-Ola Linnér, and Eva Lövbrand argue in their investigation of non-state actors in global climate governance, "[t]he Paris Agreement accepts that NDCs submitted by states are the backbone of mitigation, adaptation, and finance, but also acknowledges that non-state actors are indispensable in these pursuits as governors, implementers, experts and watchdogs."⁶¹ In fact, a program, known as the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA), that was created by the governments of France and Peru, the UNFCCC, and the UN Secretary-General in an attempt to promote substate and nonstate climate action, was declared "a fourth pillar of COP 21 alongside, and equal to, the national pledges, the financing package, and the negotiated agreement."⁶² This statement further supports that "the Paris Agreement institutionalizes an intricate interplay between state and non-state, multilateral and transnational climate action," and that "[...] public and private authority is

⁵⁸ Van Asselt, "The Role of Non-State Actors in Reviewing Ambition, Implementation, and Compliance Under the Paris Agreement," 12.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

⁶⁰ Hale, "'All Hands on Deck': The Paris Agreement and Nonstate Climate Action," 13.

⁶¹ Bäckstrand et al., "Non-state actors in global climate governance: from Copenhagen to Paris and beyond," 567-568.

⁶² Hale, "'All Hands on Deck': The Paris Agreement and Nonstate Climate Action," 14.

deeply intertwined in the new landscape of international climate cooperation” arising from the adoption of this Agreement.⁶³ Due to the explicitly inclusive and empowering language of the Agreement and the subsequent action that is already being taken by substate and nonstate actors globally, such actors have become central to the international climate regime since COP 21.⁶⁴ As scholar Thomas Hale argues, the explicit inclusion and significant role of substate and nonstate actors at COP 21 and in the text of the Paris Agreement highlight that “the post-Paris climate regime sees sub/nonstate actors not as an alternative to the UNFCCC process, or as merely a helpful addition, but as a core element of its logic of spurring rising action on climate over time.”⁶⁵ The politics of the Paris Agreement are therefore evidence of an emerging “hybrid multilateralism” characterized by increased cooperation, interplay, and shared power between state, substate, and nonstate actors.⁶⁶ In increasing the ability of substate and nonstate actors to exercise power and exert influence over other actors, including states, the design and enforcement of the Paris Agreement challenge the existing global order in which states are the primary wielders of power, and provide evidence of a new emerging global order in which states share power with and are balanced by substate and nonstate actors.

V. Conclusion

Ultimately, while some aspects of the Agreement’s design and ratification reaffirm the existing global order by facilitating cooperation through international institutions via mechanisms of state-exercised soft power, the overall politics of the Paris Agreement provide strong evidence of a new emerging global order. The enforcement of this Agreement reflects this transition by shifting power from state to substate and nonstate actors. While the politics of the Agreement are indicative of a new emerging global order, this new order may still incorporate some elements of the existing one. For example, the Paris Agreement may foster a more integrated world with greater collaboration and cooperation between states, as well as between state and nonstate actors. As illustrated in this paper, the Paris Agreement has already substantially increased the influence of substate and nonstate actors on the international climate regime. Beyond this regime, it is highly likely that these actors will soon play a more integral role in international negotiations and foreign affairs more generally. While it remains uncertain which aspects of the long-standing global order will persist in the newly emerging one, the politics of the Paris Agreement clearly demonstrate a meaningful redistribution of power among the political actors on the international stage, and may therefore significantly shape the future of international relations.

⁶³ Bäckstrand et al., “Non-state actors in global climate governance: from Copenhagen to Paris and beyond,” 569.

⁶⁴ Hale, “‘All Hands on Deck’: The Paris Agreement and Nonstate Climate Action,” 13.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 14.

⁶⁶ Bäckstrand et al., “Non-state actors in global climate governance: from Copenhagen to Paris and beyond,” 562.

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Evaluating Sebastian Rosato's Balance of Power Theory: A Case Study in The Collapse of Europe's Great Experiment

Tyler Soutendijk

Swarthmore College

Less than two years after World War II, Europe was in shambles. The most monumental war in world history had forced countries to consolidate all available resources, form precarious alliances with foreigners, and witness bloodshed in their own backyards. In spite of recent turmoil, a new military adversary emerged on the world stage that left European powers in dismay - the Soviet Union. In a memo written in 1946 from the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee to Major General Alfred Gruenther: "The USSR [is] the leading military power on the Eurasian landmass.... None of these countries [are] capable singly of waging a successful defensive war against the USSR."⁶⁷ The formidable USSR had both the strongest economy in Europe, and a military advantage over Britain and France of 6.4:1 and 8.8:1 respectively.⁶⁸ No individual nation could impede the Soviet's westward expansion, so neighboring European countries sought collaboration to counter the USSR threat. Winston Churchill, a luminary of the previous decade, called for a "United Europe", declaring that "if the people of Europe resolve to come together and work together for mutual advantage, they still have it in their power to sweep away the horrors and miseries which surround them."⁶⁹ As a result, the European Coal and Steel Community (later tailored into the European Union⁷⁰) was then formed to balance its collective capability against the budding titan.

The inception of the European Union follows the framework of Sebastian Rosato's Balance of Power Theory. While many balance of power theories exist, this essay will focus on the variant that Rosato has applied to the E.U. Sebastian Rosato, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Notre Dame, argues that "Europe's shift from sovereign state system to

⁶⁷ Kesaris, P., N. Quist, and United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Soviet Union*. pt. 2. (University Publications of America).

⁶⁸ Metrics represent material capability as defined by demographic, industrial, and military indicators - "Correlates of War," National Material Capabilities, The Correlates of War Project, 1816-2001, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org>; and Brian Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-1993*.

⁶⁹ Winston Churchill, *Never Give In! The Best of Winston Churchill's Speeches*. Winston S. Churchill (New York: Hyperion, 2003), 437-38.

⁷⁰ Referenced throughout the essay as E.U.

supranational community" was for the sole purpose of centralizing power against Soviet dominance in the region.⁷¹ And without a threat of power comparable to the magnitude of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, member countries within the European Union wouldn't have integrated into a supranational force. In the post-Cold War Era, Rosato is doubtful of the E.U.'s future: "Simply put, the European Community's best days are long gone and there is worse to come."⁷² Therefore in years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Rosato predicts that the E.U. is destined for deliberate fragmentation. In practice, temporary economic prosperity from E.U. commerce has delayed its collapse, but recent stagnation in growth indicates a vindication of Rosato's presumption. Balance of Power Theory cannot operate in isolation, but in conjunction with stalled macroeconomic growth, E.U. disintegration is inevitable. This discourse will affirm Rosato's central claim by synthesizing the principles of Balance of Power Theory as they are evidenced in historical origins of the E.U., projecting the observable implications we would expect from integrations of the E.U. following the Cold War Era, and comparing Rosato's expectations to recent cases in post-war E.U. history. These three explicit components will act as guiding logic to test the validity of Rosato's assessment and may be extrapolated to provide insights into the future of the E.U.

Balance of Power Theory rests upon the widely acknowledged framework of the anarchical system. Under the anarchical system, there is no overarching international authority capable of setting governing laws or rules that dictate state behavior.⁷³ States cannot know the intentions of other players within the system and therefore are subject to fear of malevolent action. Power, as defined by Rosato, refers to "material resources and organizational effectiveness, which together determine a state's ability to deter or defend against potential rivals".⁷⁴ Professor Jack Levy classifies a "great power" as having the "relative self-sufficiency with respect to military security".⁷⁵ Member states in the aftermath of WWII lacked power relative to the indomitable USSR and were thus relegated as "minor powers". With the European continent in ruins, structural instability left their armies and economies vulnerable to external threats. Individual nations once glorified for the success of previous empires were now worried that their neighbor would decide to repeat Germany's transgressions.

European leaders knew that westward expansion of the Soviet Union was imminent. Amidst the veil of war with the Third Reich, the USSR was able to usurp almost all of Eastern

⁷¹ Sebastian Rosato, *Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010, 9.

⁷² "Sebastian Rosato Says Worse Times Ahead for European Union," *College of Arts and Letters: University of Notre Dame*, June 15, 2010.

⁷³ "Anarchy (International Relations)," *InternationalRelations.org*, last modified November 6, 2016.

⁷⁴ Rosato, *Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community*, 21.

⁷⁵ Jack Levy, *Causes of War*, Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.

Europe (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and the eastern part of Germany). The Soviets then were able to continue their expansionist policies following World War II, labeled by Churchill in his 1946 highly publicized speech as the spread of the "iron curtain". Having conquered the East, Western Europe was the next most likely candidate. The looming threat prompted swift action on behalf of member states.

Every country in Western Europe shared a common adversary and subsequently a common threat to national security. Individually, none of these nation-states were capable of deterring the Soviet threat, but collectively as James Morrow proclaims, "nations form alliances to increase their security by amassing their capabilities against a common enemy."⁷⁶ Concentrating the power of sovereign states into a centralized authority would give Europeans the economic controls needed to accomplish the objective of providing collective security to its member states. Aligning with the Balance of Power Theory, European nation-states living in the anarchical system with a superior adversary of the Soviet Union, had no other option under the pressure of national interests and common intentions than to counterbalance in the manifestation of a political union. Tony Judt in *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* echoes a similar viewpoint: "For nations reared within living memory on grandeur and glory, 'Europe' would always be an uncomfortable transition: a compromise, not a choice."⁷⁷ Therefore because of systemic fear in the anarchical system, an imminent threat of Soviet westward expansion, and a shared adversary between Western European countries, the European Union was established.

Formation of the European Union involved deliberation over political, militaristic, and economic integration. All three of these components required alignment of supranational and national interests. State actors will support a supranational cause as long as it aligns with their national interest. A state's paramount national interest is security that comes in the form of power in both relative and absolute terms. During Cold War, national interests lined up with supranational interests because of the common threat to security. After the war, although collective security was no longer a necessity, temporary economic prosperity (derived from interstate commerce) kept the E.U. intact. However due to recent macroeconomic decline, national protectionist interests have gained popularity. In the absence of the Soviet Union, we would expect to witness gradual disintegration of the European Union, slowed by transient economic growth. The next section will elaborate on observable implications that can be expected from Balance of Power Theory following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The European Union, a cooperative instrument of international affairs, was held together by a shared goal. There was a geostrategic reason to pursue integration and preserve their

⁷⁶ James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 35, no. 4 (1991), 904.

⁷⁷ Tony Judt, *Postwar A History of Europe since 1945*, Penguin Books, 2006.

existing community. Rosato cites successful political integration in the Cold War Era because there was a unique circumstance of the "scale and proximity of the Soviet threat."⁷⁸ The E.U. in the 1950's needed a centralized union because their collective power was the only means of deterring the USSR. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the absence of that geostrategic necessity led to divergent political agendas. Agendas diverged because an investment of political capital involved surrendering sovereignty in specific areas. These areas of governance were vital to success of the EU, but came at the expense of national strategic interests. Hence, according to Balance of Power Theory, we should see a shift of political disintegration toward a decentralized political union that ensures retained sovereignty of member states.

The divergence of political agendas should come in the context of two components: aversion to unification and economic insecurity. First, reluctance to unify in the EU's early years is a sign of future disinclination. A notorious example of failure to garner collaboration was the inability to ratify the European Defense Community (EDC) project. This was partially due to the incumbent presence of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), an intergovernmental military alliance composed of Western European countries and the United States. NATO's main purpose was to oppose the Soviet Union militarily in anticipation of a Soviet offensive. The EDC project also proved too ambitious for countries like France who recently regained sovereignty and national identity from the death of Stalin.⁷⁹ Member states questioned the obligation of their own militaries in the tragedy of preceding decades. The collective gain from a supranational military alliance, in deference to both the presence of NATO and reluctance to dedicate soldiery, wasn't enough to form a centralized military. Consequently, in the absence of a Soviet opposition, we would expect continued aversion to unification.

Second, economic insecurity from a deficient Eurozone structure forecasts a potential collapse under fiscal pressures. This insecurity can be attributed to the evolution of the European Coal and Steel Community, a centralized regulatory body for industrial production in Western Europe.⁸⁰ Western Europe in World War II needed to devise an economic community in order to consolidate resources and neutralize Soviet power. Tied to the European ideals of a connected Europe, the Eurozone (an economic region of countries that have adopted the Euro) served to encourage free trade and flow of capital. The Eurozone at its zenith had 4.4% GDP growth per annum with an unemployment rate of 7% in 1988.⁸¹ In recent years however, the single market economy continues to face challenges. Despite a foundation of admirable ideals, "the eurozone

⁷⁸ Rosato, *Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community*, 245.

⁷⁹ William Wallace, "European Foreign Policy since the Cold War: How Ambitious, How Inhibited?" *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19, no. 1 (2017): 77-90.

⁸⁰ The European Coal and Steel Community was the first iteration of the European Union.

⁸¹ World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.

was not structured to accommodate Europe's economic diversity...the structure of the eurozone...[was] not designed to promote growth, employment and stability."⁸² The Euro locked each member state to a fixed exchange rate, delivering one-size-fits-all monetary policy without considering variance in fiscal discipline. As a result, because the structure of the Eurozone isn't apt for withstanding fiscal calamity, we would expect the European Union to collapse under fiscal pressures.

Therefore, it's concluded that divergent political agendas in the absence of a common threat, and in a context of aversion to unification and economic insecurity, will propel the disintegration of the E.U. in post-war era. Three cases of evidence for disintegration that will be discussed in the next section are the Greek government-debt crisis, Brexit, and populist uprisings in Eastern Europe.

The Greek government-debt crisis made international news when Greece declared in 2009 that its budget deficit would be 12.9% of GDP. While global economies were all recovering from the 2008 Financial Crisis, the news caused waves throughout the Eurozone.⁸³ Although there is a "one-size-fits-all" monetary policy in the E.U., fiscal policy is reserved to the respective countries' discretion. As Rosato claims, "fiscal policy [is a] ...source of friction, pitting members that want to run greater deficits against proponents of tighter fiscal discipline."⁸⁴ Stalled macroeconomic growth of the union is driven by the constraint of weak performance from poorer states on the economic prosperity of wealthier counterparts. Since national interests in post-war Europe are no longer aligned with supranational cooperation, states would start to question their obligation to this parasitic union.

One prominent player that decided to give into Euroscepticism was the United Kingdom in 2016. In a country-wide referendum that earned international news coverage, 52% of the U.K. population voted for withdrawal from the E.U. The United Kingdom was one of the three founding actors of the E.U. community, and their attrition signals to the rest of the E.U. that no member is obligated to remain. Experts have projected that the removal of Britain could lead other nations to follow suit. Sweden and Denmark, for example, have both rejected handing over integral powers to the coalition, and right-wing leaders push for a similar referendum.⁸⁵ Collective movement toward gradual exodus isn't a positive sign for the future of the European Union.

Many populist movements within Eastern European countries have borne out of

⁸² Joseph Stiglitz, "Joseph Stiglitz: The Problem with Europe Is the Euro." *The Guardian*, August 2016.

⁸³ The global financial crisis of 2008 was described by the IMF as the worst recession since the Great Depression.

⁸⁴ Rosato, *Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community*, 253.

⁸⁵ Rick Noack, "These countries could be next now that Britain has left the E.U.," *The Washington Post*, June 24, 2016.

nationalist interests from migrant influx. These protectionist ideologies have shaped recent elections in Eastern Europe, and significantly hindered cooperative investment in E.U. policy. A massive refugee influx into certain regions of the E.U. have caused indigenous workers to feel their values of nationalism threatened and their jobs at risk. For example, Countries along the Balkan migration route like Germany and Hungary have pushed back against E.U. immigration policy and forced delegated migrants to resettle in Turkey.⁸⁶ The European Union doesn't have the authority to enforce settlement of migrants in selected countries. As a result, the supranational E.U. had to reluctantly accept a E.U.-Turkey migration accord to allow these member countries to send back refugees. This drawback shows the weakening legitimacy of the E.U., fueled by ethnocentric attitudes and protectionist ideology.

The Greek government debt-crisis, Brexit, and populist movements in Eastern Europe are all evidence of disintegration of the European Union. Observable implications from Rosato's Balance of Power Theory of divergent political agendas in the context of aversion to unification and economic insecurity have all contributed toward these three cases in E.U. history. However, temporary economic prosperity following the downfall of the Soviet Union is the only factor that cannot be explained by Balance of Power Theory. That is why the gradual emergence of stalled macroeconomic growth from temporary economic prosperity is the cornerstone to slowly dismantling the E.U. Balance of Power Theory is imperfect and requires this second variable in order to operate properly. Alongside the necessity of stalled macroeconomic growth, there are two other stipulations to complete the argument.

Events in recent E.U. politics have affirmed Rosato's presumption, but an important consideration is that this theory is only derived from the European Union and cannot be extrapolated to ulterior cases. Hence, the scholar doesn't allow for any replication of this unique event. Professor Craig Parsons concludes, "the conditions that are supposed to have created it cannot have been present in other places or at other times."⁸⁷ The circumstance must consist of: a series of minor powers within a similar geographical location, all unable to deter the adversary on their own merit, in a "perfect storm" of desperation, against an external threat of incredible magnitude. These criterion leave limited room to contest the theory in civil debate.

Sebastian Rosato's Balance of Power Theory is also one of many International Relations models that scholars have applied to explain the origination of the E.U. An alternate model that Rosato mentions to explain interstate cooperation of the E.U. is the community model⁸⁸ known as ideational entrepreneurship. In contrast to Rosato's balance of power argument, the ideational

⁸⁶ Helena Smith, Philip Oltermann, "E.U. states begin returning refugees to Greece as German reunions slow," *The Guardian*, August 25, 2017.

⁸⁷ Craig Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, Cornell Studies in Political Economy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, 181.

⁸⁸ Created by Craig Parsons.

entrepreneurship approach holds that integration cannot solely be understood as an objective response to geopolitical or economic imperatives. European integration was driven because leaders with "pro-community" ideas came into power in France and Germany.⁸⁹ Nonetheless, Rosato sees a flaw in this causal logic by citing that there is scant evidence that prominent political figures subscribed to this reasoning.

The European Union is considered by many to be the "most extraordinary experiment in the history of political institutions."⁹⁰ In the period of post-WWII Europe, it was revered as the glue that would bring peace and prosperity to the continent. The E.U. was a beacon of hope for European nations that had lost their fortuitous power in previous decades. Sebastian Rosato's Balance of Power Theory successfully explains the formation of this union, and in conjunction with stalled macroeconomic growth following a period of economic prosperity, it's inevitable demise. Anticipating the aforementioned disintegration, scholars believe there are five fundamental challenges that face the E.U.: overexpansion, the collapse of the Soviet Empire (in-line with Rosato's theory), the euro crisis, a deteriorating regional environment, and the persistence of nationalism.⁹¹ All five of these tribulations will not be easy to overcome given the current political climate. According to Rosato, the European Union must either face an adversary comparable to the Soviet Union or be destined to a slow demise. In the dynamic international system, International Relations theorists can never be confident in definitive predictions. We can conclude by Rosato's logic in conjunction with stalled macroeconomic growth, and borne out in evidence by recent E.U. politics, that the European Union will inevitably dismantle. Although the European goal of an "even closer union" is unlikely, this is not to say that the European states will stop cooperating with each other.⁹² The E.U. has been successful in linking neighboring nations in the socio-cultural emergence of a common European identity. Even as the E.U.'s power wanes, it will always be remembered as a remarkable political achievement that has fostered the core of European exceptionalism.

In many ways the E.U. has set the standard for a model liberal institution. The idea of a failing E.U. has serious implications for our perspective of global order. If global order is composed of a multiplicity of independent state actors, and liberal institutions made up of these actors aren't surviving over time, then the future of the global order may be an attrition of supranational institutions. Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, World Bank, and World Health Organization all rest upon the same principle of cooperative action to solve dilemmas beyond the capacity of an individual nation. Does this imply that there's an

⁸⁹ Parsons, *Certain*, 25.

⁹⁰ Ian Morris, "Why Europe's Great Experiment Is Failing," *Forbes*, January 28, 2016.

⁹¹ Stephen Walt, "Does Europe Have a Future?," *Foreign Policy*, July 16, 2015.

⁹² Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art., 298 U.N.T.S. 11

overarching decline in interstate cooperation? The rise of protectionist movements challenging incumbent governments may indicate warning signs of this phenomena. Without interstate cooperation as the cornerstone of the international system, global order will cease to operate. A network of distrust between actors in the system will impede any collective action. Collective action amongst nations functions to regulate economies, prevent wars, and aid humanitarian crises. The self-serving mentality of fixating on national interests will dismantle the fabric of global community. Looking forward, we must continue to bridge cultural boundaries through the diaspora of globalization. The global order is comprised of generations capable of igniting political change. One liberal institution doesn't have to determine the future course of global order. The European Union may collapse, but there's still hope in the establishment.

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