Title

Conflicted Principals, Uncertain Agency: The International Monetary Fund And The Great Recession

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2-2012

Published In

Global Policy

Abstract

The G20's renewal of faith in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the 2008 financial crisis appears to have reversed the IMF's declining relevance evident in the years preceding the crisis. This article examines this putative revival of the IMF, arguing that the G20's actions contained a paradox of delegation. On the one hand, the nature of the G20's replenishment of the IMF's resources during the crisis (mostly through credit lines available to the IMF) as well as the independence the major G20 economies can afford to have from the IMF (given that they are not beholden to its resources) has meant that the G20 countries faced low sovereignty costs in reviving the IMF. On the other hand, truly re-establishing the IMF's relevance would impose higher sovereignty costs, specifically in the form of strengthened IMF surveillance over G20 economies. This paradox of delegation suggests that the G20's action toward the IMF does not inform properly whether the G20 states have contemplated the trade-off between suffering sovereignty costs and achieving gains from delegation. In this regard, the proper role of the IMF in the governance of the global economy remains uncertain.