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THE EPICUREAN PARASITE: HORACE, SATIRES 1. 1-3

William Turpin

I. Introduction

We have learned a great deal in recent years about reading Horace’s satires; there is now widespread agreement that the speaker of the satires is himself a character within them, a persona.¹ Such a persona may be most effective when it has obvious connections with its creator, but that fact does not preclude the exaggeration of reality, or even its complete inversion. For Horace the implications of this approach are exciting: instead of a poet discoursing with cheerful earnestness on morality, on poetry and on his daily life, we have a fictional character, whom we do not have to take seriously at all.

The three diatribe satires present us with a character so absurd that they have been taken, I think rightly, as parodies. Although the poems were once appreciated as effective moralising sermons,² even their admirers found it hard to justify the lack of intellectual coherence, to say nothing of the astonishing vulgarity of the second satire. As parodies, however, the poems are wonderfully successful. The speaker trots out a series of banalities: ‘people should be content with who they are’; ‘people should not go to extremes’; ‘people should be consistent’. But he invariably gets distracted, goes off on tangential rants, and makes a fool of himself. The moralist of the first three satires is, to put it bluntly, a jerk.³

This paper will argue that there are additional dimensions to this ridiculous moralist. I suggest that the speaker of the satires is supposed to be understood both as a committed Epicurean and as a contemporary version of that stock figure of Greek and Latin comedy, the parasite, or professional guest. These two characterisations might be thought quite distinct, but for those hostile to Epicureanism or willing to be amused by it there was clearly a connection, and it is central to the character that Horace has created.

Although much of the humour in the first three satires arises from the creation of an incompetent Epicurean, philosophy is only part of the joke. The creation of a parasite persona brings us face to face with the question of Horace’s relationship with Maecenas. It is usually assumed that the address to Maecenas is there simply as a sort of dedication, and that the many subsequent uses of the second person singular imply a sort of generic listener.⁴ But the humour of these satires is more effective if we regard the second person singulars as directed at Maecenas himself; it is Maecenas who listens to the ranting about avarice, who gets advice about what kinds of women to seduce, and who is told about forgiving friends their faults. Some of this is straightforward exaggeration: Maecenas was filthy rich, notorious for his love affairs, and of course the archetypal friend of poets.⁵ But the depiction of Maecenas as a Stoic opponent

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of Epicureanism, complete with the beard and staff of the professional philoso­pher (Sat. 1.3.133f.), is not exaggeration but inversion. In his recent book on Aristophanes, Michael Vickers observes that a figure can be lampooned not only by exaggerating known characteristics, but also by depicting features which are the opposite of the obvious ones. Vickers observes that the tech­nique is discussed in a rhetorical textbook attributed to Hermogenes, and it is employed by modern comedians of today: one example might be the cockney ladies in Monty Python sketches, with their strong opinions about Descartes and Heidegger. The real Maecenas was a notorious hedonist, and may in fact have been an Epicurean. To portray him as an austere Stoic is broad humour indeed, but we should remember that the satirist speaking in the first person is not the only fictional character in these poems.

II. The Satirist as Epicurean

The question of Horace's own commitment to Epicureanism is a persistent one, but does not need to be resolved here; we need only remember that Horace likes to say that he is, or once was, an Epicurean of some kind, at least in the­ory. The speaker of the first three satires, however, is a much more committed, even professional, Epicurean: he attacks individual Stoics and makes heavy-handed allusions to Lucretius, he quotes Philodemus by name, and he con­cludes the third satire with a sustained Epicurean attack on a Stoic doctrine. Scholars have sometimes regarded the speaker as a Cynic, or as eclectic. In part this is because Horace himself says that his model is Bion the Cynic, and if my argument here is right we should see this as a comment on genre rather than on substantive philosophy. But the main reason for denying that our speaker is an Epicurean is that his Epicureanism is simply not very impressive. This is a problem if we take him seriously as a moralist, but it makes perfect sense if we are supposed to be amused.

Philosophers have been ridiculed since Thales. Aristophanes and other writ­ers of Greek comedy clearly got a lot of mileage out of philosophers' various foibles, and the tradition was continued in Rome by Plautus, Terence, and in mime and Atellane farce. Perhaps the single best text on the subject is Lu­cian's comic sketch 'Philosophies for Sale', itself reminiscent of some of the jokes in Monty Python: philosophers of various persuasions are auctioned off, some at very low prices.

Epicureans, however, made particularly good targets. Though Epicurus himself protested that his doctrines were misunderstood, it is clear that many people understood him to be talking primarily about purely physical plea­sures. The most prominent charge was that Epicureans were far too interested in food and drink, and it is this, as we shall see, that provides the most obvious connection with the figure of the parasite. But the other important charge was that Epicureans were sexually promiscuous. This was partly because the worst
possible construction was placed on the fact that women mixed freely with men in Epicurean circles. But even more important was Epicurean doctrine, which was easy to misrepresent; Epicurus replied to a friend asking what to do about sexual urges that as long as he did no harm he should gratify himself as much as he wanted.

It is the popular association of Epicureanism with sex that lies behind the extraordinary transformation of the argument in Satire 1.2, from a sententious statement about moderation into the vulgar and obsessive pontification about adultery. As we shall see, the speaker of Satire 1.2 is obsessed with the question of sex in general, and is all too willing to provide pseudo-Epicurean advice on the subject.

III. The Satirist as Parasite

The figure of the parasite is most familiar to us, as perhaps he was to Horace, from the comedies of Plautus and Terence, where he is a relatively one-dimensional character, interested almost exclusively in food. But in Greek literature the parasite (or his predecessor, the kolax) had a wider range of interests and activities, often only hinted at in the Latin comedies. The parasites of Greek literature were of course devoted to food and drink, but they were also interested in sex. Moreover one special type of parasite was the philosopher, who could be seen so easily as a professional friend and dinner companion. Eupolis in the Kolakes made fun of sophists in general for their flattery of the wealthy Callias. It seems that Plato, too, was accused, especially in the spurious 13th letter, of having cultivated Dionysius of Syracuse for sordid motives. A similar charge was levelled against Aristotle for spending time with the tyrant Hermias, leaving the Academy for the sake of ‘his insatiable stomach’ (D.L. 5.11). More generally, Alciphron’s strange collection of fictional letters from parasites includes an amusing account of how a group of philosophers once came to dinner and beat the professional parasites at their own game (Aliciphr. 3.17.2).

As philosophers who put pleasure first, Epicureans were particularly liable to the charge of parasitism. The connection is made explicitly by Lucian, who in his comic dialogue on the parasite argues that Epicurus had exactly the same goals as parasites, but that parasites came first and practise the art in a purer form:

As to Epicurus, quite shamelessly filching the end of Parasitic, he makes it the end of his conception of happiness. That the thing is plagiarism, and that pleasure does not concern Epicurus at all, but does concern the parasite, you can assure yourself from this line of reasoning. I for my part consider that pleasure is first of all the freedom of the flesh from discomfort, and secondly, not having the spirit full of turbulence and commotion. Now then, each of these things is attained by the parasite,
but neither by Epicurus. For with his inquiries about the shape of the earth, the infinitude of the universe, the magnitude of the sun, distances in space, primal elements, and whether the gods exist or not, and with his continual strife and bickering with certain persons about the end itself, he is involved not only in the troubles of man but in those of the universe. The parasite, however, thinking that everything is all right and thoroughly convinced that it would not be better if it were other than as it is, eats and sleeps in great peace and comfort, with nothing of that sort annoying him, flat on his back, with his arms and legs flung out, like Odysseus sailing home from Scheria.  

Lucian *Parasite* 11 (tr. Harmon)

Here the obvious similarities between the Epicurean and the parasite are that both are devoted to food, and to taking things easy. Horace, as we shall see, chooses in addition to focus on their shared interest in sex.

Even more important for Horace is the fact that both parasites and Epicureans are particularly interested in their friends. Although Epicureans were not alone in treating friendship as a central concern of ethics, they were famous for their special commitment to it. Epicurus held that friendship was the most important of the pleasures that made life worth living: ‘Of the things which wisdom provides with a view to blessedness in the whole of life, much the greatest is the acquisition of friendship.’ But his view of friendship, at least in theory, was strikingly utilitarian: ‘All friendship is desirable for its own sake; but it has its beginning in usefulness.’ It is easy to see, therefore, how opponents could treat the Epicurean conception of friendship as coming suspiciously close to parasitism. Cicero accused Philodemus of being Piso’s flatterer (*Pis. 70*), and it is perhaps no coincidence that Philodemus devoted a significant portion of his *On Virtues and Vices* to a discussion of how flattery was the opposite of friendship. His interest in the subject seems to be a direct response to opponents such as Cicero, who argues (*Fin. 2.85*) that if utility was all that mattered, as the Epicureans claimed, a wealthy man would do better to trust his money than a friend; even a rich man should put a friend ahead of money, though he needs to make sure that his friend doesn’t love him just for his money. He needs, in other words, to beware of the parasite.

The question of friendship is of central importance in the satires, and indeed throughout Horace’s work. The friendships between poets and great men of affairs had always been open to the unflattering interpretation that the poets were essentially parasites. Augustus himself, as we shall see, jokingly puts this construction on Horace’s relationship with Maecenas. And Horace accepts this picture of his relationship with Maecenas for his own humorous purposes in *Epistles* 1.17 and 1.18, where he pretends to give advice on how to be a successful parasite. In the first three satires this humorous interpretation of their relationship is the basis for sustained and rather heavy-handed parody.
IV. The three satires

The parasitic and Epicurean dimensions to the speaker's persona emerge only gradually. As so often in Horace, we see the point properly only when we get to the end.

The first satire is ostensibly about why people are never happy with their own jobs and instead envy other people. The answer, unconvincing though it is, turns out to be greed; this conclusion provokes a long tirade on the futility of avarice and an argument that money ought to be spent. The speaker's philosophic loyalties are signalled by polemical attacks on Stoics, at least if we accept the identifications of the ancient commentators (lines 14 and 120), and by parodies of Epicurean doctrines: you should take pleasure in the fact that you don't have the problems other people have (111f.), and you should live so that you will have pleasures to think back on when you die (117-19).

But the issue of parasitism is not far from the surface. The first poem of a book is almost by definition a dedication, and it is addressed to Maecenas by name. In this context an attack on avarice is suspiciously self-serving: poets from Pindar on have talked about generosity as a way of dropping heavy hints about payment. Moreover the poem manages to combine the issues of parasitism and Epicureanism just before its end, by comparing the man who has lived a happy life with the guest who has dined well:

\[
\text{inde fit ut raro qui se uixisse beatum}
\]
\[
dicat et exacto contentus tempore uita
\]
\[
cedat uti conuiua satur, reperire queamus.
\]

(\textit{Satires} 1.1.117-19)

That's why it's so rare to find a man who says he has lived happily, and departs from life when his time is up, like a guest who is satiated.

As scholars have long recognised, the comparison is derived from Lucretius:

\[
\text{cur non ut plenus uitae conuiua recedis}
\]
\[
aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem?
\]

(\textit{DRN} 3.938f.)

Why don't you depart like a guest, full of life, and enjoy a quiet tranquillity with a peaceful mind, you fool?

and

\[
\text{et nec opinanti mors ad caput adstitit ante}
\]
\[
quam satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum.
\]

(\textit{DRN} 3.959f.)
And death is hovering unexpectedly over your head, before you can retire satiated and full.

Horace, however, goes out of his way to call attention to the implications of this comparison for an Epicurean who is also a parasite. In combining *conuiua* with *satur*, which Lucretius kept apart, he makes more obvious the connections with a parasite at the dinner table. His very use of the word *satur*, especially as he brings his first satire to a close, inevitably reminds us of his chosen genre. But the pun depends in part on the supposed derivation of *satura* from words for 'stew' or 'sausage'. The poem thus ends with the parasite's favorite subject, dinner.

The second satire begins by advocating the sensible, if hackneyed, view that one should avoid extremes. Our satirist, however, cannot stick to that point for long: he soon comes to the issue of extremes in love affairs (28ff.), after which he launches into a long lecture on why, in chasing women, one should choose the middle way (38ff.). This sounds sensible enough, at first, but the speaker turns out to be advocating the ludicrous position that one should sleep neither with well-born women nor with prostitutes, but with freedwomen (47-49). Aside from the absurd literalness of this view of the golden mean, we might wonder why the son of a freedman (and presumably a freedwoman) should think this an acceptable position. But as he continues to lecture on the subject of women and sex, we become aware that our speaker is suspiciously experienced in these matters: by the time we have reached the high comedy of the talking *muto* (68-71), we realise that our speaker is far too interested in the physical aspects of his subject.

Broad sexual humour of this sort might seem to have little to do with philosophy, but our speaker's rantings in fact have a distinctly Epicurean flavour, apparently owing a good deal to Philodemus. We are offered a distorted, and purely sexual, version of the Epicurean doctrine that one needs to make decisions about which pleasures to choose (111-13). But even more significant is the distortion of Epicurean views about avoiding the physical discomforts of sexual desire. As we have seen, Epicurus himself had a practical approach to the problem, and Lucretius offered both a dramatic description of the problem and a notoriously down-to-earth solution:

```
ulcus enim uiuescit et inueterascit alendo,
inque dies glicosit furor atque aerumna grauescit,
si non prima nouis conturbes uolnera plagis
uulguagae uagus Venere ante recentia cures
aut alio possis animi traducere motus.
```

*DRN 4.1068-72*

For the wound gets more intense and more intractable if you feed it, and day by day the madness grows more intense and the pain gets worse, un-
less you disturb the original wounds with new ones, and take care of them while they’re still fresh by wandering with a wandering Venus, or unless you can direct your thoughts elsewhere.

Lucretius’ views, and his articulation of them, seem extreme, but he is presumably quite serious; that did not stop less philosophical poets from writing parodies. Horace’s satirist apparently suffers from an even more extreme form of Lucretius’ physical afflictions, and he is even more direct about his solution:

\[
\text{tument tibi cum inguina, num si} \\
\text{ancilla aut uerna est praesto puer, impetus in quem} \\
\text{continuo fiat, malis tentigine rumpi?} \\
\text{non ego: namque parabilem amo uenerem facilemque.} \\
\text{(Satires 1.2.116-19)}
\]

When your organs start swelling, and if there’s slave girl or a maid or a boy available, I bet you don’t choose to bust your balls. Not me, anyhow: what I like is love that is easy and willing.

The Epicurean flavour of this unromantic approach is underscored when the speaker goes on to quote an epigram of Philodemus in support of his views:

\[
\text{illam: ‘post paulo: sed pluris: si exierit uir’} \\
\text{Gallis, hanc Philodemus ait sibi quae neque magno} \\
\text{stet pretio neque cunctetur cum est iussa uenire.} \\
\text{(Satires 1.2.120-22)}
\]

As Philodemus says, she of ‘Later’ and ‘More money’ and ‘If my husband goes out’ is for the birds, and what we want is one who doesn’t cost much and isn’t slow to come when she’s called.

We learn, indeed, that this practical approach to love and sex is based on bitter experience; the end of the poem, with its breathless description of the dangers of adultery, is surely meant to sound like advice from someone with a first-hand knowledge of the subject. And the speaker’s Epicurean loyalties are confirmed in the last line, with his passing dig at a Stoic.

The third satire makes more explicit the connection between the speaker’s parasitic and Epicurean dimensions. The argument is initially about the need to avoid extremes. But the speaker again goes off on a tangent, in this case on the need for friends to forgive small faults. What follows is a passionate argument for forgiveness in friendship, though the speaker claims to be confident that Maecenas himself would never resent the speaker’s own foibles (63-66). It emerges that the speaker sees himself as, in particular, a potential dinner guest. He hints at this first when he mentions the example of a slave who slips up

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while serving at table (80-83). But his interest in dinner becomes more obvious when he describes all the faults in a friend that he himself thinks should be forgiven:

comminxit lectum potus mensae catillum
Euandri manibus tritum deiecit, ob hanc rem,
aut positum ante mea quia pullum in parte catini
sustulit esuriens, minus hoc iucundus amicus
sit mihi?

(Satires 1.3.90-94)

If a man gets drunk and pees on the couch or knocks an antique cup off the table, or grabs a piece of chicken from my part of the dish because he’s hungry, will such a friend be less a pleasure to me?

For our speaker, clearly, there is by definition a link between friendship and dinnertime. The answer to his question about bad behaviour at dinner is actually in the affirmative: a friendship can no doubt survive bad manners, but such outrageously bad manners as this would surely test it to its limits. Our speaker is too dim to see this; he is not only a parasite, but a nightmare of a parasite.

V. Philosopher king and parasite rex

The third satire closes with a polemical attack on the Stoic doctrine that all faults are of equal weight (96ff.). It is here that our speaker’s Epicureanism is most obviously on display, though as a bad philosopher what he attacks is an outrageous caricature, not the real thing. But the question of parasitism does not, I think, disappear. The speaker comes to the conclusion that the successful Stoic philosopher, whom Stoics claimed to be the true king, will have hardly any friends at all, because he is obliged to treat all faults equally:

ne longum faciam: dum tu quadrante lauatum
rex ibis neque te quisquam stipator ineptum
praeter Crispinum sectabitur, et mihi dulces
ignoscent, si quid peccaro stultus, amici,
inque uicem illorum patiar delicta libenter,
priuatusque magis uiuam te rege beatus.

(Satires 1.3.137-42)

To make a long story short: while you go forth as a two-bit rex and have no followers except Crispinus, my dear friends will forgive me, if like an idiot I make mistakes, and I in turn will happily put up with their mis-
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takes, and will live more happily as a private citizen than you will, for all that you are rex.

The Stoic concept of rex no doubt lent itself to parody for its own sake, but I would like to suggest that the word is used in a second sense as well, providing a rather dreadful punch line. The words rex (and basileus) were technical terms in comedy and elsewhere for a parasite’s host and patron.44 Plautus plays on this meaning of rex when the parasite Ergasilus says ‘Now I’m not a parasite, I’m more regal than the king of kings’.45 And Augustus made the same joke when he suggested that Horace himself might want to leave Maecenas and work for him: ‘So let him come from that parasite’s table to this regal one’.46 Thus in wrapping up his three moralising lectures, it seems, our satirist returns in a single ambiguous word to the issue of the poet and patron, parasite and rex.

The pun on rex provides a surprising conclusion to the diatribe satires, but it is apparently foreshadowed in the two preceding poems. In the first satire this added dimension seems to add some elegance to what is otherwise simply a heavy-handed joke. The satirist warns his listener that he had better spend some of his money, lest he end up like a certain Ummidius:

denique sit finis quaerendi, cumque habeas plus
pauperiem metuas minus, et finire laborem
incipias, parto quod aubes, ne facias quod
Vmmidius quidam: non longa est fabula: diues
ut metiretur nummos; ita sordidus ut se
non umquam seruo melius uestiret; adusque
supremum tempus ne se penuria uictus
oppimeret metuebat. at hunc liberta securi
diuisit medium, fortissima Tyndaridarum.

(Satires 1.1.92-100)

And so put an end to acquisitions, and be less afraid of poverty now that you have more, and begin to put an end to your labours, spending the things you’re so avid for, and don’t be like a certain Ummidius. The tale is a brief one: he was so rich that he counted his money by the bushel, and so cheap that he dressed no better than a slave; and he was afraid to his dying day that he would be overwhelmed with poverty. But he got split in two by a freedwoman, toughest of the Tyndaridae.

The freedwoman is compared, of course, to Clytemnestra, murderer of Agamemnon. But when uttered by a parasite the allusion has a particular point: the freedwoman killed her patron, and Clytemnestra killed a king.

Kings are referred to more explicitly in the second satire, though in this case the joke is more difficult. One of the advantages of chasing a prostitute, we are
told, is that her physical charms are not hidden under a lot of respectable clothing:

adde huc quod mercem sine fucis gestat, aperte
quod uenale habet ostendit, nec si quid honesti est,
tactat habetque palam, quaerit quo turpia celet.
regibus hic mos est: ubi equos mercantur opertos
inspiciunt, ne si facies ut saepe decora
molli fulta pede est emptorem inducat hiantem,
quod pulchrae clunes, breue quod caput, ardua ceruix.
hoc illi recte: ne corporis optima Lyncei
contemplere oculis, Hypsaea caecior illa
quae mala sunt spectes. 'o crus, o bracchia!' uerum
depugis, nasuta, breui latere ac pede longo est.

(Satires 1.2.83-93)

Add in the fact that she flaunts what she’s got without any faking, she displays her wares openly, and, if she’s got some good features, she doesn’t boast about them and put them on display, while trying to hide the bad ones. Here’s what reges do: when they’re buying horses they examine them covered up, so that if (as often happens) a pretty face sits on a soft hoof it does not entice the buyer as he is smitten by the lovely haunches, the compact head and the arching neck. And they’re right to do this: so don’t you drink in bodily attractions with the sharp eyes of a Lynceus, while you look on the ugly parts with the blindness of Hypsaea. ‘What an amazing leg! What incredible arms!’ you say, but she’s got no hips, a long nose, a short waist, and big feet.

The comparison with horse-trading is surprising, not least because the speaker initially regarded the scanty clothes of prostitutes as a positive advantage; covering them back up, on the analogy of the horse-buying kings, would make them rather like respectable ladies, whose decent clothes present their own problems. More important, of course, is the obvious ludicrousness of the parallel: what features, on a woman, are analogous to a soft hoof, and what’s wrong with noticing her attractive features anyway? One wonders if the far-fetched parallel is not in fact prompted by the pun latent in regibus hic mos est; the parasite drags in the real kings, complete with their strange horse-buying techniques, as an elaborate compliment to his own rex: ‘here’s what you big-shots do’.

Puns have traditionally been held in low esteem. In recent years, however, a number of scholars have drawn attention to the use of puns in Latin authors, including Horace. The Romans could employ various kinds of word-play, and even had a technical term, paronomasia, for the most prominent of them, involving the contrast between similar, but not identical, words. Puns of the kind
I am suggesting here, based on double meanings of individual words, were also a standard feature of Roman comedy, and of Cicero's political wit. Often they were prompted by proper names: the cognomen Rex, in fact, was particularly tempting, prompting obvious puns from Julius Caesar, and from Horace himself.

Puns seem to have been specially important to Epicureans. The epigram of Philodemus, which as we have seen is 'quoted' in the second satire, depends on a pun on Galli. And puns mattered a great deal to Lucretius; whatever the precise shape of Epicurean doctrine on the origins and nature of language, it is clear that Lucretius regarded language as a useful analogue for creation in general, and went out of his way to demonstrate in his poetry just how flexible words could be. The connection between Epicurean theory and puns is easier to see in the case of paronomasia, and it is presumably no coincidence that this is by far the most common kind of pun in Lucretius. But Lucretius could also make puns based on the double meanings of words: the example that comes closest to Horace's pun on rex, perhaps, is a pun on the obvious historical and political overtones of the adjective superbus. Since the pun at the end of Horace's third satire comes as the climax to an attack on the Stoics, complete with an invocation of the Epicurean theory of language, it seems possible that the puns on rex are another manifestation of our speaker's Epicurean identity.

It is worth remembering that some Romans seem to have shared the traditional disdain for puns; Quintilian (Inst. 6.3.47) objected to Cicero's more atrocious puns, though not because they were bad in themselves, but because they were weak. It is Trimalchio—another atrocious Epicurean—who goes so far as to name his carver Carpus, so that 'whenever he says "Carpe" he names the man and gives the order in the same word'. Horace's satirist is the same kind of character: it is some comfort that when Horace makes dreadful puns he is not really himself.

The puns on rex are important not so much for their own sake, as additions to the corpus of bad Horatian jokes, but because they confirm that the reading proposed in this paper is on the right lines. The depiction of Horace and Mæcenas as a philosophising parasite and his rex may take some getting used to, but the puns force us to confront, and perhaps help us accept, the high comedy of Horace's parody.

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NOTES

2. Niall Rudd, *The Satires of Horace* (Cambridge 1966), 1: ‘Horace was no Gandhi. But he did see that a great many people who were, by their own standards, sufficiently well off never quite managed to enjoy what they had. And he made bold to point this out in poems which for good humour, lightness of touch, and absence of priggishness have never been surpassed.’ See also P.H. Schrijvers, ‘Horace Moraliste’, in Walther Ludwig (ed.), *Horace: L’Oeuvre et les imitations: un siècle d’interprétation (= Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique 39*, Geneva 1993), 41-90.

3. Freudenburg (n.1 above), 17: ‘I maintain that the diatribe satires are completely detached from the true spirit and intent of the ethical treatises they imitate. They are, in fact, a burlesque of Greek popular philosophy, which had grown fully ripe for parodic treatment by Horace’s day and certainly long before’. For the structural similarities of the first three satires see especially David Armstrong, ‘Horace’s Satires I, 1-3: A Structural Study’, *Arion* 3 (1964), 86-96.

4. E.g. P. Michael Brown (ed.), *Horace, Satires I* (Warminster UK 1993): ‘Horace now abruptly rounds on a specific imaginary opponent from the ranks of the discontented (te 38, tibi and te 40)’. See, however, R.O.A.M. Lyne, *Horace: Behind the Public Poetry* (New Haven 1995), 142: ‘It is difficult to sever most second persons from Maecenas (though, given the grammatical ambiguity, no-one can insist upon the connection).’

5. For the Roman use of the language of friendship for what we normally describe as patron/client relationships see Peter White, *Promised Verse: Poets in the Society of Augustan Rome* (Cambridge MA 1993), 13f. For the historical Maecenas in general a good starting place is Lyne (n. 4 above), 132-38.


11. Freudenburg (n.1 above, 11) calls him a Cynic; Rudd (n.2 above, 21f.) argues that he is eclectic.

12. Horace *Ep.* 2.2.60 refers to the *sermones* of Bion, for which see Jan Fredrik Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary* (Uppsala 1976).


17. See esp. fragment 2 of Damoxenus, in R. Kassel and C. Austin (eds.), *Poetae Comici Graeci* (Berlin 1986), 2-6 (= Athen. 3.101f-103b), where Epicurus’ cook argues that only Epicureans make really good cooks. So also Lucian, *Philosophies for Sale* 19.

18. See esp. Cleomedes, ed. H. Ziegler (Leipzig 1891), 2.92: ‘Shouldn’t you, most audacious and disgraceful man, quit philosophy and betake yourself to Leontion and Philaenis and the rest of
those hetairai, and to those sacred pontifications with Mindyrides and Sardanopolis and the rest of your devotees? Don’t you know that philosophy demands Hercules, and men like Hercules, and not, by God, catamites and pleasure?’ Notice also Alciphron 3.19.8, where the Epicurean dinner-guest ‘took the harp girl in his arms, gazing upon her from half-closed eyes with a languishing and melting look, and saying that this was “tranquillity of the flesh” and “consolidation of pleasure’” (tr. Benner and Fobes). For a discussion of Epicurus’ actual views see Martha C. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton 1994), 149-54.

19. D.L. 10.7 quotes Timocrates as saying that Epicurus consorted with a number of hetairai, whose names are suspiciously appropriate to their calling.


23. Note esp. Alciphron 3.31, where the parasite falls in love; notice also that the names of parasites in Latin comedy can be significant: Ergasilus *(Capiuti)* means ‘whore’ and Penulus *(Menaechmi)* means ‘little penis’ as well as ‘little brush’; see Philip B. Corbett, *The Scurra* (Edinburgh 1986), 16-18.

24. Kassel and Austin (n.17 above), v.380-99.


26. Cf. also *Parasite* 12, where it is argued that since Epicurus has to work for a living it’s better to be a parasite. See H.-G. Nesselrath, *Lukians Parasitendialog: Untersuchungen und Kommentar* (Berlin 1985), 311ff.


31. Tristano Gargiulo, ‘*PHerc.* 222: Filodemo sull’Adulazione’, *Cerc* 11 (1981), 103-27; Plutarch, in *How to tell a Flatterer from a Friend* 50c-d and 54b, distinguishes between the parasite and the flatterer, but his point is that the parasite is a more obvious example of the flatterer, and can therefore be detected easily.


33. White (n.5 above), 29 and 280 n.47.

34. Damon (n.21 above), 135-40; cf. also R.L. Hunter, ‘Horace on Friendship and Free Speech (*Epistles* 1.18 and *Satires* 1.4),’ *Hermes* 113 (1985), 480-90.


37. Freudenburg (n.1 above), 112: ‘Horace, the *conuia satiur* of line 119, is able to say “enough now”, or better yet, “it’s satire now”, and happily leave off writing.’


40. Hor. S. 1.2.111-13; cf. de Witt (n.9 above), 130.
42. I translate *Galli* very loosely; for the probable pun see below, n.57.
43. Note esp. S. 3.1.99ff, a parody of Lucretius’ account of the origins of society (*DRN* 5.780-1457).
44. White (n.5 above), 29 and 280 n.47; see also the *OLD* s.v. *rex* 8.
45. Pl. Capt. 825: *non ego nunc parasitus sum, sed regum rex regalior*.
49. Suet. *Jul.* 79.2. For Horace, see S. 1.7; another obvious pun, on the name Porcius, occurs at S. 2.8.23f. See, in general, Eugene S. McCartney, ‘Puns and Plays on Proper Names’, *CJ* 14 (1918-19), 343-58.
50. P. Michael Brown (n.4 above) is the only commentator I can find who explicitly identifies the joke as a pun, though the word *Gallus* was notoriously ambiguous, as noted by Quintilian, *Inst.* 7.9.2: *ut Gallus auem, an gentem, an nomen, an fortunam corporis, significet incertum est* (‘it is uncertain whether *gallus* represents a bird, a nationality, a surname, or the result of a bodily mishap’). It is an interesting coincidence that Cicero makes a pun on the supposed Gallic origin of Philodemus’ patron at *Pis.* 67: *ubi galli cantum audiuit, auum suum reuixisse putat* (‘when he’s heard a cock crow, he thinks his old granddad’s come to life again’). More significant, perhaps, is the fact that Philodemus himself constructs an entire epigram around a pun on his own name, *AP* 5.115 = David Sider, *The Epigrams of Philodemus: Introduction, Text and Commentary* (Oxford 1997), Epigram 10.
52. *DRN* 5.1136f.: *ergo regibus occisis subuersa iacebat/pristina maiestas soliorum et sceptra superba*.
53. Hor. S. 1.3.103f.: *donec uerba, quibus voces sensuque notarentjnominaque inuenere*
54. Petr. *Sat.* 36; note also the pun on *esse* at 34; the tables are turned on Trimalchio when one of his slaves reveals a similar aptitude for obvious puns, *Sat.* 41.
55. I am grateful to my colleagues Peter Aronoff and Martin Ostwald for helpful discussions and comments.